AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

JUNE 1988
VOLUME 82 NUMBER 2

MANAGING EDITOR

Samuel C. Patterson
Department of Political Science
Ohio State University, 112 Derby Hall
Columbus, Ohio 43210-1373

BOOK REVIEW EDITOR

Helen M. Ingram
Department of Political Science
University of Arizona, Social Sciences 315
Tucson, Arizona 85721

EDITORIAL BOARD

Suzanne Berger
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

David W. Brady
Stanford University

Charles V. Hamilton
Columbia University

John R. Hibbing
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Harold Jacobson
University of Michigan

Milton Lodge
State University of New York
at Stony Brook

John M. Orbell
University of Oregon

G. Bingham Powell, Jr.
University of Rochester

Harvey Starr
Indiana University

Dennis F. Thompson
Harvard University

John C. Wahlke
University of Arizona

Raymond Wolfinger
University of California,
Berkeley

Jean P. Kelly
Assistant Editor

Michael K. Lane
Copy Editor

Brian D. Ripley
Barbara Trish
APSR Interns

Michelle A. Colter
Editorial Assistant

The *American Political Science Review* (ISSN-0003-0554) appears in March, June, September, and December of each year. It is published by the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, and sent to all members. Dues: Regular Members with income: under $20,000, $40; $20,000-$29,000, $50; $30,000-39,999, $65; $40,000 and over, $75; Student Members (limited to 5 years); $15; Retired Members, $20; Life Members, $1,000; Institutional Members, $100. Dues allocated for a subscription to the *APSR*: $10 for individual members, $80 for institutional members. Changes of address sent to the Membership Secretary of the APSA. Postmaster: Please send notification regarding undelivered journals to address above. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional mailing offices. Copyright © 1988 by The American Political Science Association.

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party
Ivor Crewe & Donald D. Searing 361

Explaining Senate Election Outcomes
Alan I. Abramowitz 385

Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey Banks 405

Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War
Paul K. Huth 423

Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
James E. Alt, Randall L. Calvert & Brian D. Humes 445

Income Distribution in the United States
Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. & Christopher Dennis 467

Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence
Manus I. Midlarsky 491

Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare
James L. Gibson 511

Churches as Political Communities
Kenneth D. Wald, Dennis E. Owen & Samuel S. Hill, Jr. 531

Liberation Theology: The Recovery of Biblical Radicalism
H. Mark Roelofs 549

Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective
Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld 567

CONTROVERSIES

Rationalism or Revelation?
Robert Grafstein & Darrell Dobbs 579

Political Culture and Political Preferences
David D. Laitin & Aaron Wildavsky 589

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory 605
American Politics 626
Comparative Politics 651

International Relations 674
Political Economy 689

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
JUNE 1988
VOLUME 82 NUMBER 2

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

PRESIDENT:
Kenneth N. Waltz
University of California, Berkeley

PRESIDENT-ELECT:
Lucian W. Pye
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

VICE-PRESIDENTS:
Arend Lijphart
University of California, San Diego

Walter Murphy
Princeton University

Barbara Sinclair
University of California, Riverside

SECRETARY:
James E. Anderson
Texas A&M University

TREASURER:
Nancy H. Zingale
College of St. Thomas

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:
Catherine E. Rudder

PROGRAM CHAIRS:
John A. Ferejohn
Stephen D. Krasner
Stanford University

MANAGING EDITOR, *APSR:*
Samuel C. Patterson
Ohio State University

COUNCIL, 1986–88:
Robert H. Bates
Duke University

David W. Brady
Stanford University

Demetrios Caraley
Barnard College, Columbia University

Francis M. Carney
University of California, Riverside

Margaret Karns
University of Dayton

David Morgan
University of Liverpool

Mitchell Rice
Louisiana State University

Robert M. Rosenzweig
Association of American Universities

COUNCIL, 1987–89:
William I. Bacchus
Department of State

Donald Kinder
University of Michigan

Jane Mansbridge
Northwestern University

Dianne Pinderhughes
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Margaret E. Scranton
University of Arkansas, Little Rock

Mary Shanley
Vassar College

Richard A. Watson
University of Missouri, Columbia

Aristide Zolberg
New School for Social Research

Coming in August from CQ Press

Politics and Public Policy
Carl E. Van Horn, Rutgers University
Donald C. Baumer, Smith College
William T. Gormley, University of Wisconsin-Madison
A learnable and teachable intro text with a distinctive new framework that integrates discussion of the institutions and processes of public policy with policy outcomes and their consequences.

International Relations
Contemporary Theory and Practice
George A. Lopez, University of Notre Dame
Michael S. Stohl, Purdue University
editors
A collection of readings that combines scholarly articles with official policy statements to show the linkage between theory, policy making, and implementation.

Mass Media and American Politics NEW EDITION
Third Edition
Doris A. Graber, University of Illinois-Chicago

Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process NEW EDITION
Third Edition
Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Research Service

Invitation to Struggle NEW EDITION
Congress, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy
Third Edition
Cecil V. Crabb Jr., Louisiana State University
Pat M. Holt, former staff director,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

. . . and from Congressional Quarterly Inc.

The Nuclear Age NEW EDITION
Second Edition

State Government 1988-89
CQ's Guide to Current Issues and Activities
Thad L. Beyle, editor
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill

Guide to Current American Government - Fall 1988

CQ PRESS
CQ Press, College Services
1414 22nd Street NW, Washington, DC 20037 (202) 887-6363

ARTICLES

IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE BRITISH CONSERVATIVE PARTY

IVOR CREWE
University of Essex

DONALD D. SEARING
*University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill*

We address both a puzzle and a theory. The puzzle is posed by the emergence of "Thatcherism," an un-Conservative ideology that has appeared in an antiideological British Conservative party. We address this puzzle by determining what Thatcherism is and by showing that although it represents a minority viewpoint, it does indeed fit into previous Conservative thinking. The theory in question is the spatial theory of ideological change, which, we argue, is impugned by the circumstances of Thatcherism's construction. We address this theory by investigating potential constituencies at the time of Thatcherism's creation and by examining evidence about the intentions of those who created it. Finally, we seek both to draw out the implications of Mrs. Thatcher's campaign to convert the voters to her views and to explain why the same spatial theory that Thatcherism confounds seem confirmed by equally striking cases in postwar British politics.

Case studies in comparative politics, as Eckstein (1975) convincingly reminds us, can help us to recognize puzzles and also to probe theories. This case study does both. The puzzle to be recognized is that despite the British Conservative party's longstanding distaste for dogma, it has spawned a new ideology, "Thatcherism," an ideology that, moreover, has been characterized by party members as un-Conservative. The theories to be probed are spatial theories of ideological change, which, we shall argue, are impugned by Thatcherism's march away from the ideological center and improved by the conditions that this march suggests.

Thatcherism is indeed a puzzling phenomenon. The Church of England, "the Conservative party at prayer," has declared publicly that it does not particularly care for Thatcherism. (*Times*, 10 March 1985). The palace, the party's traditional rallying point, has let it be known that the Queen, too, does not care for it much. (*Times*, 20 July 1986). Former and present members of Mrs. Thatcher's Conservative governments have dubbed her "the Immaculate Misconception" and regard her programs as an attempt to overturn the mixed economy and welfare state. In their view, Thatcherism's claims about simply being an exercise in resurrecting the "fundamentals of Conservative belief" are belied by its radical dispositions. The party, they say, is in the grips of a heresy. The new leadership, they say, "worships at the shrine of Hayek," has become "the prisoner of Chicago," prefers conflict to practical reform, and is not really very Conservative at all.

On the theoretical side, Thatcherism is

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 82 NO. 2 JUNE 1988

indeed an extreme and extremely revealing case (Eckstein 1975, 99-104). For more than a decade, Mrs. Thatcher and her associates have self-consciously led the Conservative party away from the electoral center. In so doing, they have confounded formal theories of ideological change that are associated with spatial modeling and function as components of the theories of party competition of Anthony Downs (see Chappell and Keech 1986).[1] Empirical exceptions to these theoretical constructs are not so rare (Frohlich et al. 1978; Miller and Wattenberg 1985; Poole and Rosenthal 1984, 1985; Rabinowitz 1978). Yet Thatcherism is particularly worthy of close examination in this context, for it contradicts the spatial theories so clearly and so completely that it reveals the conditions that must be satisfied for these theories to work. Thatcherism is equally distinctive in its dramatic illumination of the principal alternative to Downsian models: the claim that leaders may not so much push their parties towards the public as attempt to coax the public towards themselves.

Thus we face three interrelated tasks. First, we must determine what Thatcherism is and how it departs from previous Conservative thinking. Next, we must demonstrate that the emergence of Thatcherism does indeed confound Downsian theories about the construction of ideologies. And finally we shall seek to improve these spatial models by drawing out from our case study key conditions for predicting accurately the course of ideological change.

Data and Measurement

While Margaret Thatcher was developing and propagating her ideology, she was involved in four electoral contests. The first was for the leadership of the Conservative party in February 1975. The other three were the general elections of 1979, 1983, and 1987. For the leadership election, the constituency was Conservative members of Parliament; for the general elections, it was the electorate and, in particular, Conservative supporters. To complete our three tasks, we shall require survey data covering the entire period.

The primary data set consists of survey responses collected on the eve of Thatcherism's appearance, during 1972 and 1973, from British members of Parliament, candidates, and the public. Members of Parliament (N ≐ 521) were interviewed by means of tape-recorded discussions. At the same time, a sample of candidates (N = 107) was interviewed, candidates who had never themselves been MPs. Public views are provided by a simultaneous opinion survey administered to a probability sample of British adults (N = 2,500). Ideally, we would like to examine multiple indicators carrying these preelection data forward from the early 1970s to the present. Unfortunately, very few policy questions of any kind have been replicated in surveys even over the period between the general elections of 1974 to 1987. We must rely therefore on a compilation of data from several sources: the British Election Study's cross-sectional samples for October 1974 (N = 2,365), 1979 (N = 1,893) and 1983 (N = 3,955); the BBC-Gallup election day surveys for 1979 (N = 2,435), 1983 (N = 4,141) and 1987 (N = 4,886); and Gallup opinion poll data gathered throughout the period.

Two distinct types of attitude measures are involved. Specific views about institutions and about economic and social policies are assessed by Likert-type scales. Political ideals such as "free enterprise" or "community" are measured by a technique derived from the work of Milton Rokeach (Rokeach 1968, 1973, 1979; Searing 1978; see Appendix A). Most definitions of political ideology encompass both political values and policy beliefs. But Downs (1957, 96) separates the two and restricts his definition of ideology to values, to abstract ends and means: "We define an ideology as a verbal image of the good society and of the chief means of constructing such a society." Mrs. Thatcher's approach is much the same. She believes that general political values should hold center stage and has herself devoted more energy to such themes than to detailed policy. (Kavanagh 1987, 249; Riddell 1983, 8-9). We shall follow both Downs and Thatcher by defining Thatcherism and other varieties of British Conservatism in these terms.[2] Still, specific policy beliefs must count as integral components of ideologies, for they put ideologies into practice. Thatcherite values will therefore be linked with Thatcherite policy beliefs, particularly when we consider relationships between Thatcherism and Thatcherite views in the electorate.

Thatcherism Defined

Rational politicians in two-party systems are not expected by Downsian theories to create highly integrated ideologies. It is in their interest to dilute their messages and generate ambiguity about exactly where they stand. (Downs 1957, 132-36). Yet Mrs. Thatcher despises waffling and spends a great deal of energy making her extreme positions perfectly clear. These positions revolve around three principal political ideals: discipline, free enterprise, and statecraft.

Discipline—obedience to the rules—is the value that Mrs. Thatcher has held the longest. She regrets that since the war it has declined in schools, families, and society at large. Discipline embraces self-discipline and the Victorian virtues of hard work, thrift, and deferred gratification that have, at times, been regarded as her quintessential themes (Riddell 1983, 7-8) and that have often been contrasted favorably by Thatcherites with a postwar culture of permissiveness, self-indulgence, and irresponsibility (Behrens 1980, 10). The Thatcherite interpretation of discipline emphasizes law and order, the restoration of capital punishment, and a more severe regime of sentences in the court system. Discipline also embraces the notion of a self-reliance and individual enterprise that disdains the creation of welfare benefits for anyone except the really poor. The ideal society, from this perspective, would be a world of autonomous individuals independent enough to take risks in order to achieve and responsible enough to accept the consequences, including the disappointments and the failures. Discipline is seen as the moral handmaiden of free enterprise.

Free enterprise, too, has been characterized as Mrs. Thatcher's central aim. (Utley 1978). Thatcherites believe that by rolling back the state from involvement in the economy, they can reverse Britain's economic decline. Wealth, Mrs. Thatcher argues, is created by private competition, risk taking, and efficient marketing. Thatcherite free enterprise seeks to create financial stability and to reduce inflation by curbing the growth of the money supply and by reducing government borrowing and public expenditure (Burch 1983; Norton and Aughey 1981, 79-89). Rolling back the mixed economy is a radical proposal—and Thatcherites happily accept the adjective. But radicalism goes deeply against the grain of party tradition; for if Conservatives dislike anything, they have since the French Revolution disliked radical change. Still, monetarism—superceded by privatization in the 1983 Thatcher government—helped the Thatcherites establish their legitimacy here by building a bridge between free enterprise on the one hand and the more deeply rooted Conservative ideals of "statecraft" on the other. Monetarism promoted free enterprise; but it also facilitated statecraft because, by freeing the state from the necessity of dangerous battles with the trade unions, it enabled the state to maintain its integrity and develop autonomy at the center.

Statecraft, the ideal of strong central government, was the last of the three major principles to be put in place. It seems, at first glance, out of place. Thatcherism aims to diminish the government's influence over the economy but, at the same time, to increase its influence over despised institutions like trade unions, over big-spending institutions like nationalized industries and local government, and over privileged and socially "elitist" institutions like universities, the civil service, and the BBC (Kavanagh 1987, 284-92; Riddell 1983, 17). Authoritative leadership is an essential Tory doctrine (Beer 1965, 92-94). This is what Thatcherism offered to other Conservatives. It would pull out of the economy but strengthen its control in other areas (Beattie 1979, 283-85; Bulpitt 1986, 21-26). This is less of a paradox than it might seem: in order to save the authority of the state, governments had to withdraw from the microeconomy; but in order to give free play to the market and private enterprise, they had to reassert their authority over trade unions, local government, and other hostile institutions. To underwrite free enterprise, the government could not afford to be laissez-faire.

In fact according to Bulpitt's (1986, 34-39) reading of the first Thatcher government, statecraft was its dominant concern, dominant even over free enterprise and certainly over discipline, although not unconnected with it. This was so because by 1979 the Thatcherites saw as their chief problem the restoration of the autonomy of the center, the restoration, after the "winter of discontent," of a strong central government that would be capable of governing. They were determined that if they were to do one thing during their government, it would be to return to Westminster and Whitehall a public good—strong government and leadership.

Discipline, free enterprise, and statecraft form the tripos of Thatcherism. Where does it fit in the pantheon of Conservative values? Where did it fit in the ideologies of the sorts of Conservative politicians who chose Mrs. Thatcher as their leader in February 1975?

Thatcherism and Conservatism

When Tories like Lord Alport (Letter to the editor, *Times*, 16 October 1985) complain that "Thatcherism is not Conservatism" they mean that Thatcherism conflicts with many of the ideals that have guided the party since the war. Yet Thatcherism may have been the view of a silent majority of Conservative politicians outside the magic circle. This "silent majority" thesis is compatible with spatial models of ideological construction, for it would be consistent with an argument that Thatcherism was developed to appeal to the parliamentary party, the constituency for Mrs. Thatcher's first electoral contest. We turn now to investigate the structure of Conservative values on the eve of Thatcherism, that is to say, in 1972-1973, and to attempt to locate key Thatcherite values in the blueprints.

The Conservative party has long been regarded as highly consensual with few rigid factions and much agreement about bedrock Conservative beliefs (Finer, Berrington, and Bartholomew 1961; Rose 1964). From this perspective, the value-ranking data show much less consensus than anticipated. If we examine the percentage of Conservative politicians who rank the values (see Appendix A) as either very important or very unimportant (in other words, either at the top [1-3] or at the bottom [7-9] of their lists), we find only 3 values out of the total of 36 where 8 out of 10 Conservative politicians concur: they endorse freedom and, not surprisingly, reject socialism and

Table 1. Political Values on Which the Monday Club and Pressure for Economic and Social Toryism (PEST) Differ by 20% or More

Political Values	Percentage Ranking the Value 1-3		
	Monday Club	PEST	Difference
Monday Club exceeds PEST			
Public order	71	39	32
Strong leadership	61	39	22
Strong government	58	33	25
Free enterprise	58	25	33
Patriotism	57	26	31
Self-discipline	44	23	21
Authority	35	3	32
Discipline	26	3	23
PEST exceeds Monday Club			
Community	35	81	46
Compassion	39	80	41
Social progress	38	61	23
Social equality	13	50	37
Number of Cases	24	36	

economic equality. This limited agreement on values might be enough to hold together a "broad-church" or "catch-all" party, but it hardly amounts to an impressive degree of consensus behind Thatcherism or any other variety of Conservatism. This first step in the investigation indicates that there may be many different ways of thinking conservatively. Are the ways so many as to make the party's ideological comforter a patchwork quilt of ideosyncratic views, or are there some general patterns?

The Antipodes

Antipodes are places situated at opposite ends of the earth. And on the eve of Thatcherism, the Conservative party's antipodes were represented on the Right by the Monday Club and on the Left by Pressure for Economic and Social Toryism (PEST). A comparison of similarities and differences between these two groups will establish the boundaries of the Conservative ideological map and may provide some glimpses of Thatcherism, for the Monday Club has come to be seen in retrospect as one of Thatcherism's roots within the party.

Table 1 presents those political values on which the Monday Club and PEST differed by 20% or more in ranking as "very important." For the Monday Club, these values were led by public order (defined as maintenance of law and order), followed a long way behind by concerns for traditional Conservative ideals such as strong government, patriotism, and authority. Free enterprise was plainly prominent. But it did not have the flagship role it was destined to play in Thatcherism circa 1979-1983. The Monday Club's focus is still on older Conservative interests in the nature of the state and the community rather then on the sort of economic arguments that would soon dominate political debate in the party. This is reflected in the values with the highest absolute scores, which can be found in the first column. The magnitude of such scores indicates the value's *centrality* to Monday Club members (see Appendix A). Still, if the Monday Club and kindred spirits were not fully developed Thatcherites before Thatcherism emerged, the principal pillars of Thatcherism were certainly present.

The data for PEST turn our searchlight onto the other ideological pole, in order to determine the range of the terrain within which Thatcherism was to establish itself. Here the touchstones are clearly community (defined as harmonious social relations) and compassion (defined as concern for human welfare). The PEST account is rounded off with social progress, Lord Butler's (1971) favorite term for governmental commitments towards steady social improvement, and with social equality, interpreted along the lines of Ian Macleod's aim, "to see that men had an equal chance to make themselves unequal" (Fisher 1973, 79).

An Exploratory Analysis

Our earlier findings on the lack of general consensus are consistent with accounts of Conservatism as simply a skeptical orientation toward change rather than a philosophy stocked with substantive political goals. By contrast, Table 1 on the Monday Club and PEST suggests that at least for some sub-groups within the party, Conservatism had considerable substance in the early 1970s and that political thinking in subsections of the party could be quite highly crystallized. We turn now to search for more such subgroups across the party's entire terrain, for varieties of Conservatism and Thatcherism.

For this purpose, an exploratory factor analysis was applied to all 36 values. If there were distinct ideological communities between borders set by the Monday Club and PEST, the factor analysis should give us at least a rough indication of their presence and a rough impression of their character.

First, there seems indeed to have been very little consensus across the party as a whole. However, neither was there a multiplicity of sharply defined ideological communities. Fourteen factors appeared with eigen values above 1.0; none of them explained much variance; and the drop-off from one factor to another was modest and steady.[3] The path to the next step in the inquiry was provided by an inspection of the correlation matrix, which showed clearly, as did the first factor—albeit less clearly—that by far the strongest correlations in the data (apart from items measuring much the same thing) were negative relationships between the values of community on the one side and the values of economy on the other. Community and economy have long been the respective concerns of Toryism and Whiggery, the two outlooks that Norton and Aughey (1981, chap. 2) have argued—correctly we believe—are the defining pivots for ideological thinking in the party.

The ideological legacies of Toryism and Whiggery have been brought together in the twentieth-century Conservative party's concerns with both traditional values and capitalist development. For Tories, who are devoted to the maintenance of a harmonious and ordered society, the fundamental values are authority and community. By contrast, capitalism, free enterprise, and property are the principal interests of Whigs, because Whigs focus on the economy, on creating wealth through efficient production. Still, in 1972 Thatcherism was not yet clearly seen or anticipated. Its commitments to statecraft and free enterprise seem to be on opposite sides of the fence. The picture needs to be developed further by dividing each side, Tories and Whigs, into their principal subtypes, as in Figure 1. We shall be guided by Norton and Aughey's (1981) analysis here, but mainly on the Whig side; for Toryism seems to us to have a somewhat simpler general structure than they allow.

Tories: Progressive and Traditional

After the devastating electoral defeat of 1945, progressive Tories concluded that it was necessary to present the electorate with a program that promised to reduce the extremes of poverty and wealth and to repudiate laissez-faire economics in favor of a system in which the state would act as a trustee for the community. (Behrens 1980, 13; Butler 1971, 132-46). Progressive Toryism has paternalistic roots that help explain why its support for the welfare state is so closely connected with its conception of community and why its strong emphasis on compassion complements dispositions associated with social hierarchy (Norton and Aughey 1981, 66-79). Progressive Tories also value highly the ideas of social progress, effective social reform, rationalism, and social planning because such Tories are determined that their party should be modern and well informed. They seek to adapt Conservative principles to the changing world (Norton and Aughey 1981, 75-79). And for the party to prosper in this modern world, they seek to ensure that it pursues a pragmatic, empirical approach.

Traditional Toryism, by contrast, tends to be more devoted to Old England and more patriotic (Blake 1970, 130). In fact, traditional Tories sometimes feel they live in an alien world and are often very pessimistic about modernity (Norton and Aughey 1981, 66-75). They are cynical about social planning and the progressive Tories' enthusiasm for continuous social improvement. Traditional Tories complain that the values of the counting houses are replacing those of the country house, that modern capitalism, through its alienation and compulsive consumption, is shredding the fabric of traditional British society (Norton and Aughey 1981, 66-75). Traditional Tories prefer free enterprise to socialism, of course, but economic ideologies are not their main preoccupation. Their primary concern is strong government, leadership, and authority—strength at the center of the political system and the party (Gilmour 1971, 88).

Figure 1. Patterns of Conservative Ideology on the Eve of Thatcherism

Tories	Whigs
Progressive	Liberal
Traditional	Corporate

Whigs: Liberal and Corporate

Liberal and corporate Whiggery share an overriding interest in preserving and promoting the institution of private property but differ over the most effective means of doing so. Liberal Whigs prefer the free enterprise approach of small business, which was put away in the Conservative cupboard after the war (Norton and Aughey 1981, 79-86). Liberal Whiggery refused to give up on it, however, believing that the heavy hand of government distorts the marketplace and undermines economic growth. Competition, not government planning, creates real wealth. This Victorian political economy is often complemented by a Victorian morality of hard work and discipline in society and self-discipline and self-reliance among society's members. Liberal Whigs believe that there has been a decline of morality in contemporary society, a decline they attribute not to modernity (which is the position of the traditional Tories who see liberal Whigs as part of the problem) and not to capitalism but rather to a wet collectivism found in both the Labour party and the progressive wing of their own tribe.

Corporate Whigs are, by contrast, collectivists who believe that government should work with industry to nurture large-scale capitalism. Corporate Whigs, unlike their liberal relatives, are quite sympathetic to many of the values of progressive Tories. They appreciate, for instance, the ideals of community and compassion. But they are much more concerned with producing the wealth and prosperity that they believe will make these humane values easier to achieve. Thus, corporate Whigs are not just compassionate politicians—they are compassionate capitalists. Rationalism, a rigorously reasoned approach to planning, is highly regarded by these technocratically oriented Conservatives. They believe that Britain's economic position can be boosted by a close partnership among government, business, and trade unions. A high-risk entrepreneurial approach is not for corporate Whigs; they prefer a stable economic environment conducive to large capital's long-range planning.

The description of these four types fills in the terrain between the Monday Club and PEST. We have not yet located Thatcherism with satisfactory precision—but we are close. The Thatcherite combination of free enterprise and discipline is squarely in the liberal Whig tradition. What is missing is the link with the third pillar, statecraft. Perhaps it is missing because we are dealing with Weberian "ideal types" that developed before Thatcherism emerged. A confirmatory factor analysis will help assess how our four-cell typology corresponds to the realities of Conservative thinking on the eve of Thatcherism and, through its grounding in this empirical world, may show clearer signs of the new ideology.

A Confirmatory Analysis

Tories are said to value community above the creation of wealth, and Whigs to value the creation of wealth above community. The ranking instrument is ideally suited to model these comparative evaluations. Thus for purposes of our analysis, we shall count as Tories all those who ranked community above property, and as Whigs all those who ranked property above community.[4] Next, a confirmatory factor analysis was performed for each of the two groups separately to assess the verisimilitude of our subtypes and to seek a sharper picture than emerged for the party as a whole in the exploratory factor analysis (see Appendix A).

The confirmatory analysis does not attempt to uncover dimensions beneath a wide field of values but firstly to assess our claims about the main factors that structure Tory thinking and Whig thinking; and secondly to assess our interpretation of the values that are relatively most important within each of the four subtypes. This strategy concentrates attention on the first principal component, that is, the component that best depicts linear relationships among the items.

Table 2 reports the first factor emerging from the analysis of the Whigs. This factor has an eigen value of 2.77 and explains 15.4% of the variance. It is substantially stronger than the second component, which tends to look a good deal like the third, and so on. In short, the eigen values and percentages of variance explained drop off more precipitously from the first to the second factor than they do thereafter. Hence, the first principal component can be interpreted as the best single summary of the linear relationships in the data. And it clearly represents the division between liberal and corporate Whiggery.

Liberal positions cluster at the negative pole where free enterprise and authority are found alongside statecraft. The corporate Whig ideals at the positive pole are led by social planning and, as projected by the ideal type, they mix values such as capitalism and compassion, rationalism

Table 2. Factor Analysis of Conservative Values (Whigs)

Political Values	Correlation with First Principal Component	
Authority	–.72	↑
Statecraft	–.53	
Free enterprise	–.45	
Deference	–.32	liberal Whiggery
Patriotism	–.31	
Efficiency	–.19	
Autonomy	–.17	
Public order	–.16	
Social hierarchy	.15	
Empirical	.19	
Social progress	.25	
Intelligence	.26	
Caution	.37	corporate Whiggery
Rationalism	.42	
Compassion	.46	
Capitalism	.46	
Community	.51	
Social planning	.55	↓

Note: Eigen value = 2.77. *N* = 97. The 36 value items have been reduced to 18 in this table by means of the additive indexes specified in Appendix A.

and community. Although there is ambiguity about the interpretation of some of these values, and uncertainty about the proper locations of others, there are no values with respectable loadings in the liberal list that were projected for the corporate side, nor vice versa.[5]

Table 3 summarizes the first principal component for the Tories, which carries an eigen value of 3.05 with 17.3% of the variance explained. Again, the component displays acceptable strength, and again it supports handsomely the theoretical expectations.[6] The recovery of the projected Tory patterns is very striking indeed. At the positive end are the key values associated with progressive Toryism: compassion, social hierarchy, empirical approach, and community. And clustered at the negative end are the values of traditional Toryism, notably patriotism, statecraft, and authority. Again, none of the values with respectable loadings in the hands of traditional Toryism obviously belong to progressive Toryism, nor vice versa.[7]

One of the most striking features of Tables 2 and 3 is that the value of authority anchors the perspectives of both liberal Whiggery and traditional Toryism.[8] The position of statecraft in second place in both is more intriguing still. Its incorporation into this empirical case of liberal Whiggery, in contrast to its absence from the ideal type, presents the third pillar of Thatcherism we have been seeking. Now we have together: discipline (i.e., "authority" in our data) + free enterprise + statecraft. The obvious difference between liberal Whiggery and traditional Toryism is that the liberal Whigs place, as would be expected, much greater weight on free enterprise and much less on patriotism.[9]

In the same vein, Tables 2 and 3 also clearly suggest a complementary sym-

Table 3. Factor Analysis of Conservative Values (Tories)

Political Values	Correlation with First Principal Component	
Compassion	.62	↑
Social hierarchy	.48	
Empirical	.46	
Social progress	.46	
Caution	.44	progressive Toryism
Community	.43	
Intelligence	.31	
Rationalism	.31	
Social planning	.30	
Efficiency	.04	
Capitalism	.00	
Autonomy	−.16	
Free enterprise	−.25	
Deference	−.26	traditional Toryism
Public order	−.44	
Patriotism	−.50	
Statecraft	−.53	
Authority	−.69	↓

Note: Eigen value = 3.05. N = 149. The 36 value items have been reduced to 18 in this table by means of the additive indexes specified in Appendix A.

pathy between corporate Whigs and progressive Tories, who share a strong interest in community and compassion.[10] This melding of corporate Whiggery with progressive Toryism is not so surprising as its opposite combination, for it is recognizable as the alliance that dominated the party's ruling circles from the early 1950s to 1974.

If throughout the postwar period the dominant alliance in the party has been between corporate Whiggery and progressive Toryism, then Mrs. Thatcher may be said to have built upon an alternative potential alliance linking liberal Whiggery with traditional Toryism. This new alliance seems unexpected, indeed remarkable, because of the natural tension that exists between the commercial party that constructs smart shopping precincts and the country party that preserves nostalgic England. Thatcherism has made the most of the connection between free enterprise and statecraft. It was designed to develop this new combination of well-established Conservative sympathies. But was it designed to translate such sympathies into votes?

Thatcherism and the Theory of Ideological Change

We now turn to our second task, that is, to demonstrate that Thatcherism should be particularly likely to fit spatial theories of ideological change but instead confounds them. According to Downs (1957, 96-101), politicians construct ideologies opportunistically as weapons in the struggle for office. They construct ideologies to attract votes, and they adjust them to attract the greatest number of votes. Unlike many partisan ideologies which evolve piecemeal, Thatcherism was deliberately constructed as Mrs. Thatcher prepared to face two electorates: Conservative members of Parliament, who in February 1975 would elect her as party leader, and the public, which would return her party to power in 1979, 1983, and 1987. Two empirical probes into this theory are feasible, both indirect but together perhaps convincing. The first examines Mrs. Thatcher's electorates to determine whether potential constituencies actually existed to stimulate the new ideological appeals. The second looks to the political leaders, to Mrs. Thatcher and her associates. It examines their statements and interpretations of their statements by informed observers to assess the degree to which they designed their ideological creations to attract votes.

MPs: Voters and Leaders

Although we cannot determine the exact number of potential Thatcherite MPs on the eve of Thatcherism, a range of estimates can be established by reconstructing the distribution of sympathies for the values at Thatcherism's core: strong government, free enterprise, and discipline. What *proportions* of the Conservative parliamentary party might reasonably be expected to find her appeals appealing?

A map of ideological sympathies can be reconstructed by investigating how many Conservative politicians ranked the core Thatcherite values at the top of the lists. Three soundings have been taken. The first is the proportion of respondents awarding high marks to strong government, the most widely accepted of the Thatcherite pillars. The second sounding takes the proportion of respondents who were sympathetic to both the traditional Tory value of strong government and the liberal Whig value of free enterprise. This is the crucial step, the realization that free enterprise need not be laissez-faire, the belief that the government should withdraw from the economy and at the same time flex its muscles elsewhere. The third sounding completes the Thatcherite tripos by asking how many politicians valued highly not only strong government and free enterprise but discipline as well.

Results for the Conservative MPs can be found in Table 4. These data suggest that on the eve of Thatcherism the potentially sympathetic spirits constituted a small minority—only about one quarter on the generous criterion of having taken the step of endorsing both strong government and free enterprise. On the more demanding criterion of endorsing all three Thatcherite values, the estimate would be less than 10%. Thus, the estimated range of potential support lay between 10% and 25%.[11] Moreover, according to nearly everyone who has studied the situation, Mrs. Thatcher "was elected leader of the Conservative party in February, 1975 not because she held [Thatcherite] views, but largely despite the fact that she held them" (King 1983, 97). In the early 1970s a march to the Right was favored neither by Conservative party workers, Conservative MPs, nor Conservative peers (Wapshott and Brock 1983, 106).

Let us turn to the leaders. Mrs. Thatcher was herself well aware that a sizable constituency for her views did not exist in the parliamentary party. It was certainly not to attract the greatest number of leadership votes that Thatcherism was created. This can be shown in two different ways. First, Mrs. Thatcher held, albeit in an undeveloped form, major elements of her ideology long before she contemplated standing for the leadership. She drew a preliminary sketch of Thatcherism in a speech at the Conservative party conference in 1968, two years before she was appointed a minister in the Heath government and seven years before the leadership election. This speech expressed skepticism about the welfare state and its tendency to undermine such

Table 4. Conservative Politicians on the Eve of Thatcherism: Strong Government, Free Enterprise, and Discipline, by Subgroups

Conservative Subgroups	Number of Cases	Percentage Ranking the Value 1-3 Strong Government	 Strong Government and Free Enterprise	 Strong Government, Free Enterprise, and Discipline
Senior ministers	15	47	20	0
Junior ministers (including PPSs)	54	48	17	1
Backbenchers	139	48	24	7
Candidates	46	59	26	13

middleclass values as hard work, self-discipline, and personal responsibility. In the same vein, the way to control prices, she said, was through competition, not governmental regulation. She even foreshadowed monetarism. In fact, the only missing component was "statecraft," which would be added later.

Secondly, during the campaign for the leadership election, an important decision was made to tone down her ideological position and talk about leadership instead. The emerging ideology of Thatcherism was regarded as a liability because it was believed that very few members of the Conservative Parliamentary party were ready to turn against government intervention in the economy or towards Victorian morality (Wapshott and Brock 1983, 106-14). Instead, Mrs. Thatcher's campaign rested on a succession of accidents and a creative stratagem. The accidents were the withdrawals of Sir Keith Joseph and Edward Du Cann from the race (both for personal reasons) and the bungled campaign of William Whitelaw. The creative stratagem was devised by her campaign manager, who went round the House of Commons the night before the poll, winning votes from MPs who did not wish to see her leader but who wanted Heath out and would have to ensure that she had enough votes to trip Heath on the first ballot and thereby trigger a second where their own preferred candidates would enter (Cosgrave 1978, 70-71).

Publics: Voters and Leaders

If Thatcherism was not designed to please Mrs. Thatcher's parliamentary colleagues, neither was it designed to move the Conservative party closer to the electorate—even though the party had just lost two general elections in 1974 and had won only one out of the previous five (1970).

To estimate the size of the potential public audience for Thatcherism, it is necessary first to establish how far the electorate thinks politically in terms of Conservative values. What aspects of Tory, Whig, and Thatcherite values in fact structured the thinking of the electorate?

We applied the confirmatory factor analyses undertaken on the party's politicians to Conservative identifiers. The results suggest patterns that are less crystallized than those for the politicians but are nonetheless recognizable reflections of the politicians' views.[12] Although corporate Whiggery fails to appear in the public's vision, both progressive and traditional Toryism emerge, and Thatcherism is foreshadowed in a liberal sector, more plainly perhaps than for the

Table 5. Thatcherites in the Electorate on the Eve of Thatcherism: Strong Government, Free Enterprise, and Authority, by Subgroups

		Percentage Ranking the Value 1-3		
Electorates	Number of Cases	Strong Government	Strong Government and Free Enterprise	Strong Government, Free Enterprise, and Authority
Conservative-attentive public[a]	382	64	30	5
Conservative identifiers	613	59	26	5
Conservative voters[b]	572	60	26	4
All public	1,988	53	17	3

[a]Conservative identifiers who express moderate or high political interest.

[b]Conservative voting intention.

politicians. Voters were aware. But were they sympathetic?

Table 5 reports value-ranking data for the electorate in 1972-73 that are comparable to those reported in Table 4 for MPs.[13] Overall, the results are again similar to those for the politicians: the potential constituency for Thatcherism is restricted to a small audience in both the Conservative and general electorates. Thus while half of the general public endorsed strong government, only 17% endorsed the critical combination of strong government and free enterprise; and only 3% accorded all three Thatcherite political values top marks. The situation is barely more promising among Conservative voters, identifiers, and attentive publics. Thus there were not nearly enough Thatcherites in the electorate to support a convincing Downsian case. Was the same true for specific policies?

To extend our ideological analysis into policy views, we shall work through the Thatcherite political values and seek policy beliefs that are part of the ideological package. For this purpose, a simple additive index was constructed from politicians' responses to Thatcherism's core values of strong government, free enterprise, and discipline. Correlations between this index and each of the six policy items in Table 6 were significant at the .05 level or better.[14]

Unlike the politicians, however, the public audience does not connect these Thatcherite policy beliefs with Thatcherite political values. Only two of the correlations between the public's Thatcherism index and the six policy beliefs are significant at the .05 level.[15] Yet these are Thatcherite policy beliefs. It is therefore still worthwhile to investigate whether enough voters were sympathetic to such policies to have stimulated Thatcherites to promote them.

Policies, Downs reiterates (1957, 97–98), are created to win votes. Table 6 reports the proportions of the general public and Conservative identifiers who agreed in 1972–73 with the policy positions that Thatcherism would begin to promote a year later. These data bring in the first findings consistent with spatial models of ideological construction. In the area of discipline, Thatcherism did indeed move the Conservative party closer than it had been before to strong, popular, policy opinions. Very large majorities of both Conservative identifiers and the

Table 6. Proportions of the General Public and Conservative Identifiers Holding Thatcherite Policy Views in 1972–73 (%)

	General Public		Conservative Identifiers	
Items	Agreeing	Agreeing without Reservation	Agreeing	Agreeing without Reservation
Free Enterprise				
1. Denationalize nationalized industries	34	19	44	25
2. Restrict social service benefits to the really poor	49	29	58	34
Statecraft				
3. Trade unions don't have automatic right to consultation	33	17	44	23
4. Business doesn't have automatic right to consultation	34	15	37	16
Discipline				
5. Death penalty should be reintroduced	78	62	86	72
6. Harsher sentences for violent crimes	85	68	88	73
Number of Cases	1,988		613	

Note: Questionnaire items for entries in this table are presented in Appendix B.

general public favored more "law and order" (items 5 and 6) and supported programs that Mrs. Thatcher would develop.

Still, discipline seems to be the only one of the three Thatcherite pillars whose policy programs were tuned into public opinion. In the area of free enterprise, there is no sign of particularly strong support for denationalization and rolling back the welfare state (items 1 and 2).[16] Much the same picture emerges for the corporatist issues under the statecraft rubric (items 3 and 4). The public was at the time suspicious of trade union power,[17] but there is no evidence of popular support for dismantling functional representation or for intimidating institutions like local government, nationalized industries, universities, the civil service, and the BBC. In sum, the data reported in Table 6 suggest that electoral gains could be extracted from only one of Thatcherism's three core values, discipline. Significantly, these are also the policy views that Mrs. Thatcher developed long before she became leader of the party and was in a position to think about ideological appeals that might help win the general elections of 1979, 1983, and 1987.

Nor is it the case that Mrs. Thatcher and her associates simply misread public opinion and believed it more receptive than it actually was to free enterprise and statecraft themes. On the contrary, the early Thatcherites were well aware that their views were at odds with most of the electorate. When, after 1974, she and Sir Keith Joseph began to articulate the ideology, they very self-consciously moved away from the electoral center. In his series of public lectures criticizing the postwar consensus, Joseph's central theme was the importance of "getting it right" rather than getting elected. After Mrs. Thatcher became leader in 1975 she set up institutes and seminars and brought in philosophers and policy advisors to clarify and apply the ideology. There is no evidence whatsoever that this exercise was designed to attract votes.

Indeed, Mrs. Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph believed that they had a mission to save Britain from itself and therefore embarked on a pedagogic crusade to win public support for the difficult road ahead. One of the few positive roles that Thatcherites give to the state is that of changing public expectations and values. Mrs. Thatcher's own behavior is important in this respect. Not since Gladstone has a prime minister held so many personal political convictions and sought to use the office to persuade the electorate of their truth. Surely she could not have believed that the voters were already convinced.

Persuading the Public

Mrs. Thatcher's crusade has special relevance to spatial theories of ideological construction because it represents the antithesis of the usual models: instead of politicians moving their own locations towards those of the voters, they try to move the voters towards themselves. This alternative model, which is politician-driven rather than voter-driven, is promoted in some criticisms of the Downsian spatial wisdom. (Clubb, Flannigan, and Zingale 1980; Rabinowitz 1986). Thus we have in Thatcherism a remarkably strong effort by political leaders to reshape the political thinking of the electorate. Did it work? Mrs. Thatcher regards herself as tutor to the British nation. Has the British nation been a good pupil?

The purely electoral evidence is deceptive. Despite Mrs. Thatcher's three successive election victories, the last two with handsome parliamentary majorities, there has been no electoral surge towards the Conservatives under her leadership. In 1979, the Conservative share of the vote, although up from 36% to 44%, was well below that obtained at previous Conservative election victories since the war. In 1983 it actually fell slightly to 42% where it stayed in 1987. Moreover, Conservative partisanship has weakened since the 1960s. In the three elections of 1964, 1966, and 1970 about half of all Conservative identifiers described themselves as "very strong" identifiers; in 1983 it was down to a quarter, which was less than in the party's disastrous 1974 elections. Thus she has neither swelled the Conservative congregation nor strengthened their faith.

But has she changed their ideological beliefs? "The Great Moving Right Show" was the title of an article in *Marxism Today* where Stuart Hall argued that Mrs. Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph were succeeding in their crusade to convert the British electorate to a new Conservatism that fused free market doctrines and anticollectivism with "authoritarian populism" (January, 1979; see also Hall and Martin 1983, 19–39). According to this politician-driven model, Mrs. Thatcher and her supporters have indeed reshaped public opinion.

Table 7 reports on trends in public attitudes towards 10 Thatcherite issues (using 13 indicators) between 1974, shortly before Thatcherism emerged, and 1987. Few indicators cover the entire period. The entries here are based on proportions supporting Thatcherite positions and are drawn from three sources: the British Election Studies, the monthly Gallup Political Index and the BBC-Gallup Election Day Surveys.

This table spans the period during which Mrs. Thatcher has worked to reeducate the nation. It suggests that she has succeeded in shifting public opinion to the right on only one out of the 10 issues—denationalization. Her governments' massive sale of British industry, on a scale comparable to the nationalization program of the postwar Labour government, has converted public opinion. From a low point of 24% in 1974, support for dena-

Table 7. Support for Thatcherite Policy Positions, 1970–87 (%)

Issue	1970	1974	1979	1983	1987	Trend[a]
Privatization of nationalized industry	33	24	40	42	—	1974–83, +18
Death penalty	81	—	75	63	—	1970–83, –18
Abortion (gone too far)	—	43	44	32	—	1974–83, –11
Abortion (restrict)	41	42 (1973)	36 (1980)	—	—	1973–80, – 6
Pornography	—	64	66	64	—	1974–83, —
Repatriation of immigrants	—	43	34	—	—	1974–79, – 9
Equal opportunities for blacks	—	27	30	20	—	1974–83, – 7
Trade union power	73	81	82	74	—	1974–83, – 7
Illegitimacy of trade unions	29	33	41	28	25 (1986)	1974–86, – 8
Prices vs. jobs		60 (1976)	56 (1980)	27	14 (1986)	1976–86, –46
Profits vs. taxes to create jobs	—	—	74	61	53	1979–87, –21
Welfare benefits	—	34	50	20	—	1974–83, –14
Tax cuts vs. social services	—	—	37	24	13	1979–87, – 8

Note: *Don't knows* excluded from percentage base. Question wording is provided in Appendix B.

[a] Plus = more Thatcherite; minus = less Thatcherite.

tionalization rose to 40% by 1979 and to 42% by 1983.

The climate of public opinion on discipline-related issues presents a contrast. The Conservative party has traditionally been the party of law and order. But under Mrs. Thatcher's leadership the party has spoken even more persistently and stridently on these issues. Its 1979 manifesto, for example, promised a renewed debate on the death penalty (albeit on a "free," i.e., unwhipped, vote) early in the new Parliament and two further debates were held in 1983 and 1987: on each occasion Mrs. Thatcher voted for its restoration. And yet the proportion in favor of restoring the death penalty was greater in 1970 (81%) than in 1979 (75%) or 1983 (63%). The majority of British electors have always favored capital punishment and a hard line on crime and disorder. But the years after 1974 do not appear to mark a *resurgence* of tough-minded authoritarianism.

In the same vein, a connection between "permissiveness" and the breakdown of social order is commonly made by Thatcherites. Opposition to the liberalizing legislation on abortion, homosexuality, divorce and censorship ushered in during the Labour governments of 1964 to 1970 is a recurrent Thatcherite theme. And yet Table 7 shows that support for Thatcherite positions on abortion and pornography, which has never been that substantial, did not increase between 1974 and 1983.

Changing public attitudes on issues of immigration and race tell a similar story. While the Conservative party is formally committed to equality before the law and equality of opportunity for all citizens, Mrs. Thatcher and her close supporters are associated with a hard line on black (i.e. Indian and Pakistani) immigration and relative indifference to discrimination and prejudice against black minorities. Mrs. Thatcher's widely publicized (if misinterpreted) remarks about the danger of Britain being "swamped" by too many black immigrants identified her section of the party with the view that blacks threatened the British national character, its law and democracy. Yet support for the repatriation of immigrants fell from 43% to 34% between 1974 and 1979 while the right-wing refrain that equal opportunity policies for blacks had "gone too far" found an ever-weakening echo among the British electorate (down from 27% in 1974 and 30% in 1979 to 20% in 1983). Thus on matters of racial equality the British electorate remained moderate, edging gradually to a more liberal position during the Thatcher years.

Hostility towards trade unions, a statecraft and free enterprise issue, has ebbed and flowed; but there has been no Thatcherite tidal wave. After the 1974 defeat of the Heath government in the aftermath of the miners' strike, Thatcherites persistently painted trade unions as "the enemy within," whose monopoly powers and legal immunities needed to be ruthlessly stripped. While the Thatcher governments' trade union reforms have been popular, its more ambitious aim of persuading the electorate that trade unions are undesirable or unnecessary institutions has completely failed. For example, Gallup's annual question of 30 years' standing ("Generally speaking, and thinking of Britain as a whole, do you think that trade unions are a good thing or a bad thing?") has consistently produced only minorities saying "a bad thing" (after excluding *don't knows)* and smaller minorities in 1986 (25%) than in 1983 (28%), 1979 (41%) or 1974 (33%).

Mrs. Thatcher's crusade further assaulted the postwar consensus by claiming that it was not practical for governments to maintain full employment in all circumstances. In 1976 and 1979 the public accepted this view. But by the May 1983 election there was a dramatic reversal, which can be seen in Table 7 and which has since proceeded further. Similarly, in 1979, the electorate concurred with the Conservative view that jobs should be created by "allowing companies to keep more of their profits" rather than the Labour view that "it was up to the Government to use tax money to create jobs." But by 1983 all sections of the electorate had shifted leftward on the issue, and in 1987 they lurched further to the left again. Nor has the electorate adopted a Thatcherite position on the welfare state. Before the 1979 election the party promised a drive against the welfare "scrounger." Since then the Thatcher governments have constantly reiterated the trade-off between taxation and welfare spending.

Once again, however, the electorate shows little evidence of having adopted a Thatcherite position on these issues. For example, between 1974 and 1979 the electorate did move to the right on the issue of whether benefits "nowadays have gone too far"; by 1983 it had reversed direction and was to the left of its original position in 1974. Nor have Thatcherites converted the electorate to the goal of a low-tax, minimal welfare economy. Asked to choose between tax and social service cuts or tax and social service increases, the public was evenly divided—37% apiece—when the Conservatives came to office in May 1979. By 1983 service increasers outnumbered tax cutters by 52% to 24%, and by May 1987 by the even greater margin of 64% to 13%. Mrs. Thatcher may have triumphed in 1987, but Samuel Smiles did not.

These findings from survey and polling data offer little support for the principal criticism of spatial theories, namely that electorates are pliable and that their outlooks can be shaped by political leaders. In the case of Thatcherism, a small number of Conservative leaders decided what they thought the public interest required and set out to persuade sceptical elites and the electorate. But by 1983 informal estimates of the number of Thatcherite MPs still only ranged from King's (1983, 97) 10% to Riddell's (1983, 12) "no more than 20-25 percent," the same range that we estimated for 1972-73. And as for the public, with the notable exception of denationalization, the voters actually sympathized less with Mrs. Thatcher's convictions after a decade of crusading than they did at the beginning. Thatcherism reminds us that ideologies can arise from personal convictions that have little to do with maximizing votes. It also suggests that it can be far more difficult than Downs's critics think for political leaders to mold people's minds.

Discussion

Mrs. Thatcher has made her way in the Conservative party by joining together components from two familiar perspectives: liberal Whiggery and traditional Toryism. Thus Thatcherism is recognizably Conservative even if it has neglected the ideas of the Conservative establishment. But Thatcherism is also a minority viewpoint, and as such it challenges spatial accounts of ideological construction (Norton 1987, 31). So strikingly does it depart from spatial models that its performance must convince us all of the existence of very important cases where politicians are more interested in moving electorates toward themselves than in moving themselves towards electorates (see Clubb, Flannigan, and Zingale 1980; Rabinowitz 1986).

Mrs. Thatcher has in fact demonstrated that a basic assumption of spatial models is not universal and is therefore not an appropriate axiom for deductive theories. Rational politicians can deliberately construct ideologies that draw their parties away from, not towards, the electorate. Yet these same spatial models work perfectly well in other postwar British cases. Under what conditions, then, are they most likely to apply? Consideration of Thatcherism in this broader postwar electoral context suggests three such conditions. Politicians are most likely to adjust their ideologies to appeal to electorates (1) after a devastating electoral defeat (2) when the victorious opponent's ideology is thought to be popular, and (3) when politicians' commitments to their own party's ideology are relatively weak. None of these conditions were satisfied when the Thatcherite counterexample emerged after 1973. But all three were very plainly present in the postwar cases that best support spatial theory: the Conservative party's reaction to defeat in the 1945 general election, and the similar Labour reactions to defeat in the general elections of 1983 and 1987.

Responding to a devastating landslide in the 1945 general election, leading Conservative politicians were quick to learn what they called the new electoral lessons. They set out to adjust the party's goals and overhaul its policy programs accordingly (Hoffman 1964). The ideology of the victorious party, Labour's ideology, appeared to be as popular in 1945 as the Conservative party's appeals appeared outdated. By the beginning of the 1950s the Conservatives had moved towards the electoral center to accept the basic outlines of the mixed economy and welfare state that Labour was putting in place (Beer 1965, 302). Finally, as Lord Butler (1971, 92), the architect of this ideological overhaul, explains in his memoirs, the move was greatly facilitated by an awareness among leading Tories that Disraeli's two nations still existed in England and that it was time to do something about "the injustices and anomalies of the prewar period"—which Conservatives had administered.

The right conditions were in place, too, for the Labour party's steady retreat from radicalism between 1983 and 1987. The majority of Labour MPs had never supported the party's lurch to the Left after 1979 but had been outflanked by embittered constituency and trade union activists exploiting a "democratic" policymaking process. At the 1983 election, Labour suffered a devastating defeat, its worst since 1918 in terms of share of the vote, despite the severity of the economic recession under Mrs. Thatcher. The subsequent attempts by Labour's new leader, Neil Kinnock, to rescue the party have been almost purely Downsian: electoral victory, he has declared, must take priority over socialist purity because without winning elections socialism cannot be put into practice.

Electorally damaging policies from the 1983 manifesto have either been reversed (e.g., withdrawal from the EEC, the abolition of the Lords, opposition to council house sales), relegated to the sidelines (e.g., renationalization, rechristened "social ownership"), or, where politically necessary, smothered by creative ambiguity (e.g., the restoration of trade union rights and immunities). The almost exclusive emphasis has instead been on the Labour party's traditionally popular commitment to the welfare state. These shifts of policy position and emphasis, moreover, have not been couched in the socialist rhetoric of equality, social justice, or class war but in the bland centrist language of "mending divisions," "community and caring," or the almost Thatcherite language of "opportunity" and "efficiency" (Kinnock, 1986; Labour Party 1987). Indeed, two of Labour's leading politicians have refurbished democratic socialism in the style of "freedom" (Gould 1985; Hattersley 1987).

Returning to Thatcherism, all three conditions were lacking when contrary to Downsian theory this radical ideology was constructed. As regards the first condition, the Conservative party was defeated in 1974, but *not* overwhelmingly, let alone devastatingly. As for the second, what appealed to the electorate was not the victorious Labour party's ideology so much as the prospect of getting rid of Mr. Heath's government. And finally, the Heath government's U-turns left Conservative politicians irritated and uneasy but *not* less committed to existing doctrines than they had been before. Mrs. Thatcher was therefore not required to present convincing electoral justifications for her radical convictions—convictions that had less to do with winning elections than with "binding together the faithful and providing a test of membership in the elect."[18]

And yet Mrs. Thatcher won. Despite the unpopularity of her ideology, she won the leadership election of 1975; and she won the general elections of 1979, 1983, and 1987. In the leadership election, Conservative MPs cared more about removing Mr. Heath than they did about her ideology (Riddell 1983, 21; Wapshott and Brock 1983, 106). In the general election of 1979, she benefited from Labour's collapse during the "winter of discontent"; and in both 1983 and 1987 she was reelected to office because the anti-Conservative vote was divided between two opposition parties (which were themselves internally divided). Thus Mrs. Thatcher's electoral successes and the policy revolutions she has carried out in their wake further require us to make theoretical room for the fact that it is possible in contemporary democracies not only to "get it right" and nevertheless to get elected but even to get elected again (and again) and successfully implement radical political programs that are unpopular with most political leaders and voters.

Appendix A:
The Value-ranking Instrument

The value ranking instrument consists of an inventory of 36 political values arranged in four separate lists of nine values each (Searing 1978). This inventory was assembled from parliamentary debates, political memoirs, journalistic commentaries, and academic attempts at synthesis and was reviewed through pretests with former members of Parliament. The rank order instrument is based on the assumption that individuals hold cognitive value hierarchies, that is to say, that they generally give certain values precedence over others and that these hierarchies can be roughly reconstructed on the values form. Respondents are asked to examine each list separately and to write the number 1 alongside the ideal that is personally most important to them, the number 2 alongside the next most important value, and so on. The items in these lists were familiar to the politicians, and most respondents found the exercise easy to complete. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that value hierarchies, particularly those of many Conservatives, are certainly not inflexible and may not even be well crystalized. In fact, the exercize compels respondents to represent their political values with more structure than usually characterizes their thinking about such matters.

In the comparison between the Monday Club and PEST, a value's *distinctiveness* is indicated by the size of the difference between its score for the Monday Club and its score for PEST, a figure reported in the last column of Table 1. On this criterion, free enterprise heads the list, followed closely by public order, authority, and patriotism.

In the exploratory factor analysis, several values were combined into additive indexes and several others were removed altogether in order to reduce the large number of value items and to suppress noise. Thus, on the basis of connotations and correlations, the following items were combined into additive indexes: strong government + strong leadership = statecraft; self-discipline + self-reliance = autonomy; authority + discipline = authority; empirical approach + gradualism = empirical; and, property + capitalism = capitalism. The following values were dropped from the analysis either because they focused on distinctions in the Labour party or were too skewed or both: economic equality, freedom, socialism, privacy, unity, social equality, duty, fellowship, meritocracy, participatory democracy, loyalty, cooperation, and security (see Searing 1978). After these steps, 18 vetted items remained with which to assess the argument.

Appendix B: Items for Table Entries

Table 6

1. "Profitable sectors of nationalized industries should be denationalized."
2. "Social service benefits and exemptions ought to be provided only to the really poor rather than to all low-wage earners."
3. "Trade union organizations do not have an automatic right to be consulted about the making of policies which affect their interests."
4. "Business organizations do not have an automatic right to be consulted about the making of policies which affect their interests."
5. "The death penalty should be reintroduced for the murder of police officers."
6. "Criminals convicted of violent crimes should be given longer prison sentences and fewer paroles."

Table 7

Privatization of nationalized industry. "Which of these statements comes closest to what you yourself feel should be done?"—"Some of the industries that are nationalized now should be denationalized." *Source: British Election Studies.*

Death Penalty. 1970: "Did you want to see the death penalty kept or abolished?"; 1979: "I am going to read out a list of things that some people think a government should do. For each one you can say whether you feel it is: very important that it should be done, fairly important that it should be done, it doesn't matter either way, fairly important that it should not be done, very important that it should not be done. . . . What is your view about bringing back the death penalty?"—"Very/fairly important that it should be done"; 1983: "Please say whether you agree or disagree with each of these statements, or say if you are not sure either way: . . . Britain should bring back the death penalty"—"Agree." *Source: British Election Studies.*

Abortion (gone too far). "Would you say that the availability of abortion on the National Health Service: has gone much too far; has gone a little too far; is about right; has not gone quite far enough; has not gone nearly far enough?"—"Has gone much/a little too far." *Source: British Election Studies.*

Abortion (restrict). "Do you think that the law should make legal abortion easier, more difficult or should the situation be left as it is?"—"More difficult." *Source: Gallup Political Index.*

Pornography. "Would you say that the right to show nudity and sex in films and magazines: has gone much too far; has gone a little too far; is about right; has not gone quite far enough; has not gone nearly far enough?"—"Has gone much/a little too far." *Source: British Election Studies.*

Repatriation of immigrants. "I am going to read out a list of things that some people say a government should do. For each one you can say whether you feel it is: very important that it should be done, fairly important that it should be done, it doesn't matter either way, fairly important that it should not be done, very important that it should not be done. . . . What is your view about sending coloured immigrants back to their own country?"—"Very/fairly important that it should be done." *Source: British Election Studies.*

Equal opportunities for blacks. "Would you say that attempts to give equal opportunities to black people and Asians: have gone much too far; have gone a little too far; are about right; have not gone quite far enough; have not gone nearly far enough?"—"Have gone much/a little too far." *Source: British Election Studies.*

Trade Union Power. "Do you think that trade unions have too much power or not?"—"Too much power." *Source: British Election Studies.*

Illegitimacy of trade unions. "Generally speaking, and thinking of Britain as a whole, do you think that the trade unions are a good thing or a bad thing?"—"Bad thing." *Source: Gallup Political Index, no. 296.*

Price vs. jobs. "Which do you think the government should give greater attention to—trying to curb inflation or trying to reduce unemployment?"—"Curb inflation." *Source: Gallup Political Index.*

Profits vs. taxes to create jobs. "Which of these statements comes closest to your view? The best way to tackle unemployment is to allow private companies to keep more of their profits to create more jobs; It is mainly up to the government to tackle unemployment by using tax money to create jobs"—"Allow private companies to keep more of their profits." *Source: 1979: British Election Study; 1983 and 1987: BBC-Gallup Election Survey.*

Welfare Benefits. "Thinking about the welfare benefits that are available to people today, would you say that these have: gone much too far; gone a little too far; are about right; not gone quite far enough; not gone nearly far enough?"—"Gone much/a little too far." *Source: British Election Studies.*

Tax cuts vs. social services. "People have different views about whether it is more important to reduce taxes or keep up government spending. How about you?

Which of these statements comes closest to your view? Cut taxes, even if this means some reduction in government services, such as health, education and welfare; Things should be left as they are; Government services such as health, education and welfare should be extended, even if it means some increases in taxes"—"Cut taxes." *Source: Gallup Political Index.*

Notes

This research was supported by grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities (FT-28855-86) and the National Science Foundation (SOC 71-3575 A03). We would like to thank James Douglas for his detailed and stimulating comments on an earlier version of this paper and Peter Hall for his observations about Mrs. Thatcher as "antithesis." We are also indebted to Stuart Elaine Macdonald and George Rabinowitz for their methodological advice and stubborness, which led us to reanalyze some of our data and discover what we had missed before.

1. According to Downs (1957, 114–27), in a two-party system like Britain's, where voters' opinions are unimodal and normally distributed, both parties will tend to converge ideologically toward the center of the political spectrum. To march away from the center would be irrational because it would invite electoral punishment. Downs (1957, 96–113) argues further that politicians do not regard ideologies as ends in themselves but rather as means to other ends, these being "whatever benefits them most." And these benefits, according to Downs's "basic hypothesis," are the "power, income, and prestige that go with office." Thus the ultimate goals are power, income, and prestige; the proximate goal is winning office; and the instrumental goal is the creation of an ideology that will appeal to voters. In short, ideologies are "voter-driven."

2. Although political values are typically considered more salient to politicians than to the general public, the public is expected to hold such values too. Indeed, according to Downs (1957, 98–99), it is for them that politicians create general political ideologies in the first place: the public is expected to find such ideologies useful short-cuts for evaluating parties and thereby avoiding the burdens of investigating the details of a wide range of issues.

3. When the analysis was repeated for members of known ideological communities—the Monday Club and PEST—a relatively strong first factor did emerge to structure the data. This was defined at one end by authority and discipline, Monday Club favorites, and at the other by compassion and community—PEST's ideals. Conservative politicians whose views are highly crystallized are apparently not in the majority. Thus when the analysis was repeated again, this time for respondents who were members neither of the Monday Club nor of PEST, the percentage of variance explained by the early factors was cut in half, while the eigen values displayed an even more modest stepwise decline than was found for the entire sample.

4. This step produced 149 respondents classified as predominantly Tories and 97 as predominantly Whigs, proportions in line with general impressions of the rough distribution of such views in the party at the time.

5. It needs to be emphasized that even among these values the structure is weak. Although we are primarily interested in the first principal component, an inspection of the complete factor analysis presents a rather flaccid picture: a varimax rotation recovers eight dimensions with eigen values of about 1.00, which together explain only 69% of the variance. Conservative politicians are correct when they claim that the party's ideological perspectives are not highly crystallized, that value clusters are not sharply defined, and that there is much overlapping between one tendency and another.

6. Its strength compared to the second factor is somewhat more impressive than that found with the Whigs. After a relatively sharp drop from the first to the second factor, the decline across the other components is more steady, as is the decline in percentage of variance explained. At the same time, the overall structure is again weak with seven factors at eigen values of about 1.00 explaining together only 62% of the variance.

7. The present analysis was applied to Conservative members of Parliament and candidates together. This has the advantage of producing a large *N* and of broadening the elite net to capture some opinion outside Westminster. But members of Parliament were also analyzed separately and the results were much the same: the eigen values and percentage of variance explained were slightly higher for the Whigs and slightly lower for the Tories. Moreover, the correlations between the value items and the first principal component were virtually identical. This reinforces results reported elsewhere that suggest that Conservative MPs and candidates have quite similar value profiles (Searing 1978).

8. To some extent, this is due to the choice of components from which the authority index has been constructed, albeit they are strongly intercorrelated (Gamma = .50).

9. Free enterprise is ranked at the top (1–3) by 66% of the liberal Whigs but by only 23% of the traditional Tories. Patriotism is accorded the same

importance by 40% of the liberal Whigs but by 84% of the traditional Tories. This analysis of comparative ranking distributions was designed to explore the foundations of similarities and differences between overlapping subtypes. Whigs were partitioned into liberal and corporate according to whether strong leadership or social planning received the higher rank. Tories were partitioned into traditional and progressive according to their relative ranks for patriotism and compassion. The comparison of the performances of the liberal Whigs and the traditional Tories showed that in addition to the divisions over free enterprise and patriotism, they differ over the type of authority they prefer. Liberal Whigs hold firm on discipline while falling a little behind the traditional Tories on authority ('the right to command'). The two viewpoints are in closest accord over strong leadership and strong government, the components of the statecraft index, for which approximately two-thirds from each camp awards top marks (1-3).

10. The obvious and predicted difference here is that the corporate Whigs care much more about capitalism than do the progressive Tories, the proportions giving it top marks being 64% and 18% respectively. But the progressive Tories—again as would be anticipated—are more responsive than the corporate Whigs to social progress (64% to 46%).

11. (Cf. Norton 1987, 31). Potential sympathy for Thatcherism diminishes as we rise in rank from candidates to backbenchers to junior ministers to senior ministers, although this shrinkage is much too modest to characterize Thatcherism as an ideological "peasant's rebellion" (see Riddel 1983, 10). Despite the claims at the time, there is remarkably little difference between frontbenchers and backbenchers.

12. For both Tories and Whigs, the varimax rotations recover six dimensions with eigen values above 1.00, explaining in each case approximately two-thirds of the variance. The eigen values of the first factors (1.54) are considerably weaker than those of the politicians, and they are not substantially stronger than those of the next components. On the Tory side, the progressive Tory values of compassion and community anchor one pole, while the traditional Tory values of patriotism and strong government anchor the other. The most obvious inconsistencies with the configuration for MPs are that public order moves into the progressive territory while free enterprise improves its standing in traditional lands. Turning to the Whig results, free enterprise defined the liberal pole; but capitalism fails to come through to establish corporate Whiggery at the other end.

13. Authority is substituted for discipline, which was not included in the public opinion survey but with which authority was highly correlated among MPs.

14. The items were satisfactorily intercorrelated, with Gammas ranging from .38 to .52. They all encompass Thatcherite policy views. Thus item 1 in Table 6—denationalizing profitable sectors of nationalized industries—is in keeping with Thatcherism's free enterprise beliefs and commitment to reducing the size of the state sector. Item 2—the provision of social service benefits to the poor only—is consonant with Thatcherism's aim of shrinking the welfare state in order to reduce tax burden. Thatcherism's conception of statecraft involves an autonomous center and thus brooks no alternative sources of power, especially not the trade unions. Thus the higher the score on the Thatcherism index, the less likely Conservative politicians are to believe that trade unions or business organizations (items 3 and 4) have an automatic right to be consulted about the making of policies that affect their interests. Thatcherism's Victorian morality, which is injected into our index through the discipline value, draws decisive conclusions about law and order. Mrs. Thatcher has been a prominent public advocate of reintroducing the death penalty for the murder of police officers (item 5), as well as of seeing that criminals convicted of violent crimes are given stiffer prison sentences (item 6).

15. The respective significance levels for the items are as follows, with the politicians' result reported first and then the public's: item 1, .0001 and .0006; item 2, .02 and .22; item 3, .04 and .17; item 4, .003 and .35; item 5, .0000 and .08; item 6, .001 and .003.

16. In fact, between 1964 and 1974, the decade preceding the emergence of Thatcherism, public attitudes were not skewed towards denationalization but were evenly balanced between further nationalization and privatization, with the plurality in favor of the status quo (source: British Election Studies).

17. By 1974, the public's widespread belief that trade unions are over-mighty had reached its peak (in that year 81%, excluding *don't knows*), said that "trade unions have too much power," and Mrs. Thatcher's proposals for trade union reform were therefore very popular (source: British Election Studies).

18. James Douglas in a private communication.

References

Beattie, Alan. 1979. Macmillan's Mantle: The Conservative Party in the 1970s. *Political Quarterly* 50:273-90.

Beer, Samuel H. 1965. *British Politics in the Collectivist Age*. New York: Knopf.

Behrens, Robert. 1980. *The Conservative Party from Heath to Thatcher*. London: Saxon House.

Blake, Robert. 1970. *The Conservative Party from Peele to Churchill*. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.

Bulpitt, Jim. 1986. The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs. Thatcher's Statecraft. *Political Studies* 34:19-39.

Burch, Martin. 1983. Mrs. Thatcher's Approach to Leadership in Government: 1979-June 1983. *Parliamentary Affairs* 36:399-416.
Butler, Lord. 1971. *The Art of the Possible.* London: Hamish Hamilton.
Chappell, Henry W., and William R. Keech, 1986. Policy Motivation and Party Differences in a Dynamic Spatial Model of Party Competition. *American Political Science Review* 80:881-900.
Clubb, Jerome, William H. Flannigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, 1980. *Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History.* Beverly Hills, California: Sage.
Cosgrave, Patrick. 1978. *Margaret Thatcher: A Tory and Her Party.* London: Hutchinson.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper & Row.
Eckstein, Harry. 1975. Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In *Handbook of Political Science,* vol. 7: *Strategies of Inquiry,* ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Finer, Samuel E., H. B. Berrington, and D. J. Bartholomew. 1961. *Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons, 1955-1959.* London: Pergamon.
Fisher, Nigel. 1973. Ian Macleod. London: Andre Deutsch.
Frohlich, Norman, Joe A. Oppenheimer, Jeffrey Smith, and Oran R. Young. 1978. A Test of Downsian Voter Rationality: 1964 Presidential Voting. *American Political Science Review* 72:178-97.
Gilmour, Ian. 1971. *The Body Politic.* London: Hutchinson.
Gould, Bryan. 1985. *Socialism and Freedom.* London: Macmillan.
Hall, Stuart, and Martin Jacques, eds. 1983. *The Politics of Thatcherism.* London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Hattersley, Roy. 1987. *Choose Freedom: The Future for Democratic Socialism.* London: Michael Joseph.
Hoffman, John. 1964. *The Conservative Party in Opposition, 1945-1951.* London: MacGibbon & Kee.
Kavanagh, Dennis. 1987. *Thatcherism and British Politics.* London: Oxford University Press.
King, Anthony. 1983. Margaret Thatcher: The Style of a Prime Minister. In *The British Prime Minister,* 2d ed., ed. Anthony King. London: Macmillan.
Kinnock, Neil. 1986. *Making Our Way.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Labour Party. 1987. *Britain Will Win: Labour Manifesto.* London: author.
Miller, Arthur H., and Martin P. Wattenberg. 1985. Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1980. *American Political Science Review* 79:359-72.
Norton, Philip. 1987. Mrs. Thatcher and the Conservative Party: Another Institution "Handbagged?" In *Thatcherism: Personality and Politics,* ed. Kenneth Minogue and Michael Biddis. London: Macmillan.
Norton, Philip, and Arthur Aughey. 1981. *Conservatives and Conservatism.* London: Temple Smith.
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1984. The Polarization of American Politics. *Journal of Politics* 46:1061-79.
Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science* 29:357-84.
Rabinowitz, George. 1978. On the Nature of Political Issues: Insights from a Spatial Analysis. *American Journal of Political Science* 22:793-817.
Rabinowitz, George. 1986. The Future of Multi-Dimensional Scaling and Spatial Modeling. Roundtable presentation, annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington.
Riddell, Peter. 1983. *The Thatcher Government.* Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Rokeach, Milton. 1968. *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Rokeach, Milton. 1973. *The Nature of Human Values.* New York: Free Press.
Rokeach, Milton. 1979. *Understanding Human Values: Individual and Societal.* New York: Free Press.
Rose, Richard. 1964. Parties, Factions, and Tendencies in Britain. *Political Studies* 12:33-46.
Searing, Donald D. 1978. Measuring Politicians' Values: Administration and Assessment of a Ranking Technique in the British House of Commons. *American Political Science Review* 72:65-79.
Utley, T. E. 1978. The Significance of Mrs. Thatcher. In *Conservative Essays,* ed. Maurice Cowling. London: Cassell.
Wapshott, Nicholas, and George Brock. 1983. *Thatcher.* London: Macdonald & Company.

Ivor Crewe is Professor of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, England, 0206 862286.

Donald D. Searing is Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514.

EXPLAINING SENATE ELECTION OUTCOMES

ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ
Emory University

Aggregate-level data are used in this analysis to explain the outcomes of Senate elections between 1974 and 1986. Using the individual Senate contest as the unit of analysis permits estimating the relative influence of a wide variety of factors on Senate election results including political characteristics of states, characteristics of the candidates, and national political conditions. Of these factors candidate characteristics had the strongest impact on the outcomes of Senate elections. The importance of candidate characteristics has had two major consequences for Senate elections. First, two-party competition has spread to every region of the country: in Senate elections, no state can be considered safe for either party. Second, money is probably now more important than ever, especially for challengers and candidates for open seats.

Bicameralism is one of the central features of the United States Congress. The framers of the Constitution created two legislative chambers with distinctive political characteristics that affect both the internal organization and decision-making processes of the Senate and House of Representatives (Froman 1967; Ornstein 1981) and the nature of Senate and House elections (Fenno 1982).

The relatively small number of senators, the size and political importance of Senate constituencies, the length of Senate terms, and the special constitutional responsibilities of the Senate all contribute to the political visibility of individual senators. Most House members are well known only to the voters in their own district. Only the Speaker and a few other leaders are national political figures. In contrast, many senators are well known outside of their home states.

The major reason for the relatively high visibility of members of the upper chamber is that media coverage of senators and Senate campaigns is much more extensive than media coverage of House members and House campaigns (Clarke and Evans 1983; Fenno 1982; Hess 1986). For senators this attention has both advantages and disadvantages. Senators are much more likely to be considered potential candidates for the presidency; however, senators also have much less control than members of the House over the information their own constituents receive about their performance. Moreover, the size of most states' populations limits personal contact between senators and constituents, so voters' impressions of senators are probably based almost entirely on information supplied by the printed and electronic media.

The influence and visibility enjoyed by individual senators have one other political disadvantage: when incumbent senators seek reelection they often attract prominent, well-financed challengers. A large proportion of Senate challengers in recent years had held a major elected office. Several other Senate candidates achieved prominence outside of politics, including three former astronauts, a former professional basketball player, two former Vietnam POWs, and the sixth husband of actress Elizabeth Taylor. These elected officials and celebrities not only enjoyed high public visibility, but they also usually spent large sums of money on their campaigns. A number of other Senate candidates in recent years have been multimillionaires who were willing to invest large amounts of their personal wealth in their own campaigns. As a result, many Senate challengers have been able to use television advertising extensively in their campaigns.

Of course not all Senate challengers are prominent or well-financed (Westlye 1983). However, the fact that many Senate challengers are well-known public officials, celebrities, or millionaires helps to explain why Senate incumbents have greater difficulty holding their seats than House incumbents. The visibility of the challenger is probably the most important variable influencing an incumbent representative's or senator's chance of reelection (Abramowitz 1980; Hinckley 1980; Mann and Wolfinger 1980).

The visibility of Senate challengers and extensive media coverage of Senate campaigns may also increase voters' awareness of candidates' issue positions and ideologies. National and international issues appear to play a larger role in Senate campaigns than in House campaigns (Fenno 1982). Presidential campaigning for Senate candidates and the involvement of ideological political action committees such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) have probably increased the ideological content of Senate campaigns in recent years. As a result, voters' ideological preferences appear to have a significant influence on their voting decisions in Senate elections (Abramowitz 1980; Jacobson and Wolfinger 1987; Wright and Berkman 1986). National issues such as the president's performance and the state of the economy may also have an important influence on voting decisions in Senate elections, although there has been little research on this question (Abramowitz and Segal 1986; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1985).

A variety of factors may affect the outcomes of Senate elections, including the partisan and ideological preferences of the electorate, state population size, the incumbent's voting record, scandals and controversies, intra-party conflicts, the backgrounds of the candidates, campaign spending, and national political conditions. There has been much less empirical research on Senate elections than on House elections. Existing national survey data are not well suited for the purpose of analyzing voting in Senate elections. There have also been very few studies of Senate elections using aggregate-level data because the small number of Senate contests in any election year makes the task of estimating the effects of factors such as presidential popularity or economic conditions much more difficult than in House elections. However, by using the individual Senate contest as the unit of analysis, it is possible to estimate the relative influence of a wide variety of factors on the results of Senate elections, including political characteristics of the states, characteristics of the candidates, and national political conditions.

Hypotheses To Be Tested

State Characteristics

The first set of hypotheses to be tested involves the political characteristics of the states. Three characteristics that should affect Senate elections are the partisan composition of the electorate, the ideological composition of the electorate, and the size of the state's population. Although the proportion of citizens identifying with the Democratic and Republican parties and the influence of party identification on voting decisions have both declined in recent years, party labels still provide an important cue for many voters. The proportions of Democratic and Republican identifiers in a state should have a significant impact on the outcomes of Senate elections.

In addition to partisanship, the ideological composition of the electorate may affect the outcomes of Senate elections. Voters generally perceive the Democratic party as more liberal than the Republican party and voters' ideological identifications have had significant effects on their candidate preferences in several recent presidential elections (Holm and Robinson 1978; Levitin and Miller 1979). Given the salience of national issues in many recent Senate campaigns, ideological identifications may also affect voting for Senate candidates: the proportion of liberal identifiers in a state should have a positive impact on the vote for Democratic Senate candidates.

Population size may affect the outcomes of Senate elections in a manner somewhat different from either partisanship or ideology. The size of a state's population should affect not support for the parties but support for the incumbent senator. The larger the population of a state, the more difficult it may be for a senator to cultivate the support of the voters (Hibbing and Brandes 1981). As population size increases, so does political and economic diversity; in addition, the size of a state's population should be inversely related to personal contacts with voters. However, the impact of population size on support for the incumbent may not be linear. As a state's population increases, the ability of an incumbent senator to cultivate support through personal contact with constituents should diminish fairly rapidly and then level off: once a state's population reaches several million, personal contact with constituents becomes impractical and a senator probably must rely on the mass media to communicate with citizens.

Candidate Characteristics

The second set of hypotheses to be tested involves the characteristics of the Senate candidates. When an incumbent is seeking reelection, the incumbent's past performance is usually the major focus of the campaign: the challenger criticizes the incumbent's record and the incumbent defends that record. Several aspects of the incumbent's performance may affect the outcome of a Senate election, including the incumbent's voting record, scandals or political controversies, health concerns, and intra-party opposition.

The key question concerning the incumbent's voting record is its congruence with the ideological preferences of the state's voters. The greater the distance between a senator's ideology as reflected by his voting record and the ideology of the average voter, the greater should be the challenger's opportunity to win votes by taking a position closer to that of the average voter in the state.

Involvement in well-publicized scandals or political controversies should also reduce support for an incumbent officeholder (Peters and Welch 1980). Although no member of the Senate was indicted or convicted of a crime during the period covered by this study, several senators were the subjects of investigations based on allegations of official or personal misconduct. A larger number were involved in incidents that raised questions about their honesty, personal judgment, or competence. Even though no official action was taken against any of these senators, media coverage of such incidents probably had a negative impact on the incumbents' reputation among their constituents.

Along with scandals and political controversies, questions about a senator's health or physical vigor may also have a negative impact on electoral support for the incumbent. The issue here is not age—senators in their seventies or eighties have had no difficulty winning reelection—but whether or not an incumbent can vigorously meet the demands of the job.

One additional potential problem for an incumbent senator is intra-party opposition. Serious opposition to an incumbent senator in his own party's primary is relatively rare. When such opposition does emerge, however, it may cause political problems for the incumbent even if he wins the primary. Criticism of the incumbent's performance by a serious intraparty challenger may lead to an erosion of public support that carries over into the general election.[1]

Even if there are weaknesses in an incumbent senator's record and a strong challenger emerges in the opposing party, the incumbent has one additional resource at his disposal: the ability to raise and spend large sums of money on his reelection campaign. An incumbent senator can usually outspend even a prominent and well-financed challenger. However, it is not clear how much good this does. Although there has been almost no research on the impact of campaign spending in Senate elections, studies of campaign spending in House elections have generally found that spending by incumbents has little or no impact on their electoral fortunes; only the challenger's spending has a substantial impact on the outcome of a House election (Glantz, Abramowitz, and Burkart 1976; Jacobson 1978, 1980). The explanation for this finding is that the incumbent is already well known by the time the campaign gets under way, whereas the campaign is the only opportunity for the challenger to get his message across to the electorate.

There is a strong likelihood that campaign spending does not have a simple linear effect on the outcomes of Senate elections. Spending is probably subject to diminishing marginal returns: as a candidate spends more money and becomes better known, the impact of further spending diminishes. Since incumbents generally begin the campaign with a much higher level of recognition than challengers, their spending should have a lower initial rate of return than that of challengers.

In estimating the impact of campaign spending in Senate elections there is an additional complication that is not present in House elections: the wide variation in state populations. A Senate campaign in California will be much more expensive than an equivalent campaign in Delaware. However, simply dividing spending by population is probably also inaccurate. While many costs of waging a campaign increase with population, other costs are relatively fixed. Broadcasting charges are based on audience size, but other costs, such as producing political advertisements, hiring professional consultants, and conducting polls, are probably not greatly affected by the population of a state. Thus in order to estimate the impact of campaign spending in Senate elections, it is necessary to adjust candidate spending to reflect both fixed and variable campaign costs.

Although a Senate campaign involving an incumbent usually revolves around the record of the incumbent, the ability of the challenger to effectively criticize the incumbent's record also depends on the resources and political skills of the challenger. The next set of hypotheses to be tested in this study involves the characteristics of Senate challengers. Three characteristics of Senate challengers which should affect their ability to conduct an effective campaign are political experience, celebrity status, and campaign spending.

A challenger who has held elected office has several advantages over one who has never won an election. The experience of conducting at least one successful campaign should be an advantage in organizing a Senate campaign. Depending on the importance and visibility of the office, the challenger may begin the campaign with a high level of recognition among the electorate. Holding elected office probably also enhances a challenger's credibility among both the voters and members of the media. A challenger who has held an important elected office will probably receive more extensive and favorable coverage in the media and will be taken more seriously by the voters than a challenger who has never held elected office.

A challenger who has achieved prominence through activities other than holding elected office should enjoy many of the same advantages as one who has held elected office. A famous athlete, entertainer, astronaut, or military hero will begin the campaign with higher public recognition and will probably receive more extensive and favorable media coverage than a challenger who is not a celebrity.

Challengers who are not celebrities and have never held elected office can attempt to compensate for these deficiencies by spending more money on their campaigns. Of course this is much easier for challengers who are independently wealthy and can contribute large sums of money to their own campaigns. Although challenger spending should have a greater impact on election outcomes than incumbent spending, it is probably also subject to diminishing marginal returns. And just as in the case of incumbent spending, challenger spending must be adjusted to take into account both fixed campaign costs and costs that are based on population.

National Political Conditions

In addition to characteristics of the states and candidates, Senate elections are also influenced by national political conditions. Two variables reflecting the national political climate will be examined in this study: party competence evaluations and whether a Senate contest takes place in a midterm or presidential election year.

Political scientists have long recognized that the outcomes of House elections are influenced by national issues such as the state of the economy and the popularity of the incumbent president (Kramer 1971; Tufte 1975). Although Senate elections may be less predictable than House elections because of the smaller number of contests involved, they appear to follow the same pattern as House elections: the greater the president's popularity and the stronger the economy, the more seats the president's party can expect to win (Abramowitz and Segal 1986; Lewis-Beck and Rice 1985).

Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth (1986) have argued that the effects of economic conditions and presidential popularity on congressional elections are mediated by short-term party evaluations. What connects congressional candidates with the performance of the president and the state of the economy is the voter's perception of the relative competence of the Democratic and Republican parties. Including party competence evaluations in our model should capture the effects of economic conditions and presidential performance on Senate elections.

One of the most regular patterns of U.S. electoral politics is the tendency of the president's party to lose seats in the House of Representatives in midterm elections. This pattern is based partially on the fact that the president's party usually has won more than its normal share of seats in the preceding presidential election year. In addition, however, the party controlling the White House may lose support in midterm elections because of negative voting: when the president himself is not on the ballot, voters who are dissatisfied with his performance may take out their discontent on candidates representing his party. Thus, in midterm elections, negative evaluations of the incumbent president may have a stronger impact on voting decisions than positive evaluations of the incumbent president (Cover 1986; Kernell 1977). This phenomenon may help to explain why the president's party usually loses Senate seats in midterm elections, even though the same seats were not at stake in the preceding presidential election year. Since 1936 the president's party has lost Senate seats in 10 of 13 midterm elections, with an average loss of 4.7 seats.

Open Seats

In the preceding discussion, I have assumed that a Senate contest involves an incumbent seeking reelection and a challenger. However, almost one-fourth of all Senate contests between 1974 and 1986 did not involve an incumbent. Many of the same factors expected to influence races involving an incumbent should also affect contests for open seats: the partisan and ideological composition of the electorate in the state, the backgrounds and political experiences of the candidates, campaign finances, and national political conditions. However, there is a qualitative difference between a race involving an incumbent and a contest for an open seat. When an incumbent is seeking reelection, one expects the incumbent's performance to be the main focus of the campaign. The challenger's background and qualifications, while important, are usually less salient than the incumbent's record. By contrast, a contest for an open seat generally involves a choice between two equally salient alternatives. As a result, the candidates' qualifications and financial resources may have a stronger impact on the outcome of a contest for an open seat than the challenger's qualifications and finances have on the outcome of a contest involving an incumbent.

Data and Methodology

Data for this study are based on all contested Senate races between 1974 and 1986. Information regarding campaign spending in Senate elections was not available before 1974. The dependent variable used in the study is the percentage of the major party vote received by the incumbent senator or, in a contest for an open seat, the percentage of the major party vote received by the Democratic candidate. The measures used for each of the independent variables are described in the Appendix.

In order to test the hypotheses presented above, I will estimate two models of Senate election outcomes: an incumbent support model and an open seat model. The incumbent support model can be summarized as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} IV = a &+ b_1P + b_2I + b_3CD + b_4D \\ &+ b_5S + b_6C + b_7H + b_8PC + b_9PM \\ &+ b_{10}I\$ + b_{11}CPE + b_{12}CC + b_{13}C\$ \\ &+ b_{14}NPC + b_{15}MT + e \end{aligned}$$

where IV is the percentage of the major party *vote* received by the *incumbent; a* is a constant; P is the *partisan* orientation of the state's electorate; I is the *ideological* orientation of the state's electorate; CD is the natural logarithm of the number of *congressional districts* in a state; D is the *distance* between the incumbent's ideology as reflected by his voting record and the ideological position of the average voter in the state; S is a dummy variable which indicates the presence or absence of a *scandal* involving the incumbent; C is a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of a political *controversy* involving the incumbent; H is a dummy variable indicating the presence or absence of questions about the incumbent's *health* or physical condition; PC is a dummy variable which indicates whether or not the incumbent had a *primary contest; PM* is the incumbent's *margin* of victory in percentage points over his closest *primary* challenger; $I\$$ is the natural logarithm of the *incumbent's* campaign *spending* adjusted for state pop-

Table 1. OLS Estimates for Incumbent Support Model

Independent Variable	*b*	Standard Error	Beta	Significance Level
State partisanship	.14	.03	.22	.001
State ideology	.15	.03	.26	.001
Natural log of state size	−.70	.41	−.07	.05
Ideological distance	−.04	.02	−.12	.01
Scandal	−7.11	2.41	−.13	.01
Controversy	−3.07	1.47	−.09	.025
Health	−8.28	3.00	−.12	.01
Primary contest	−6.75	1.78	−.35	.001
Primary margin	.10	.03	.37	.001
Natural log of incumbent spending	1.31	.62	.11	.025
Challenger political experience	−1.94	.49	−.20	.001
Celebrity challenger	−5.74	2.48	−.10	.025
Natural log of challenger spending	−3.63	.43	−.49	.001
National party competence	.16	.04	.21	.001
Midterm	−1.89	.60	−.15	.001
Constant	69.75	2.18		

ulation and inflation; *CPE* is the *challenger's political experience; CC* is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the *challenger* was a *celebrity; C$* is the natural logarithm of the *challenger's* adjusted campaign *spending; NPC* is the *national party competence* score for the year of the election; *MT* indicates whether a contest took place during a *midterm* election when the president was a member of the incumbent's party or the challenger's party; and *e* is an *error* term.

The open seat model can be summarized as follows:

$$DV = a + b_1P + b_2I + b_3C\$ + b_4CPE + b_5NPC + b_6MT + e$$

where *DV* is the *Democratic* candidate's share of the major party *vote; P* is the *partisan* orientation of the state's electorate; *I* is the *ideological* orientation of the state's electorate; C$ is the difference between the natural logarithm of the Democratic *candidate's* adjusted campaign *spending* and the natural logarithm of the Republican candidate's adjusted campaign spending; *CPE* is the difference between the Democratic *candidate's political experience* and the Republican candidate's political experience; *NPC* is the *national party competence* score for the election year; *MT* indicates whether a contest took place during a *midterm* election with a Democratic or Republican president; and *e* is an *error* term.

Results

Both models were estimated using ordinary least squares regression analysis. The results for the incumbent support model are presented in Table 1. All of the estimated coefficients are statistically significant and in the expected direction. The overall fit of the model appears to be very good: almost three-fourths of the variance in the incumbent's share of the vote is accounted for by these 15 independent variables. The standard error of 5.0 percentage points in the "predictions" made by the model is also rather impressive. This figure comes close to the expected margin of error of a public opinion poll conducted immediately before an election.

Effects of State Characteristics

The most interesting results of the regression analysis are the estimated effects of each of the independent variables on the outcomes of Senate elections. Looking at the effects of state political characteristics, for example, we find that the ideological orientation of the electorate was just as important as the partisan orientation of the electorate. Although Democratic candidates enjoyed an advantage in most states because there were more Democratic than Republican identifiers, this advantage was offset by the fact that in all 48 states included in this study there were more conservative voters than liberal voters.

In order to evaluate the relative positions of the Democratic and Republican Senate candidates in a state, it is necessary to consider both the partisan and ideological composition of the electorate in that state: some of the most Democratic states, in terms of partisanship, are also among the most conservative states in the nation. Based on partisanship and ideology, the most favorable states for Republican candidates were Utah and Idaho, while the most favorable states for Democratic candidates were Georgia and Louisiana. With all other factors held constant, a Democratic Senate candidate in Georgia or Louisiana could expect to receive about 3% more of the vote, while a Democratic Senate candidate in Utah or Idaho could expect to receive about 7% less of the vote, than a Democratic Senate candidate in an average state. While these are substantial differences, no state can be considered safe for either party in a Senate election.

As expected, support for the incumbent senator decreased as state population increased. A senator from a state with only one House district, such as Delaware or Wyoming, could expect to receive about 3% more of the vote than a Senator from California, all other factors held constant.

Effects of Candidate Characteristics

According to my results, a senator whose voting record was inconsistent with the ideological preferences of his or her constituents could expect to pay a substantial price in electoral support for this discrepancy. A very liberal senator representing a very conservative state or a very conservative senator representing a very liberal state could expect to receive 4.3% less of the vote than a senator whose voting record matched the preferences of the constituents.

During the period covered by this study, there were several senators whose voting records demonstrated a marked discrepancy with the ideological preferences of the voters in their states. It is probably no coincidence that most of these senators lost reelection bids to challengers whose views were more in tune with the voters. George McGovern, Frank Church, and James Buckley suffered the same fate as Edmund Burke, who pledged to vote for his conscience rather than his constituents' wishes and discovered that the voters preferred to be represented by a delegate rather than a trustee.

According to the results presented in Table 1, senators who were involved in scandals experienced a substantial loss of electoral support: an average drop of 7.1 percentage points, other factors held constant. Four of the 5 senators accused of being involved in illegal activities were defeated when they sought reelection. Controversies that raised questions about a senator's honesty or competence were much more common than full-blown scandals and far less costly: the average decline in electoral support was only 3.1 percentage points. However, 7 of the 14 Senators involved in political controversies were defeated. Three Senators with significant physical or health problems sought reelection between 1974 and 1986. Only 1 of the 3 was reelected and this issue produced an average decline in electoral support of 8.3 percentage points.

Senators who had significant opposition in their own party's primary experienced a substantial loss of support in the general election. The estimated coefficients for the primary contest and primary margin variables indicate that to avoid any negative impact from the primary, the incumbent had to defeat his closest challenger by a margin of at least 67 percentage points. An incumbent who barely survived a primary challenge (winning by a margin of less than 1 percentage point) could expect a decline in support of 6.8 percentage points in the general election.

The challenger's characteristics also had a strong impact on the outcomes of Senate elections. Challengers who held elected office had a considerable advantage over those who did not. For example, a challenger who had been elected governor could expect to receive an additional 5.8% of the vote compared with a challenger who had never been elected to public office, all other factors held constant.

The elected office held most often by Senate challengers was U.S. representative. Between 1974 and 1986, 36 current or former members of the House of Representatives sought a Senate seat by challenging an incumbent. Based on the estimated coefficient for the political experience index, membership in the House of Representatives was worth 3.9% of the vote to a Senate challenger. Sixteen of the challengers who had served in the House, or 44%, were successful.

Challengers who were celebrities also enjoyed a decided advantage in Senate elections. In fact, being a celebrity was worth almost as much—an additional 5.7% of the vote—as being the governor of a state. Three of the five celebrity challengers who ran for the Senate between 1974 and 1986 were successful. It appears from these results that public prominence is just as valuable to a Senate challenger as political experience.

Perhaps the most interesting results in Table 1 involve the effects of campaign spending by incumbents and challengers. Although both coefficients are statistically significant, the estimated coefficient for challenger spending is almost three times as large as the estimated coefficient for incumbent spending. In fact, challenger spending was easily the most important single factor influencing the outcomes of Senate elections.

Since campaign spending was measured by the natural logarithm of total spending adjusted for inflation and state population, it is difficult to interpret the coefficients for the incumbent and challenger spending variables directly. The value of the challenger spending variable ranged from 0 to 5.4 with a mean of 2.7. Thus an average challenger increased his or her share of the vote by 10.0 percentage points as a result of campaign expenditures. The value of the incumbent spending variable ranged from 0 to 6.0 with a mean of 3.7. The average incumbent increased his or her share of the vote by 4.8 percentage points as a result of campaign expenditures. Combining these estimates, the net impact of campaign spending in an average Senate race was to increase the challenger's share of the vote by 5.2 percentage points, even though the average incumbent outspent the average challenger by a substantial margin.

Although incumbents' campaign expenditures had much less impact on the outcomes of Senate elections than challengers' campaign expenditures, the ability of an incumbent to raise an enormous campaign war chest was a decisive factor in several close races. The all-time spending record for a Senate campaign was set by Jesse Helms of North Carolina in 1984. Faced with a strong challenge from Governor James Hunt, Helms spent almost 17 million dollars on his reelection campaign. Helms won the election with 52% of the vote. Based on our estimate of

Table 2. OLS Estimates for Open Seat Model

Independent Variable	*b*	Standard Error	Beta	Significance Level
State partisanship	.10	.09	.12	—
State ideology	.17	.14	.12	—
Campaign spending	4.62	1.26	.41	.001
Political experience	3.14	.77	.43	.001
National party competence	.19	.11	.18	.05
Midterm	-1.16	1.39	-.08	—
Constant	49.64	2.60		

the effect of incumbent spending, Helms's campaign expenditures increased his share of the vote by 7.8 percentage points.

Effects of National Political Conditions

National political conditions had a strong influence on the outcomes of Senate elections between 1974 and 1986. Ratings of the relative competence of the Democratic and Republican parties ranged from -9 in 1980 (the most pro-Republican score) to 21 in 1974 (the most pro-Democratic score). Based on the estimated coefficient for the national party competence variable, a Democratic Senate candidate in 1974 would have received 4.9% more of the vote than a Democratic Senate candidate in 1980, all other factors held constant.

Even after controlling for party competence evaluations, Senate candidates representing the president's party received an average of 1.9% less of the vote in midterm election years than in presidential election years. In the four midterm elections between 1974 and 1986 only 71% of Senate incumbents from the president's party were reelected; in the same elections 94% of incumbents from the opposing party were reelected.

Results for Open Seats

Almost one-fourth of all Senate contests between 1974 and 1986 did not involve an incumbent. The estimated coefficients for the open seat model are presented in Table 2. Because of the relatively small number of open seat contests included in this analysis, the coefficients should be interpreted cautiously. Although all of the estimated coefficients are in the expected direction, only three are statistically significant and the overall fit of the open seat model is not as good as that of the incumbent support model: the six independent variables account for 55% of the variance in the outcomes of open seat contests and the standard error of 7.4 percentage points for the open seat model is substantially greater than the standard error of 5.0 percentage points for the incumbent support model.

The results presented in Table 2 do indicate that the outcomes of Senate contests for open seats are overwhelmingly based on the backgrounds and resources of the candidates. The two independent variables that had by far the strongest effects on the results of these races were the relative political experience of the candidates and the relative campaign expenditures of the candidates. Other factors such as national political conditions and the partisan and ideological makeup of the state's electorate were much less important.

Campaign Spending and Senate Election Outcomes

In his study of campaign spending in House elections, Jacobson (1978) suggested that there could be a reciprocal relationship between campaign spending and election outcomes. Of course the outcome of an election cannot directly affect campaign spending. However, expectations of potential contributors regarding the outcome of an election could affect the candidates' fund raising and the same factors which influenced these expectations could affect the outcome of the election (p. 470). If this is the case and if the factors that influenced contributors' expectations were not included in the model, then estimates of the effects of campaign spending might be biased.

Since Jacobson could not directly control for all of the factors that might have influenced the expectations of campaign contributors and the outcomes of House elections, he tried to estimate a nonrecursive model that would allow for reciprocal effects between campaign spending and election outcomes. The results did not significantly alter his previous conclusions regarding the relative effects of incumbent and challenger spending. However, there were several problems with the procedures used to estimate this nonrecursive model (Green and Krasno 1986). First, the instruments Jacobson used to obtain the first-stage estimates in the two-stage least squares analysis were only weakly related to challenger and incumbent spending. In addition, the challenger's political experience was used as one of the instruments in the equation predicting challenger spending even though this variable is itself an important determinant of election outcomes, thus violating the assumption that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.

Instead of attempting to estimate a nonrecursive model to test for the possibility of reciprocal effects between campaign spending and the outcomes of Senate elections, I will attempt to control for the effect of contributors' expectations by including a measure of these expectations in the incumbent support and open seat models. Although the expectations of potential campaign contributors cannot be directly measured, there is a measure available that is probably a very good surrogate for contributor expectations: the election forecast published in the special pre-election issue of *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.*

Approximately one month before the date of an election, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* publishes a special pre-election report that includes a forecast of every House and Senate race. Each contest is classified on a seven-point scale: the categories are *safe Democratic, Democrat favored, leans Democratic, no clear favorite, leans Republican, Republican favored,* and *safe Republican.* This forecast, based on information obtained from observers in each state, has been quite accurate. The simple correlation between the *CQ* forecast (coded on a scale ranging from minus three to three) and the Democratic percentage of the major party vote in Senate elections from 1974 through 1986 is .86.

The *CQ* forecast should provide a good measure of the expectations of sophisticated election observers such as campaign contributors. By adding this forecast to the incumbent support and open seat models we can control for the impact of expectations on campaign spending. Actually, this approach will almost certainly underestimate the effects of campaign spending since expectations about the candidates' electoral prospects are undoubtedly based in part on the candidates' campaign finances: a candidate who

Table 3. OLS Estimates for Expanded Incumbent Support and Open Seat Models

Independent Variable	*b*	Standard Error	Beta
Incumbent Support Model			
State partisanship	.13	.03	.21
State ideology	.13	.03	.23
Log of state size	-.61	.38	-.06
Scandal	-6.54	2.23	-.12
Controversy	-.61	1.44	-.02
Health	-5.43	2.84	-.08
Primary contest	-4.63	1.70	-.24
Primary margin	.07	.02	.27
Ideological distance	-.03	.02	-.07
Challenger experience	-1.01	.49	-.10
Celebrity challenger	-2.90	2.36	-.05
Log of incumbent spending	.94	.58	.08
Log of challenger spending	-2.68	.44	-.36
National party competence	.11	.04	.15
Midterm election	-1.53	.56	-.12
CQ forecast	2.37	.47	.32
Open Seat Model			
State partisanship	.04	.08	.05
State ideology	.02	.13	.01
Candidate experience	1.46	.78	.20
Candidate spending	2.90	1.17	.26
National party competence	.15	.10	.14
Midterm election	-1.81	1.21	-.13
CQ forecast	3.35	.83	.50

raises a substantial amount of money and is able to wage a strong campaign, thereby increasing his or her visibility and standing in the polls, will be perceived as having a better chance of winning than one who does not.

The estimates for the incumbent support and open seat models including the *CQ* election forecast are included in Table 3. Although the coefficients for the incumbent and challenger spending variables are reduced by about 25% when the forecast is included in the incumbent support model, both coefficients remain statistically significant. Furthermore, even with the *CQ* forecast in the model, the challenger's campaign spending remains the most important single factor influencing the outcomes of these elections. The coefficient for the challenger spending variable in the expanded model is still about three times the size of the coefficient for the incumbent spending variable.

The results for the expanded open seat model are similar, although the *CQ* forecast emerges as the strongest predictor of election outcomes. The coefficient of the relative campaign spending variable is reduced by slightly over one-third in the expanded model, but it remains highly statistically significant.

These results indicate that while some factors excluded from my models may influence both contributors' expectations and the outcomes of Senate elections, this is probably not a major problem. The technique used here almost certainly overcontrols for the impact of expectations on campaign spending and therefore underestimates the impact of campaign spending on election outcomes. The most important conclusion about the effects of campaign spending remains secure: challenger spending has a much stronger influence on the outcomes of Senate elections than incumbent spending.

Comparing Winners and Losers

The results obtained for the incumbent support model can be used to estimate the relative contributions of each of the independent variables in the model to the difference in electoral support between winning and losing incumbents. This involves calculating the difference between the mean scores of winning and losing incumbents on each variable and multiplying this difference by the estimated regression coefficient for each variable.

Between 1974 and 1986, there were 166 contested Senate races involving incumbents for which complete data were available; 129 of the incumbents (78%) were reelected while 37 (22%) were defeated. The average winning incumbent received 61.8% of the major party vote while the average losing incumbent received 46.2% of the major party vote, a difference of 15.6 percentage points.

Table 4 shows the estimated contribution of each independent variable to the difference in electoral support between winning and losing incumbents. The challenger's campaign spending is by far the most important factor differentiating winning from losing incumbents: almost 30% of the difference in support between winning and losing incumbents is directly attributable to the challenger's campaign spending.

Of the remaining independent variables, those involving characteristics of the incumbent made the largest contribution to the success or failure of incumbent senator's reelection campaigns. Defeated incumbents were particularly harmed by intraparty opposition, scandals, and political controversies. Other major factors that contributed to incumbent defeats were politically experienced challengers, support for the opposition party among a state's voters, and unfavorable national political conditions.

Conclusions

Based on the findings presented in this study, candidate characteristics had the strongest influence on the outcomes of recent Senate elections. In Senate contests involving an incumbent, the incumbent's record and the challenger's qualifications and financial resources were the most important factors influencing the outcome; in contests for open seats, the relative experience and financial resources of the candidates were the most important determinants of the outcome.

The challenger's campaign expenditures are the single most important variable affecting an incumbent senator's chance of being reelected. Although an incumbent faced with a well-financed challenger can usually respond by increasing his or her own campaign spending, the incumbent's spending has much less impact on the outcome of a Senate race than the challenger's spending.

Although the candidates' records, qualifications, and financial resources were the most important factors influencing the results of Senate elections, national political conditions also had a significant influence on election outcomes. The impact of national political conditions on the results of Senate elections was not simply due to strategic behavior on the part of candidates and contributors (Jacobson and Kernell 1983).

One of the most important trends in U.S. electoral politics in recent years has been a shift from party-centered to candidate-centered campaigns. This trend has had at least two major consequences for Senate elections. First, two-party competition has spread to every region of the country. In Senate elections, no state can be considered safe for either party. Second, money is probably more important than ever, especially for challengers and candidates for open seats. The weakening of party loyalties in the electorate means that candidates must increasingly rely on personal appeal to gain votes. Incumbents can use the perquisites of office for this purpose; challengers have to spend money.

In addition to these conclusions about the determinants of Senate election outcomes, the findings underscore the importance of the informational context of electoral decision making. The quality and quantity of information available to voters regarding the characteristics, records, and positions of candidates for office determine what factors will be weighed in their decision-making process. Senate elections differ from House elections not simply because of differences between the Senate and House as institutions but also because of differences in the

Table 4. Contributions of Variables to Difference in Support between Winning and Losing Incumbents

Independent Variable	Net Impact (Winners − Losers) (%)
State political characteristics	
State partisanship	1.0
State ideology	0.5
State size	0.0
Subtotal	1.5
Incumbent characteristics	
Ideological distance	0.4
Scandal	0.7
Political controversy	0.4
Health	0.4
Primary contest margin	1.1
Subtotal	3.0
Challenger characteristics	
Challenger political experience	1.0
Celebrity challenger	0.4
Subtotal	1.4
Campaign spending	
Incumbent spending	-0.4
Challenger spending	4.6
Subtotal	4.2
National political conditions	
National party competence	0.7
Midterm	0.7
Subtotal	1.4
Total explained difference	11.5
Not explained	4.1
Total difference	15.6

information available to voters about Senate and House candidates. Media coverage of senators and Senate campaigns and the ability of Senate challengers to use television advertising make it more difficult for Senate than for House incumbents to control the flow of information to constituents between or during campaigns. A competitive electoral environment depends upon the ability and willingness of challengers and the news media to provide voters with critical information about the performance of incumbents.

Appendix: Measures of Independent Variables

The partisan and ideological orientations of the electorate in each state were measured by using data from CBS News-*New York Times* surveys conducted between 1974 and 1984 and compiled by Wright, Erickson, and McIver (1985). No data were available for Alaska or Hawaii. The partisan orientation of the electorate was measured by the difference between the percentage of Democrats in a state and the percentage of Republicans in a state; similarly, the ideological orientation of the electorate was measured by the difference between the percentage of liberals and the percentage of conservatives. The estimates for less populous states were based on relatively small samples. The estimated partisanship scores for two states—Wyoming and South Dakota—were out of line with both election results and voter registration statistics. We corrected the partisanship scores for these two states by using the average difference in party registration between 1974 and 1986. When the vote for the incumbent was the dependent variable, these measures of partisanship and ideology were transformed to correspond to the party affiliation of the incumbent senator.

The number of House districts in a state was used to measure state population.

The ideological distance between a senator and the average voter in a state was measured by comparing the liberalism or conservatism of the senator's voting record with the ideological orientation of the state's electorate. We measured the liberalsim or conservatism of senators' voting records by combining ratings of the liberal Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA), using the formula L = ADA rating/(ADA rating + ACA rating), where L is a senator's liberalism score. We then subtracted the average liberalism score for all senators (52%) from each senator's score. Similarly, we computed a liberalism score for each state by taking the difference between a state's liberal-conservative score and the average score for all 48 states. Ideological distance was measured by taking the absolute value of the difference between the senator's adjusted liberalism score and the state's adjusted liberalism score.

Campaign spending was measured by adjusting each candidate's reported campaign expenditures for inflation and population size. We controlled for inflation by measuring campaign spending in constant 1974 dollars. The procedure used to control for differences in state population was more complicated. Each candidate's total spending in thousands of 1974 dollars was divided by the number of congressional districts in a state plus a constant. This constant was based on an estimate of the relative effects of fixed costs and population-dependent costs on total campaign spending in Senate elections.

In order to estimate the size of the constant in the population adjustment formula I performed a regression analysis with campaign spending (in 1974 dollars) as the dependent variable and the number of House districts in a state as the independent variable. Assuming that on average the level of campaign spending across different states reflects differences in the costs of campaigning, the size of the constant relative to the slope of the regression line should reflect the relative size of fixed and population-dependent costs in Senate campaigns. We obtained the following results: for incumbent spending, expenditures = 441,000 + (36,200 × districts); and for challenger spending, expenditures = 280,000 + (29,500 × districts). Thus, for both incumbents and challengers, the constant was approximately 10 times the size of the slope. I therefore used the number 10 as the constant in my population adjustment formula.

Scandals, political controversies, and concerns about the incumbent's health or physical conditions were measured by using dummy variables. The presence or absence of each of these issues was coded on the basis of information contained in the special pre-election issue of *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.* An incident was coded as a scandal if there were allegations in the media of illegal activities involving the incumbent; political controversies involved incidents that were reported by the media and raised questions about the incumbent's honesty, judgment, or competence; health concerns were coded as an issue in the campaign if the incumbent's physical condition was mentioned as a potential political problem in the pre-election report. A brief description of each of these incidents is presented in Table A-1.

In order to measure the extent of *intraparty opposition* to the incumbent I used a dummy variable to indicate whether or not the incumbent had a primary contest and a second variable which measured the incumbent's percentage

Table A-1. Special Conditions

Year	State	Party	Candidate	Type	Description
1974	Colorado	R	Dominick	H	difficulty walking due to back injury
1974	Colorado	R	Dominick	C	handling of contributions from milk producers while chairman of Republican Senate Campaign Committee
1974	Kansas	R	Dole	C	outspoken support for President Nixon as chairman of Republican National Committee
1974	South Dakota	D	McGovern	C	disastrous presidential campaign
1976	Indiana	D	Hartke	C	excessive foreign travel
1976	Maryland	R	Beall	C	secret $250 thousand campaign contribution from White House in 1970
1976	Nevada	D	Cannon	C	gifts and campaign contributions from corporations concerned with subcommittee
1976	New Mexico	D	Montoya	S	use of staff to manage business properties; space leased to post office in shopping center owned by senator; tax audit blocked
1978	Massachusetts	R	Brooke	S	lied about financial worth in divorce proceedings; mother received $72 thousand in fraudulent medicaid payments
1978	Michigan	R	Griffin	C	announced retirement from Senate, then changed his mind

Table A-1 (continued)

Year	State	Party	Candidate	Type	Description
1978	West Virginia	D	Randolph	C	indecisiveness on Panama Canal Treaty vote
1980	Arizona	R	Goldwater	H	hip ailment, difficulty walking
1980	Georgia	D	Talmadge	S	financial misconduct and alcoholism
1980	Washington	D	Magnuson	H	difficulty walking and inability to campaign energetically
1984	Iowa	R	Jepsen	S	membership in "health spa" used for prostitution
1984	Oregon	R	Hatfield	C	wife received $55 thousand for real estate work for Greek financier backing African oil pipeline supported by senator
1986	Idaho	R	Symms	C	personal eccentricities; alleged drunkenness on Senate floor
1986	New York	R	D'Amato	C	contributions from brokerage firms while chairman of securities subcommittee
1986	North Dakota	R	Andrews	C	use of private detectives to investigate opponents; controversial medical malpractice lawsuit
1986	South Dakota	R	Abdnor	C	"misstatements" regarding farm problems
1986	Washington	R	Gorton	C	vote trading on judicial appointments
1986	Wisconsin	R	Kasten	S	arrest for drunken driving; association with fraudulent real estate deal; failure to file income tax returns

Note: C = controversy; H = health problems; S = scandal.

margin of victory over his closest primary challenger. If the incumbent did not have a primary contest, the victory margin was scored as zero. Margin of victory was used rather than the incumbent's share of the primary vote because it is not as sensitive to the number of candidates running in the primary.

The challenger's political experience was measured by an index ranging from zero to three. A score of zero was assigned to a challenger who had never held elected office; a score of one was assigned to a challenger who had been elected to the state legislature or to a local office representing fewer than 100 thousand people; a score of two was assigned to a challenger who had been elected to a local office representing over 100 thousand people, a statewide office other than governor, or the House of Representatives; a score of three was assigned to a challenger who had been elected governor of the state.

A challenger was classified as a celebrity if he was a prominent public figure because of his activities before seeking elected office. Brief descriptions of these challengers and their activities are included in Table A-2.

National party competence scores for each election year were taken from the results of the last Gallup poll before the election that asked respondents to compare the abilities of the two major parties

Table A-2. Celebrity Challengers

Year	State	Party	Candidate	Previous Activities
1974	South Dakota	R	Thorsness	Vietnam POW
1976	California	R	Hayakawa	President of San Francisco State University involved in confrontation with student demonstrators
1976	New Mexico	R	Schmitt	astronaut
1976	New York	D	Moynihan	White House advisor, ambassador to India, UN ambassador
1984	Michigan	R	Lousma	astronaut

to handle the most important problem facing the country. A score was obtained by taking the difference between the percentage of respondents favoring the Democratic party and the percentage of respondents favoring the Republican party. Where the vote for the incumbent was the dependent variable, this score was recoded to correspond to the party affiliation of the incumbent senator.

The midterm election variable was coded as one if a Senate contest took place during a midterm election with a Democratic president, minus one if it took place during a midterm election with a Republican president, and zero if it took place in a presidential election year. When the vote for the incumbent was the dependent variable, the midterm election variable was recoded to correspond to the party affiliation of the incumbent Senator.

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1987 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Jeffrey Segal played a major role in the development of the ideas underlying this paper. I would also like to thank Albert Cover and Ronald Rapoport for their many helpful comments and suggestions.

1. Kenney and Rice (1984) found that the relative divisiveness of Democratic and Republican Senate primaries affected the outcome of the general election. They did not distinguish between primaries in the incumbent's and challenger's parties. I would not expect the divisiveness of the challenger's primary to have the same impact on the general election as the divisiveness of the incumbent's primary. A closely contested primary in the challenger's party could reflect either the absence of a strong contender or a strong field of candidates attracted by the perceived vulnerability of the incumbent. Moreover, I would not expect intraparty divisions in the challenger's party to be as salient as those involving an incumbent. When the challenger's margin of victory in the primary was included in a multiple regression analysis, it had a negligible impact on the outcome of the general election.

References

Abramowitz, Alan I. 1980. A Comparison of Voting for U.S. Senator and Representative. *American Political Science Review* 74:633–40.

Abramowitz, Alan I., Albert D. Cover, and Helmut Norpoth. 1986. The President's Party in Midterm Elections: Going from Bad to Worse. *American Journal of Political Science* 30:562–76.

Abramowitz, Alan I., and Jeffrey A. Segal. 1986. Determinants of the Outcomes of U.S. Senate Elections. *Journal of Politics* 48:433–39.

Clark, Peter, and Susan Evans. 1983. *Covering Campaigns: Journalism in Congressional Elections.* Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Cover, Albert D. 1986. Presidential Evaluations and Voting for Congress. *American Journal of Political Science* 30: 786–801.

Fenno, Richard. 1982. *The United States Senate: A Bicameral Perspective.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Froman, Lewis A. 1967. *The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules, and Procedures.* Boston: Little Brown.

Glantz, Stanton A., Alan I. Abramowitz, and Michael P. Burkart. 1976. Election Outcomes: Whose Money Matters? *Journal of Politics* 38:1033–38.

Green, Donald P., and Jonathan S. Krasno. 1986. Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections. University of California, Berkeley. Typescript.

Hess, Stephen. 1986. *The Ultimate Insiders: U.S. Senators in the National Media.* Washington: Brookings.

Hibbing, John R., and Sara L. Brandes. 1981. State Population and the Electoral Success of U.S. Senators. *American Journal of Political Science* 25:808–19.

Hinckley, Barbara. 1980. House Reelections and Senate Defeats: The Role of the Challenger. *British Journal of Political Science* 10:441–60.

Holm, John D., and John P. Robinson. 1978. Ideological Identification and the American Voter. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 42:235–46.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1978. The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections. *American Political Science Review* 72:469–91.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1980. *Money in Congressional Elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jacobson, Gary C., and Samuel Kernell. 1983. *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, 2d edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jacobson, Gary C., and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1987. Context and Choice in Two Senate Elections. Delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago.

Kenney, Patrick J., and Tom W. Rice. 1984. The Effect of Primary Divisiveness in Gubernatorial and Senatorial Elections. *Journal of Politics* 46:904–15.

Kernell, Samuel. 1977. Presidential Popularity and Negative Voting: An Alternative Explanation of the Midterm Congressional Decline of the President's Party. *American Political Science Review* 71:44–66.

Kramer, Gerald H. 1971. Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964. *American Political Science Review* 65:131–43.

Levitin, Teresa E., and Warren E. Miller. 1979. Ideological Interpretations of Presidential Elections. *American Political Science Review* 73:751–71.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Tom W. Rice. 1985. Are Senate Election Outcomes Predictable? *PS* 18:745–54.

Mann, Thomas E., and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1980. Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections. *American Political Science Review* 74:617–32.

Ornstein, Norman J. 1981. The House and the Senate in a New Congress. In *The New Congress*, ed, Thomas E. Mann and author. Washington: American Enterprise Institute.

Peters, John G., and Susan Welch. 1980. The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections. *American Political Science Review* 74:697–708.

Tufte, Edward R. 1975. Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections. *American Political Science Review* 69:812–26.

Westlye, Mark C. 1983. Competitiveness of Senate Seats and Voting Behavior in Senate Elections. *American Journal of Political Science* 27:253–83.

Wright, Gerald C., and Michael B. Berkman. 1986. Candidates and Policy in United States Senate Elections. *American Political Science Review* 80:567–88.

Wright, Gerald C., Robert S. Erikson, and John P. McIver. 1985. Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey Data. *Journal of Politics* 47:479–89.

Alan I. Abramowitz is Professor of Political Science, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322.

ELECTIONS, COALITIONS, AND LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES

DAVID AUSTEN-SMITH
JEFFREY BANKS
University of Rochester

Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game between the parties in the elected legislature. This game is essentially defined by the vote shares each party receives in the general election, and the parties' electoral policy positions. At the electoral stage parties and voters are strategic in that they take account of the legislative implications of any electoral outcome. We solve for equilibrium electoral positions by the parties and final policy outcomes.

Spatial theories of elections and legislatures are now well established if not thoroughly worked out (for recent reviews, see Austen-Smith 1983; Calvert 1986; Shepsle 1986). For the most part, theories of elections and theories of legislatures have developed independently of one another. This is unfortunate because, inter alia, voters are interested in policy outcomes, not policy promises. And policy outcomes are determined within an elected legislature that typically comprises representatives of several districts or political parties. Rational voters, therefore, will take into account the subsequent legislative game in making their decisions at the electoral stage of the process. In turn, rational candidates will take account of such deliberations in selecting their electoral strategy and subsequent legislative behavior conditional on electoral success. So to understand more fully both electoral and legislative behavior—in the sense of being able to explain and predict policy positions, policy outcomes, and coalition structures—it is necessary to develop a theory of both political arenas simultaneously.

We analyze a sequential model of electoral and legislative decision making in a three-party proportional representation (PR) system. Following an election, parties attempt to form a governing coalition, which subsequently chooses a final policy outcome. The procedure by which a government is formed constitutes a noncooperative bargaining game among the parties. This structure generates a unique policy prediction given the electoral platforms and vote shares of the represented parties. Thus upon observing the platforms selected by the parties, voters can deduce the policy consequences of any distribution of votes. This implies that voters are able to determine how best to cast their votes. And this in turn allows the parties to condition their choice of platform on the voters' optimal responses and therefore on the ultimate legislative implications.

The rationale for starting with the assumption of PR is twofold: first, it

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 82 NO. 2 JUNE 1988

allows us to examine coalition formation in legislatures using the party as the unit of analysis; second, the discreteness problem induced by any plurality system is absent—that is, under PR, the number of legislative seats won by a party may be treated as essentially proportional to the number of votes that party attracts. And in addition to PR being an important electoral mechanism in most of western continental Europe, there is renewed analytical interest in PR and other alternative rules to simple majority or plurality voting (e.g. Greenberg and Shepsle 1987; Greenberg and Weber 1985; Sugden 1984). But to our knowledge, in all of this work the voters are assumed to vote over *candidates* and not over *final policies.* As the remarks above suggest, this is a misspecification of the choice set. Although candidate characteristics other than policy positions surely matter in elections (Enelow and Hinich 1984), it is inappropriate to ignore the *legislative* implications of electing one candidate over another, as is explicitly done in the sources cited above. Likewise, while there are strategic models of legislative coalition formation and bargaining (e.g. McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer 1978; Riker 1962; Schofield 1985), none of these explicitly considers the *electoral* implications of the legislative behavior studied.

The notion that a political model should involve both electoral and legislative stage is of course not new. Downs (1957) examines a fairly informal model in which a legislature is formed via PR, and then simple majority voting within the legislature determines the government. His conclusions are imprecise and vague; and his focus is on showing how any voter's decision calculus is made more difficult when, at the electoral stage, the voter is ignorant of the eventual coalition structure in the legislature. Robertson (1976) analyzes a multidistrict model in which the party whose candidates win the most districts controls the legislature. Thus it is evidently not sensible for a party to maximize votes; what matters is obtaining a controlling number of seats in the legislature. With only two parties and simple majority voting in the legislature, there is no room for postelection coalition-building. Recognizing this, rational voters vote on the basis of party policy, rather than candidate policy. Still, Robertson does not exploit a rigorous strategic model and his conclusions are correspondingly "broad-brush."

Austen-Smith (1981, 1984, 1986) develops a sequence of multidistrict models in which simple plurality voting in districts generates a legislature and voters vote on the basis of legislative policy outcomes. In Austen-Smith 1981 there are several "Downsian" parties, where all party candidates coordinate their policy positions so as to win control of the legislature; but the issue of coalition formation at the legislative stage is ignored. In Austen-Smith 1984 there are only two parties, all candidates belong to one or the other party, and candidates are free to adopt any policy they wish. Thus the analysis focuses on the mechanism that aggregates candidates' electoral positions into party positions at the legislative stage. Finally, in Austen-Smith 1986 it is assumed that all candidates in a multidistrict, simple plurality election are completely independent. In this case, rational voters at the electoral stage will form estimates of (1) which legislature will form, given any list of candidate positions; (2) which coalition will form, given a legislature; and (3) what will be the policy that is implemented, given a coalition. The legislative stage is not formulated explicitly; rather, each component is treated in an essentially probabilistic fashion.

In contrast, the model developed here provides a structure for solving for the policy outcome from the formation of a given legislature, by positing an institution in which the parties attempt to form a government. The typical approach to predicting the formation of coalitions and policy outcomes has been with the theory on cooperative games (cf. McKelvey, Ordeshook, and Winer 1978 and Schofield 1985, inter alia). This approach avoids identifying which of the possible winning coalitions form and instead generates families of coalition-payoff combinations that satisfy certain stability properties. Since our goal is to allow the parties and voters to "look ahead" to the future consequences of current actions, we prefer instead to adopt an approach that might give unique behavioral predictions at the legislative stage as a function of the results from the electoral stage. Hence we adopt a noncooperative approach to coalition formation that, given the generic nonexistence of the core, necessitates the imposition of some exogenous institutional structure to the problem. Thus we are trading off generality in favor of analytic tractability; this is in the spirit of recent work that examines outcomes as a function of institutions as well as preferences (e.g. Ferejohn and Krehbiel 1987; Shepsle 1979).

The particular institutional feature we have in mind is the widespread convention of first asking the party with the largest number of votes to attempt to form a winning coalition, that is, a government (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1986, tbl. 39). If this party is unsuccessful, the party with the next largest number of votes is allowed to try to form a government, and so on. In the event that no government is able to form, a "caretaker" government forms that is assumed to make the choice of legislative outcomes "equitably."

Once the general election results are determined, the mechanism described generates a noncooperative bargaining game in the legislature. Given parties' electoral platforms, this game has a unique equilibrium outcome for any distribution of electoral votes across parties. An outcome in the model is a winning coalition, a legislative policy position implemented by that coalition, and a distribution of portfolios across the coalition. Because only one policy can be implemented and parties have different "preferences" over what it should be, coalition governments are sustained partly through sharing the benefits of being a member of the government. These benefits are modeled here as portfolios, and a party can be induced to join a government and compromise over the policy choice by offering it some portfolios. Thus parties have an incentive to join a government other than policy implementation alone. And, as we shall see, this incentive is important in supporting equilibrium policy positions.

Voters in the model care about final policy outcomes and not about party platforms per se or about the distribution of portfolios in any resulting government. Voters are also presumed to be rational. Given a list of electoral platforms of parties and given the structure of the legislative bargaining game, voters can compute the final legislative policy decision as a function of the distribution of electoral votes. Therefore, given everyone else's voting behavior, each individual will cast his or her vote to promote the final policy outcome he or she most prefers. In a two-party, simple plurality election, this amounts to voting sincerely over the party platforms. In a multiparty election with proportional representation, in which individuals cast at most one vote, sincere voting is typically not rational (Austen-Smith 1987). Furthermore, such voting behavior effectively eliminates any stable set of party policy positions; strategic (rational) voting here is necessary to support electoral equilibria.

In the next section we present the model of electoral and legislative behavior formally. We then provide a characterization of a class of equilibria generated by the induced multistage game. There are three features of the equilibria identified worth anticipating:

1. Given the electoral policy positions, only the rank order of the electoral vote shares matters in determining the winning coalition (government) that emerges from the legislative bargaining process. Assuming no one party receives an overall majority of votes, the government will comprise the largest and smallest legislative parties; the middle-ranked party in terms of votes will be excluded. Thus a party's influence in the legislature is not monotonic in its vote share, and the winning coalition may not be of minimum size (in the sense of Riker 1962) or connected (in the sense of Axelrod 1970).
2. The equilibrium electoral policy positions of the parties are symmetrically distributed around the median voter's most-preferred policy, with one party adopting this position to contest the election. This party, however, receives the fewest votes. As a result, the *expected* legislative policy outcome (i.e., prior to the legislative process being completed) is the median position; but the *actual* outcome in any election period will be skewed away from this point.
3. Not all individuals vote sincerely relative to the party positions in equilibrium. Therefore, the equilibrium party vote shares will not necessarily reflect the distribution of preferences of the electorate. Furthermore, as the minimum number of votes necessary for a party to be elected to the legislature goes down, the number of individuals not voting sincerely goes up.

Advocates of proportional representation often predicate their arguments upon two premises. First, the composition of the legislature will mirror the preference distribution of the population at large; second, legislative outcomes will reflect the relative weights of the elected parties in the legislature (see Sugden 1984, 31–33 for a discussion). The results reported here suggest that neither of these premises may be well founded. We will take up these issues at greater length later.

The Model

There are three parties, α, β, and γ, where $\Omega = \{\alpha,\beta,\gamma\}$, competing on a one-dimensional policy space $P \subset R$, for the votes from a finite set N of individuals. Assume $|P| < \infty$, and $|N| \equiv n$ is sufficiently large ($\geqslant 15$) and odd. Let $S(\Omega)$ denote the set of all subsets of Ω. At time $t = -2$ the parties simultaneously announce policy positions p_k in P, where $\mathbf{p} = (p_\alpha, p_\beta, p_\gamma)$; and at $t = -1$ the voters each cast a single ballot for one of the three parties. The method of determining a legislature is by proportional representation, where a party needs at least s votes to gain entrance to the legislature. We assume that s is odd and $s \in [3, 1/3 \cdot n)$. Let w_k be the proportion of votes party k receives in the election at $t = -1$, and let $\mathbf{w} = (w_\alpha, w_\beta, w_\gamma)$. If one or more parties receives less than s votes, we normalize the weights of the remaining parties so that they sum to 1. For example, if only party γ gets less than s votes, then $w_\alpha' = w_\alpha/(w_\alpha + w_\beta)$. For what follows we assume that all parties receive at least s votes, so that we use the vector $\mathbf{w}$ rather than $\mathbf{w}'$ in establishing legislative influence.

For all coalitions $C \in S(\Omega)$ let

$$w_C = \sum_{k \in C} w_k$$

and define $D(\mathbf{w}) = \{C \in S(\Omega) : w_C > 1/2\}$. We assume that $D(\mathbf{w})$ identifies the set of winning coalitions in the legislature given the vector of seats $\mathbf{w}$. Also, for all $k \in \Omega$ let $D_k(\mathbf{w}) = \{C \in D(\mathbf{w}) : k \in C\}$ be the set of winning coalitions of which party k is a member.

From $t = 1$ on, the parties attempt to form a *government,* or a winning coalition, that will collectively choose (1) a policy $y \in P$ and (2) a distribution of portfolios among the parties, which we characterize as choosing a distribution of a fixed amount G of transferable benefits across the parties; let $\Delta(G) = \{(g_\alpha, g_\beta, g_\gamma)\colon g_k \geqslant 0, \forall\, k \in \Omega$ and

$$\sum_{k \in \Omega} g_k = G\}$$

be the set of such distributions. The process by which a government is formed is as follows: At $t = 1$, the party with the largest number of seats proposes a coalition $C_1 \in D(\mathrm{w})$, a policy $y_1 \in P$, and a distribution of benefits $g_1 \in \Delta(G)$, where $g_1 = (g_{1\alpha}, g_{1\beta}, g_{1\gamma})$. The members of the coalition either accept or reject the proposal. If the parties that accept the proposal constitute a winning coalition, then they form a government, implement y_1, and distribute g_1. If not enough parties accept the proposal, then at time $t = 2$ the party with the second highest number of seats proposes a coalition, a policy, and a distribution of benefits; and again the members of the proposed coalition either accept or reject. If a government has not formed after the $t = 3$ proposal, then a "caretaker" government is implemented which "equitably" makes the policy and benefits decisions.

Given this description, then, a *strategy* for party k consists of three elements: an *electoral position* $p_k \in P$, a *proposal* $\Gamma_k \in D(\mathrm{w}) \times P \times \Delta(G)$, and a *response strategy* $r_k\colon D_k(\mathrm{w}) \times P \times \Delta(G) \times T \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ specifying whether or not party k accepts (1) or rejects (0) a proposal that includes k in the coalition, where this response may be a function of the time [$t = 1,2,3$] at which it is offered. Note that our definition of a proposal is *ahistorical*; while a complete description of a strategy would imply the proposal being a function of past electoral positions, proposals, and responses, the nature of the model eliminates the necessity of carrying around this extra notation. Let $\Gamma = (\Gamma_\alpha, \Gamma_\beta, \Gamma_\gamma)$, and $r = (r_\alpha, r_\beta, r_\gamma)$. A *strategy* for voter i is a function $\sigma_i\colon P \times P \times P \rightarrow \Delta(\Omega)$ specifying the probability that i votes for each party given their electoral positions. Let $\sigma_i(\mathrm{p}) = (\sigma_i(\alpha), \sigma_i(\beta), \sigma_i(\gamma))$, where $\sigma_i(k)$ is the probability that voter i votes for party k and $\sigma(\mathrm{p}) = (\sigma_1(\mathrm{p}), \ldots, \sigma_n(\mathrm{p}))$.

Voters are assumed to be purely policy oriented, with preferences characterized by quadratic utility functions $u_i(\bullet) = u(\bullet; x_i)$ over the policy space P, where x_i is voter i's ideal point in P. It is assumed that $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is common knowledge and ordered so that $\forall\, i < n$, $x_i < x_{i+1}$. Further, assume that voter ideal points are distributed symmetrically about the median voter's ideal point. Let $\mu = (n + 1)/2$ be the median voter. The assumption of quadratic preferences implies that if the policy outcome from the legislative stage is uncertain but there exists a probability distribution $\varrho(\bullet)$ over P, then the *expected utility* for voter i is

$$E_\varrho[u_i(\bullet)] = -(y^\varrho - x_i)^2 - s^\varrho,$$

where y^ϱ is the mean and s^ϱ is the variance of the distribution ϱ.

Parties will have utility functions defined over $\Delta(G)$ as well as, at the *legislative* stage, over P. However, their ex ante policy preferences will be a function only of the *difference* between their electoral positions and the final policy outcome. The motivation for this is as follows: Voters and parties are actually engaged in a continuing relationship that spans a number of elections. Voters therefore have the ability to condition future decisions on the past performance of the parties; in particular, they can condition their votes on the degree to which party promises (i.e., electoral positions) differ from the actual policy outcomes as a way of imposing costs on the parties at the legislative stage for deviating from their announced positions. Even if the parties are only concerned with winning elections and collecting the transferable benefits, *future* benefits will be a function of the current difference between the electoral position of a party and the final policy outcome from the legislature if the voters adopt these "retrospective" strategies. (These strategies are justified as equilibrium behavior in a model of two-candidate competition with repeated elections in Austen-Smith and Banks 1987.) Hence rational parties will take this difference into account when choosing electoral positions and legislative proposals. Since it is in the interest of the voters to adopt these strategies, it seems consistent, in a "single-election" model, to characterize party preferences as we do.

This assumption also implies that if a party receives less than s votes and hence is not represented in the legislature, its payoff would *not* be a function of the final policy outcome. Thus we assume that party preferences are represented by a utility function taking on the values $U_k(y,g;\mathbf{p})$ if elected and $-c$ otherwise, where later we assume that the "cost" c is sufficiently large. The function U_k is assumed to be quasi-linear, that is, additively separable and linear in g_k and quadratic in y: $U_k(y,g;\mathbf{p}) = g_k - (y - p_k)^2$, where p_k is the electoral position of party k. Again, use of quadratic utility functions implies that the *expected utility* for party k generated by the distribution $\varrho(\bullet)$ over P and $f(\bullet)$ over $\Delta(G)$ is

$$E_{f,\varrho}[U_k(\bullet,\bullet;\mathbf{p})] = g_k^f - (y^\varrho - p_k)^2 - s^\varrho,$$

where y^ϱ and s^ϱ are defined as above and g_k^f is the mean value of g_k with respect to the distribution $f(\bullet)$.

A sequential equilibrium to this game will consist of voter and party strategies that are optimal for each participant at every point in time, given the assumed equilibrium behavior of the others. To characterize these equilibria we first determine the equilibrium behavior at the legislative stage for any vectors $\mathbf{p}$ of policy positions and $\mathbf{w}$ of party weights. By the sequential nature of the decision making at the legislative stage, we initially solve for the optimal proposals and responses at time $t = 3$. This then allows us to solve for the optimal behavior at $t = 2$ as a function of the optimal behavior to occur at $t = 3$, and so on. As we shall see, the equilibrium prediction for the legislative stage will in general be unique for any $(\mathbf{p},\mathbf{w})$. Therefore, for any $\mathbf{p}$ and set of voting strategies $\sigma(\mathbf{p})$, voters can deduce the final legislative outcome. This allows us to analyze equilibrium behavior at the voting stage, for all party positions $\mathbf{p}$, by solving for the optimal behavior of the voters. In equilibrium, the vector of party weights $\mathbf{w}$ will be a known function of the party positions $\mathbf{p}$, where this functional relationship will be determined by the voting strategies σ. This then constitutes the basis for analyzing the competition among the parties at the electoral stage as well, since now the legislative outcome is a function only of the positions the parties choose.

We shall initially describe the equilibrium behavior at the legislative stage and then work back to the voting and electoral stages.

Equilibrium Behavior

Equilibrium Legislative Outcomes

As described above, in this section the vector of party policies $\mathbf{p} = (p_\alpha, p_\beta, p_\gamma)$ and weights $\mathbf{w} = (w_\alpha, w_\beta, w_\gamma)$ are treated parametrically. It will be convenient to relabel the parties according to their relative positions on the policy space P. Let $p_L = \min\{p_\alpha, p_\beta, p_\gamma\}$, $p_M = mid\{p_\alpha, p_\beta, p_\gamma\}$, $p_R = \max\{p_\alpha, p_\beta, p_\gamma\}$; similarly define w_L, w_M, and w_R as the weights of the *left*, *middle*, and *right* parties, respectively, and let $\Omega = \{L,M,R\}$. If the weights of any two parties are equal while the remaining party has less weight, then it is assumed that prior to $t = 1$ a fair coin is flipped to decide which party will make the $t = 1$ proposal; a similar assumption holds when the two parties have the lowest weight or when all parties have equal weight. Most of the following analysis will focus on the case where each party has a distinct electoral position; however, the outcomes when some of the positions coincide will be easily derived from our proposition 1.

If only two parties receive the necessary s votes, then, as discussed in the account of the model, the weights of the parties in the legislature are normalized to reflect this fact. Thus the party with the higher vote share will hold a majority of the seats in the legislature. If the parties have the same vote shares, then it is assumed that the coin flip determines who will hold the majority in the legislature. In what follows we assume that all three parties receive at least s votes; given the above description of events, the subsequent analysis is easily extended to the case where only two parties are represented.

We assume that G is sufficiently large ($\geqslant |P|^2$) that it would always be possible for a coalition to form at any time and sufficiently large that any caretaker government would have the ability to, and in fact would, choose a policy $y \in P$ and a distribution $g \in \Delta(G)$ such that the utilities for the parties would all be equal to zero in the event of no agreement at $t = 1$, 2, or 3. Note that we could have equivalently assumed that there existed a positive coefficient on the linear term in the parties' utility functions and assume that this coefficient, rather than G, were sufficiently large.

If any party has a majority of the seats, say, for example, party L, it is clear that the only equilibrium is for that party to choose $y_1 = p_L$ and $g_{1L} = G$, since it needs no other party to form a government. Furthermore, by the assumption of complete information with regard to the payoffs of the parties, we need only consider minimum winning coalitions, so that all members of a proposed coalition must agree to the proposal.

Suppose party k is attempting to form a government. In order to induce party j to agree to a proposal, party k must offer j at least as much as j could get by rejecting k's proposal; that is, party j's *opportunity cost* of joining the coalition. Let u_j^t be party j's opportunity cost at time t. It is clear from the above assumptions that $u_L^3 = u_M^3 = u_K^3 = 0$, since by rejecting a proposal at $t = 3$ each party guarantees a payoff of zero from the ensuing caretaker government. If a government would implement (y_3, g_3) at $t = 3$, then the opportunity cost for party k at $t = 2$ would be determined by k's utility from the outcome (y_3, g_3); that is, $u_k^2 = U_k(y_3, g_3;\mathrm{p})$, since this is the utility k would receive from rejecting a proposal at $t = 2$. Similarly, if (y_2, g_2) would be implemented at $t = 2$, then $u_k^1 = U_k(y_2, g_2;\mathrm{p})$.

In general the parties' opportunity costs will depend on the responses of the parties to subsequent proposals. Let

$$\delta(C,y,g,t) = \prod_{k \epsilon C} r_k(C,y,g,t)$$

be the product of party responses to a proposal of (C,y,g) at time t; thus $\delta(C,y,g,t)$ will be one if all parties agree to the proposal and zero otherwise. Since only minimum winning coalitions will be proposed, $\delta(C,y,g,t)$ is sufficient to deduce whether a government will form at t.

Definition. *Given proposals* Γ *and responses* r, *the opportunity cost of party* k *at time* t, $u_k^t(\Gamma, r)$, *is*

$$u_k^3(\Gamma, r) = 0$$

$$u_k^2(\Gamma,) = \delta(C_3, y_3, g_3, 3) \bullet \mathrm{U}_\mathrm{k}(y_3, g_3;\mathrm{p})$$

$$u_k^1(\Gamma, r) = \delta(C_2, y_2, g_2, 2) \bullet U_k(y_2, g_2;\mathrm{p}) + (1 - \delta(C_2, y_2, g_2, 2)) \bullet u_k^2$$

Given a list Γ of proposals, then, we can inductively define equilibrium responses for the parties. To determine the equilibrium proposals for the parties, define $\tilde{U}_k(\Gamma_k, r) = U_k(y,g;\mathrm{p})\cdot\delta(C,y,g,k)$ as the utility for party k generated by the proposal $\Gamma_k = (C,y,g)$ if Γ is accepted.

DEFINITION. *A legislative equilibrium consists of response strategies* $r^*(\bullet) = (r^*_L(\bullet), r^*_M(\bullet), r^*_R(\bullet))$ *and proposals* $\Gamma^* = (\Gamma^*_L, \Gamma^*_M, \Gamma^*_R)$ *such that* $\forall\, t$, $\forall\, k \in \Omega$,

$$\forall\, \Gamma,\ r^*_k(C,y,g,t) = 1 \text{ if } U_k(y,g{:}p) \geqslant u^t_k(\Gamma, r^*) \text{ and } 0 \text{ else}$$

$$\Gamma^*_k \text{ maximizes } \tilde{U}_k(\Gamma_k, r^*)$$

The logic of this definition follows from the sequential nature of the actions: since $r^*_k(\circ,3)$ is known for all $k \in \Omega$, the optimal proposal from the party with the lowest weight can be explicitly solved. This then generates $r^*_k(\bullet,2)$ so that the optimal proposal at $t = 2$ can be solved, and so on.

The presence of perfect information guarantees that in equilibrium, if there exists a proposal at $t = 3$ that gives the party with the lowest weight and some other party nonnegative utility, then the *equilibrium* proposal at $t = 3$ will be accepted; similar logic holds for $t = 2$ and $t = 1$. Furthermore, if parties k and j agree to form a coalition at $t = k$, it must be that the proposal (y_k, g_k) is such that y_k lies between p_k and p_j and $g_{kk} + g_{kj} = G$; in words, the proposal must be Pareto-efficient for the coalition $C = \{k,j\}$. Also, if j accepts k's proposal, then it must be that either j is receiving exactly its opportunity cost, or $y_k = p_k$ and $g_{kk} = G$, since otherwise k could offer j less than g_{kj} or a policy closer to p_k and still gain j's acceptance. The assumption that G is sufficiently large relative to $|P|$ implies that in equilibrium the proposal by the party with the highest weight will be accepted at an outcome that either is "first-best" for that party or makes the joining party indifferent between accepting and rejecting the proposal. (This is typical of bargaining models with perfect information; see Rubinstein 1982.) To determine who will join this party and at what outcome, then, we need to analyze the equilibrium proposals at $t = 3$ and $t = 2$ decisions to generate the opportunity costs of the parties at $t = 1$.

Suppose that $w_L > w_M > w_R$, so that party R has the lowest weight, and hence makes a proposal at $t = 3$ if no government has yet formed. Given the form of the parties' utility functions, it is clear that party R will attempt to form a coalition with the party whose electoral position p_j is closest to p_R, since the opportunity costs of the other parties are equal. Thus, in this case, R would attempt to form the coalition $\{M,R\}$. Since R cannot implement $y = p_R$ and $g_{RR} = G$, R chooses (y_3, g_3) to solve

$$\max_{y,g}\ g_R - (y - p_R)^2 + \lambda(G - g_R - (y - p_M)^2),$$
$$y \in P,\ g_R \in [0,G].$$

Since the utility functions are separable and quadratic in y, the solution to the above optimization will be

$$y^*_3 = \frac{p_R + p_M}{2} \equiv p_{RM}$$
$$g^*_{3R} = G - (p_M - p_{RM})^2$$
$$g^*_{3M} = (p_M - p_{RM})^2$$

Thus if a government has not formed at $t = 1,2$, then at $t = 3$ the policy outcome of the government will be the midpoint between the electoral positions of R and M, while the benefits G will be distributed in such a way as to give M a utility of exactly zero, that is, M's opportunity cost. (Note: this solution holds if we weaken the assumption on party preferences from quadratic to symmetric concave over policy.)

Notice that this logic is quite general: for any (p,w), the equilibrium proposal at

$t = 3$ will be such that the policy y is the midpoint between the electoral positions of the party with the lowest weight and the party with the nearest electoral position.

At $t = 2$, then, the opportunity costs of the parties will be $u_L^2 = -(p_{RM} - p_L)^2$, $u_M^2 = 0$, and $u_R^2 = G - 2(p_R - p_{RM})^2$. Thus party L will accept a proposal that is "first-best" for party M, $y = p_M$ and $g_M = G$, since this gives L utility of $-(p_M - p_L)^2$, which is greater than $-(p_{RM} - p_L)^2$.

At $t = 1$, then, $u_L^1 = -(p_M - p_L)^2$, $u_M^1 = G$, and $u_R^1 = -(p_R - p_M)^2$, implying that at $t = 1$ the coalition $\{L,R\}$ will form, since party M's opportunity cost at $t = 1$ implies that L could never make a proposal that would keep M indifferent while making L better off but there do exist proposals that make both L and R better off. If $d_L \equiv (p_M - p_L) \geqslant (p_R - p_M) \equiv d_R$, then, as at $t = 3$, the optimal proposal from party L at $t = 1$ will be such that $y = p_{RL}$, and R receives sufficient transferable benefits to meet its opportunity cost. If $d_L < d_R$, then the optimal proposal would be to choose $y = p_M$ and $g_L = G$, since this gives R precisely his opportunity cost and no other proposal would make L better off without making R worse off. Thus if $w_L > w_M > w_R$, the equilibrium policy will either be p_M or p_{LR}, depending on the distances between the electoral positions.

Suppose instead that $w_M > w_L > w_R$. By the same logic as above, at $t = 3$ the coalition $\{M,R\}$ would form, with policy $y_3 = p_{MR}$, and benefits $g_{3M} = (p_{MR} - p_M)^2$, $g_{3R} = G - g_{3M}$. At $t = 2$, then, the coalition $\{L,M\}$ would form with some policy $y_2 \in (p_L, p_M)$, where again the exact policy will be a function of the distances between electoral positions. At $t = 1$, then, the opportunity cost of party R, u_R^1, will be less than $-(p_R - p_M)^2$; hence R will accept a proposal by party M of $y_1 = p_M$ and $g_{1M} = G$. Thus the equilibrium policy outcome when $w_M > w_L > w_R$ will be $y = p_M$, regardless of the distances between the electoral positions.

Note that the above analysis applies directly to the symmetric cases where $w_R > w_M > w_L$ and $w_M > w_R > w_L$. The remaining cases, where party M has the lowest weight, can be analyzed similarly, although in these cases the algebra is somewhat trickier.

The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium coalitions C^* and outcomes y^*, g^* from the legislative stage. The (lengthy) formal statement of the proposition can be found in the Appendix.

PROPOSITION 1. *Let party k offer the proposal at $t = 1$, party h at $t = 2$, and party j at $t = 3$.* (1) *If k has a majority in the legislature, then $y^* = p_k$, $g_k^* = G$;* (2) *If k does not have a majority, then $C^* = \{k,j\}$, y^* lies between p_k and p_{kj}, and*

$$\max g_j^* = (p_k - p_{kj})^2 \text{ if } y^* = p_{kj} \text{ and } 0 \text{ else}$$

$$g_k^* = G - g_j^*,\ g_h^* = 0$$

Thus in equilibrium it will always be the parties with the highest and lowest weights that form the governing coalition. The logic of this follows directly from the recursive nature of the analysis: the party with the middle weight is excluded precisely because it would make the $t = 2$ proposal, thus implying a high opportunity cost at $t = 1$ and hence a degree of bargaining power vis-à-vis the party with the highest weight exceeding that of the party with the lowest weight. The noncooperative bargaining model of coalition formation developed here generates a unique coalition prediction, where this coalition is minimum winning but is not of minimum size (Riker 1962) and is not necessarily connected (Axelrod 1970).

The cases in which the party with the lowest weight is in the middle and $d_L = d_R$ yields a sequential equilibrium prediction that is nonunique. The reason for this is that, at $t = 3$, party M is indifferent between forming a government with L or with R, since either will give M the same payoff. However, the equilibrium payoffs to M depend on exactly this choice at $t = 3$. In particular, M receives a higher payoff if it forms with the party with the highest weight than it would from forming with the party with the middle weight. The selection we make is the equilibrium with the higher payoff for party M, since M could ex ante *credibly* threaten the party with the highest weight that it would take such an (equilibrium) action at $t = 3$ if it were called upon to do so.

It is worth remarking that the prediction in proposition 1 that the government will consist of the parties proposing first and last is not a consequence of the assumption of quasi-linear party preferences. As long as the preferences of the parties are increasing in portfolio benefits and single peaked in policy, this result will hold. The assumption of quasi-linear preferences gives us the ability to solve explicitly for what the ultimate policy and benefits will be, which in turn allows us to solve for the optimal voter and party behavior prior to the legislative stage.

Equilibrium Voting Strategies

Let $y(\mathrm{w},\mathrm{p})$ be the equilibrium policy outcome from the legislative stage given the vector of weights w and positions p. Define $\Lambda(\mathrm{p}) = \{y \in P\colon y = y(\mathrm{w},\mathrm{p})$ for some $\mathrm{w}\}$ to be the set of possible equilibrium policy outcomes given p. The vector of weights w will be determined by the individual voting behavior; in particular, assuming that all voters adopt pure strategies, for any $k \in \Omega$,

$$w_k = |\{i \in N\colon \sigma_i(k) = 1\}|/N$$
$$\equiv v_k(\sigma(\mathrm{p}))/N$$

where $\sigma(\mathrm{p}) = (\sigma_1(\mathrm{p}), \ldots, \sigma_n(\mathrm{p}))$. Thus the probability of any specific policy $y \in \Lambda(\mathrm{p})$ being the final outcome is a function of voter strategies; let $\pi(\bullet|\sigma,\mathrm{p})\colon\Lambda(\mathrm{p}) \rightarrow [0,1]$ denote this probability.

DEFINITION. *For any* $C \in S(\Omega)$, *with* $|C| \geqslant 2$ *and any* $\mathrm{p} \in P^3$, *voter i's sincere strategy relative to C,* $\sigma_i^C(\bullet)$, *is defined as*

$$\sigma_i^C(k') = 1 \textit{ if and only if } u_i(p_{k'}) > \max_{C\backslash\{k'\}} u_i(p_k)$$

Notice that if $|C| = 2$, an individual who votes sincerely relative to C at p does not necessarily vote for the party offering his or her most preferred policy in $\{p_L, p_M, p_R\}$.

DEFINITION. *A voting equilibrium is an n-tuple* $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})$ *such that* $\forall\ \mathrm{p}, \forall\ i \in N, \forall\ \sigma_i(\mathrm{p})$:

$$E_{\pi(\sigma^*,\mathrm{p})}[u_i(y)] \geqslant E_{\pi(\sigma_i,\sigma^*_{-i},\mathrm{p})}[u_i(y)]$$

Thus, given p, a voting equilibrium is simply a Nash equilibrium to the game with players N and payoffs induced by the equilibrium behavior in the legislative game generated by p. For simple plurality, two-candidate electoral competition, Nash equilibrium is too weak a concept; it admits equilibria that are supported only by weakly dominated strategies. Consequently, in such games voter strategies are additionally required to be undominated. In the three-party proportional representation game developed here, however, no strategy is weakly dominated. The reason for this is that in contrast to the two-party case, the final outcome from the legislative game for any p is not monotonic in vote shares: given that no party has an overall majority, it is always the largest and smallest parties that form the government. Thus requiring voter strategies to be undominated is vacuous here, even when two of the three parties adopt identical platforms.

An example will illustrate this fact. Suppose $n = 15$, $s = 3$, and $x_i = i$ for all i

= 1, . . . , 15. Suppose also that $p_L = p_M = 11 < p_R = 12$. Evidently, $u_1(p_M) > u_1(p_R)$. Is voting for R a dominated strategy for 1? The answer is no. To see this, suppose individuals $i = 2, \ldots, 5$ vote for L, individuals $i = 6, \ldots, 11$ vote for M, and $i = 12, \ldots, 15$ vote for R. All these voters are voting sincerely relative to the positions $\mathrm{p} = (11,11,12)$. Since $s = 3$, all parties get elected to the legislature in the absence of 1's vote. If 1 votes sincerely for either L or M, then no party has an overall majority; and the legislative weights of the parties are $w_M > w_L > w_R$ if 1 votes for L, and $w_M > w_L = w_R$ if 1 votes for M. By proposition 1 the final policy outcome from the legislative bargaining process will be $(p_M + p_R)/2 = 11.5$ if 1 votes for L, and will be (in expectation) $1/2 \cdot (p_M + p_R)/2 + 1/2 \cdot p_M = 11.25$ if 1 votes for M. Now assume 1 votes for party R. Then $w_M > w_R > w_L$, in which case the final policy outcome is surely $p_M = 11$. Hence, individual 1 is better off voting for R in this circumstance than he or she is by voting sincerely.

So eliminating voting equilibria involving dominated strategies buys us nothing. Consequently, we make a selection from the set of voting equilibria that is simple, supports an intuitively reasonable class of equilibrium party positions, and has two desirable properties. First, at any equilibrium set of party positions, every voter is decisive between at least two parties. Thus although we cannot apply the "weak dominance" argument for all electoral positions p, in equilibrium each voter will have a nontrivial decision problem in that the final policy outcome will be a function of how he or she votes. Second, at any out-of-equilibrium party positions, the voting equilibrium strategies provide incentives for the parties to "move toward" the equilibrium positions.

The voting equilibrium is described formally and in detail in the Appendix. For current purposes it is sufficient to identify the key features of the equilibrium informally.

PROPOSITION 2. *A voting equilibrium* $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})$ *is well defined for all* $\mathrm{p} \in P \times P \times P$. *It is such that at least one party is penalized (in terms of votes) if, relative to the distribution of voter preferences* (1) *any two parties are "too close,"* (2) *no party is centrally located, or* (3) *parties are "too dispersed."*

Together, conditions (1), (2), and (3) ensure that in equilibrium parties will adopt distinct positions symmetrically distributed about the median of the voter distribution. Exactly what constitutes being "too close" or "too dispersed" will become clear once we analyze the parties' strategic choice of electoral policy platforms.

It is worth noting that in the voting equilibrium we select, no individual votes sincerely relative to Ω for all $\mathrm{p} \in P \times P \times P$. Moreover, as we remarked, if individuals are *constrained* always to vote sincerely, then there is no set of party positions that could be an equilibrium: given any set of party platforms p, there is invariably one party that can unilaterally improve its payoff by deviating from p. From a theoretical perspective, therefore, strategic behavior on the part of the voters is required to generate stable electoral outcomes. And there exists considerable empirical evidence for strategic voting in legislative elections (Riker 1982).

Equilibrium Party Positions

We are now in a position to define the equilibrium path of the entire multistage game by analyzing the electoral game among the parties, where the payoffs are those induced by the equilibrium behavior of the voters at $t = -1$ and the subsequent equilibrium behavior of the parties at the legislative stage. Let

$$\psi_k(\mathrm{p}) = E_{\pi(\sigma^*,\mathrm{p})}[U_k(y^*(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})),\mathrm{p}), g^*(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})),\mathrm{p});\mathrm{p})]$$

Figure 1. Equilibrium Party Positions



be the (expected) indirect utility for party k from the electoral positions p given the equilibrium behavior at the voting stage $\sigma^*(\bullet)$ and at the subsequent legislative stage $y^*(\bullet)$, $g^*(\bullet)$.

DEFINITION. *An electoral equilibrium is a triple* $\mathbf{p}^* = (p_\alpha^*, p_\beta^*, p_\gamma^*)$ *such that* $\forall\, k \in \Omega$, $\forall\, p_k \in P$, $\psi_k(\mathbf{p}^*) \geqslant \psi_k(p_k, p_{-k}^*)$. *For any* $a \in \mathrm{R}$ *define* int$[a]$ *as the smallest integer greater than or equal to a.*

PROPOSITION 3. *Relative to the voting strategies of proposition 2,* $p^* \in P \times P \times P$ *is an electoral equilibrium for any* $s \in [3, n/3)$, *s odd, if and only if*

(1) $p_M^* = x_\mu$

(2) $(p_M^* - p_L^*) = (p_R^* - p_M^*) \in [8/3 \bullet (x_{i^*} - x_\mu), 4 \bullet (x_{j^*} - x_\mu))$, *where* $i^* \equiv \mu + (s -)/2$, $j^* \equiv \mu + \mathit{int}[(n - 1)/4]$

Under the assumption of a symmetric distribution of voter ideal points, at any p* in this class, the equilibrium vote shares $\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\bullet))$ are $w_L = w_R > w_M$, where party M receives *exactly* s votes. Consequently, from the analysis above, the equilibrium policy outcome from the legislative stage will be either p_{LM}^* or p_{MR}^*, with each of these occurring with probability 1/2 due to the equal weights of the extreme parties. Further, in none of the equilibria characterized in proposition 3 is it the case that a voter votes for the party whose platform is farthest from his or her ideal point. Note also that by the assumption of quadratic utilities, all of the equilibria in this class are Pareto-inefficient; that is, everyone would ex ante prefer the outcome $y^* = p_M$, $g_L^* = (1/2) \bullet g = g_R^*$, since this gives the same *mean* utility as all the equilibria but at zero variance. The equilibrium that is Pareto-efficient among the class of equilibria is where the extreme parties adopt the innermost positions defined in proposition 3, condition 2.

Figure 1 gives an example of equilibrium party positions along with the associated voting behavior of the electorate. Define $x(d)$ as the point in P such that in an equilibrium where $(p_R - p_M) = (p_M - p_L) = d$, an individual with $x(d)$ as an ideal point would be indifferent between voting for M and giving M precisely s votes, and voting for R and giving R a subsequent majority in the legislature. Thus $x(d)$ solves

$$-(x - x_\mu)^2 - d^2/4 = -(d - (x - x_\mu))^2$$

Solving this, we find that $x(d) = x_\mu + 3/8 \bullet d$. Proposition 3, condition 2 then implies that M receives at least s votes, and $x(d) \geqslant x_{i^*}$; otherwise voter i^* would prefer to vote for R, thereby upsetting the equilibrium. To see that M receives exactly s votes, suppose that some voter $i > i^*$ were voting for M in an equilibrium described in proposition 3. Then, by switching its vote to R, party M still receives at least s votes, but now party R will surely make the first proposal in the legislature, thus implying that the policy outcome will be p_{RM} with probability 1. It is easy to see that this outcome would be preferred by i to the proposed equilibrium outcome.

Discussion

From the perspective of positive political theory, little is known about the comparative properties of proportional representation and simple plurality decision-making schemes. What is known is largely confined to the abstract structures of various aggregate preference relations. For example, we can say how simple majority preference and the single transferable vote match up on desiderata such as "anonymity," "neutrality," or "independence of irrelevant alternatives"; but we have little idea about how strategic agents—candidates for office, voters, and so on—would behave differentially under these mechanisms or what the difference in the final policy outcomes might be in an otherwise fixed environment.

We developed a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The particular PR mechanism assumed has two parts. First, at the election stage, a fixed standard, or quota, rule determines the composition of the legislature. Second, in the elected legislature, a noncooperative bargaining process determines the membership of the government, the distribution of portfolios across this membership, and the final policy outcome. The legislative bargaining process is defined both by the relative electoral vote shares of parties—the "weights" of the parties in the legislature—and by the policy platforms they adopt to contest the election. The identified equilibria to this game have three main substantive features:

1. The government consists of the parties with the highest and the lowest weights. Hence, the legislative influence of an elected party is not monotonic in its vote share.
2. Parties' electoral platforms are symmetrically distributed about the median voter's ideal point in the one-dimensional issue space. The party adopting this position to contest the election receives the smallest number of votes, and the remaining parties have an equal likelihood of being first-ranked in the legislature. Therefore, by feature 1, the expected final policy outcome will be at the median voter's ideal point; but the realized final outcome will lie between the median and either the rightmost, or the leftmost, party's position.
3. Not all individuals vote sincerely (for the party platforms they most prefer). So even with equilibrium party platforms, vote shares will not reflect the true distribution of preferences of the electorate.

The comparison with the two-party, winner-take-all, electoral mechanism in this environment is straightforward. In this case

1. The party with the most votes has monopolistic control of the legislature. Legislative influence, therefore, is monotonic in votes.
2. In equilibrium, both parties adopt the median voter's position, and this is surely the final policy outcome.
3. All voters vote sincerely, whether the parties adopt the equilibrium policy platforms or not.

In sum, the popular conception that in contrast with simple plurality schemes, proportional representation leads to legislatures—and hence to final policy outcomes—that reflect the variety of interests in the electorate seems mistaken. Such a conception rests on the more or less implicit assumption of nonstrategic behavior by the voters and parties that, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, is unwarranted. This said, two caveats should be noted in regard to the model here.

First, the question of entry into the electoral competition is ignored. This is clearly important, since the number of candidates or parties contesting the election will be functionally dependent on the particular electoral and legislative schemes in place. However, allowing free entry, say, is not going to remove the incentives for strategic behavior by the voters in the election; and the logic of the legislative bargaining process studied here is invariant to the number of parties in the legislature (although the location of the final policy outcome is, of course, sensitive to this number).

Second, the equilibrium location of the three parties' policy platforms depends on the specification of the (equilibrium) voting behavior for any set of platforms. If voting strategies are altered, the associated equilibrium party policies will be altered as well. Sincere voting by everyone is not capable of supporting any equilibrium in party positions, as it is in two-party competition; rather, strategic voting is essential to generate stable outcomes. Moreover, as we argued earlier, no voting strategy is weakly dominated. Suppose we fix party positions and fix some individual's (j's) vote arbitrarily; then there exists a distribution of votes by others such that j voting otherwise makes him or her strictly worse off. Consequently, for any distribution of party platforms there is a multiplicity of undominated voting equilibria; and the selection of exactly which one to adopt in order to solve for the electoral equilibrium in party platforms is somewhat arbitrary. The criterion used here was to insist that in *any* electoral equilibrium, *every* voter must be pivotal, that is, capable of unilaterally altering the final policy outcome from the legislative bargaining process by affecting the rank order of parties' electoral vote shares. This is a non-trivial prerequisite that refines the set of admissible equilibria considerably. But it is clear that work needs to be done on this problem.

Appendix

PROPOSITION 1. *The following constitute the legislative equilibrium coalitions and outcomes:*

1. *If* $w_M = \max\{w_L, w_M, w_R\}$, *then* $C^* = \{M,k\}$, *where* $w_k = \min\{w_L, w_M, w_R\}$, $y^* = p_M$, $g_M^* = G$.
2. *If* $w_L > w_M > w_R$, *then* $C^* = \{L,R\}$ *and if*
   - a. $d_L \leqslant d_R$, *then* $y^* = p_M$, $g_L^* = G$.
   - b. $d_L > d_R$, *then* $y^* = p_{LR}$, $g_R^* = (p_{LR} - p_R)^2$, *and* $g_L^* = G - g_R^*$.
3. *If* $w_R > w_M > w_L$, *then* $C^* = \{R,L\}$ *and if*
   - a. $d_L \leqslant d_R$, *then* $y^* = p_{LR}$, $g_L^* = (p_{LR} - p_R)^2$, *and* $g_R^* = G - g_L^*$.
   - b. $d_L > d_R$, *then* $y^* = p_M$, $g_R^* = G$.
4. *If* $w_L > w_R > w_M$ *and* $d_L \leqslant d_R$, *then* $C^* = \{L,M\}$ *and*
   - a. *if* $2d_L \geqslant d_R$, $y^* = p_{LM}$, $g_M^* = (p_{LM} - p_M)^2 - (p_{RL} - p_M)^2$, *and* $g_L^* = G - g_M^*$.
   - b. *if* $2d_L < d_R \leqslant 3d_L$, $y^* = 2p_M - p_{RL}$, $g_L^* = G$.
   - c. *if* $3d_L < d_R$, $y^* = p_L$, $g_L^* = G$.
5. *If* $w_L > w_R > w_M$ *and* $d_L > d_R$, *then* $C^* = \{L,M\}$, $y^* = p_{LM}$, $g_M^* = (p_M - p_{LM})^2 - (p_{RM} - p_M)^2$, *and* $g_L^* = G - g_M^*$.
6. *If* $w_R > w_L > w_M$ *and* $d_L < d_R$, *then* $C^* = \{R,M\}$, $y^* = p_{MR}$, $g_M^* = (p_{MR} - p_M)^2 - (p_M - p_{ML})^2$, *and* $g_R^* = G - g_M^*$.
7. *If* $w_R > w_L > w_M$ *and* $d_L \geqslant d_R$, *then* $C^* = \{R,M\}$ *and*
   - a. *If* $d_L \leqslant 2d_R$, $y^* = p_{MR}$, $g_M^* = (p_M - p_{RM})^2 - (p_M - p_{RL})^2$, *and* $g_R^* = G - g_M^*$.
   - b. *if* $2d_R < d_L \leqslant 3d_R$, $y^* = 2p_M - p_{RL}$, $g_R^* = G$.
   - c. *if* $d_L > 3d_R$, $y^* = p_R$, $g_R^* = G$.

Next, we state and prove the formal version of proposition 2. For any $\mathrm{p} \in P \times P \times P$, $k \in \Omega$, let $B_k(\mathrm{p}) = \{i \in N: u_i(p_k) > u_i(y), \forall\, y \in \Lambda(\mathrm{p})\}$.

PROPOSITION 2. *The following n-tuple* σ^* *of voter strategies is a voting equilibrium* *for any* $s \in [3, n/3)$, *s odd:*

1. *a.* $p_L = p_M = p_R \Rightarrow \sigma_i^*(k) = 1/3, \forall i \in N, \forall k \in \Omega$.

   b. $p_L = p_M < p_R \Rightarrow \sigma_i^*(R) = 1, i = \mu - 1, \ldots, n; \sigma_i^*(k) = 1/2, i = 1, \ldots, \mu - 2, k = L, M$.

   c. $p_L < p_M = p_R \Rightarrow \sigma_i^*(L) = 1, i = 1, \ldots, \mu + 1; \sigma_i^*(k) = 1/2, i = \mu + 2, \ldots, n, k = L, M$.

2. $p_L < p_M < p_R$ *and* $|B_k| \geqslant (n + 1)/2$, *some* $k \in \Omega \Rightarrow \sigma_i^* = \sigma_i^\Omega, \forall i \in N$.

Now suppose that $p_L < p_M < p_R$ *and* $|B_k| < (n + 1)/2, \forall k \in \Omega$. *Then* $x_\mu \in (p_L, p_R)$, *and*

3. *a.* $x_\mu > p_M \Rightarrow \sigma_i^*(M) = 1, i = 1, \ldots, s; \sigma_i^*(R) = 1, i = s + 1, \ldots, n$.

   b. $x_\mu < p_M \Rightarrow \sigma_i^*(L) = 1, i = 1, \ldots, n - s; \sigma_i^*(M) = 1, i = n - s + 1, \ldots, n$.

4. $x_\mu = p_M$ *and* $d_L < (>)\, d_R \Rightarrow \sigma_i^* = \sigma_i^{\{L,M\}}\ (\sigma_i^{\{R,M\}}), \forall i \in N$.

5. $x_\mu = p_M$ *and* $d_L = d_R = d < (x_{(2\mu+s-1)/2} - x_\mu) \bullet 8/3 \Rightarrow \sigma_\mu^*(L) = \sigma_\mu^*(R) = 1/2; \sigma_i^* = \sigma_i^{\{L,R\}}, \forall i \neq \mu$.

6. $x_\mu = p_M$ *and* $d_L = d_R = d \geqslant (x_{2\mu+s-1)/2} - x_\mu) \bullet 8/3 \Rightarrow \sigma_i^*(L) = 1, i = 1, \ldots, (2\mu - s - 3)/2, \sigma_i^*(M) = 1, i = (2\mu - s - 1)/2, \ldots, (2\mu + s - 1)/2, \sigma_i^*(R) = 1, i = (2\mu + s + 1)/2, \ldots, n$.

Proof.

1*a*. Suppose p $= (y, y, y)$. Then $\Lambda(\mathrm{p}) = \{y\}$, in which case all voters are indifferent over voting strategies. Hence $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})$ as specified is an equilibrium.

1*b*. Suppose p $= (y', y', p_R)$, where $p_R > y' = p_L = p_M$. Then $\Lambda(\mathrm{p}) = \{y', (y' + p_R)/2, p_R\}$, $v_R)\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) \geqslant (n + 3)/2$, and $y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})), \mathrm{p}) = p_R$. Clearly all $i \in B_R$ are using maximizing strategies. And given $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})$, no $i \in N \setminus B_R$ is pivotal between $\{p_L, p_M\}$ and p_R. Hence $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})$ is an equilibrium.

1*c*. An argument symmetric to that used in 1b applies.

2. If $|B_k(\mathrm{p})| \geqslant (n + 1)/2$, for some $k \in \Omega$, then $\sigma_i^*(k) = 1$ is clearly a best response for any $i \in B_k(\mathrm{p})$, since $y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*), \mathrm{p}) = p_k$. And given σ_{-i}^*, no $i \in N \setminus B_k$ is pivotal between p_k and any other possible outcome. Hence, $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})$ is an equilibrium.

3*a*. In this instance, $v_R(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) = n - s > 2n/3$, so that $y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})), \mathrm{p}) = p_R$. Since no individual is pivotal, $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})$ is an equilibrium.

3*b*. Mutatis mutandis, the same is true for this case.

4. Suppose $x_\mu = p_M$ and $d_L < d_R$. Then $v_M(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) \geqslant (n + 1)/2$ and $y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})), \mathrm{p}) = p_M$. If any individual i is pivotal, then $\sigma_i^*(M) = 1$ and $v_M(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) = v_L(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) + 1 = (n + 1)/2$. Since $s \geqslant 3$, $\sigma_i \neq \sigma_i^*$ implies $y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-i}^*), \mathrm{p}) \leqslant p_M$, with strict inequality if σ_i is a pure strategy. But $[x_\mu = p_M, v_M(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) = (n + 1)/2$, and $\sigma_i^{\{L,M\}}(M) = 1]$ implies $x_i \geqslant p_M$. Hence, $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})$ is an equilibrium. A symmetric argument holds when $d_L > d_R$.

5. By definition of p_M and d, the argument for this case follows immediately from that of case 6.

6. Given $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})$, $v_L(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) = v_R(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) = (n - s)/2 > v_M(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) = s$. Hence $y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})), \mathrm{p}) \in \{p_{LM}, p_{MR}\}$, where each occurs with probability 1/2. By supposition, $d_L = d_R = d$. Thus for all $j \in N$,

$$Eu_j(y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})), \mathrm{p})) = -(x_j - p_M)^2 - d^2/4$$

Consider any i such that $\sigma_i^*(M) = 1$ and suppose i switches to $\sigma_i(R) = 1$. Then, $v_R(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-i}^*) = (n - s + 2)/2 > y_L(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-i}^*) = (n - s)/2 > v_M(\sigma_i, \sigma_{-i}^*)$

$= s - 1$. Hence M is not elected to the legislature, and $y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma_i, \sigma^*_{-i}),\mathrm{p}) = p_R$. In this event, i's utility is

$$Eu_i(y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma_i, \sigma^*_{-i}),\mathrm{p})) = -(x_i - p_R)^2$$

Therefore,

$$Eu_i(y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})),\mathrm{p}) - Eu_i(y(w(\sigma_i, \sigma^*_{-i}),\mathrm{p})) < 0 \Leftrightarrow$$

$$(x_i - p_R)^2 - (x_i - p_M)^2 - d^2/4 < 0 \Leftrightarrow$$

$$[(x_i - p_R) - (x_i - p_M)]\bullet[(x_i - p_R) + (x_i - p_M)] - d^2/4 < 0 \Leftrightarrow$$

$$x_i > p_M + 3d/8$$

Similarly, if $\sigma_i(L) = 1$ for any i such that $\sigma^*_i(M) = 1$,

$$Eu_i(y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})),\mathrm{p}) - Eu_i(y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma_i, \sigma^*_{-i}),\mathrm{p})) < 0 \Leftrightarrow$$

$$x_i < p_M - 3d/8$$

By definition of this case, $d \geqslant (x_{(2\mu+s-1)/2} - p_M)\bullet 8/3$. Hence all i such that $\sigma^*_i(M) = 1$ are using best responses. Now consider any i such that $\sigma^*_i(L) = 1$. If $\sigma_i(k) = 1$, $k \in \{M,R\}$, then, because $3 \leqslant s < n/3$, all parties get elected and $y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma_i, \sigma^*_{-i}),\mathrm{p}) = p_{MR}$ with probability 1. Hence

$$Eu_i(y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma_i, \sigma^*_{-i}),\mathrm{p})) = -(x_i - p_{MR})^2$$

and

$$Eu_i(y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p}),\mathrm{p})) - Eu_i(y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma_i, \sigma^*_{-i}),\mathrm{p})) < 0 \Leftrightarrow$$

$$x_i > p_M$$

But $\sigma^*_i(L) = 1$ only if $x_i < p_M$. Hence $\sigma^*_i(L) = 1$ is a best response for such individuals. By symmetry, $\sigma^*_i(R) = 1$ is a best response for $i > (2\mu + s + 1)/2$. This completes the proof of case 6 (and case 5). QED

PROPOSITION 3. Relative to the voting strategies of proposition 2, $\mathrm{p}^* \in P \times P \times P$ is an electoral equilibrium for any $s \in [3,n/3)$, s odd, if and only if

1. $p^*_M = x_\mu$
2. $(p^*_M - p^*_L) = (p^*_R - p^*_M) \in [8/3\bullet(x_{i^*} - x_\mu), 4\bullet(x_{j^*} - x_\mu))$, where $i^* \equiv \mu + (s - 1)/2$, $j^* \equiv \mu + \mathrm{int}[(n - 1)/4]$

Proof (suff.). Suppose p^* satisfies proposition 3, conditions 1 and 2. Then $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p}^*)$ is described by the voter strategies of case 6 of the voting equilibrium. Hence $v_L(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p}^*)) = v_R(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p}^*)) = (n - s)/2 > s = v_M(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p}^*))$, and $y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p}^*)),\mathrm{p}^*) \in \{p^*_{LM}, p^*_{MR}\}$. Let $|p^*_M - p^*_k| \equiv d^*$, $k = L,R$. Since each outcome occurs with probability 1/2, proposition 1 yields

$$\psi_L(p) = \psi_R(\mathrm{p}^*) = 1/2\bullet(G - d^{*2}/4) - d^{*2} - d^{*2}/4 = G/2 - 11/8\bullet d^{*2},$$

$$\psi_M(\mathrm{p}^*) = 0.$$

By the assumption on the size of G, $\psi_k(\mathrm{p}^*) > 0$, $k = L,R$.

Consider $p = (p^*_L, p, p^*_R)$ and suppose that $p \in (p^*_L, p^*_M)$. Since $p^*_M = x_\mu$, $|B_k(\mathrm{p})| < (n + 1)/2$, $\forall\, k \in \Omega$. Hence case 3a of the voting equilibrium obtains at p, in which case $v_M(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) = s$, $v_R(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) = n - s$, and $y(w(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p}),\mathrm{p}) = p^*_R$. Therefore, $\psi_M(\mathrm{p}) = -(p - p^*_R)^2 < 0$. Now suppose $p = p^*_L$. Then case 1b of the voting equilibrium obtains, and $v_R(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p}) > (n + 1)/2$, so that $y(w(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})),\mathrm{p}) = p^*_R$. Therefore $\psi_M(\mathrm{p}) < 0$. If $p < p^*_L$ then again case 3a of the voting equilibrium obtains, but here $v_M(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) = 0$ so that $\psi_M(\mathrm{p}) = -c < 0$. A symmetric argument holds for $p > p^*_M$. Thus, p^*_M is a best response to (p^*_L, p^*_R).

Consider $\mathrm{p} = (p, p^*_M, p^*_R)$ and suppose that $p < p^*_L$. Then case 4 of the voting equilibrium obtains with $d_L > d_R$, in which case $v_L(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) = 0$, and $\psi_L(\mathrm{p}) = -c < 0$. Suppose $p \in (p^*_L, p^*_M)$. Then case 4 again obtains, with $d_L < d_R$, in which case $v_M(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})) \geqslant (n + 1)/2$. Therefore $y(\mathrm{w}(\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})),\mathrm{p}) = p^*_M$ and $\psi_L(\mathrm{p}) = -(p - p_M)^2 < 0$. Suppose $p = p^*_M$. Then case 1b of the voting equilibrium obtains; $Ev_L(\sigma^*(\mathbf{p})) = (n - 3)/4 < v_R(\sigma^*(\mathbf{p})) = (n + 3)/2$, and $\psi_L(\mathbf{p}) \in \{-c, -(p - p_R^*)^2\} < 0$. If $p > p_M^*$, then case 2 of the voting equilibrium obtains, so that $v_M(\sigma^*(\mathbf{p})) \geqslant (n + 1)/2$ and $\psi_L(\mathbf{p}) \in \{-c, -(p - p_M^*)^2\} < 0$. Therefore, p_L^* is a best response to (p_M^*, p_R^*). By symmetry, p_R^* is a best response to (p_L^*, p_M^*).

Proof (nec.). We prove necessity by first showing that if $p \in P \times P \times P$ is such that one of cases 1–5 of the voting equilibrium obtains, then p cannot be an electoral equilibrium. Let $\Sigma(\sigma^*)$ be the set of electoral equilibria relative to the voter strategies σ^*.

Let $\mathbf{p} = (y, y, y)$. Then $\psi_k(\mathbf{p}) = G/3$, $\forall k \in \Omega$. Consider party α. If $y \neq x_\mu$, choosing $p_\alpha' = x_\mu$ implies $|B_\alpha(x_\mu, y, y)| \geqslant (n + 1)/2$, so that $\psi_\alpha(x_\mu, y, y) = G$. If $y = x_\mu$, choose $p_\alpha' > y$. Then case 1b of the voting equilibrium obtains, in which case $v_\alpha(\sigma^*(\mathbf{p})) = (n + 3)/2 > Ev_k(\sigma^*(\mathbf{p}))$, $k \neq \alpha$. Thus $\psi_\alpha(p_\alpha', y, y) = G$. Therefore, $\mathbf{p} \notin \Sigma(\sigma^*)$.

Let $\mathbf{p} = (p_\alpha, y, y)$ and suppose $p_\alpha > y$. Consider party β. At $\mathbf{p}$, case 1b of the voting equilibrium obtains. Therefore, $\psi_\beta(\mathbf{p}) \in \{-c, -(y - p_\alpha)^2\}$. If $p_\alpha \neq x_\mu$, choose $p_\beta' = x_\mu$. Then either case 2 or case 4 obtains. In either case, $v_\beta(p_\alpha, x_\mu, y) \geqslant (n + 1)/2$ and $\psi_\beta(p_\alpha, x_\mu, y) = G$. If $p_\alpha = x_\mu$, choose $p_\beta' > x_\mu$ such that $(p_\beta' - x_\mu) < (x_\mu - y)/t$, $t \geqslant 2$. Then case 4 of the voting equilibrium obtains with $d_L > d_R$, so that $v_\gamma(p_\alpha, p_\beta', y) = 0 < v_\beta(p_\alpha, p_\beta', y) < v_\alpha(p_\alpha, p_\beta', y)$. Hence for sufficiently large t,

$$\begin{aligned}\psi_\beta(p_\alpha, p_\beta', y) &= -(p_\beta' - p_\alpha)^2\\ &> \max \psi_\beta(\mathbf{p}).\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, $\mathbf{p} \notin \Sigma(\sigma^*)$. By symmetry, the same is true for $p_\alpha < y$.

Let $\mathbf{p} = (p_\alpha, p_\beta, p_\gamma)$ and suppose all parties adopt distinct positions. Then we can write $\mathbf{p} = (p_L, p_M, p_R)$. Let $\mathbf{p}$ be such that case 2 of the voting equilibrium occurs. Suppose $|B_L(\mathbf{p})| \geqslant (n + 1)/2$, and consider $\mathbf{p}' = (p_L, p_M, p)$. By the assumption of symmetric utilities, $x_\mu < (p_L + p_M)/2$. If $p_L \neq x_\mu$, choose $p = x_\mu$. Then either case 2 occurs or case 4. In both cases, $v_R(\mathbf{p}') \geqslant (n + 1)/2$, so that $\psi_R(\mathbf{p}') = G > \psi_R(\mathbf{p})$. If $p_L = x_\mu$, choose $p < x_\mu$ so that $(x_\mu - p) = (p_M - x_\mu)/t$, $t \geqslant 2$. Then case 4 occurs at $\mathbf{p}'$ with $d_L < d_R$. Thus we have $\psi_R(\mathbf{p}') > \max \psi_R(\mathbf{p})$ for sufficiently large t. Therefore, if $\mathbf{p} \in \Sigma(\sigma^*)$ and case 2 of the voting equilibrium occurs, $|B_L(\mathbf{p})| < (n + 1)/2$; by symmetry, $|B_R(\mathbf{p})| < (n + 1)/2$. And if $|B_M(\mathbf{p})| \geqslant (n + 1)/2$, the same arguments, mutatis mutandis, apply. Therefore, $\mathbf{p} \notin \Sigma(\sigma^*)$.

Let $\mathbf{p} = (p_L, p_M, p_R)$ and assume hereafter that $|B_k(\mathbf{p})| < (n + 1)/2$, for $k = L, M, R$.

Suppose that $x_\mu > p_M$. Then $v_L(\sigma^*(\mathbf{p})) = 0$ and $\psi_L(\mathbf{p}) = -c$. Assume first that $(p_M + p_R)/2 \neq x_\mu$ and consider $\mathbf{p}' = (x_\mu, p_M, p_R)$, where the party offering p_L in $\mathbf{p}$ now offers x_μ. Then case 4 occurs and $\psi_L(\mathbf{p}') = G > \psi_L(\mathbf{p})$. Now assume $(p_M + p_R)/2 = x_\mu$ and consider $\mathbf{p}' = (p_L, x_\mu, p_R)$, where the party offering p_M in $\mathbf{p}$ now offers x_μ. Then again case 4 occurs, and $\psi_M(\mathbf{p}') = G > \psi_M(\mathbf{p}) = -(p_M - p_R)^2$. So $\mathbf{p} \notin \Sigma(\sigma^*)$; by symmetry the same is true when $x_\mu < p_M$.

Let $\mathbf{p} = (p_L, p_M, p_R) = (p_L, x_\mu p_R)$ and suppose $d_L \neq d_R$. Then case 4 of the voting equilibrium occurs and $v_k(\sigma^*(\mathbf{p})) = 0$ for some $k = L, R$. Let $k = L$ so that $d_L > d_R$, and $\psi_L(\mathbf{p}) = -c$. Consider $\mathbf{p}' = (p, p_M, p_R)$, $p < p_M$ and $(p_M - p) = (p_R - p_M)/t$, $t \geqslant 2$. Then case 4 obtains at $\mathbf{p}'$ and $d_L' < d_R' = d_R$. Hence $v_L(\sigma^*(\mathbf{p}')) \geqslant s$ and, for sufficiently large t, $\psi_L(\mathbf{p}') > \psi_L(\mathbf{p})$. Therefore, $\mathbf{p} \notin \Sigma(\sigma^*)$; by symmetry, the same is true when $k = R$.

Let $\mathbf{p} = (p_L, p_M, p_R) = (p_L, x_\mu, p_R)$ and suppose $d_L = d_R = d < 8/3 \bullet (x_{(2\mu + s - 1)/2} - x_\mu)$. Then case 5 of the voting equilibrium occurs. Hence $v_M(\sigma^*(\mathbf{p})) = 0$ and $\psi_M(\mathbf{p}) = -c$. Consider $\mathbf{p}' = (p_L, p_M - \epsilon, p_R)$, $\epsilon > 0$. Then case 3a of the voting equilibrium occurs with $x_\mu > p_M - \epsilon$, in which case $v_M(\sigma^*(\mathbf{p}')) = s$ and $\psi_M(\mathbf{p}^*) = -(d + \epsilon)^2$. Therefore

$$\psi_M(\mathrm{p}') - \psi_M(\mathrm{p}) = c - (d + \epsilon)^2 > 0 \Leftrightarrow$$
$$c - d^2 > \epsilon \bullet (2d + \epsilon).$$

By assumption, $c \geqslant 8/3 \bullet (x_{(2\mu+s-1)/2} - x_\mu)^2 > d^2$, so for sufficiently small ϵ, $\psi_M(\mathrm{p}') > \psi_M(\mathrm{p})$. Therefore, $\mathrm{p} \notin \Sigma(\sigma^*)$.

Putting the previous arguments together, we have that $\mathrm{p} \in \Sigma(\sigma^*)$ implies $\sigma^*(\mathrm{p})$ is such that case 6 of the voting equilibrium occurs. To complete the argument for necessity, note that by the symmetry of voter preferences and the distribution of ideal points

$$[p_M = x_\mu,\ d_L = d_R = d, \text{ and}$$
$$d \geqslant 4 \bullet (x_{j^*} - x_\mu)] \Rightarrow$$
$$|B_M(\mathrm{p})| \geqslant (n + 1)/2. \qquad \text{QED}$$

Note

We would like to thank seminar participants at California Institute of Technology, the University of Rochester, and conferees at the International Conference on Coalition Theory and Public Choice, Fiesole, Italy, 1987 for comments and suggestions. Financial support of the National Science Foundation through grant SES-8700468 is gratefully acknowledged.

References

Austen-Smith, David. 1981. Party Policy and Campaign Costs in a Multiconstituency Model of Electoral Competition. *Public Choice* 37:389–402.

Austen-Smith, David. 1983. The Spatial Theory of Electoral Competition: Instability, Institutions, and Information. *Environment and Planning C* 1:439–59.

Austen-Smith, David. 1984. Two-Party Competition with Many Constituencies. *Mathematical Social Sciences* 7:177–98.

Austen-Smith, David. 1986. Legislative Coalitions and Electoral Equilibrium. *Public Choice* 50: 185–210.

Austen-Smith, David. 1987. Sincere Voting in Models of Legislative Elections. Working Paper No. 637. California Institute of Technology.

Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey Banks. 1987. Electoral Accountability and Incumbency. University of Rochester. Typescript.

Axelrod, Robert. 1970. *Conflict of Interest.* Chicago: Marham.

Calvert, Randall. 1985. Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty, and Convergence. *American Journal of Political Science* 29:69–95.

Calvert, Randall. 1986. *Models of Imperfect Information in Politics.* London: Harwood Academic.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper & Row.

Enelow, James, and Melvin Hinich. 1984. *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ferejohn, John and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. Reconciliation and the Size of the Budget. *American Journal of Political Science* 31:296–320.

Greenberg, Joseph, and Shlomo Weber. 1985. Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation. *American Political Science Review* 79: 693–703.

Greenberg, Joseph, and Kenneth Shepsle. 1987. The Effect of Electoral Rewards in Multiparty Competition with Entry. *American Political Science Review* 81:525–39.

Inter-Parliamentary Union. 1986. *Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Compendium.* 2d ed. Vol. 2. London: Gower.

McKelvey, Richard, Peter Ordeshook, and Mark Winer. 1978. The Competitive Solution for n-Person Games without Transferable Utility. *American Political Science Review* 72:599–615.

Riker, William. 1962. *The Theory of Political Coalitions.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Riker, William. 1982. The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science. *American Political Science Review* 76:753–66.

Robertson, David. 1976. *A Theory of Party Competition.* London: Wiley.

Rubinstein, Ariel. 1982. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. *Econometrica* 50:97–109.

Schofield, Norman. 1985. Bargaining in Weighted Majority Games, with an Application to Portfolio Distributions. California Institute of Technology. Typescript.

Shepsle, Kenneth. 1979. Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models. *American Journal of Political Science* 23:27–59.

Shepsle, Kenneth. 1986. The Positive Theory of Legislative Institutions: An Enrichment of Social Choice and Spatial Models. *Public Choice* 50: 135–78.

Sugden, Robert. 1984. Free Association and the Theory of Proportional Representation. *American Political Science Review* 78:31–43.

David Austen-Smith is Associate Professor and Jeffrey Banks is Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, NY 14627.

EXTENDED DETERRENCE AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

PAUL K. HUTH
University of Michigan

Successful deterrence, it is argued, requires a combination of military capabilities and bargaining behavior that enhances a defender's credibility without provoking a potential attacker. Hypotheses on the political and military conditions under which extended-immediate deterrence is likely to succeed or fail are formulated and tested by probit analysis on fifty-eight historical cases. The empirical results indicate that (1) the military capability of the defender to deny the potential attacker a quick and decisive victory on the battlefield enhances deterrence; (2) a policy of reciprocity in diplomacy and military actions by the defender contributes strongly to deterrence success; and (3) a past record of backing down under pressure or intransigence in confrontations with the potential attacker increases the likelihood of deterrence failure.

To threaten or resort to the use of military force is a critical foreign policy decision for the leadership of a country. Policymakers have often believed that national interests extended beyond the defense of their own country to include the security of other states. As a result, when such countries were the targets of an attack, policymakers have threatened military retaliation against the potential aggressor in an attempt to deter the attack. The effective use of extended deterrent threats, however, is not easily achieved.

A potential aggressor's uncertainty as to the willingness of the deterrer to risk war over the defense of another state can weaken the credibility of deterrence. As Schelling (1966, 36) argues, "The difference between the national homeland and everything "abroad" is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and threats that have to be made credible. To project the shadow of one's military forces over other countries and territories is an act of diplomacy."

The security dilemma can lead policymakers to overestimate the hostile intentions and threats posed by the military capabilities and actions of other states. In a situation of extended deterrence the intended defensive military actions of the deterrer can be perceived by the potential aggressor as an offensive threat and thereby provoke a spiral of military escalation (Jervis 1976, 58–113).

A deterrer must strike a balance between actions that demonstrate resolve and enhance the credibility of threats and the provocation of the potential aggressor. In this study I will test hypotheses on historical cases of extended deterrence from 1885 to 1984 in an attempt to identify the conditions under which extended deterrence is likely to succeed or fail.

Concept of Extended Deterrence

In this study cases of extended-immediate deterrence will be analyzed. The concept of *deterrence* will be defined as follows:

1. *Deterrence.* A policy of deterrence seeks to convince an adversary by the threat of military retaliation that the costs of resorting to the use of military force to achieve foreign policy objectives will outweigh the benefits (Howard 1982–83, 315). The deterrer's threat of retaliation may be based on either the military capability to repulse an attack and thereby deny the attacker its battlefield objectives and prevent the loss of territory or the capability to inflict heavy military losses on the attacker in a protracted armed conflict of attrition (deterrence by "denial" versus "punishment"; see Snyder 1961, 14–16).
2. *Extended deterrence.* A confrontation in which the policymakers of one state ("defender") threaten the use of force against another state ("potential attacker") in an attempt to prevent that state from using military force against an ally—or territory controlled by an ally ("protégé")—of the defender. The objective of extended deterrence is to protect other countries and territories from attack, as opposed to preventing a direct attack on one's own national territory.
3. *Extended-immediate deterrence.* A confrontation that is characterized by the following:

   a. A potential attacker is actively considering the use of force against a protégé of the defender.

   b. Policymakers of the defender state are aware of the threat directed at the protégé.

   c. Policymakers of the defender state, either explicitly or by the movement of military forces, threaten the use of retaliatory force in an attempt to prevent the use of force by the potential attacker (Morgan 1977, 38).

An extended-immediate deterrence confrontation entails an overt threat and counterthreat by potential attacker and defender. In contrast, *extended-general deterrence* refers to an adversarial relationship between states in which the threat of an armed conflict over the security of another country exists but the potential attacker is neither engaged in a dispute that threatens war nor has issued coercive threats or initiated military preparations for the use of force. Extended-general deterrence is maintained by arms races, the formation of alliances, and in the declaratory statements of foreign policy leaders as to their country's security interests. For example, United States troops are deployed in South Korea as a deterrent to a potential North Korean attack and statements by United States leaders of the intent to defend the Persian Gulf are designed to counter a potential Soviet threat to countries in the region.

Fifty-eight cases of extended-immediate deterrence were identified for the period 1885–1984.[1] In a majority of cases both the potential attacker and defender were great powers, while in a small number of cases both states were regional powers. Twenty-four cases were coded as failures of deterrence while the remaining thirty-four cases were coded as successful deterrence (see the Appendix for a complete listing of the cases and discussion of coding procedures).

Assumptions

The decision-making calculus of the potential attacker is based on certain assumptions.

Offense and Defense

The objectives of the potential attacker in threatening the use of force against the protégé represent a combination of both offensive and defensive goals. Analytically, it may be possible to draw a relatively clear distinction between these two opposing motives; but in the actual calculations of the potential attacker the two are often closely interconnected. Defensive motives determine the minimal goals to be pursued by the potential attacker, while offensive motives define the more ambitious maximum goals to be pursued. The important implication is that in most international disputes and crises there is an opportunity for diplomacy and negotiations to contribute to conflict resolution because the potential attacker is not motivated solely by far-reaching and aggressive aims.

Force and Negotiation

In deciding whether to challenge the deterrent threats of the defender, it is assumed that the potential attacker will consider two alternative courses of action:

1. reliance on military threats and the use of force to resolve the conflict with the defender and protégé
2. reliance on negotiations and diplomacy to resolve the conflict with the defender and protégé

In game-theoretic terms, these two courses of action define the basic structure of the conflict for the potential attacker, in which the choice is between the coercive strategy of standing firm behind its demands, or the accommodative strategy of cooperating and making concessions to the defender's bargaining position (Snyder and Diesing 1977, 40–41). A number of variants can be identified for each of these two courses of action and the potential attacker may combine the two policies in the initial stages of the confrontation; but once the intentions of the defender are determined, a fundamental decision will be made by the potential attacker as to what policy to adopt. As a result, these two courses of action become policy alternatives at this crucial point in the confrontation with the defender.

Bargaining Reputation

The potential attacker will be sensitive to how the outcome of the confrontation with the defender will affect its own bargaining reputation. Bargaining reputation can be defined as the willingness of state's foreign policy leadership to risk armed conflict in pursuit of political goals and to refuse to concede to the demands of adversaries under coercive pressure. Bargaining reputation is important because policymakers very often believe that their actions and behavior in a particular confrontation will be interpreted by other states as a general indicator of their resolve (see Snyder and Diesing 1977, 187–88). The political leadership's bargaining reputation has both domestic as well as international consequences. Domestically, the leadership's political stature and influence within the elite and broader population will depend in part on its record of managing difficult foreign policy issues and international crises. A successful record will enhance the leadership's political stature and authority, whereas a record of weakness and setbacks in foreign policy will diminish the leadership's political position. Internationally, a strong bargaining reputation will increase a state's position of leadership, influence with allies, and the credibility of coercive threats directed at adversaries; while a weak bargaining reputation will have the reverse impact. The important implication for a potential attacker is that the desire to protect its bargaining reputation will be an important factor in a decision whether to challenge the defender's deterrent threat.

Costs and Gains

The final decision of the potential attacker will be based on a comparison of the likely costs and benefits of the two alternative policy choices. The course of action with greater expected gains (or fewer losses) will be adopted by the potential attacker.

Hypotheses on Extended Deterrence

To be deterred the potential attacker must conclude that the defender's deterrent actions are both credible and stable. A *credible* deterrent depends on whether the defender possesses the military capabilities sufficient to inflict high military costs on the attacker in an armed conflict (battlefield casualties, destruction and depletion of arms and equipment, damage to and potential loss of territory) and the intention to use those capabilities if necessary. A *stable* deterrent does not increase the potential attacker's fear of a preemptive military strike and thus provoke rapid military escalation and avoids engaging the bargaining reputation of the potential attacker to such an extent that it makes it more difficult for the potential attacker to back down from its coercive bargaining position.

Four sets of variables can be identified that are likely to play a critical role in determining the credibility and stability of the defender's deterrent actions. These four sets of variables are hypothesized to play a crucial role in the potential attacker's calculus of deterrence:

1. the balance of military forces between potential attacker and defender
2. the interests at stake for the defender in protecting the protégé
3. the past behavior of the defender in confrontations with states
4. the bargaining behavior of the defender during the immediate deterrence confrontation with the potential attacker

The Military Balance

Immediate deterrence is likely to succeed when the potential attacker estimates that the probability of success is relatively low and the costs high in resorting to the use of sustained military force to achieve foreign policy objectives. The potential attacker is likely to consider three alternative options for using military force:

1. limited aims strategy
2. rapid offensive attack strategy
3. attrition strategy (George, Hall, and Simons 1971, 15–21; Mearsheimer 1983, 23–66).

The objectives of a limited aims strategy is to seize control of disputed territory held by an opponent. The key to success for the potential attacker is to achieve tactical, if not strategic, surprise in the use of force.[2] The potential attacker is then in a position either to overwhelm the underprepared forces of the opponent or to occupy the disputed territory before the opponent has the opportunity to send in reinforcements and build up local defenses. The goal of the attacker is to limit, if not avoid, direct engagement with the military strength of the opponent and instead use force where local superiority prevails.

The second military option for the potential attacker is the strategy of rapid offensive attack in which the objective is to defeat the opponent's armed forces decisively. The goal is not to minimize armed conflict with the adversary and to take control of disputed territory but to engage the armed forces of the adversary in a series of large-scale battles so that its armed forces can be defeated. The assumption of the potential attacker is that if the armed forces of the adversary can be defeated in a rapid and decisive manner, the adversary will be forced to surrender before it can mobilize the economy and civilian population for war or before allies can effectively intervene in support of the target of the attack.

The third military option available to a potential attacker is the strategy of attrition. The objective is similar to that of the rapid offensive attack: the decisive defeat of the armed forces of the adversary. The principal difference between the two strategies, however, is the time required to achieve military victory. With a strategy of attrition the attacker does not anticipate a series of rapid victories but a protracted conflict in which the goal is to wear down and outlast the adversary by being able to withstand heavy military losses better.

One factor that is likely to have an important impact on the success of each of these military strategies is the balance of military forces between attacker and defender. To counter a limited aims strategy, defending forces should be in a position to repulse the armed forces of the attacker so they cannot seize disputed territory. The best defense then is for the defender to have strong forces in forward positions at the point of attack. In a confrontation where the attacker is considering a rapid offensive attack, the outcome of large-scale battlefield engagements is critical. Deterrence success will depend in part on the strength of the standing armed forces that each side can mobilize and deploy on the battlefield in the initial weeks and months of combat. When the attacker is considering a strategy of attrition, the long-term balance of forces is critical to the success or failure of deterrence. The outcome of a protracted conflict will be determined in part by the capacity of each side to sustain the commitment of large armies on the battlefront for an extended period of time. To provide such support a country must be able to maintain domestic support for the war, have the bureaucratic-administrative capacity to mobilize the population and economy for war, the productive capacity to be able constantly to replace the equipment and arms destroyed, and the population base to absorb heavy casualties.

Military and political leaders considering an attack generally seek to achieve their objectives in a rapid and decisive manner through the use of force. A number of recent studies have argued persuasively that military organizations are biased towards doctrines and strategies that call for the rapid and decisive use of military force (Snyder 1984, 118–22, Van Evera 1984, chap. 7). Institutional interests and incentives—such as the desire to increase the size and amount of expenditures for armed forces; to increase autonomy from civilian intervention in operational planning; and to reduce the uncertainty of the battlefield and provide a structured environment for planning and training—contribute to a strong bias for rapid victories by means of preplanned offensives. For example, Betts (1977, 3–15), in his study of the influence of the military on U.S. crisis decisions since 1945, argues that the weight of military advice has generally counseled against the use of force unless the United States was in a strong military position to defeat the adversary in a quick and decisive manner. Contemporary Soviet doctrine for conventional war in Europe calls for a blitzkrieg offensive against NATO forces. Political leaders have a strong interest in avoiding costly armed conflicts and, instead, in sanctioning the use of force when a rapid and decisive victory is anticipated. In a prolonged war high levels of battlefield casualties and the potential for substantial economic dislocations and burdens being imposed on the population create very real risks of a loss of domestic political support. For example, Arthur Stein (1980) has reported that popular support for United States participation in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War declined steadily over time. The desire to avoid protracted and costly wars is also reflected in Mearsheimer's study (1983, chaps. 5, 8) of a number of historical cases of conventional deterrence. Mearsheimer found that military leaders were often under considerable pressure from political leaders to devise plans of attack that projected a quick victory.

If the potential attacker's policymakers believe that military force can be successfully employed in a quick and decisive attack, then the probability of deterrence success will decrease. Conversely, if the policymakers estimate that military force cannot be successfully employed in a quick and relatively low-cost attack, then deterrence is more likely to prevail. Calculations regarding the outcome of a protracted war are not likely to have a critical impact on deterrence outcomes since policymakers do not generally initiate an armed conflict with the intention of engaging in a war of attrition.[3] The immediate balance of forces (defense against the limited aims strategy or the rapid offensive attack designed to defeat the protégé before the defender can intervene) and the short-term balance of forces (defense against the strategy of rapid offensive attack in which the attacker seeks to defeat both the defender and protégé) should be positively related to the success of extended-immediate deterrence.

HYPOTHESIS 1. *The probability of extended deterrence success increases as the balance of military forces improves for the defender. The immediate and short-term balance of forces will have a greater impact on deterrence outcomes than will the long-term balance of forces.*

The deterrent value of nuclear weapons is a controversial and important question. The credibility of a nuclear threat will depend on the political-military situation in which they might be employed. For purposes of self-defense and to deter the use of nuclear weapons by another state against one's own territory the threat of nuclear retaliation is likely to function as a credible deterrent, given a secure second-strike capability (Howard 1984, 95–98; Jervis 1984, 126–46). However, in this study, of the fifteen cases in which the defender possessed nuclear weapons, the potential attacker in fourteen cases was a nonnuclear power. (The only exception is the 1979 case of the People's Republic of China as the potential attacker and the Soviet Union as defender of Vietnam.) The critical question, then, is what extended deterrent value do nuclear weapons exert when the potential target is a nonnuclear power? In such situations it is argued that the deterrent impact will be minimal for a number of reasons. First, the use of nuclear weapons would risk provoking strong criticism and denunciation both internationally and domestically (in twelve of fifteen cases the nuclear power defender was the United States, United Kingdom, or France). Secondly, nuclear use would be likely to increase the incentives for horizontal nuclear proliferation, which the nuclear powers have consistently opposed. Thirdly, the likelihood of collateral damage to civilians would act as a strong constraint. In summary, the combination of salient political, military, and ethical questions about the immediate and long-term consequences of nuclear use by the defender against a nonnuclear power raise serious doubts as to the credibility of such a decision.

HYPOTHESIS 2. *The possession of nuclear weapons and the latent threat of nuclear use by the defender will not have a significant impact on extended deterrence outcomes when the potential attacker is a nonnuclear power.*

Interests at Stake for the Defender

The potential attacker's uncertainty as to the intentions of the defender are inherent in a situation of extended deterrence. If the policymakers of the potential attacker are to believe that the defender is willing to incur the costs of armed conflict in defense of the protégé, they must be convinced that the issues at stake are vital enough to the defender to justify those costs. If the potential attacker does not believe that the defender has important interests at risk in defending the protégé, then the credibility of extended deterrence will be questioned (George and Smoke 1974, 560–61).

The value of the protégé to the defender can be determined in part by the political, military, and economic ties that link the defender to the protégé. The stronger those ties, the more important they are to the defender to maintain and protect. The presence of a military alliance between defender and protégé indicates that the defender has reputational interests at stake. The credibility of the alliance commitment for the defender can be linked to the defender's concern to maintain a reputation for honoring agreements with states and a reputation for a willingness to use force in support of allies when threatened. The failure to honor an alliance if the protégé is the target of an unprovoked attack risks signaling to other states that the defender is reluctant to use force if its own security is not directly threatened. As a result, not only may the defender's security commitments to other states be questioned, but the defender may also subsequently find it more difficult to secure allies in support of its own defense. In the period from 1816–1965, 76% of allied nations that were attacked received armed support, whereas only 17% of nonallied states received such support (Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 113). Huth and Russett (1984, 521; Huth and Russett, n.d.) report that alliance ties increased significantly the likelihood that the defender would go to war to defend a protégé if attacked.

HYPOTHESIS 3. *The probability of extended deterrence success will increase if the defender has an alliance with the protégé.*

Military arms transfers from defender to protégé also indicate that reputational interests are at stake for the defender. The greater the degree to which the protégé relies exclusively on the defender for arms imports, the more likely it is that the defender will be viewed by other states as developing a sphere of influence and closer political ties with that country. Military arms transfers do not represent a formal security commitment but the defender's reputation for supporting friendly countries and willingness to use force in defense of other countries can become intertwined with the security of a protégé that depends largely on the defender for military aid. A tacit alliance may therefore evolve over time in which the supplier (defender) is recognized by other states as the principal protector of the recipient (protégé).

HYPOTHESIS 4. *The probability of extended deterrence success will increase as the protégé's reliance on arms transfers from the defender increases.*

The protégé may also be economically important to the defender. High levels of foreign trade between defender and protégé indicate some of the potential economic costs to be incurred if the protégé is forced by the attacker to cut its ties with the defender. Exports from the defender to the protégé contribute to higher levels of domestic employment and output, while imports from the protégé may represent important sources of raw materials or products that cannot be produced as efficiently domestically.[4]

HYPOTHESIS 5. *The probability of extended deterrence success will increase as the protégé's share of the defender's foreign trade increases.*

Bargaining Behavior of the Defender

The potential attacker's uncertainty as to the defender's intentions and sensitivity to threats and challenges indicate that the defender's bargaining behavior can play a critical role in the success or failure of deterrence. An effective bargaining strategy by the defender can reduce the potential attacker's uncertainty and thereby enhance credibility, whereas ineffective strategies can reduce credibility or provoke the potential attacker. The optimal bargaining strategy will enhance the credibility of the defender's deterrent actions while avoiding the provocation of the potential attacker. There are two principal dimensions to the bargaining process in the confrontation between the potential attacker and defender: (1) diplomacy and negotiations and (2) military preparations and movement of forces.

For both dimensions of the bargaining process three general strategies are available to the defender ranging from conciliation and minimal military actions to an unyielding position in negotiations and maximum military preparations. The three strategies of military escalation by the defender are

1. *Policy of strength.* The defender responds to the military actions of the potential attacker with greater-than-equal levels of military preparedness.
2. *Policy of tit for tat.* The defender responds to the military actions of the potential attacker with equal levels of military preparedness.
3. *Policy of caution.* The defender responds to the military actions of the potential attacker with less-than-equal levels of military preparedness (Leng and Wheeler 1979; Snyder and Diesing 1977, 209–43).

The three strategies of diplomacy and negotiations for the defender are

1. *Bullying policy.* The defender adopts an unyielding position in support of its demands and does not reciprocate accommodative initiatives by the potential attacker.
2. *Firm-but-flexible policy.* The defender adopts a mixed policy of refusing to concede to the repeated demands and threats of the potential attacker while also proposing to compromise based on reciprocal concessions.
3. *Conciliatory policy.* The defender adopts a policy of proposed concessions despite the lack of reciprocation by the potential attacker (Kaplowitz 1984; Leng and Wheeler 1979; Snyder and Diesing 1977).

Caution in military actions by the defender will minimize the risks of provocation due to the security dilemma and thereby enhance deterrence stability. Similarly, conciliation in negotiations by the defender will avoid engaging the potential attacker's bargaining reputation, which will also enhance deterrence stability. The critical problem, however, with these two strategies is that they assume, or are designed to deal with, a potential attacker motivated by defensive goals only. As a result such policies fail to recognize that the potential attacker is also likely to be considering more ambitious offensive objectives; thus deterrence stability is increased but at the expense of deterrence credibility. The reverse problem exists when the defender adopts a bullying negotiating strategy or a policy of strength in military preparedness. An unyielding diplomatic stance clearly signals the defender's intention to support the protégé and possibly risk armed conflict; but the defender's refusal to propose or consider some form of limited concessions is likely to increase the potential attacker's concern that a retreat will be viewed by other states as capitulation under pressure. A policy of military strength will put the defender in a favorable military position to intervene if deterrence should fail; but it may also increase the chances of deterrence failure by provoking either further escalation by the potential attacker and fears of a preemptive strike or the potential attacker's determination to avoid signs of retreat under maximum coercive pressure. Diplomatically and militarily, these two strategies are optimal for enhancing credibility if the potential attacker is motivated solely by offensive aims; but if the security dilemma and defensive objectives are also an important component of the potential attacker's calculus, then such policies risk provocation.

The optimal strategy for balancing credibility and stability is to pursue a policy of reciprocity. Diplomatically, reciprocity signals to the potential attacker the determination of the defender to support the protégé while at the same time signaling the defender's intention to not coerce or force the potential attacker to accept a settlement that is clearly one-sided. Proposals for negotiations and limited compromise may therefore offer a way for the potential attacker to back down in the confrontation with minimum damage to its bargaining reputation. Tit-for-tat military escalation signals both the defender's intention to use force if the protégé is attacked and the increased capability to act promptly if necessary but does not place the potential attacker in a highly vulnerable military position.

HYPOTHESIS 6. *A policy by the defender of tit for tat in military escalation will increase the probability of extended deterrence success in comparison to alternative policies.*

HYPOTHESIS 7. *A firm-but-flexible policy of diplomacy and negotiations by the defender will increase the probability of extended deterrence success in comparison to alternative policies.*

Past Behavior of the Defender

The bargaining behavior of the defender provides a direct means by which to signal to the potential attacker the defender's intentions to support the protégé. The potential attacker, however, may also draw on the past behavior of the defender in international confrontations to help determine the defender's willingness to risk armed conflict or to concede under coercive pressure. If security commitments are interdependent (Schelling 1966, 55–59), a defender's past actions in a confrontation should have an impact on the potential attacker's assessment of the defender's likely behavior in the extended-immediate deterrence conflict. If the defender has backed down in a previous conflict and conceded to the demands of the opponent in order to avoid an armed conflict, the credibility of the defender's extended deterrent actions are more likely to be questioned. If the defender, however, did not concede under coercive pressure then the credibility of the defender's extended deterrent actions should be enhanced.

The work of Robert Jervis (1976, 239–70) suggests that historical events have their greatest impact on policymakers when they or their country is directly involved in the event. Jervis argues that personal and direct experience of this kind can prove to be a powerful determinant of a policymaker's image of an opponent. The past behavior of the defender therefore can be divided into two sets of cases for purposes of analysis: (1) previous cases of attempted extended deterrence in which the identity of the potential attacker varies from case to case and (2) only those previous conflicts in which the defender confronted the same potential attacker as in the current case of attempted deterrence.

HYPOTHESIS 8. *The past behavior of the defender in those confrontations in which the current potential attacker was directly involved will have a greater impact on deterrence outcomes than in those cases in which the current potential attacker was not directly involved.*

Consistent with the logic underlying the hypotheses on bargaining behavior, a past record of firm-but-flexible bargaining by the defender should increase the probability of deterrence success in comparison to a past record of conciliation or bullying. A past record of making concessions under coercive pressure and an unwillingness to risk armed conflict should contribute to the weakening of the defender's future credibility; while a past record of intransigence and bullying will have already imposed domestic political as well as international costs on the potential attacker. As a result, the potential attacker should be even more determined to protect its bargaining reputation and avoid another retreat before the defender (see Leng 1983).[5]

HYPOTHESIS 9. *In past confrontations between defender and potential attacker firm-but-flexible bargaining by the defender will enhance the deterrence actions of the defender in the next confrontation between the two states. If the defender, however, adopted a bullying or conciliatory strategy, then the probability of deterrence failure in the next confrontation will increase.*

Measurement of Variables

The dependent variable was coded as either deterrence success (one) or failure (zero) in accordance with the coding rules outlined in the Appendix.

To measure the conventional balance of military forces a number of different dimensions affecting military capabilities could be analyzed: force-to-space ratios, the quantity and quality of weaponry, the mobility of forces based on logistical support and command and control capabilities, and the capacity of states to mobilize economic and manpower resources efficiently (Epstein 1987; Mearsheimer 1983, chap. 6; Organski and Kugler 1980, chap. 2; Posen 1984–85). In this study, due to the limits of data availability, military capabilities will be measured as simply the ratio of defender-protégé forces to potential attacker forces. Three different operational measures were constructed. First, the immediate balance of forces includes those ground forces (number of troops) of the defender-protégé and potential attacker that can be deployed in the battlefield at the very outset of an armed conflict. The *immediate balance* is defined as those land forces of the potential attacker in a position to initiate an attack directly and those land forces of defender-protégé in a position to repulse such an attack directly. To be in a position to engage in combat directly the opposing troops must be either concentrated and mobilized for combat at the point of likely attack or capable of mobilization for immediate combat from forward positions to the point of attack. Primary as well as secondary sources were utilized for each case to collect this information. Second, the *short-term balance* is defined as the capacity of the potential attacker and defender-protégé to reinforce and augment the immediate balance of forces through the mobilization of each country's standing ground and air forces and first class of trained reserves.[6] The third measure is the *long-term balance* of forces, which is defined as the capacity of each side to build up its existing armed forces and to maintain that increased level of fighting strength by the mobilization of the economy and population for a protracted war. The composite national capabilities index (Singer, Bremer, and Stucky 1972) was adopted by multiplying each state's existing military capabilities (share of world total military personnel and expenditures) by the sum of that state's industrial and demographic size (share of world total steel production, industrial fuel consumption, urban, and total population).[7] The deterrent value of nuclear weapons for the defender was recorded as one for those cases in which the defender possessed nuclear weapons and zero for the remaining cases.[8]

The military and economic ties between defender and protégé were measured as follows: First, the existence of an *alliance* between the two states was coded with a value of one, the absence of an alliance was coded with a value of zero. Second, *military arms transfer ties* was defined as the share of arms imported by the protégé from the defender as a percentage of total arms imported over a three-year period prior to the case of extended deterrence. The percentage share was calculated on a 10-point scale ranging from 1 (0%–10%) to 10 (91%–100%). Third, *economic ties* were measured as the protégé's share of the defender's total merchandise exports and imports over a three-year period (Huth and Russett 1984, 511–13).

The following categories were utilized to code the outcomes of previous cases of attempted extended deterrence for the defender:

1. *Success.* Defender stands firm in support of protégé and potential attacker refrains from attack.
2. *Failure but armed support.* Deterrence fails, and protégé is attacked; but defender does intervene with military force to protect protégé.
3. *Capitulation.* Deterrence fails, but defender does not intervene with military force to protect protégé.

Categories 1 and 2 represent indicators of a past record of firmness for the defender, while category 3 indicates a record of weakness. In the statistical analysis a value of one was recorded for each case with one of the three possible outcomes listed above, while a value of zero was recorded for each case in which there was no past attempt at extended deterrence for the defender.

The following categories will be utilized to describe the outcomes of the most recent past confrontation between the defender and potential attacker:

1. *Diplomatic put-down.* The defender adopts a bullying bargaining strategy or forces the potential attacker to make critical concessions in order to avoid an armed conflict, or both.
2. *Stalemate.* The defender and potential attacker avoid a direct military confrontation, but firm-but-flexible bargaining by the defender fails to achieve any agreement with the potential attacker resolving the underlying issues in dispute.
3. *Diplomatic defeat.* The defender retreats under the pressure of the potential attacker and concedes on the critical issues in dispute in order to avoid becoming involved in a direct military confrontation (Leng 1983; Maoz 1982, 226–31).

To determine which outcome applied to the past behavior of the defender, a detailed summary of diplomatic negotiations was recorded for each past case and then examined to determine to what extent the defender had conceded to the demands of the potential attacker.[9] The distinction between a put-down by the defender and a stalemate is based on whether the potential attacker was forced to make critical concessions or the defender rebuffed proposals for compromise. In the case of a stalemate both sides tacitly agree not to press their demands further and the immediate confrontation is allowed to deescalate as neither side is forced to back down and accept the demands or position of its opponent. The defender adopts a firm-but-flexible bargaining strategy; but the potential attacker is not interested in a compromise settlement, and therefore the issues in contention remain unresolved. To test the hypothesis that a record of past conciliation or bullying with the potential attacker reduces the likelihood of deterrence success, those cases in which the defender has either backed down and accepted a diplomatic defeat or the potential attacker has done so will be examined. To test the hypothesis that a record of firm-but-flexible bargaining enhances the likelihood of deterrence success, those cases in which the past behavior of the defender is coded as a stalemate will be analyzed.

For purposes of statistical analysis the three different outcomes of past confrontations between the defender and potential attacker will be treated as dummy variables. For each case that the past behavior of the defender is coded as either *diplomatic put-down, stalemate,* or *diplomatic defeat,* a value of one will be recorded for that case. The excluded category (a value of zero) will be those cases in which there is no past confrontation between defender and potential attacker.

To operationalize the diplomatic and military strategies adopted by the defender a detailed chronological summary of the negotiating process and military actions of each state was compiled for each case. To determine which diplomatic strategy was pursued by the defender the record of the negotiating process was broken down into a series of sequential exchanges between defender and potential attacker from the beginning to the end of the dispute. The coding rules of Leng and Wheeler (1979, 657–71) were then adopted to identify which of the three strategies the defender had pursued.[10] A value of one was recorded for each case in which the defender adopted a firm-but-flexible negotiating strategy and a value of zero for those cases in which alternative strategies were adopted. For example, in the Anglo-Russian dispute over the northern Afghan border in 1885 the British pursued a firm-but-flexible strategy by proposing to the Russians that the Panjdeh territory would be conceded only if Afghanistan was to retain control over disputed territory that was strategically vital. In contrast, in the confrontation between Russia and Japan over Korea and Manchuria in 1903–4, the Russian government refused to negotiate over Russian rights in Manchuria; while at the same time it sought to place severe constraints on Japanese rights in Korea (Huth n.d., chap. 6).

To determine which strategy of military escalation was pursued by the defender the summary of military actions was broken down chronologically into a series of moves and countermoves by each side. The military moves of defender and potential attacker were then categorized according to the following scale of escalation:

1. symbolic show of force, display of military presence
2. demonstration of military capabilities
3. build-up of military forces
4. positioning of forces for immediate use
5. preparation of forces for immediate use
6. mobilization of forces for war

For each round of move and countermove the response of the defender was coded as either *greater than, equal to,* or *less than,* the military actions of the defender. The coding rules of Leng and Wheeler were then adopted to identify the overall policy of military escalation pursued by the defender.[11] For those cases in which the defender adopted a policy of tit for tat a value of one was recorded, while a value of zero was assigned to those cases in which a policy of strength or caution was adopted. For example, Libyan armed intervention in the Chadian Civil War in 1983 and preparation to advance on the capital was reciprocated by the airlifting of French troops to the Chadian capital and their deployment along the so-called red line north of the capital. In contrast, in the Czech crisis of 1938 German mobilization of ground and air forces for an attack against Czechoslovakia was countered only by precautionary naval measures on the part of the British and, as a result, Britain was not in a position to defend Czechoslovakia if it was attacked. A tit-for-tat policy would have required that the British expeditionary force be sent to France and then be deployed and mobilized to carry out with French forces a counteroffensive along the Franco-German border (Huth n.d., chap. 5).

Data Analysis

The hypotheses formulated for empirical testing represent a mixture of complementary as well as competing explanations for the success or failure of deterrence. For example, hypotheses on the military balance and strategies of military escalation supplement each other by focusing both on the capabilities of the defender to protect the protégé and on indicators of the defender's intention to employ those capabilities if necessary. At the same time, a number of different factors can influence the potential attacker's estimate of the defender's intention to use force. For example, is the defender's reputation for standing firm or backing down under the threat of armed conflict more important than the specific interests at stake in determining intentions or are the immediate diplomatic and military actions of the defender even more critical in signaling intentions?

The model specified for empirical testing included four variables: the military balance, the value of the protégé to the defender, the bargaining behavior of the defender, and the past behavior of the defender. These four sets of variables represent two fundamental components in the potential attacker's calculus of deterrence: (1) the military capabilities of the defender to protect the protégé and (2) the likely intention of the defender to use force to protect the protégé. Probit analysis was utilized to determine which of the alternative indicators for each set of variables provided the greatest degree of relative explanatory power. The hypotheses as formulated in the preceeding section represent the expected results of the empirical testing. Multiple equations were then tested with at least one indicator from each set of variables included in each equation. Those indicators that did not reach the 95% level of significance were deleted from the equation. In order to recheck the final results of the probit analysis each of the previously deleted indicators was reentered individually into the final equation and tested to make sure that the indicator remained insignificant. Close attention was directed to the potential problem of multicolinearity among the indicators of the independent variables. Auxiliary r-square values for the indicators in each equation tested were checked and multicolinearity was a problem with auxiliary r-square values below .3 in almost no cases.

The final equation is presented in Table 1. Overall, the results of the probit analysis indicate generally strong support for the hypotheses as formulated. The principal findings can be summarized as follows:

1. The balance of forces had an important impact on deterrence outcomes. As Hypothesis 1 predicted, the immediate and short-term balance of forces had a positive impact on the probability of deterrence success, whereas the long-term balance of forces had no significant impact. The most effective military deterrent seems to be the capacity of the defender to repulse an attack and deny the adversary its military objectives from the very outset to early stages of an armed confrontation. Conventional deterrence based on a denial capability is much more effective than the threat of punishment in a protracted armed conflict. In addition, the possession of nuclear weapons by the defender (Hypothesis 2) did not have a significant impact on deterrence outcomes when the target was a nonnuclear power.
2. Strategies of crisis bargaining play an

Table 1. Probit Analysis of Deterrence Outcomes

Explanatory Variable	Estimated Coefficient	Standard Error
Constant	-1.67	—
Military balance		
Immediate balance of forces	.55	.28*
Short-term balance of forces	.83	.36**
Bargaining behavior		
Firm-but-flexible diplomacy	.97	.45**
Tit-for-tat military escalation	.98	.46**
Reputation from past behavior[a]		
Defender backs down	-1.15	.64*
Defender intransigence	-.86	.49*

Note: Percentage of predictions correct = 84; number of cases = 58.

[a]Those cases in which the defender and potential attacker were adversaries in a previous confrontation.

*Significant at the 95% confidence level, one-tailed test.

**Significant at the 97.5% confidence level, one-tailed test.

important role in the success or failure of deterrence. As argued in Hypotheses 6 and 7, the adoption of a policy of tit for tat in military escalation and a firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategy are the most effective bargaining strategies in contributing to deterrence success. These results indicate that bargaining behavior based on a policy of reciprocity can signal to the potential attacker the defender's determination to protect the protégé, without provoking the potential attacker. These results support a growing body of experimental and comparative historical research which concludes that reciprocity is a robust strategy for inducing cooperation among adversaries (Axelrod 1984; Gochman and Leng 1983; Leng 1984; Leng and Gochman 1982; Patchen 1987).

3. Consistent with Hypothesis 8, the past behavior of the defender in the most recent confrontation with the potential attacker had a significant effect on deterrence outcomes; whereas the past behavior of the defender in deterrence cases with other states did not. Hypothesis 9 was partially supported by the empirical evidence: a record of past conciliation and of backing down under pressure or of bullying by the defender reduced the likelihood of deterrence success. A past outcome of firm-but-flexible bargaining and stalemate between defender and potential attacker, however, did not increase the probability of deterrence success, contrary to the expectations of Hypothesis 9.
4. The only set of hypotheses not supported by empirical testing were those linking high levels of political-military and economic ties between defender and protégé to deterrence success (3–5). The reason would seem to be the strong impact of bargaining behavior on influencing the potential attacker's estimate of defender intentions and interests at stake. High levels of arms transfers and foreign trade between defender and protégé represent an indirect basis for estimating the defender's interests at stake. The bargaining behavior of the defender, however, provides a more immediate and direct indicator of the defender's intent to support the protégé, which the

Table 2. The Impact of the Balance of Military Forces on Deterrence

Balance of Military Forces	Change in Ratio of Defender-Protégé Forces to Potential Attacker Forces	Percentage Change in Probability of Successful Deterrence
Immediate	.25- .50	5
	.50- .75	5
	.75-1.00	6
	1.00-1.50	9
	1.50-2.00	8
	2.00-3.00	10
	3.00-5.00	6
Short-term	.25- .50	6
	.50- .75	5
	.75-1.00	4
	1.00-1.50	7
	1.50-2.00	6
	2.00-3.00	8
	3.00-5.00	9

Note: The marginal impact of each variable is calculated by changing its value while holding all other variables in the model (Table 1) at their mean value. The change in the location on the cumulative standard normal distribution is then converted into the percentage change in the probability of successful deterrence.

potential attacker is likely to infer reflects the importance of the interests at stake for the defender. Alliance ties have little independent deterrent impact, it would seem, since the importance of the alliance for the potential attacker rests largely on the immediate and short-term military contribution of the defender to the protégé, which is reflected in the balance of forces. The long-term political and military costs to the defender of not honoring an alliance commitment do not seem to be that salient to the potential attacker.

In order to help interpret the results in Table 1 additional tables are presented that report the marginal impact of changes in each variable while holding all other variables in the equation at their mean value. In Table 2 the impact of changes in the immediate and short-term balance of forces is reported. For example, a change in the immediate balance of forces from a one-to-four disadvantage to an equal balance of forces for the defender increases the probability of deterrence success by 16%; while the change from an equal balance to a three-to-one advantage for the defender increases the likelihood of deterrence success by 27%. Similar results are obtained when the short-term balance of forces is examined.

The results presented in Table 3 indicate that crisis bargaining plays a critical role in determining the success or failure of deterrence. These results lend strong support to the argument that despite the potential problems of misperception and cognitive biases (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985, 183, 204–11; Lebow 1981, 277) in a crisis or confrontation, policymakers can still effectively signal and clarify intentions by means of diplomatic and military actions. For example, the adoption of a firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategy increased the probability of deterrence success by 32%. A strategy of tit for tat in responding to the military escalation of the potential attacker increased the chances of success by 33%.

The defender's past behavior also plays a critical role in deterrence outcomes. If the defender was forced by the potential

Table 3. The Impact of Bargaining Strategies and Past Behavior on Deterrence

Strategies and Behavior	Percentage Change in Probability of Successful Deterrence
Bargaining strategy	
Firm-but-flexible diplomacy[a]	+32
Defender military escalation	
Tit for tat[b]	+33
Past confrontation outcome	
Defender backs down[c]	−42
Defender intransigence or putdown[c]	−32

Note: The marginal impact of each variable is calculated by changing its value while holding all other variables in the model (Table 1) at their mean value. The change in the location on the cumulative standard normal distribution is then converted into the percentage change in the probability of successful deterrence.

[a] As opposed to a bullying or conciliatory strategy.

[b] As opposed to exceeding or failing to match escalation of the potential attacker.

[c] As opposed to stalemate or no past confrontation.

attacker to concede to its demands under military pressure in a previous confrontation, then the deterrent threats and actions of the defender lacked credibility in the next dispute between the two states. As the results in the bottom third of Table 3 indicate, if the defender has backed down, the probability of deterrence success decreases by 42%. A reputation for unyielding firmness and bullying, however, is not to the advantage of the defender (just as it is not an effective bargaining strategy for immediate deterrence). If the defender adopted a bullying strategy (diplomatic put-down) in the last encounter with the potential attacker the probability of deterrence success also decreased—by 32%. The reason seems to be that having been bullied previously, the potential attacker was less likely to retreat in the future and suffer further damage to its bargaining reputation. For example, the decision by Russia to go to war in defense of Serbia in 1914 was strongly influenced by the diplomatic setbacks that Russia suffered at the hands of Germany in previous confrontations in 1909 and 1912–13 (Huth n.d., chap. 6).

Conclusion

The defense of allies from external threats is an enduring feature of the competition between states for spheres of influence in the international system. Extended deterrence, however, can be a very difficult and demanding task for foreign policy leaders. In this study we have found that a potential attacker's calculus of military costs seems to focus on whether military force can be used to achieve decisive results at relatively low cost. Extended deterrence is greatly strengthened, therefore, if the defender has the military capability to deny the attacker a quick victory and turn the conflict into a protracted struggle. While a number of recent case studies have questioned whether the military balance is a powerful explanatory variable in the analysis of deterrence outcomes (Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985, 215–16; Stein 1987, 348, 351), the results of this study strongly suggest that the balance of forces is an important variable in a potential attacker's calculus of deterrence.

Uncertainty in estimating the intentions of the defender in a situation of extended deterrence is a critical problem confronting a potential attacker. One way in which the defender can signal its intentions and reduce uncertainty is through the bargaining process. A tit-for-tat policy of military escalation not only signals the defender's willingness to use force if necessary, it also has an important impact on the immediate balance of forces. The movement and positioning of military forces by the defender in many cases of extended deterrence erased a local imbalance of forces in favor of the potential attacker and established a formidable tripwire deterrent capability in which the use of force by the potential attacker would necessarily result in the direct engagement of the defender's armed forces. As a result, the ability of the potential attacker to achieve quick and decisive results with the use of force was greatly reduced and the military costs increased (Huth n.d., chap. 5).

Deterrence success, however, is not only a question of the defender possessing and demonstrating the intent to use powerful military forces. The critical role that a firm-but-flexible diplomatic strategy played in deterrence success strongly suggests that the political costs of inaction are also an important factor in the potential attacker's calculus of gains and losses (also see Russett 1967; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985, chaps, 3, 5, 9). The emphasis in deterrence theory has been on the requirements of the defender to possess strong military forces and to demonstrate the intent to use force. It is important to recognize, however, that estimates of only the military costs of using force provide a partial and incomplete explanation of deterrence outcomes in a number of cases. The political costs for the potential attacker of not pressing ahead with the use of force, defined in terms of bargaining reputation, need to be recognized as central to successful crisis management. By combining firmness with conditional proposals of limited compromise, the immediate confrontation can be deescalated and the potential attacker can retreat from its threat to use force without reinforcing the appearance of capitulation due to coercive pressure. The credible threat of military force is required to convince the potential attacker that the military costs of changing the status quo are high, but skillful diplomacy is also required to assure the potential attacker that the political costs of continued peace are acceptable.

Appendix

The fifty-eight cases are listed in Table A-1.

The following criteria were utilized in selecting them: First, the initial threat of force by the potential attacker has to be explicit, and the target of the threat clearly identifiable. Coercive actions by the potential attacker included:

1. verbal threat or warning that force would be used
2. reinforcement and movement of military forces to positions near the border or off the coast of the protégé
3. concentration and alerting of military forces on the border or off the coast of the protégé

Second, the threat of military retaliation by the defender had to be clearly directed at, and perceived by, the potential attacker. Deterrent actions by the defender included the same actions 1, 2, and 3, as directed at the potential attacker (adopted from Gochman and Maoz 1984, 587–89).

Table A-1. Cases of Attempted Extended-Immediate Deterrence, 1885–1984

Case	Year	Potential Attacker	Protégé	Defender	Outcome[a]
1	1885	Russia	Afghanistan	Britain, India	S
2	1885–86	Bulgaria	Serbia	Austria-Hungary	S
3	1886	Greece	Turkey	Britain	S
4	1894	Japan	Korea	China	F
5	1897	Greece	Crete	Britain, Turkey	S
6	1898	France	Egyptian Sudan	Britain	S
7	1902–3	Germany	Venezuela	United States	S
8	1903–4	Japan	Korea	Russia	F
9	1903–4	Colombia	Panama	United States	S
10	1905–6	France	Morocco	Germany	F
11	1905–6	Germany	France	Britain	S
12	1906	Turkey	Egypt	Britain	S
13	1908–9	Serbia, Russia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	S
14	1911	Italy	Tripoli	Turkey	F
15	1911	France	Morocco	Germany	F
16	1911	Germany	France	Britain	S
17	1912–13	Serbia, Russia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	S
18	1913	Romania	Bulgaria	Russia	S
19	1913	Bulgaria	Greece	Serbia	F
20	1913	Serbia	Albania	Austria-Hungary	S
21	1914	Austria, Germany	Serbia	Russia	F
22	1914	Russia, Serbia	Austria-Hungary	Germany	F
23	1914	Germany	France	Britain, Russia	F
24	1914	Germany	Belgium	Britain	F
25	1921	Panama	Costa Rica	United States	S
26	1922	Turkey	Greece	Britain	S
27	1935	Italy	Ethiopia	Britain	F
28	1935–36	Japan	Outer Mongolia	Soviet Union	S
29	1937	Soviet Union	Manchukuo	Japan	S
30	1938	Soviet Union	Manchukuo	Japan	F
31	1938	Germany	Czechoslovakia	Britain, France	F
32	1938–39	Italy	Tunisia	France, Britain	S
33	1939	Germany	Poland	Britain, France	F
34	1940–41	Soviet Union	Finland	Germany	S
35	1946	Soviet Union	Iran	United States	S
36	1946	Soviet Union	Turkey	United States	S
37	1948	Soviet Union	West Berlin	United States, Britain	S
38	1950	China	Taiwan	United States	S
39	1950	United States	North Korea	China	F
40	1954–55	China	Quemoy-Matsu	United States	S
41	1957	Turkey	Syria	Soviet Union	S
42	1961	Iraq	Kuwait	Britain	S
43	1961	North Vietnam	Laos	United States	S
44	1961	India	Goa	Portugal	F
45	1961–62	Indonesia	West Irian	Netherlands	F
46	1964–65	Indonesia	Malaysia	Britain	F
47	1964–65	North Vietnam	South Vietnam	United States	F
48	1964–65	United States	North Vietnam	China	S
49	1967	Israel	Syria	Egypt	F
50	1967	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	F
51	1970	Syria	Jordan	Israel	S
52	1971	India	Pakistani Kashmir	China	S
53	1974	Turkey	Cyprus	Greece	F
54	1975	Morocco	Western Sahara	Spain	F

Table A-1 (continued)

Case	Year	Potential Attacker	Protégé	Defender	Outcome[a]
55	1975	Guatemala	Belize	Britain	S
56	1977	Guatemala	Belize	Britain	S
57	1979	China	Vietnam	Soviet Union	F
58	1983	Libya	Chad	France	S

[a] S = successful deterrence, F = failure of deterrence.

Successful immediate deterrence is defined as those cases in which the potential attacker does not attack the protégé or engages in only the limited use of force against the protégé and fails to force the defender to capitulate to its demands under the threat of force and escalation to full-scale war. To conclude that deterrence has succeeded can be difficult when there is a lack of documentary evidence. Diplomatic historians and country experts were consulted, as were secondary sources in order to distinguish between bluffs and actual threats to use force. In some cases, as well, a number of factors were likely to have contributed to the decision by the potential attacker to not use force; but by drawing on expert advice and secondary analyses I gained reasonable confidence that the defender's deterrent actions played a central role in that decision. Although the coding of deterrence success in some cases cannot be established definitively, it is essential to have cases of success and failure to compare if hypotheses and propositions on deterrence are to be tested systematically.

There were a total of six cases (nos. 5, 7, 28, 43, 51, and 58) of successful deterrence in which the attacker engaged in the use of limited force against the protégé. In five cases the combined total of battle fatalities between the regular armed forces of protégé and attacker was less than one hundred and in one case (no. 51) fatalities were between one hundred and two hundred. In all of the cases the attacker failed to achieve its primary political-military objectives and deescalated the use of force in response to the threatened intervention of the defender. The critical distinction between extended-immediate deterrence success and failure is whether the attacker decides to commit its armed forces to sustained combat against the protégé and defender in pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. As a result, the limited use of force by the attacker is not a failure of immediate deterrence if the attacker steps back from the escalation that is considered necessary to attain those objectives. A clear-cut distinction between any use of force and no use of force as the dividing line between the success or failure of immediate deterrence is misplaced since the critical question for the attacker is whether to take the necessary military steps to achieve its goals or to try and settle for some form of a negotiated settlement. Deterrence *failure* is therefore defined as those cases in which the attacker commits its armed forces to sustained combat against the protégé and defender or in which the defender conceded to the principal demands of the attacker under the threat of armed conflict.

Notes

I would like to thank Bruce Russett, Paul Kennedy, Robert Jervis, and James Morrow for their advice and comments. Yoshitaka Nishizawa provided invaluable assistance on problems of data analysis, while Celest Wallander and Lorrie Harvey provided excellent research assistance. Finally, I would like to thank the National Science Foundation (SES-8413022) for financial support of this project. I assume full responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation. This article is adapted from *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* by Paul K. Huth to be published November 1988 by Yale University Press. Copyright © 1988, Yale University Press.

1. The cases listed in the Appendix represent an extended and revised version of the data set that was used in an earlier study (Huth and Russett 1984).

2. Strategic surprise occurs when a defender fails to react to intelligence information and does not undertake precautionary military preparations for defense. Tactical surprise occurs when the defender receives warning of an attack and initiates military preparations but has insufficient time to mobilize fully and position forces for optimal defense.

3. The response of states that are the target of an attack is a very different question. To defend their own country's territory policymakers are very likely to resist an attack even if a protracted war of attrition is required to defeat or at least punish the aggressor. This does not seem to hold true for the defense of allies (see Huth and Russett n.d.).

4. Conceptually, high levels of private foreign investment by the defender in the protégé's economy would also be a good indicator of economic interests at stake. Data on foreign investment, however, are sketchy and unavailable for many cases in the period prior to World War II.

5. There is very little systematic empirical work that tests the impact of past behavior. The work of Snyder and Diesing (1977, 187–88) and Huth and Russett (1984, 517) suggest that past behavior is not very important. Blechman and Kaplan (1978, 110–11), however, find some relation between the previous use of force by the United States in a region and positive outcomes in the short term.

6. The short-term balance of forces is adjusted to reflect the impact of distance between defender and protégé and potential attacker and protégé if necessary. The loss-of-strength gradient is taken from Bueno de Mesquita (1981, 105).

7. Data for this indicator were obtained from the Correlates of War National Capabilities Data Set. The operationalization of the long-term balance-of-forces indicator fails to capture the political capacity dimension and as a result the indicator assumes that both sides will be able to mobilize available economic and manpower resources. This measurement error produces a bias toward overestimating the capabilities of the defender, which would enhance the deterrent value of the long-term balance-of-forces indicator.

8. The deterrent value of nuclear weapons could also be tested by examining cases in which explicit nuclear threats—verbal or the alerting or movement of nuclear capable forces—occurred. There are, however, only two cases in this study of such explicit threats—Berlin, 1948 and Quemoy-Matsu, 1955—and therefore such a test is not attempted.

9. On a random sample of twenty cases the intercoder reliability score was $r = .96$.

10. The intercoder reliability score on a random sample of twenty cases was $r = .91$.

11. The intercoder reliability score was $r = .88$ on a random sample of twenty cases.

References

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation.* New York: Basic Books.

Betts, Richard. 1977. *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Blechman, Barry, and Stephen Kaplan. 1978. *Force without War.* Washington: Brookings.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. 1981. *The War Trap.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Epstein, Joshua. 1987. *Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf.* Washington: Brookings.

George, Alexander, David Hall, and William Simons. 1971. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy.* Boston: Little, Brown.

George, Alexander, and Richard Smoke. 1974. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Gochman, Charles, and Russell Leng. 1983. Realpolitik and the Road to War: An Analysis of Attributes and Behavior. *International Studies Quarterly* 27:97–120.

Gochman, Charles, and Zeev Maoz. 1984. Militarized Disputes, 1816–1976: Procedures, Patterns, and Insights. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28:585–616.

Howard, Michael. 1982–83. Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s. *Foreign Affairs* 61:309–24.

Howard, Michael. 1984. *The Causes of War.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Huth, Paul. N.d. *Deterrence and War.* New Haven: Yale University Press. Forthcoming.

Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett. 1984. What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. *World Politics* 36:496–526.

Huth, Paul, and Bruce Russett. N.d. Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation. *International Studies Quarterly.* Forthcoming.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1984. *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein. 1985. *Psychology and Deterrence.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kaplowitz, Noel. 1984. Psychological Dimensions of International Relations: The Reciprocal Effects of Conflict Strategies. *International Studies Quarterly* 28:373–406.

Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. *Between Peace and War.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Leng, Russell. 1983. Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27: 379–420.

Leng, Russell. 1984. Reagan and the Russians: Crisis Bargaining Beliefs and the Historical Record. *American Political Science Review* 78:338–55.

Leng, Russell, and Charles Gochman. 1982. Dangerous Disputes: A Study of Conflict Behavior and War. *American Journal of Political Science* 26:654–87.

Leng, Russell, and Hugh Wheeler. 1979. Influence Strategies, Success, and War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23:655–84.

Maoz, Zeev. 1982. *Paths to Conflict.* Boulder: Westview.

Mearsheimer, John. 1983. *Conventional Deterrence.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Morgan, Patrick. 1977. *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis.* Beverly Hills: Sage.

Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. *The War Ledger.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Patchen, Martin. 1987. Strategies for Eliciting Cooperation from an Adversary. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31:164–85.

Posen, Barry. 1984–85. Measuring the European Conventional Balance: Coping with Complexity in Threat Assessment. *International Security* 9: 47–88.

Russett, Bruce. 1967. Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory. *Journal of Peace Research* 4:89–105.

Schelling, Thomas. 1966. *Arms and Influence.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stucky. 1972. Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965. In *Peace, War, and Numbers,* ed. Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Snyder, Glenn. 1961. *Deterrence and Defense.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Snyder, Glenn, and Paul Diesing. 1977. *Conflict among Nations.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Snyder, Jack. 1984. Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984. *International Security* 9:108–46.

Stein, Arthur. 1980. *The Nation at War.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Stein, Janice Gross. 1987. Extended Deterrence in the Middle East: American Strategy Reconsidered. *World Politics* 39:326–52.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1984. Causes of War. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.

Paul K. Huth is Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045.

REPUTATION AND HEGEMONIC STABILITY: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS

JAMES E. ALT
Harvard University
RANDALL L. CALVERT
University of Rochester
BRIAN D. HUMES
Michigan State University

We develop and explicate a game-theoretic model in which repeated play, incomplete information, and reputation are major elements. A significant advance of this model is the way it represents cooperation under incomplete information among rational actors of different sizes. The model is used to formalize certain aspects of the "theory of hegemonic stability." It shows that the "dilemma" or "limits" of hegemonic stability look like natural attributes of games where reputation is involved, unifying both "benevolent" and "coercive" strands of hegemony theory. An example, drawn from recent developments in the Organization of Petroleum-exporting Countries, shows how our model of reputation guides the study of hegemonic regime construction. We conclude by comparing the nature of cooperative behavior under conditions of complete and incomplete information.

We here address two closely related purposes. One is the development and explication of the strategic nature of "hegemonic" relations among rational nation-actors, using a game-theoretic model in which repeated play, incomplete information, and reputation are major elements.[1] The model itself has broader applicability. In general, it describes a "large" actor's ability to affect distributional outcomes in a situation where actors compete over shares at the same time that they cooperate to produce a good.

Our other purpose is to illustrate game theory as "applied theory," used to model features of situations and derive observable implications. We consider the collapse of oil prices in late 1985 as a game of incomplete information. Within our model, central features of that episode include the different production capacities of Saudi Arabia and other oil producers, uncertainty about future world demand for oil, and certain internal costs known only to the Saudis. Our analysis shows that in hegemonic situations there can be instability, because reputational considerations predict that in equilibrium actors will follow "mixed strategies" of challenge and acquiescence, and that cooperation and information spreading will be severely limited.

The significant advance of our model is its ability to represent cooperative behavior when rational actors have asymmetric information and different capabilities. *Information* is asymmetrically distributed in that an actor may know its own true costs and payoffs better than others do. *Capabilities* differ to such an extent that, even if at cost to itself, only one "large" actor is able to punish (inflict costs on) others. Within this structure we show that there exists an equilibrium of cooperation under a large actor's reputation for toughness. This demonstration is important since analysts can view observable behavior corresponding to an equilibrium as something reasonable people could do and persist in doing.

Thus we bring together a number of previously separate perspectives. Our model accords a major role in international relations to reputation and threat, as any student of diplomacy would want. It stresses coercion, but treats regimes as chosen cooperative behavior. Most important, it shows what is gained by taking a more complex model from the realm of economics and applying it to a developing area of theory in political science, the (hitherto informal) "theory of hegemonic stability." In fact, many of the insights of hegemony theory turn out to be features of a repeated game of incomplete information. In formalizing this theory, our model shows that the "dilemma" (Stein 1984) or "limits" (Snidal 1985a) of hegemonic stability can be reinterpreted as natural attributes of games involving reputation. Snidal's distinction between "benevolent" and "coercive" strands of hegemony theory is thus subsumed within a unified model. This offers hope of advancing the promise that Ruggie (1985) ascribes to game theory that "both conflict and cooperation can be explained by a single logical apparatus."

This accommodation of the central concerns of hegemony theorists (unequal resources) and game theorists (strategic interaction) proceeds as follows. The first section introduces the theory of hegemonic stability and shows how certain features of the hegemonic situation—particularly asymmetric distributions among actors of information and other power resources—lie largely outside existing game-theoretic analyses of international regimes. The second section describes games of incomplete information and shows how reputation addresses problems of hegemony. It then develops a model of reputation, demonstrates that it produces a Bayesian equilibrium under mixed strategies, and describes possible extensions of the model. The third section uses the example of the recent collapse of oil prices and subsequent behavior of the nations in the Organization of Petroleum-exporting Countries (OPEC) to elaborate on the model. The conclusion provides further examples, stresses desirable extensions, and characterizes differences in effective strategic choice and cooperation between hegemonic and nonhegemonic situations.

Hegemonic Stability, Uncertainty, and Reputation

Regime Analysis, Game Theory, and Hegemony

The interest in game theory among students of international relations is closely connected with the analysis of regimes. Regimes are agreed-upon, semivoluntary, ongoing, long-run joint maximizing strategies that induce seemingly selfless behavior. Broader than formal agreements, regimes include principles (stating purposes), norms (general injunctions or definitions of legitimacy), rules (specific rights and obligations), and procedures (formal indications of means rather than substance). Regimes prescribe actions for members and persist when members follow these prescriptions. Examples include cartels, trade agreements, financial systems, and the like.

Game theorists have sought to interpret regimes as cooperative solutions to repeated collective action games. Rational actors (that is, actors who maximize long-run net benefits and choose courses of action based on their own preferences and expectations of how others will behave) under appropriate circumstances have sufficient incentives to cooperate with each other. Among such actors, structured, regimelike interactions would appear and persist. Whether cooperation ensues in such games depends on the structure of payoffs, the probability of repeated interaction, and the number of players (Oye 1985).

Hegemonic stability theory holds that spontaneous cooperation in these repeated games seldom occurs and that stable regimes depend instead upon the fostering actions of a dominant state. The hegemonic state provides an international order that furthers its own self-interest, although the resulting cooperation may work to the advantage of other states as well (Snidal 1985a, 587). This theory is applied to such diverse cases as Dutch-led world trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and British trading regimes in the nineteenth century by Gilpin (1981), Keohane (1981, 1984), Kindleberger (1973, 1981), Krasner (1976), and Stein (1984). A small part of the conflict between the hegemonic stability theory and game theory of regimes reflects a debate over the effects of large numbers on the robustness of cooperation (Oye 1985, 15). More importantly, hegemony theory typically stresses a variety of features—size asymmetries, distributional conflict, costly coercion, learning and uncertainty, and instability—that have proved difficult to model in game-theoretic analyses of regimes. Although some formalization of strategic elements of hegemony is desirable, the game theory of international relations could profit by incorporating important insights of hegemony theorists. Our incomplete information analysis of hegemony is formulated to reflect these insights, which we now elaborate.

Significant Features of Hegemony Theory

Asymmetry of Size. The central feature of hegemony theory is that the hegemon is "big" relative to others. Substantively, it may be big in markets, big in capital, big in resources, or big in military power (Keohane 1984). Theoretically, it has a size advantage. Unfortunately, the game-theoretic analysis of regimes has been restricted to equal-actor, complete information games, which impose symmetry on issues, for instance, "by treating a very large state and very small ones as equal partners in a Prisoners' Dilemma" (Snidal 1985b, 47). Our game-theoretic analysis begins by assuming the hegemon's size advantage, which we treat as superiority in the possession of information and in the ability to inflict costs on others.[2]

Distributional Conflict. Hegemony theorists repeatedly observe that while all hegemonic regimes contain a big actor and many small actors, sometimes the big actor appears to get a good deal (Snidal's "coercive" strand, Kindleberger's "dominance"), at other times the small ones do ("benevolent" strand and "leadership"). This is because hegemonic stability theories, like other political economy efforts to model the role of enforcement in assisting voluntary cooperation through contracting, seek to explain the sharing of any generated surplus or gains from cooperating. Such possible "rent-sharing" arrangements between a "big" enforcer (a "hegemon") and many small others (the "allies") form a continuum. One end we could call an *empire*, where the allies' share is some level of net benefit below which they would resist or rebel, and the hegemon gets the remainder. The other is an *alliance*, in which the allies get most of the benefits (say, the provision of order) while the hegemon may hardly fare better than with no regime at all.

In between are the most interesting

situations, in which the gains from cooperation are shared. Here, the hegemon would always prefer to extract a larger contribution (net of any cost of extraction) from the allies, who (for any level of private benefit secured by the availability of order) in turn would always prefer to contribute less for the order itself. How good a deal each gets determines whether the outcome more closely resembles empire or alliance. The key is the hegemon's ability to force subordinate states to make contributions, which is based on its size advantage. Indeed, as Snidal (1985a, 588–90) points out, if the allies receive net benefits, "they may recognize hegemonic leadership as legitimate and so reinforce its performance and position."

Coercion and Costs. The hegemon's being recognized as legitimate is one way to reduce the cost of extracting contributions from the allies. This highlights the important role of the cost of coercion in the theory of hegemony.[3] The cost of coercion depends on what is done to coerce. In trade, if the hegemon enters an ally's markets competitively, it may have to bear the cost of subsidizing its own exports. In defense, withdrawal of military protection forces the hegemon to bear the costs of finding alternate sites and arrangements for refueling, training, and staging of exercises. Effective substitutes may not be available. Our model brings out clearly the way in which the *cost of punishing* is the key to the hegemon's *strength.* We distinguish between "strong" hegemons, who coerce at low cost, and "weak" hegemons, who coerce at high cost but might in appropriate situations nevertheless benefit from coercion. Both sorts are distinct from allies, who are assumed incapable of coercing profitably.

Reputation and Uncertainty. But how does a hegemon get to be "legitimate" and thus collect contributions without actually carrying out costly coercive actions? One way is for a weaker hegemon to pretend to be stronger by "investing in reputation": bearing some initial cost to establish a reputation for "toughness" which subsequently (if believed) allows cheaper coercion. Indeed, this reputation seeking appears to be a common feature of hegemony, whether in military matters, tariff wars (Stein 1984, 371), or finance (Lipson 1985). Naturally, strategic misrepresentation can backfire when bluffs are called and future credibility requires carrying out costly threats (Downs, Rocke, and Siverson 1985, 133; Ward 1987). Our model formulates more precisely some reputation-seeking strategies and the conditions under which they are rational.

Hegemonic Decline. Finally, a regular feature of hegemonic regimes is their propensity to decline, a degree of instability remarkable in something theorized about for its stability. But there doesn't seem to be much doubt about why they decline. Oye (1985, 5) cites a study by McKeown that shows how unanticipated downturns in the business cycle alter the benefits of open trade policies, and Stein (1984, 349) attributes instability to differential rates of economic growth and rapidly changing markets. But a hegemonic regime founded on reputation contains its own source of instability, since reputation requires some uncertainty about future costs of coercion. Repeated interaction may allow allies to learn more about the hegemon's nature, eroding the reputational basis of an existing regime. Of course, costs in turn may also change with unanticipated changes in a wider world (of trade, or whatever) beyond the control of the hegemon or regime, producing the appearance of instability.

Summary. We identify a regime with equilibrium behavior in which actors maintain cooperation. Cooperation need not entail hegemony, and thus Keohane (1984) can be right in claiming that hegemonic stability does not explain the

Bretton Woods regime. Snidal (1985a) is also right to say that declining hegemony may be replaced by either cooperation or conflict. A formal model of hegemony should address this aspect of the problem and also have room for costly coercion, learning, uncertainty, and decline. We believe that strategic reputation building is the key to models of hegemonic stability. We shall see below (1) how the theory of games of incomplete information can address all these points; (2) how asymmetric information coupled with costly coercion provides possible incentives to invest in a reputation for toughness; and (3) how reputation in turn can produce regimes that look more or less like empires *or* alliances but that contain within them the seeds of their own unraveling.

The Game Theory of Reputation and Leadership

Games of Incomplete Information

Our model is a repeated game of asymmetric incomplete information. Most game-theoretic applications in international relations (and in political science generally) have employed games of complete information; that is, the strategies available to all players and the resulting payoffs for all players are assumed to be common knowledge. Phenomena incompatible with these assumptions, such as commitment, bluffing, and reputation, are usually described as "situational features" not analyzable within the game-theoretic model.[4] For subjects like regime stability, in which incomplete information and reputation may be central, such analyses become informal just at the point where game-theoretic rigor should, ideally, play its most important role: the analysis of complex strategic interaction.

Game theorists, beginning with Harsanyi (1967–68), have devised tools to bring these phenomena under the same set of modeling assumptions used in more traditional game-theoretic approaches. In games of incomplete and asymmetric information, the players do not know the entire structure of payoffs. Indeed, players have *different* information. Each, for example, may know only its *own* payoffs. With *repeated interaction*, these information conditions are precisely what create the possibility of reputation, as well as learning and adjustment (Snidal 1985b; Wagner 1983).

Consider, for example, the "empire" pole of the continuum of hegemonic arrangements. Here, a coercive hegemon exploits allied states by forcing behavior costly to them and allowing them minimal benefits in return. Coercion, involving military force or economic sanctions, may be costly to the hegemon as well. The costs to the hegemon will vary from one situation to another, and may not be precisely known to the vassal states. As a result, the hegemon can sometimes threaten punishments whose true costs, if carried out, would outweigh the expected benefits from the coerced behavior. If the allies' uncertainty means that the threats do not always have to be carried out, the results may profit the hegemon, which builds a reputation for being more able to punish than it actually is.

At the opposite pole, that of "alliance" hegemony, reputation is equally important. Suppose first that several nations would be nearly equal beneficiaries from providing a collective good but that one of them (the hegemon) is able to provide selective incentives, perhaps through military or economic actions unrelated to this collective good. These incentives are costly to the hegemon; and, again, the costs to the hegemon vary and are not perfectly known to the hegemon's allies. The allies know their net benefits from both the collective and selective goods and know that the hegemon has an incentive to mislead them by misrepresenting its costs. They are tempted to challenge the regime, that

Figure 1. The Hegemony Game



is, to dump some steel, reduce an exchange rate, reduce defense expenditures. But the hegemon can gain benefits for itself (and the allies) by occasionally applying selective incentives, even if costly, masking its true pattern of costs and counteracting their temptations to challenge.

In either of these settings, or any in between, we have a hegemon threatening other states with punishment for not contributing. Uncertainty about the cost of those punishments presents the hegemon with a chance to maximize its benefits by threatening, promising, sometimes punishing or rewarding, creating a reputation for willingness to punish. The most successful, stable regimes of this sort will be the ones in which the hegemon optimizes its use of these costly threats to create the desired reputation. Of course, if a hegemon could almost always punish without cost, regime maintenance would be easy and stable hegemony common. The assumption underlying our approach is that hegemons must typically depend on *costly* punishment. Thus by focusing on reputation building, we analyze decision making at the margin that is most relevant to regime stability.

A Game of Reputation under Incomplete Information

In this section we examine a purely game-theoretic approach to the problem of reputation building. The model allows us to derive the choices, deceptions, guesses, and learning processes of rational players in a setting of incomplete information. It yields a sequential equilibrium, which we exploit to analyze the nature of reputation and of rational reputation building.[5]

Assumptions. Our model assumes that in each of two periods, a hegemon faces a potential challenge from a single ally.[6] In period *t*, ally *t* can either *obey* (adhere to the behavior required in the regime or alliance) or *challenge* (go against the hegemon's wishes). If ally *t* challenges, the hegemon can either *punish* that ally or acquiesce. Ally 2 learns the outcome of period 1 (obey; challenge and acquiesce; or challenge and punish) before making its own choices in period 2. Figure 1 displays a single period of this game in extensive form.

As the figure shows, an ally who obeys receives zero. An ally who challenges receives b $(0 < b < 1)$. Punishment exacts a penalty of one, so an ally who challenges and is punished receives $b - 1$. Thus each ally prefers most to challenge and not be punished; challenging and being punished is the worst outcome. (The value of b could be assumed different for each ally without changing any of our results.)

In each period the hegemon receives a payoff of a $(a > 1)$ if the ally obeys, and zero if the ally challenges. If the hegemon chooses to punish a challenge, the cost of punishment in period t is x_t, where x_t is one (costly) with probability w and zero (cheap) with probability $1 - w$.[7] The hegemon learns the value of x_t at the beginning of period t, before either player makes a move in that period, but faces the problem in period 1 of choosing a rational strategy for that period without knowing whether punishment will be costly in period 2. This is a key feature of our approach: unlike other models in which the hegemon is always strong or weak, here there is some uncertainty for the hegemon as well.

The value of w might be thought of as the "expected weakness" of the hegemon. The higher the value of w, the "weaker" the hegemon, that is, the more likely punishment is to be costly. We assume that the hegemon knows the true value of w—how weak he or she is on average—but not whether an individual punishment episode will be costly until that period arrives. Allies have an initial, subjective estimate of w summarized by a random variable W; but they never learn the hegemon's true costs. As the game proceeds, allies can try to make inferences about w from observing the hegemon's interactions with other allies; but they only observe acquiescence and punishment, not whether punishment was costly.

So that the allies' Bayesian updating of their beliefs about w be relatively simple, we assume also that W has the beta distribution. Intuitively, their beliefs depend on two parameters α and β, where α counts costly punishments and β counts cheap ones; $\alpha/(\alpha + \beta)$ is the ally's expected probability that the hegemon will face a costly punishment.[8] In equilibrium, by observing the hegemon's behavior in case of a challenge in period 1, ally 2 can update W, that is, modify α and β using Bayes' rule, assuming that the hegemon follows its equilibrium strategy.

Equilibrium. The solution to such a game of incomplete information is called a Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium (Harsanyi 1967–1968), which is an internally consistent combination of actions and beliefs such that neither player would wish to change its actions unilaterally, *given* the assumed incompleteness of information. A Bayesian equilibrium for our game then includes the following elements: (1) a move (obey or challenge) to be made by ally 1 that, given the hegemon's strategy and ally 1's beliefs about W, maximizes ally 1's expected payoff; (2) a rule for ally 2 for responding to the outcome of the first period, which maximizes ally 2's expected payoff given the hegemon's strategy and given ally 2's updated beliefs about W, using Bayes' rule to take into account the outcome of period 1; and (3) a strategy that maximizes expected payoff for the hegemon, given the allies' strategies, describing how the hegemon would respond in period 1 if ally 1 challenged and how to respond if ally 2 challenges, given the outcome of period 1, for *each* possible value of the hegemon's private information (w, x_1, and x_2). In this and the next section we describe such an equilibrium and discuss certain of its properties. Formal proofs of these results are outlined in the Appendix.

In this equilibrium, the hegemon always punishes in period t ($t = 1$ or 2) if $x_t = 0$ and never punishes in period 2 if $x_2 = 1$. The latter is required because there is nothing to be gained by punishing in the final period. (Whether there is ever such a "final period" in the real world is an issue to which we return subsequently.) Beyond this, each player's behavior depends upon the value of b, the allies' payoff, relative to the allies' beliefs as described by α and β. In effect, this is a comparison between the *temptation* to challenge and the *danger* (i.e., the estimated probability together with the ally's confidence in that estimate) that the hegemon can punish costlessly.

To illustrate the reasoning behind this equilibrium, suppose for a moment that there were only one period of play and that the ally believed the hegemon would punish if this were cheap and not if costly. Then the ally would decide what to do by making an expected value calculation. It could challenge and get away with it (if punishment were costly), receiving b with probability $\alpha/(\alpha + \beta)$; it could challenge

Figure 2. Temptation, Danger, and the Four Cases of Equilibrium Strategy



and be punished, receiving $(b - 1)$ with probability $\beta/(\alpha + \beta)$; or it could obey, receiving zero. Summing, the expected payoff from challenging is then $b - \beta/(\alpha + \beta)$; so the ally in such a case would challenge whenever $b > \beta(\alpha + \beta)$. Repeat play opens up the possibility of reputation and deterrence and so complicates the calculation. In fact, the equilibrium comprises four separate cases, illustrated in Figure 2.

Case 1. $b \leqslant \beta(\alpha + \beta + 1)$. The allies' benefit from challenging is so small relative to the probability of costless punishment that they *never* challenge. Even if ally 1 did (irrationally) challenge, the hegemon would not need to punish in order to deter a rational challenge from ally 2. Formally, in equilibrium the hegemon never punishes when $x_t = 1$ and neither ally challenges.

Case 2. $\beta/(\alpha + \beta + 1) < b \leqslant \beta/(\alpha + \beta)$. Here the temptation is somewhat greater, but still ally 1 is afraid to challenge. With no revision in initial beliefs, therefore, ally 2 also obeys. However, if ally 1 had irrationally challenged and the hegemon had acquiesced, ally 2 would be willing to challenge.[9] To deter this, a hegemon always punishes a challenge from ally 1, even if costly.

Case 3: $\beta/(\alpha + \beta) < b < (\beta + 1)/(\alpha + \beta + 1)$. This is substantively the most interesting case, because here the hegemon must actively establish a reputation. If $x_1 = 1$, the hegemon punishes a challenge from ally 1 with probability r, where

$$r = \frac{\beta\{1 - [b(\alpha + \beta + 1) - \beta]\}}{\alpha[b(\alpha + \beta + 1) - \beta]} ;$$

that is, the hegemon pursues a mixed strategy. The allies' behavior depends upon which of the following two subcases applies:

Case 3'. $b \leqslant (r\alpha + \beta)/(\alpha + \beta)$. Ally 1 obeys. Here, ally 1 is deterred, not by the high probability of a costless punishment but by appreciation of the hegemon's willingness to engage in reputation building. However, ally 2, who will only be punished if it is costless, always challenges. The hegemon has not had a chance to build a reputation.

Case 3''. $b > (r\alpha + \beta)/(\alpha + \beta)$. Here, ally 1 challenges. If the hegemon acquiesces, then ally 2 also challenges. If ally 1 is punished, then ally 2 pursues a mixed strategy, obeying with probability $1/a$. In other words, the punishment sometimes deters ally 2; the lower the hegemon's incentive to deter, the more often this deterrence is successful. Ally 2 has a suspicious nature.

Case 4. $b \geqslant (\beta + 1)/(\alpha + \beta + 1)$. Symmetrically with case 1, here the temptation is so high that the allies always challenge. Even if the hegemon punishes ally 1, ally 2 cannot be deterred, so the hegemon never applies costly punishments.

The strategies specified constitute a Bayesian equilibrium to the hegemony game. It is also a *sequential equilibrium* (Kreps and Wilson 1982a). Among other things, a sequential equilibrium is "subgame perfect," meaning that it is rational to carry out any threats should the occasion arise even if the occasion *should* not arise under equilibrium behavior. This applies especially to the implicit threat by the hegemon in case 2 above to punish any challenge by ally 1, although in equilibrium ally 1 never challenges. A sequential equilibrium is also "trembling-hand perfect," meaning that it is robust against at least some possibility of mistakes by the players in making their moves (Selten 1975).

Mixed Strategies and Equilibrium Reputation-Building. This equilibrium features realistic reputation building by the hegemon in case 3". In cases 1 and 2, no challenge should ever take place; and in case 4 challenges are never deterred, so there is never any punishment. In case 3, however, the hegemon takes advantage of opportunities to build a reputation by sometimes invoking costly punishments to try to deter ally 2 from challenging. In turn, ally 2 is indeed sometimes deterred. Most importantly, all this behavior is rational for the players even though the allies are sophisticated about the hegemon's incentive to deceive, the hegemon is aware of that sophistication, and so on. This contrasts with reputation building in models such as that of Brams and Hessel (1984).

A significant feature of the reputation-building behavior predicted by this model is that it necessarily involves the use of mixed strategies by the hegemon and by ally 2. To see that this is necessary, suppose instead that the hegemon's strategy in case 3 were always to punish in equilibrium, regardless of cost. Then observing a first-period punishment would convey no new information about the hegemon's strength and ally 2 would not update its beliefs and would challenge even if the hegemon had punished. Since costly punishment in period 1 would then have no deterrent effect, the hegemon would have no incentive to carry it out. Similar reasoning shows that the hegemon cannot *avoid* all costly punishment and that ally 2 cannot respond to first-period punishment by *always* obeying. In general, such pure strategies, if expected by opponents, would bring about strategic adjustments that would leave the pure-strategy player dissatisfied with its own strategy. Only if all players mutually intend to carry out—and expect one another to carry out—the specified mixed strategies, will each player be satisfied with both its strategy and its expectations about the others' strategies. Reputation building through mixed strategies is the only stable, consistent, rational combination of strategies and expectations for all players.[10]

Theoretically, a mixed strategy is one in which a player chooses among the available "pure" strategies at random, according to some predetermined probability distribution. The result of this randomization is not observed by the opponent until after the opponent's (here, ally 1's) choice is made (Luce and Raiffa 1957, 69–71). Behaviorally, a hegemon can achieve such a mixed strategy by basing the choice upon some exogenous variable whose value is known to the hegemon at the time of choice (but not before) but only known probabilistically to the allies. For instance, in an international game we might think of the hegemon's true cost of punishment as being x_t plus a random value v, representing special domestic political considerations learned by the hegemon at the time of choice, perhaps in a separate game involving the hegemon but unobservable by others. If beforehand all players expect that v is less than some v' with probability r, then when $x_t = 1$ the hegemon would punish if $v < v'$ and acquiesce otherwise. (For more detail see Harsanyi 1973.) We elaborate on the role of such uncertain costs of coercion in the oil price example discussed below.

Hegemonic Decline and Other Results

In order to incorporate the hegemon's uncertainty about future costs, we were able to describe the equilibrium only for a two-period game. However, there are reasons to believe that important properties of our results would still hold in a game with more periods. Such an extension will offer significant insights into the relationship between reputation and the decline of hegemonic regimes.

A Multiperiod Model? Kreps and Wilson (1982a) modeled reputation building by a predatory monopolist in a setting similar to ours, allowing for an arbitrary finite number of repetitions. Our results resemble theirs closely, with two important differences. First, if the Kreps-Wilson monopolist ever once fails to punish, then the jig is up: all other players know for certain that the monopolist cannot really afford to punish and (as a result) will never do so again. In our model, a hegemon who fails to punish in period 1 may yet punish in period 2 if $x_2 = 0$. Second, our model, unlike theirs, exhibits situations in which the hegemon is so well off that it need not worry about reputation, as well as circumstances in which reputation building is hopeless. In other respects, the Kreps-Wilson results correspond closely to ours.[11] These similarities indicate that if our model could be extended to arbitrary finite length, it ought to exhibit behavior similar to the Kreps-Wilson model. For instance, depending on parameter values, the hegemon's reputation may endure for the entire game, or with the approach of the final period the allies may become bolder. If this happens, the hegemon may resist at first, temporarily reestablishing its reputation. In other cases, the hegemon may give up early, and endure challenges for the rest of the game.

Hegemonic Decline. These results and extensions open up several ways in which a hegemonic regime could decline after having at first succeeded. (We assume throughout what follows that the nations involved are in a situation corresponding to case 3″.) First, the very fact of repeated play can reduce the possible scope of a hegemon for reputation building, even without allies having been initially wrong in their estimates of w. Repetition reduces the variance of W and increases their confidence in their estimates.[12] In this sense, a reputational model of a hegemonic regime contains within it possible sources of the regime's ultimate disintegration without requiring further arguments about unanticipated exogenous change.

Moreover, the use of mixed strategies by the players may bring about decline. In our two-period model, ally 2 may challenge even though the hegemon punished a challenge by ally 1. In a multiperiod model (or indeed the Kreps-Wilson model), the same scenario could unfold at any time. The hegemon may punish several times, establish a reputation that deters some challenges, then be (randomly) challenged, and (randomly) fail to punish, incurring further challenges from which it may be difficult or impossible to recover. As we have seen, equilibrium behavior requires mixed strategies; therefore a rational hegemon must leave itself open to this kind of hegemonic decline.

Finally, the onset of the late periods of the game may bring about the decline of the regime through the hegemon's loss of reputation. With no updating, ally 2 has a smaller chance of being punished than does ally 1, simply because only a costless punishment will be meted out in the final period. This makes ally 2 more willing to challenge, other things equal. This would be an ongoing process. Challenges become more and more attractive in the later periods, and under some conditions obedience breaks down several periods before the last. If there were anything resembling an "end of the game" in real life, this would provide an additional source of hegemonic decline, again despite the fact that the regime may have worked perfectly well initially.

Is there such an "end of game"? International politics is perhaps more accurately characterized as an infinite-horizon game. Even though a regime may end for exogenous reasons, the players need have no advance warning of it. Under such conditions, they will behave as though they expect the game to go on forever but discount future payoffs due to uncertainty (as for example in Axelrod 1984). If this discounting is not too severe, then such behavior may look very much like early-period behavior in an incomplete information game with a long but finite horizon. With heavier discounting, the strategies resemble last-period play in a finitely repeated game. If players receive warning that the game is likely to end sooner rather than later, the effect is precisely that of increasing the rate at which they discount the future.[13] Strategically, such a change in discounting should look a lot like approaching the end of a finite game. The point is that hegemonic regimes may decline as they *approach,* but before they actually *reach,* the exogenously imposed end of the line.

An Example: The Price of Oil

In the late summer of 1985, Saudi Arabia began substantially increasing oil production for export, precipitating a large drop in the world price of oil. We apply our model to this episode to analyze the strategies pursued by Saudi Arabia and other nations as a qualitative illustration of reputation building in hegemonic relations. As we shall see, incomplete information and coercion costs play major roles in this episode, in which Saudi Arabia was in the position of a hegemonic actor. We give evidence that the Saudis' goal was to establish a reputation for toughness, that is, an ability to force down oil prices and withstand the costs of prolonged periods of low prices in order to deter future production by others, both within and outside OPEC. We also give evidence that their expected gains from this strategy exceeded any likely gains from alternative strategies that have been imputed to them. Finally, the 1985 price decline is one of a series of similar episodes involving the Saudis, some successes and some failures, some attempts at punishment and some acquiescence, very much resembling the applications of mixed strategies described above. Thus, what looks from some perspectives like an episode of regime breakdown appears instead to us as the sort of event (challenge, punish, acquiesce) that determines the basis of future regime cooperation in an ongoing, oft-repeated international interaction.

Background

The Saudi action in 1985 followed a period of major changes in patterns of supply and demand for oil. As Figure 3 shows, Saudi production then stood at about 2 million barrels a day (mbd), down from 5 mbd just over a year earlier and from a high of about 10 mbd five years before. Indeed, for a brief moment in 1985 Saudi Arabia was no longer the world's largest producer, though their proven low-cost reserves were still largest. As Table 1 shows, part of this decline in the Saudis' market share was a response to decreased world demand, which had fallen by over 10% since 1980. It also reflected increased production by non-OPEC nations (especially Britain and Norway). However, most of the reduction reflected the Saudis' major role in OPEC's effort to decrease production to shore up the price of oil. The quota levels negotiated in late 1984 (which provided for OPEC production of nearly 16 mbd) brought Saudi production down to just

Figure 3. OPEC Crude Oil Production



Note. We are grateful to J. L. Johnston, senior economist, Amoco Oil Corporation, for supplying this figure.

over 4 mbd. A year later OPEC was still producing at nearly the same output level, but Saudi production had been halved. By contrast, the combined production of Norway and Britain (not members of OPEC) had reached 3.5 mbd by 1985, of which half was exported. Their exports had been negligible (less than .5 mbd) five years before.

In December 1985, the Saudis achieved a majority decision in OPEC to abandon their joint price-stabilizing production quotas and threaten a price war with non-OPEC producers, particularly the North Sea producers, Britain and Norway. Saudi oil production initially doubled to over 5 mbd in summer 1986, though following further OPEC negotiations it has since fallen closer to 3 mbd. There were scattered production cuts by other countries (both OPEC members and nonmembers but not Britain or, until recently, Norway), and the price of oil fell from above $30 to below $10 per barrel, recently fluctuating below $20.

Table 1. World Oil Production, 1980 and 1985

	Millions of Barrels per Day	
Source of Oil	1980	1985
Exports		
Saudi Arabia	10	3
Rest of OPEC	15	11
Non-OPEC	4	8
Total exports	29	22
Indigenous production	21	22
Total world demand	50	44

Note. We are grateful to J. L. Johnston, senior economist, Amoco Oil Corporation, for supplying figures from which these data were calculated.

Interpretations

What might the Saudis have wanted? Some (including, apparently, Saudi propagandists) claimed they sought to create structural economic changes to increase world demand for oil. This could be true, but only as a means to increase their own revenues. Others argue that they want to maximize market share (editorial, *Wall Street Journal*, 30 January 1986). Increasing market share plays a role in our account, too, but is not a motivation independent of price; for the Saudis alone can have the whole world market at two dollars a barrel for 15 years. Alternately, journalist Henry Jacoby ("A Shock That OPEC Won't Overcome," *New York Times*, 26 January 1986) interpreted the present situation as a "classic prisoners' dilemma," with OPEC and non-OPEC members able to benefit jointly from reduced production but unable to make binding agreements to forego production. Thus, he argued, the competitive outcome will be worse for all producers than continuing OPEC quota cooperation; and the squabbling over prices and production reflects their inability to enforce cooperation.

We believe instead that the episode represents an effort to maintain an oil producers' regime under Saudi hegemony. Hegemony theorists would argue that no stable oil producers' regime was possible unless backed by a "large" power. In market terms the Saudis are certainly the largest oil-producing nation. However, their position as swing producer (accepting cuts in production to prop up prices) meant that OPEC in late 1985 closely resembled, in our terms, a hegemonic "alliance." Could Saudi Arabia use its superior reserve position to alter the distribution of benefits and restore its previous position within OPEC? This depends on whether it is willing to bear the short-term costs of very low oil prices in order to maximize revenues in the long run, and whether other nations (including those in OPEC) are convinced of this willingness. If so, the Saudi action is a credible threat and deters entry or excess production by some other countries after prices rise.[14]

First, the 1985 price fall is not an isolated episode. As Ahrari (1986) points out, the Saudis have acted similarly on two previous occasions, 1977 and 1981. On those occasions, he argues, their initiatives failed because market conditions remained tight. This is consistent with our overall stress on viewing the problem as one of repeated interaction, and highlights the importance of the hegemon's uncertainty about the price elasticity of world demand for oil.

Equally important, the Saudis can gain more from reputation than under other cooperative outcomes. For example, published estimates using conventional analysis of supply and demand showed that the Saudis could maximize their foreign earnings at about $65 million per day by producing 6 mbd at $15 per barrel, under conditions approximating competition without quotas (*New York Times*, 19 February 1986).[15] Other journalists and analysts of the *Wall Street Journal* argued that OPEC would eventually reestablish quotas and speculated that the Saudis would produce about 4 mbd at $22 a barrel. (Above this price, apparently, the incentives for competitive entry by many small producers multiply rapidly.) This latter arrangement would give them earnings of $60 million per day. At this lower production level, their reserves would last longer. Indeed, given the scale of their reserves, the Saudis should prefer such an outcome to competition without quotas at discount rates for future earnings below about 3% per annum. Thus, the Saudis' better strategy might be to compete by producing 6 mbd, contrary to observed behavior, though possible data errors and uncertainty over discount rates make this a tentative conclusion.

However, this ignores the possibility that the Saudis could deter future exploration and production by establishing a reputation for toughness, which they could do in either case. They would have to withstand a long enough period of low oil prices to persuade other nations (or oil companies) to defer exploration and investment through the *threat* of future punishment (further periods of low prices) without actually having repeatedly to carry out the threat. It would be worth it to dissuade enough exploration and investment to add even as little as 10% to the long-run price of oil. With such an improvement, the Saudis might produce 6 mbd at $17 per barrel under competition or 4 mbd at $25 under quotas.[16] The extra $10 million per day thus gained from reputation would exceed the likely difference (without reputation) between competition and quotas.

Costs of Coercion

With their enormous low-cost reserves, the Saudis' ability to withstand periods of low prices provides the possibility of establishing a reputation for toughness from which they can subsequently profit —if they can bear the costs of driving prices down to get that reputation. Before the fact, the Saudis may have believed they could afford this strategy. Recently announced accounts show that the Saudis had a budget deficit of $13 billion, or about $36 million a day, while earning about $50 million per day from oil in 1986 (equal to the earnings on about 4.5 mbd at $13 a barrel). Two points follow from this. First, this rate of earnings is $10–$15 million per day below the industry analysts' quoted estimates of what the Saudis could have made without establishing a reputation. However, such a shortfall sustained for 6–12 months could be made up by exploiting reputation in a couple of years. Certainly the decisions to reduce exploration and investment by others would come quickly, while the price benefits to the Saudis would last longer.[17]

Second, the principal cost of coercion to the Saudis is the domestic dislocation produced by budget deficits or low government revenues through the impact of cheap oil. The Saudis are unable to generate enough revenue with oil at $10–$15 per barrel to meet projected domestic expenditures, needing to produce 7 mbd to do so even at the upper end of this price range. In the short term, they would draw against their massive ($100-billion) cash reserve built up in the flush years after 1978 while attempting to establish a reputation. In the long term, they apparently need to produce about 5 mbd at $22 per barrel (on which they net nearly $88 million a day) to balance the budget. Our calculations above show that this was unobtainable under any nonreputation strategy but just possible (perhaps after a year or two) at the price-quantity combinations arising under an established reputation for toughness. In any event, the Saudis twice announced "deferral" of a budget in 1986, announcements treated by some analysts as evidence of "weakness" (high cost of punishment). While there is no evidence of serious domestic unrest (elite or popular), Saudi planners privately stress that they expected demand for oil to rise faster at lower prices and thus the revenue impact to be smaller.[18]

Success, Failure, and Mixed Strategies

Even with this difficulty, the Saudis have done relatively well so far. The August 1986 OPEC agreement accorded them an improved quota. A number of allies, both inside and outside OPEC, lined up production cuts. The speed with which they fell into line reflects the cost of oil production and desperation for foreign currencies. Gabon and Ecuador have extremely high production costs, Mexico is deep in debt, and Egypt imports food with oil earnings. These countries were among the first to cut production. Other higher-cost producers (Algeria, Qatar, Libya, Venezuela, and Nigeria) clamored for cuts to shore up prices. Those who lost significant revenues only when oil prices fell below $15 a barrel, like Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates (*Wall Street Journal*, 11 February 1986), were less vocal.

The key "allies" were Britain and Norway, who neither cut production nor indicated willingness to discuss it. There the lower oil price meant foregone government revenues and possible public borrowing or increased taxes (both countries), reduced public investment (Norway), and a lower exchange rate (Britain). Both countries voiced similar claims. British spokesmen claimed that 90% of North Sea oil can be produced at five to eight dollars a barrel (*Wall Street Journal*, 11 February 1986). The Norwegians claimed that oil would flow at five dollars a barrel, conceding that exploration would stop at that price (*Wall Street Journal*, 24 January 1986). Later, they said that they would follow Britain's lead (*Wall Street Journal*, 11 February 1986). These claims, founded in fixed costs of production with no further recovery of old investment (*New York Times*, 7 February 1986), represent an effort to call a bluff. They are the real equivalent of our model's "challenge," in the belief that

Saudi production could not continue at low prices.

In fact Britain and Norway had less to lose in the short run than might have been expected. Norway's public investment loss will be felt slowly and was certainly anticipated by government planners. A lower exchange rate would find much support among British manufacturers. The Thatcher government would not want to raise domestic revenues in the runup to a general election but had two years left at the time.[19] The British also lacked control over their offshore oil industry and may well have felt that any cuts they made would have been too small to affect world prices. Of course, it is also possible that impressing other OPEC members was more important to the Saudis than any actual cuts obtained in North Sea production. Though the Saudis did relatively well in the August 1986 negotiations, they subsequently adopted a softer position, acquiescing in production cuts to help keep prices up. Within our model, this would represent continuing application of a mixed strategy, under the assumption that (domestic) costs of coercion had become too large to allow continued punishment. As we noted above, some evidence is available to support this interpretation.

In sum, potential Saudi gains from hegemony make their initiative comprehensible. In spite of early predictions that "the British will talk, they know the Saudis can force the price down" (*Wall Street Journal*, 6 February 1986), a British challenge was not necessarily irrational. Since equilibrium hegemonic regimes are possible and the Saudis have enormous low-cost reserves, they may succeed in establishing a hegemonic regime. If such a regime forms, the Saudis should do well relative to expectations based on perfect competition or alliance behavior. If the regime doesn't form now, the discussion of hegemony in the previous section suggests that the Saudis will try again. However, if a hegemonic regime does form as a "mixed strategy equilibrium," uncertainty about world trends will lead to sporadic challenges from allies (especially as conditions change) and possibly ultimate collapse.

Conclusion

We analyzed a game-theoretic model containing many of the central features of hegemonic stability theory of regimes: asymmetry, distributional conflict, costly coercion, uncertainty, and instability. Our results depend crucially upon the assumptions that (1) there is incomplete information about the true abilities of the hegemon and (2) the hegemon sometimes faces costs in coercing others to cooperate. Hegemonic instability in the model is a natural consequence of uncertainty and mixed strategies, which render reputation both exploitable and challengeable. The model incorporates size differences among participants by virtue of asymmetric information and asymmetric abilities to coerce.

Although the model uses specific assumptions about the nature of uncertainty, it is important to notice how general in spirit these assumptions really are. The important fact is that the hegemon knows more about its own costs than allies know about the hegemon's costs. No actor, not even the hegemon, has perfect foresight about future costs or actions. We have employed fairly general distributional forms, and there is no reason to believe that these alone account for the qualitative results we derive. Our strongest assumption, really, is that the hegemon and allies are all completely cognizant of the information structure of the game, so that despite the gaps in their knowledge they can act strategically against one another. The result of this strategic interaction is expressed in our results on equilibrium in the hegemony game. Since the equilibrium is *Bayesian,* we have accounted for rational learning by the players upon observing one anothers' actions. The expectations of each player are consistent with the actions of the other players. This equilibrium is *robust,* though not unique.

Implications for Hegemonic Stability

Our results have several important implications for hegemonic stability theory. Most notably, although ours is a result about "stability" in the sense of equilibrium, it demonstrates exactly how and in what circumstances hegemonic regimes might break down or appear unstable. In situations like cases 1 and 2, stability is complete and lasting. In case 4 the hegemon gets no respect and punishes only when it is costless to do so. In a model with a more complex information and cost structure, such behavior might appear as intermittent cooperation by the allies, depending on the information they have about the hegemon's costs in specific situations. Indeed, one can extend this analysis to predictions of declining severity of punishments over time as a hegemon's reputation becomes better established, as well as predictions of the relative durability of hegemonic and nonhegemonic regimes.[20]

More interestingly, in case 3 the appearance of instability results from the incentive for a rational ally to challenge the hegemon. In addition, the hegemon punishes challenges using a mixed strategy; and the ally uses a mixed strategy to decide whether to respond to a previous punishment. Thus, even though the general costs and information parameters of the game remain constant, the equilibrium strategies call for purposely erratic behavior by hegemon and allies. Such behavior is necessary to keep one's opponents guessing and (for the hegemon) to take optimal advantage of the allies' learning process. The result is that the regime will appear to follow a rocky road, with allies sometimes challenging the hegemon and at other times obeying and with the hegemon sometimes applying costly punishments and sometimes acquiescing. Equilibrium behavior in the hegemony game necessarily implies hegemonic instability.

It is particularly useful to realize that the behavior involved in this instability is in no way attributable to "mistakes" of any kind on the part of any of the actors. Only by contemplating mixed strategies can the actors be satisfied that their own plans are consistent with their expectations about their opponents. Allies occasionally challenge and endure punishments, and the hegemon occasionally neglects to punish, randomly but not irrationally or unexpectedly. The nature of hegemonic instability is thus predictable in the context of the game-theoretic model.

Effective Choice in Hegemonic Relations

Several authors, notably Keohane (1984), have drawn an analogy between regimes and cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma game. But this game, even with added assumptions of incomplete information (Kreps et al. 1982), does not reflect the effects of size differences or asymmetric abilities to punish. Thus many of the results of our model of reputation stand in marked contrast to the behavior that Axelrod identifies as "effective choice" in the prisoner's dilemma (1984, chaps. 6, 9).

First, a successful prisoner's dilemma player should practice a "nice" strategy, that is, never be the first to defect. In contrast, a successful strategy for an ally in the reputation game must involve challenging the leader according to a mixed-strategy plan. Failure to do so allows the hegemon to take too much advantage of the allies by commanding their obedience, even when they ought to have the strength to resist. If the regime consists of a hegemon enforcing mutually beneficial collective action, then such resistance may not, overall, be advantageous. However, if in the process the hegemon is demanding private benefits for itself, then any successful challenge by an ally is to the ally's long- *and* short-run gain.

Second, a successful strategy in Axelrod's scheme had to be "provocable," that is, willing to retaliate against any transgression. The successful hegemon, on the other hand, should in some circumstances acquiesce to challenges from its allies. In cases 1 and 4 of our description of equilibrium, this is obvious. But even in case 3, when the hegemon is engaged in active reputation building, the equilibrium strategy requires the hegemon to acquiesce with probability $1 - r$ if punishment is costly. Too much provocability will weaken the hegemon's ability to build a reputation, because the allies will regard punishment from a relatively "weak" hegemon as being so likely that when they do observe a punishment, they do not reduce their estimates of w by very much.

Third, Axelrod's prescription that a successful strategy be "simple," that is, easy for opponents to detect and understand, must be qualified in an important way for this reputation game. Both hegemon and allies must use mixed strategies under certain circumstances. Too much straightforwardness can reduce a hegemon's ability to cultivate a reputation and an ally's ability to resist the hegemon's threats. If a hegemon is weak, then building a reputation requires that the hegemon cultivate rather than alleviate the opponents' uncertainty. And benefit-maximizing allies must not allow such a hegemon to be completely confident that a few quick punishments will scare off all future challengers.

Finally, Keohane (1984) suggests that "collective action" alliance-type regimes form and disseminate information as a major means of overcoming the prisoner's dilemma problems their members face. This will not be a characteristic of hegemonic regimes, in which the existence of at least some uncertainty is beneficial to the hegemon. The hegemon will disseminate information beneficial to itself, but repress information that might serve to inform allies of the hegemon's true costs of punishing. The hegemon's incentive to preserve others' uncertainty is clear in the OPEC case discussed above.[21]

Other Implications and Extensions

These results clearly demonstrate the potential usefulness of advanced game-theoretic models in the study of international relations. By explicitly modeling the sequential features of the game (as advocated by Snidal [1985b] and Wagner [1983]) and the incompleteness of information, one can motivate such phenomena as reputation and, in our case, instability. Behavior previously treated as extratheoretic "situational" features can thus be incorporated as endogenously arising phenomena in a rational actor model. This allows the student of international relations to *analyze* reputation in the same strategic, rational choice terms so usefully applied to the analysis of cooperation and conflict.

The general nature of the reputation problem modeled here gives the results much broader applicability as well. Examples can be found in security policy as well as trade.[22] But applications of reputational models (and, by implication, hegemonic regimes) are by no means restricted to the international arena. Domestic applications include legislative leadership (Calvert 1987), predatory pricing and entry deterrence in markets (Kreps and Wilson 1982a), monetary policy management (Barro 1986), the politics of labor union relations with management, and the relations between a political party and organized interest groups.

Some natural extensions of the model could yield further interesting results. As noted above, allowing the actors to receive specific information about individual situations, that is, about individual periods in the game, would further illuminate the nature of hegemonic instability. Especially for this purpose, it would be useful to allow a longer horizon in our varying costs game. Further, more could be learned about the kinds of cooperation that a hegemon can achieve if we modeled reputation within the context of a collective action game, with the possibility that the hegemon's punishments may be impossible to focus on a particular offender, as is true in the oil price conflict described above. Such a model might also illustrate cooperation problems faced by allies, who could join together in smaller coalitions to challenge the hegemon. Finally, assuming uncertainty on the hegemon's part about the allies' costs and benefits would further clarify the nature of the allies' strategic opportunities.

Even without these further considerations, our model has a number of interesting features. It subsumes a dimension of conflict from an empire (in which a hegemon easily monitors opponents' behavior and punishes costlessly, obtaining nearly all the gains from its regime) to an alliance (in which a hegemon may so value the good produced by the regime that it is provided practically regardless of cooperation, sharing benefits widely). Even at the margin of these polar types, as well as anywhere in between, there is room to create and exploit reputation. Similarly, the model implies that allies do not challenge simply for the sake of finding out the hegemon's true nature. And, indeed, the model emphasizes the hegemon's incentive to limit the dissemination of information in order to continue exploiting uncertainty, as well as to continue trying (while allies continue probing) to create a regime exploiting reputational effects. Further extensions and applications should prove rewarding.

Appendix: Sketch of Proof and Properties of Equilibrium

This appendix describes the steps needed to prove that the description of equilibrium found in the text is indeed a sequential equilibrium. After that, it explains briefly why *all* reputation-building equilibria in this game require the use of mixed strategies. More details are available from the authors on request.

We will use the following additional notation: Let q be the probability with which ally 1 challenges. Let s_O, s_A, and s_P represent the probability with which ally 2 challenges given the outcome of period 1: *obedience, acquiescence* to a challenge, and *punishment* of a challenge, respectively. Let r_0 be the probability with which the hegemon punishes a challenge by ally 1 if punishment is costless; r_1 the probability of punishing ally 1 if costly; and r_2 the probability of punishing a challenge by ally 2 if costless (obviously no costly punishment is ever rational in the final period). Let p_1 be ally 1's subjective probability of punishment, a function of the hegemon's strategy (r_0 and r_1). Finally, let p_1^O, p_2^P, and p_2^A be ally 2's subjective probabilities of being punished, conditional on the outcome of period 1.

First note that, in all four of the cases (ranges of b) described in the text, $s_A \geqslant s_P$; therefore $r_0 = 1$ since a costless punishment in period 1 has a positive deterrent effect. Note also that the hegemon is indifferent about punishing in period 2 when it is costless to do so; therefore $r_2 = 1$ is acceptable. It remains to derive best response functions for q, r_1, s_O, s_A, and s_P.

Step 1 is to derive the hegemon's basic response function for r_1. This is accomplished fairly simply by writing the hegemon's expected utility for the remainder of the game from using r_1, given the other players' strategies, when ally 1 has just challenged and it is costly to punish. Then maximize this expression with respect to r_1.

Step 2, the easiest, is to derive ally 1's best response for q, given r_1, again by maximizing ally 1's expected utility.

Step 3, calculating ally 2's best response functions, is a bit more involved. First, calculate p_2^O, p_2^A, and p_2^P using r_1, α, and β. Notice that ally 2 must use the previous moves, along with r_1, to update the subjective distribution of W according to Bayes' rule. Next, for each outcome $h \in \{O, A, P\}$ use the calculated values of p_2^h to write ally 2's expected utility from challenging with probability s_h. Finally, for each h maximize ally 2's expected utility with respect to s_h given r_1.

Finally, step 4 is to look at the four cases of the range of b, verifying in each case that the strategies given in the text simultaneously satisfy all the best response functions calculated in steps 1–3. This proves that the given strategies form a Bayesian equilibrium.

In proving that this Bayesian equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium, only case 2 causes a problem: if ally 1 unexpectedly challenges *and* if the hegemon unexpectedly acquiesces, then the denominator in Bayes' formula is undefined and we cannot calculate p_2^A and derive ally 2's best response. This is remedied by setting $p_2^A = \beta/(\alpha + \beta + 1)$; such a belief is proved consistent by using the following sequence of strictly positive strategies for the hegemon: for each $n = 1, 2, \ldots,$ let $r_0^n = 1 - 1/n^2$, and let $r_1^n = 1 - 1/n$. (For definitions of these terms see Kreps and Wilson 1982b.)

There are other, more complicated equilibria in this game that also exhibit reputation building. All of them, however, involve mixed strategies. Alternative equilibria may arise in four ways: First, trivially, at the boundaries of cases 1, 2, and 4, some mixed-strategy equilibria may also arise due to the indifference of a player between two pure strategies. Second, there are "mirror-image" equilibria in which ally 2 sets $s_A < s_P$ in cases 2 or 3, and the hegemon must acquiesce in order to "deter" ally 2. Such perverse equilibria can be ruled out by putting conditions on the "reasonableness" of beliefs in equilibrium (see Calvert 1987).

Third, the hegemon is free to make r_1 (or r_2, for that matter) depend upon w rather than being constant.[23] Such a strategy would require that both allies also use different strategies, even if the expected value of r_1 is still r. To see why, consider ally 1's expected payoff when the probability of punishment, when costly, is $\varrho_1(w)$:

$$E\{[1 - \varrho_1(W)]Wb + [1 - W + W\varrho_1(W)](b - 1)\}.$$

Since $E[W\varrho_1(W)] \neq EW \cdot E\varrho_1(W)$, the payoffs to ally 1's responses can be changed while keeping $E\varrho_1(W) = r$. Similar reasoning applies to ally 2. This gives rise to a large set of alternative equilibria; however, all of them involve the use of mixed strategies by ally 2. Although the hegemon's strategy is technically pure, it looks to any observer, including the analyst and ally 2, like a mixed strategy since the true value of w is unobservable.

Fourth, since the hegemon is indifferent about applying a costless punishment in the final period, there are other equilibria in which $r_2 < 1$. We might imagine that, there being no real final period, the hegemon really would have a positive incentive to punish costlessly. This amounts to adding a (small) positive payoff ϵ for such "costless" punishments. Such a payoff eliminates the possibility that $r_2 < 1$, but now, as it turns out, r_1 is *forced* to depend on w. Equilibrium can still be derived using a similar proof, but the details are considerably more complicated (contrary to the conjecture in Calvert 1987).

Notes

An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the 1986 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago. The authors benefitted from the comments of David Baron, John Ferejohn, Robert Keohane, David Laitin, Ian Lustick, James Morrow, Michael Munger, Kenneth Shepsle; from the international relations workshops at the University of Illinois and the Hoover Institution, Stanford; and from the political economy workshop at Washington University. We are grateful for the support of the National Science Foundation under Grant SES85-12037.

1. Whether applied to international trade, finance, or defense, the "theory of hegemonic stability" holds that regimes survive only if backed by a hegemonic power.

2. By assuming the initial asymmetry of hegemon and ally and explicitly modeling the strategic problem of the hegemon in achieving and maintaining a reputation for willingness to engage in costly retaliation, the present study goes beyond the existing international relations literature on "threat power" (Brams and Hessel 1984), "capability" (Maoz 1983) and "resolve" (Allan 1983; Cioffi-Revilla 1983).

3. For instance, Stein remarks that Kindleberger, Gilpin, and Krasner "all mention that a hegemon uses inducements and force. . . . The hegemon must get others to agree. . . . *Without agreements there* can be no regime. Such accords typically require the hegemon to make important concessions" (1984, 356–59).

4. An influential early example is Schelling (1960, esp. 24–27, 119–50), and regime stability theorists have often taken the same approach (Downs, Rocke, and Siverson 1985; Jervis 1985, 61, 69, 73–78; Snidal 1985a, 600; Snidal 1985c, 931).

5. Our model is a generalization of that of Kreps and Wilson (1982a) for the special case of a two-period game, as explained below. Every game of incomplete or asymmetric information essentially involves problems of reputation. Some of the economic theory literature closest to our concerns includes: Fudenberg and Kreps 1985 on reputation building by a monopolist facing a variety of potential competitors; Rubenstein 1985 and Grossman and Perry 1986 on bargaining under asymmetric information; Sobel 1985 on the establishment of credibility in ongoing signaling games; and Fudenberg and Tirole 1986 on a "war of attrition" in which two duopolists attempt to convince each other to exit from an industry that cannot support them both.

6. We treat these allies as two different players, although in fact our model does not distinguish between two allies, each making one decision, and a single ally making two decisions sequentially. See Calvert 1987.

7. Formally, each x_t has the Bernoulli distribution with $p = w$. In this way we relax the assumption of Kreps and Wilson (1982a) and others that hegemonic sanctions are either always costly or always costless. In contrast, our model allows this cost to vary in a way better understood by the hegemon than by its allies. This general situation, the "chain store paradox," was first analyzed by Selten (1975, 1978).

8. The beta distribution is a flexible distributional form on the unit interval. It describes the limit of infinite repeated sampling from a Bernoulli (zero or one) population. When sampling from such a population with probability w of obtaining a "one," the beta distribution has parameters α and β such that its mean, $E(W)$ is equal to $\alpha/(\alpha + \beta)$. The variance of W is $\alpha\beta/[(\alpha + \beta)^2(\alpha + \beta + 1)]$. The values of α and β may be any positive numbers (DeGroot 1970, 35). To grasp the roles of α and β, consider Bayes' rule for updating a beta prior. If the initial parameters are (α,β) and a "one" is observed, α becomes $\alpha + 1$, increasing the mean; if a "zero" is observed, β becomes $\beta + 1$, decreasing the mean. In a loose sense, then, α gives the number of "1's" and β the number of "0's" in previous observations.

9. An ally in case 2 who began with an estimate of w just below the upper threshold would assume that acquiescence indicated a high cost of punishment. It would therefore add one to α, giving a new estimate of $w = \beta/(\alpha + \beta + 1)$, which is by definition of this case less than b, so it would now be prepared to challenge.

10. Although ours is not the unique equilibrium in this game, all but one of the others also require the use of mixed strategies. See the Appendix.

11. Their model, too, requires the use of mixed strategies in equilibrium. There, also, the opportunities for reputation building vary with the game's parameters; and the results hold with any combination of several allies, each making several decisions.

12. For instance assume initial values of two for each of α and β, so that $E(W) = .5$ initially (the cutoff between cases 2 and 3) and the boundary of case 4 = .6 (see Figure 2). Assume an ally's payoff of .58, putting this ally squarely in case 3. Then, after several observations of punishment and acquiescence, both α and β could have increased by two, leaving $E(W)$ unchanged at .5, but reducing $(\alpha + 1)/(\alpha + \beta + 1)$ to .55, placing the ally in case 4 (always challenge).

13. For example, the hegemon may lose its asymmetrical ability to punish, as described for example by Keohane (1984, chap. 9). Or the collective good produced and distributed by the regime may lose its value. Allies can observe these changes and become aware that random shocks are now more likely than before to put an end to the regime.

14. This is an aggressive strategy, but their previous exploitation within OPEC shows that alternative "nicer" side-payment strategies would not succeed in inducing cooperation, nor would any alternative (for instance, military) capacities allow the Saudis the same leadership possibilities.

15. Saudi Arabia consumes 1 mbd of its own oil. Assume it costs $2 per barrel to produce. Their earnings = (production − domestic consumption) ×

(sale price − production cost). Then in this scenario the Saudis will earn 5 (= 6 − 1) × $13 (= 15 − 2), or $65 million per day.

16. Under competition with reputation the Saudis make $75 million a day (5 × $15). Under quotas with reputation they could make $69 million—(4 − 1) × ($25 − 2), or 3 × 23. Again, since lower production lasts longer, we can treat the Saudis as indifferent between the present values of these two alternatives.

17. For instance, virtually all U.S. oil companies reduced capital spending for exploration drastically in 1986. Moreover, many decisions are irreversible. For example, the reopen price of many stripper wells that were profitable at $30 per barrel is at least $50 per barrel. Indeed, Sheik Yamani himself took the trouble to stress this point (*New York Times*, 25 March 1986).

18. A complication is that the Saudis have only one instrument of punishing, driving down the world price of oil, so they cannot target retaliation against individual opponents. In our model, the punishment of an ally harmed only that ally. Also, some of the Saudis' usual "friends" also suffer considerably from low oil prices and may threaten violence against the Saudis. Moreover, at prices below approximately $15 a barrel, oil competes favorably with European coal and U.S. natural gas industries, multiplying the number of "enemies" the Saudis face.

19. Moreover, their oil royalties are only collected on production above a fair recovery price, probably in the low twenties for most North Sea oil, so significant revenues were unlikely to reaccrue at any oil price likely in the near term.

20. We are grateful to Jim Morrow (personal communication) for these suggestions, as well as the example of Warsaw Pact relations for the possibility of declining severity over time.

21. For instance, it was a year after the budget deferral before figures became public. Moreover, it was hard to tell how much oil the Saudis were producing. On one day in early March 1986, the *Wall Street Journal* and *New York Times* contained claims (respectively) that Saudi production had declined and increased. Innovations in netback contracting (which provide for payment to crude oil producers at rates dependent on the ultimate market prices of refined products) meant that the Saudis (who observe their own portfolio and cash flow) knew far better than anyone else at what price their oil was being sold.

22. For example, in February 1985 the New Zealand government refused a U.S. request for a destroyer Buchanan to pay one of its ports a call. The U.S. retaliated by declaring the ANZUS treaty no longer binding so as not to set a precedent that could be followed by "allies that really count, the ones in NATO and, of course, Japan" (*Washington Post*, 26 February 1985).

23. The authors are grateful to David Baron for clarifying this issue.

References

Ahrari, Mohammed E. 1986. *OPEC: The Falling Giant*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Allan, Pierre. 1983. *Crisis Bargaining and the Arms Race: A Theoretical Model*. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

Barro, Robert J. 1986. Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information. *Journal of Monetary Economics* 17:3–20.

Brams, Steven, and Marek Hessel. 1984. Threat Power in Sequential Games. *International Studies Quarterly* 28:23–44.

Calvert, Randall L. 1987. Reputation and Legislative Leadership. *Public Choice* 55:81–119.

Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio. 1983. A Probability Model of Credibility. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27: 73–108.

DeGroot, Morris. 1970. *Optimal Statistical Decisions*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Downs, George W., David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson. 1985. Arms Races and Cooperation. *World Politics* 38:118–46.

Fudenberg, Drew, and David M. Kreps. 1985. Reputation and Multiple Opponents. Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 843. Stanford, CA: Stanford University.

Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. 1986. A Theory of Exit in Duopoly. *Econometrica* 54:943–60.

Gilpin, Robert. 1981. *War and Change in World Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Grossman, Sanford J., and Motty Perry. 1986. Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information. *Journal of Economic Theory* 39:120–54.

Harsanyi, J. C. 1967–68. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. 3 pts. *Management Science* 14(Series A):159–82, 320–34, 486–502.

Harsanyi, J. C. 1973. Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium Points. *International Journal of Game Theory* 2:1–24.

Jervis, Robert. 1985. From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation. *World Politics* 38:58–79.

Keohane, Robert. 1980. The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977. In *Change in the International System*, ed. Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Keohane, Robert. 1984. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kindleberger, Charles P. 1973. *The World in Depression, 1929-1939.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kindleberger, Charles P. 1981. Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy. *International Studies Quarterly* 25:242–54.

Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. *World Politics* 28:317–43.

Kreps, David M., Paul Milgrom, John Roberts, and Robert Wilson. 1982. Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. *Journal of Economic Theory* 2:245–52.

Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. 1982a. Reputation and Imperfect Information. *Journal of Economic Theory* 27:253–79.

Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. 1982b. Sequential Equilibrium. *Econometrica* 50:863–94.

Lipson, Charles. 1985. Bankers' Dilemmas: Private Cooperation in Rescheduling Sovereign Debts. *World Politics* 38:200–25.

Luce, Robert Duncan, and Howard Raiffa. 1957. *Games and Decisions.* New York: Wiley.

Maoz, Zeev. 1983. Resolve, Capabilities, and the Outcomes of Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27:195–229.

Oye, Kenneth. 1985. Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies. *World Politics* 38:1–24.

Rubenstein, Ariel. 1985. A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information. *Econometrica* 53:1151–72.

Ruggie, John G. 1985. International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State. Presented at the 1985 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.

Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Selten, Reinhard. 1975. Re-examination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Form Games. *International Journal of Game Theory* 4:25–55.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985a. The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory. *International Organization* 39:579–614.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985b. The Game Theory of International Politics. *World Politics* 38:25–57.

Snidal, Duncan. 1985c. Coordination versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes. *American Political Science Review* 79:923–42.

Sobel, Joel. 1985. A Theory of Credibility. *Review of Economic Studies* 52:557–73.

Stein, Arthur. 1984. The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order. *International Organization* 38:355–86.

Wagner, R. Harrison. 1983. The Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation. *American Political Science Review* 77:330–46.

Ward, Hugh. 1987. The Risks of a Reputation for Toughness: Strategy in Public Goods Provision Problems Modelled by Chicken Supergames. *British Journal of Political Science* 17:23–52.

James E. Alt is Professor of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Randall L. Calvert is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Rochester, NY 14627.

Brian D. Humes is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824.

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES

DOUGLAS A. HIBBS, JR.
Göteborg University
CHRISTOPHER DENNIS
California State University
Long Beach

Political action has affected postwar income distribution in the United States mainly through policy-induced variations in macroeconomic activity and government transfer benefits in proportion to total income. We present a small dynamic model of the connections among the partisan balance of power, macroeconomic fluctuations, transfer spending trends, and income distribution outcomes. The model is based on the premise that the parties have different distributional goals, and it is designed to identify how shifts in party control of the presidency and the strength of the parties in Congress have affected the distribution of after-tax, after-transfer income by influencing cyclical economic performance and the flow of resources to transfer programs. We therefore extend the "partisan theory" of macroeconomic policy to the domain of income distribution outcomes.

> Economic bases of party affiliation must be sought in [the] area of income distribution.
>
> —George J. Stigler

Conventional democratic political action can affect significantly the distribution of economic well-being, and politically induced changes in distribution affect in turn the level of living standards experienced by individuals and classes. For these reasons political life revolves to a great degree around short-run distributional struggles.

The main empirical indicator of the distribution of economic well-being is the distribution of (measured) income. At any given time and place the observed income distribution depends on the distribution of chance events (luck), the distribution of skills and ability (individual endowments of human capital, innate and acquired), the distribution of motivation and effort (ambition), the degree to which structural and institutional arrangements permit the transmission from generation to generation of earlier distributions (the rigidity of the class system), the macroeconomic environment (business cycles and the degree of economic "slack"), and government social and economic policies (see Becker 1967; Bowles 1972; Jencks et al. 1972; and Mincer 1974). Government policy influences distributional outcomes in at least three ways.

First, government regulations (tariffs, quotas, legislated barriers to market entry and market competition, etc.) and targeted tax and credit policies may profoundly advantage those engaged in the favored activities. Aside from tax prefer-

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 82 NO. 2 JUNE 1988

ences geared to and exploited by high-income classes, however, such microeconomic policies generally do not affect inequality by systematically conferring benefits on some income classes at the expense of others. Redistributions from this quarter are largely arbitrary and not related to the preexisting size distribution of income. (For many examples, see Tullock 1983.)

Second, government macroeconomic policy (aggregate fiscal thrust and the aggregate supply of money and credit) affects distributional outcomes indirectly by influencing cyclical macroeconomic activity. Empirical work shows that lower unemployment and higher growth rates, in addition to raising aggregate national income, reduce both inequality and outright poverty. Empirical evidence also indicates that increased inflation, which often accompanies cyclical expansions, is largely neutral with respect to inequality of income distribution and erodes the wealth position of (the highest) income classes holding financial capital (Blank and Blinder 1986; Blinder and Esaki 1978; Hibbs 1987, chaps. 2, 3).

Finally, government directly affects income distribution through income- and employment-contingent taxes and transfers. Throughout the postwar period effective federal tax rates on personal incomes have been only mildly progressive (somewhat less so after the changes achieved by President Reagan than before); so the federal tax system has made, at most, a modest contribution to after-tax equality. The personal tax system as a whole is essentially proportional (see Pechman 1985).

Most of the government's direct influence on income inequality is exerted by federal transfer spending programs, notably social security (OSADHI), unemployment insurance (UI), Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), housing assistance, supplementary security income (SSI), food stamps, medicaid and medicare. During the last 30 years the resources devoted to these programs have grown substantially, though at varying rates. In fact, in the United States as well as in other developed democracies, transfers account for nearly all of the growth of government expenditure in relation to aggregate income during the past quarter century. Spending on transfers to persons (inclusive of spending for in-kind transfer programs) grew from around 5% of total personal income in the early 1950s to just over 16% by the early 1980s. To be sure, several of the important transfer programs are not targeted on low-income households alone. But with the exception of UI, two-thirds or more of the benefits of the programs listed above flow to the bottom quintile of the income distribution, and all are important to the economic well-being of lower-income classes (Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick 1981).

Politics and policy, then, systematically affect inequality of income distribution in the United States by influencing the flow of transfer spending and cyclical macroeconomic activity. We analyze how shifts in the balance of power between the parties have affected distributional outcomes during the postwar period in the United States. Specifically, we examine the response of the size distribution of after-tax, after-transfer family income to changes in unemployment and transfer spending generated by shifts in party control of the presidency and variations in the strength of the parties in Congress.

Party Constituencies, Voter Interests, and Party Goals

The Democratic and Republican parties have more heterogeneous social bases and are less distant ideologically than the major parties in most advanced industrial democracies. Nonetheless, in U.S. national politics the Democratic party is indisputably the party of the "Left," with differential appeal to lower-income classes; and the Republican party is just as clearly the party of the "Right," with relatively great attractiveness to upper-income classes. This is essentially as true today as it was during the late New Deal, at which time the displacement of traditional sectional politics by modern class politics was consolidated,[1] although, as Edsall argues, the Republicans in recent years may have become more effective in representing the interests of their upper-income constituencies (Edsall 1984).

The down-scale classes, which make up the core constituency of the Democratic party, hold human capital (their economic well-being depends primarily on earnings from labor) and tend to occupy unsheltered, lower-status jobs. Democratic supporters therefore have greater exposure to rising unemployment than Republican supporters and they normally bear a disproportionate share of the economic and broader social costs of cyclical contractions. Consequently, their relative position in the income distribution as well as their absolute level of economic well-being is typically improved by falling unemployment and tight labor markets. The Democratic constituency is also advantaged by a generous system of income- and employment-contingent transfer spending, even if such spending is financed by proportional tax levies.

Up-scale groups, which form the core constituency of the Republican party, hold the lion's share of financial capital in the household sector; and they tend to occupy higher-status, sheltered jobs. So Republican supporters absorb greater losses from extra inflation than Democratic supporters and they experience the greatest gains from disinflation. On average, the Republican constituency also loses (or benefits less than Democratic supporters) from growth-of-income transfers.

These differences in the interests of the parties' core constituencies are reflected in the pattern of policies and outcomes observed under Democratic and Republican administrations. On the side of the macroeconomy, Democratic administrations have been more likely than Republican ones to pursue expansive policies yielding lower unemployment and extra growth but running the risk (frequently realized) of higher inflation. Republican administrations usually weight the problem of inflation more heavily. As a result they have more readily and more vigorously pursued disinflationary policies, and they have been more cautious about stimulating aggregate demand and employment.

Similarly, the parties have contrasting income distribution goals that are consistent with the locations of their core constituencies in the hierarchy of income classes. (For some opinion data on the views of party leaders and followers on income equality and redistribution see Verba and Orren 1985.) The general course of income security and redistribution spending policies during the postwar period is one of Democratic initiatives that successfully (though rather modestly) helped improve the relative position of the lower quintiles of the income distribution, followed by periods of Republican inaction or retrenchment, followed in turn by new Democratic efforts to improve equality, and so on (see Page 1983).

Income Distribution Measurement

Empirical analysis of trends and fluctuations in distributional outcomes requires choice of an income distribution measure. Measurement of income inequality is a complicated matter and has been the subject of an enormous literature. (See Cowell 1977 for a good overview.) Fortunately, our purposes are well served by a very straightforward measure that follows naturally from what we know about the incidence of government taxes and transfers and the distributional consequences of cyclical economic activity.

Income-contingent transfers, which are the main fiscal engine of government-induced redistribution, flow almost entirely to the bottom two quintiles of the pretax, pretransfer distribution. Computations by Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) and others show that the tax system is nearly proportional and that net benefits of all taxes and transfers are unambiguously positive (and progressively sloped) for the bottom two quintiles of the distribution, are quite flat or proportional over the next two quintiles, and turn progressively more negative over the top quintile. The principal redistribution achieved by the tax and transfer system is from the top 20% of the distribution to the bottom 40%.

The very same distributive effects accompany cyclical fluctuations of the macroeconomy. Empirical work shows that variations in the inflation rate are only weakly connected to fluctuations of the size distribution of income. And the associations that do exist suggest that inflation adversely affects the income share of the upper quintile relative to the shares of the bottom two quintiles. On the other hand, cyclical declines in unemployment unambiguously raise the share of the bottom two quintiles, almost exclusively at the expense of the top one. (See the sources cited previously.)

Hence, income distribution movements induced by the business cycle and the tax-transfer system consist largely of flows between the top 20% and the bottom 40% of income classes. A natural income distribution measure for our purposes, therefore, is the ratio of the posttax, posttransfer share of the top 20% of the family distribution to the posttax, posttransfer share of the bottom 40% of the family distribution.[2] The natural logarithm of this ratio (multiplied by 100), which we use in the empirical analyses ahead, gives the percentage gap between the net (after taxes and transfers) income shares of the top fifth and bottom two-fifths of the family distribution. We shall frequently refer to this inequality measure as the *equality gap*.

During the period 1950–83 the average share of net income going to the top quintile was about 40% of the total family income, whereas the average net share of the bottom two quintiles was about 20%. The postwar mean of the 20-to-40 ratio is 1.97, with standard deviation .15; and the mean for the natural log of the ratio (times 100) is 67.6 (an average equality gap of 67.6%), with standard deviation 1.3. The 20-to-40 ratio of net income shares essentially contrasts the relative experience of the upper middle class and the rich to the lower middle class and the poor. It registers most of the distributional action in the underlying data on all quintile shares and at the same time corresponds nicely to the parties' core constituencies insofar as they are income-related. The "omitted quintiles," the middle 40% of the net income distribution (the broad middle classes), though tilted toward the Republicans at the upper range, are the critical battlegrounds of party competition for marginal votes.

A Small Dynamic System for the Politics and Economics of Income Inequality

The Proximate Determinants of Inequality

It is easy to show that the political strength of the Democrats has a significant negative statistical association with income inequality over the postwar period. This much is clear from the first two columns of Table 1, which report simple regressions (for annual data, 1950–83) of the equality gap variable just

Table 1. Estimates for Income Inequality Equations, Annual 1950–83

Variables	Regression Models (1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Means
Constant	6.42* (3.49)	16.3** (6.36)	27.7** (9.78)	24.1** (7.48)	
$\log I_{t-1}$ (equality gap)	.912** (.05)	.868** (.05)	.624** (.11)	.640** (.09)	68.2
U_t (unemployment rate)			1.90** (.49)	1.85** (.37)	5.56
Trans_t (share of transfers in personal income)			-1.03** (.33)	-1.01** (.27)	10.3
Dempres_{t-1} (Democratic presidents = 1)	-2.09** (.83)		.438 (1.02)		.47
Demcong_{t-1} (% share of Democrats in Congress)		-.135* (.08)	-.048 (.07)		58.3
Adjusted R^2	.904	.894	.931	.935	
Standard error of regression	2.36	2.47	1.99	1.94	
Method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	

Note: Base model:

$$\log I_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \log I_{t-1} + \alpha_2 U_t + \alpha_3 \text{trans}_t + \alpha_4 \text{Dempres}_{t-1} + \alpha_5 \text{Demcong}_{t-1}.$$

Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses.

$^{*}p < .05$.
$^{**}p < .01$.

described (denoted *logI*) on its own lagged value ($\log I_{t-1}$) and a binary variable for Democratic presidential administrations (Dempres) and the average percentage share of Democrats in the Congress (Demcong),[3] both lagged one period. The third regression in Table 1, however, shows that these results are not structural; they merely establish statistical correlations. In the presence of unemployment (U) and spending on transfers to persons as a percentage of gross personal income (trans), which are the two main channels by which government policy systematically affects the size distribution of income, the coefficients of Dempres and Demcong are indistinguishable from zero. Hence, the best model in Table 1 for the time path of the equality gap (logI) is the first-order dynamic equation in the last column (Model 4), where fluctuations in inequality are driven by changes in unemployment and transfer spending:

$$\log I_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \log I_{t-1} + \alpha_2 U_t + \alpha_3 \text{trans}_t \qquad (1)$$

The results for this equation indicate that each extra percentage point of unemployment initially raises inequality by 1.85 percentage points. Sustained indefinitely, an extra point of unemployment adds just over five points to the equality gap ($1.85/[1 - .64] = 5.1$). Transfer spending also has powerful effects on income inequality. A rise of one percentage point in the transfer share of personal income closes the equality gap by about one percentage point during the first year; after all lags of adjustment the same increase in transfer spending lowers inequality by 2.8% ($-1.01/[1 - .64] = -2.8$).

Movements in unemployment[4] and transfer spending, with allowance for first-order dynamic adjustment, are, then, the principal proximate determinants of postwar fluctuations in the inequality of disposable personal incomes. It follows that political influence on the size distribution of income must operate through at least one of these channels. We develop first a political analysis of the unemployment channel.

Modeling Unemployment and Inflation Time Paths

As we noted previously, the Democratic and Republican parties have different unemployment targets, denoted ahead by U^T, which are constrained by and tend to vary about a "normal" or benchmark unemployment rate, denoted U^N. Although the Democrats' constituency weights unemployment more heavily and inflation less heavily than the Republicans' constituency, few voters of any political orientation are happy with high rates of inflation (Hibbs 1987, chaps. 4, 6). Consequently, the unemployment targets of both parties become more conservative (less ambitious) as the inflation rate observed by the actors, P_{t-1}, rises. Conditional on the received inflation rate (P_{t-1}), the unemployment target prevailing during Democratic presidential administrations typically is lower than the corresponding target during Republican administrations, which leads to the U^T equation

$$U_t^T = \beta_o + U^N_t + \beta_1 \text{Dempres}_{t-1} + \beta_2 P_{t-1} \qquad (2)$$

where, as before, Dempres is a binary variable equal to one during Democratic presidential administrations and zero during Republican administrations; U^N, which trends upward from 5% in the late 1950s to 6% in the late 1970s, is set equal to Robert J. Gordon's calculation of the natural unemployment rate (Gordon 1984b, Appendix B); P is the year-on-year percentage rate of change of the GNP deflator; and we anticipate that $\beta_2 > 0$; and the party hypothesis requires $\beta_1 < 0$.

Because the macroeconomic policy machinery is largely directed by the administration rather than Congress, the party controlling the White House (Dempres), rather than the strength of the parties in Congress (Demcong), is the relevant variable for political analysis of unemployment outcomes. (This presumption is supported by empirical analysis not reported here.) The Dempres term appears with a one-period lag because the unemployment target reflected in current policies is based on the party in power during the previous period.[5] Hence by Equation 2 the unemployment target underlying policy during a typical Democratic administration is $\beta_o + U^N_t + \beta_1 + \beta_2 P_{t-1}$, and the target during a typical Republican administration is $\beta_o + U^N_t + \beta_2 P_{t-1}$. Given the behavioral lags in policy formulation, institutional lags in policy implementation and, most important, structural lags in the response of the economy to policy actions, economic goals cannot be realized immediately. Administrations are able to adjust the observed unemployment rate, U, to their preferred rate, U^T, only partially each period. The adjustment mechanism is

$$U_t - U_{t-1} = \phi(U^T_t - U_{t-1}) + \beta_3 \text{shock}_{t-1} + v_t \qquad (3)$$

where $0 < \phi < 1$, and v is a well-behaved disturbance.

Equation 3 implies that policy-induced changes in unemployment from one year to the next are capable of closing only a fraction (ϕ) of the gap between the current target and the actual unemployment rate observed for the previous period. Fluctuations in unemployment due to shocks exogenous to the domestic political economy, notably the energy price hikes of 1973–74 and 1979–80, are represented by the variable *shock*, which is equal to the percentage point change in the price of imported oil less the inflation rate of the GNP deflator, weighted by the net share of energy imports (imports less exports) in GNP.

Substituting Equation 2 into Equation 3 and solving for U_t yields the following nonlinear equation for the time path of unemployment:

$$U_t = \phi\beta_o + (1 - \phi)U_{t-1} + \phi U^N_t + \phi\beta_1\text{Dempres}_{t-1} + \phi\beta_2 P_{t-1} + \beta_3\text{shock}_{t-1} + v_t \qquad (4)$$

Equation 4 specifies the way in which political and economic forces influence income inequality via the unemployment channel of Equation 1. Estimates for this equation, which appear in the first column of Table 2 (Regression Model 5), give strong support to the party cleavage approach to modeling unemployment outcomes. (The constant β_o in Equation 4 was statistically insignificant and nearly zero, so it is omitted from the estimation equation in Table 2.) The rate of adjustment of unemployment to party targets (ϕ) is on the order of 38% per year (.38), which means that adjustment is almost fully realized after four to five years.

Unemployment also was affected by exogenous supply shocks. The estimate of β_3 indicates that the OPEC supply shocks initially raised unemployment, after a one-period lag, by .8 percentage points for each GNP-weighted percentage point increase in energy prices above the domestic inflation rate. The shock variable takes peak values of 2.3 in 1974, .5 in 1979, and 1.4 in 1980 (in other periods shock is negligible); and dynamic calculations imply that the energy price hikes raised unemployment directly by about 1.8% in 1975, .9% in 1976, .4% in 1980, and 1.3% in 1981. (After 1982 declining energy prices were a source of downward pressure on unemployment.) Once allowance is made for the rises in inflation caused by the oil price increases, calculations of the shock-induced effects on unemployment would be even greater because extra inflation tends to raise the unemployment targets of administrations of either party.

Political analysis of the unemployment dynamics implied by Equation 4 requires joint consideration of the parameter for, and time path of, party control of the presidency (β_1, Dempres$_{t-1}$) and the parameter for, and time path of, inflation (β_2, P_{t-1}). β_1 estimates the magnitude of the cross-party difference in unemployment targets and hence the typical impact of sustained changes in party control of the presidency on unemployment performance, *assuming everything else is held equal.* Hence, for benchmark unemployment (U^N), external supply shocks (shock), and lagged inflation (P_{t-1}) held fixed the results in Table 2 imply that a shift from a Republican to a Democratic administration typically would yield a decline in unemployment of about .97 percentage points ($\phi\beta_1$) after the first year and about 2.6 percentage points (β_1) after all adjustment lags.

For the reasons noted earlier, however, inflation prompts the parties to raise their unemployment targets, which eventually results in higher unemployment rates. The estimates in Table 2 indicate that each extra point on the inflation rate leads to a rise in unemployment of about .11 percentage points ($\phi\beta_2$) after one year and, if sustained long enough, to a rise of .30 percentage points of unemployment (β_2) per extra point of inflation after all lags of adjustment to party goals. Moreover, the U.S. Phillips curve tells us that higher unemployment yields lower future inflation; a connection that Robert J. Gordon aptly described as "one of the most stable empirical macroeconomic relationships of the postwar era" (Gordon 1984a, 42). These feedback relationships—from rising inflation to higher unemployment via the implementation of party targets, and from higher unemployment to lower future inflation via the Phillips curve—mean that although U^N and shock may realistically be viewed as exogenous and held fixed when evaluating the impact of shifts in party control of the White House, the inflation rate may not. So interpreting β_1 in isolation (by holding inflation "fixed") may give an exaggerated idea of the interparty difference in unemployment goals and performance.

Accurate evaluation of the impact of the parties on income distribution through party differences in unemployment performance requires bringing the response of inflation to unemployment (the Phillips curve) explicitly into the analysis. The standard rule-of-thumb for the U.S. macroeconomy is that each extra percentage point of unemployment, sustained a year, produces a decline in the annual inflation rate, exogenous shocks aside, of about one-half a percentage point. (By *extra unemployment,* we mean deviations of the actual rate, U, from the "natural" or nonaccelerating inflation rate, U^N.) This standard rule implies the relation

$$P_t = \alpha_1 P_{t-1} + \alpha_2(U_t - U^N_t) + \alpha_3 \text{shock}_t \quad (5)$$

with $\alpha_1 = 1.0$, $\alpha_2 = -.5$ and $\alpha_3 > 0$. The regression estimates reported in the second column of Table 2 (Regression Model 6) conform almost perfectly to this stylized Phillips curve.[6]

Joint analysis of Equations 4 and 5 will yield appropriate estimates of the magnitudes and duration of the effects of changes in party control of the White House on the time path of unemployment and, through the unemployment channel, the effects of partisan change on the time path of income distribution. Before pursuing this further, we first complete the system by analyzing the transfer spending channel of political influence on inequality.

Modeling the Flow of Transfers in Personal Income

We pointed out previously that cash and in-kind transfer programs have been the government's main fiscal instruments for influencing income inequality and poverty. So the parties' transfer spending targets (trans^T) are intimately related to their income distribution goals (logI^T). Indeed, in contrast to unemployment and inflation, which influence income distribution (directly in the case of unemployment, indirectly in the case of inflation because extra inflation raises party unemployment targets) but are independent objects of policy, transfer spending goals are based primarily on the distributional effects of income security programs.[7] At each period party spending targets are also constrained by the existing fiscal landscape, as reflected in actual transfer spending during the previous period (trans_{t-1}). As "incrementalist" theories of budgeting have correctly emphasized (the seminal contribution being Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky 1966), spending goals are not formed de novo each period; any given stock of spending tends to get "locked in"—or at least to exhibit considerable inertia—which imparts an upward bias to spending in relation to gross income. Accordingly, the transfer spending target embodied in current policy is

$$\text{trans}^T_t = \delta_0 + \delta_1 \text{logI}^T_t + \delta_2 \text{trans}_{t-1} \quad (6)$$

where logI^T denotes the prevailing target for the equality gap variable introduced previously and, as before, trans (actual transfer spending) and trans^T (transfer spending targets) are expressed as percentage shares of aggregate personal income, inclusive of in-kind benefits.

By Equation 6, transfer spending goals, after allowing for the constraining influence of the received level of transfer expenditures ($\delta_2\text{trans}_{t-1}$) and a scaling constant (δ_0), are proportional to the prevailing inequality target. Other things equal, the higher the prevailing target for income inequality (which, as we indicate below, depends on the balance of political forces), the lower the prevailing target for transfer spending in relation to total personal income. Clearly, the theory requires that δ_1 be less than 0 in the transfer spending equation. The quantity δ_2, which weights the constraining influence of existing transfer spending on the formation of policy targets, should lie in the interval $0 < \delta_2 \leqslant 1$. And, for $\delta_2 < 1$, δ_0 should be greater than 0.

The Democrats, as we argued earlier, aim for a more egalitarian distribution of income than the Republicans; in other words, they generally push for a smaller equality gap, logI. In principle, the magnitude of the inequality target underlying current transfer spending policy might depend on both the party controlling the White House (Dempres = 1 denoting Democratic control) and the strength of the parties in Congress (Demcong being the average share of Democratic seats in the House and Senate). But neither party seriously entertains "pie-in-the-sky" income distribution goals; at every period the formation of inequality targets is constrained by the income distribution observed in the previous period, logI_{t-1}. These ideas underlie the equation for the income distribution target reflected in policy:

$$\text{logI}^T_t = \pi_0 + \pi_1\text{Dempres}_t + \pi_2\text{Demcong}_t + \pi_3\text{logI}_{t-1} \qquad (7)$$

The party cleavage or partisan model implies that $\pi_1, \pi_2 < 0$, and that the coefficient scaling the constraining impact of the observed income distribution should fall in the interval $0 < \pi_3 \leqslant 1$. $\pi_0 > 0$ allows for the possibility that $\text{log}^T_t > \text{logI}_{t-1}$.

U.S. institutional arrangements make it impossible to move actual transfer spending instantly into line with policy goals. Moreover, no matter what the current partisan balance of power and prevailing transfer spending target, transfers will respond automatically to recent changes in the rate of unemployment because of preexisting provisions of unemployment insurance and other employment- and income-contingent transfer programs. (In the longer run the responsiveness of transfers to the business cycle may of course be changed by political action.) For these reasons, we specify a first-order, partial adjustment-to-target equation for movements in actual spending that includes recent changes in unemployment rates:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{trans}_t - \text{trans}_{t-1} &= \Theta(\text{trans}^T_t - \text{trans}_{t-1}) + k_1 dU_t \\ &+ k_2 dU_{t-1} + e_t \qquad (8)\end{aligned}$$

where Θ represents the fraction of the gap between transfer spending targets and actual transfer spending in the previous period that is closed each year; dU the first backward difference of unemployment ($U_t - U_{t-1}$); and e a well-behaved stochastic disturbance. The model implies k_1 and $k_2 > 0$ and that Θ should take a value in the interval $0 \leqslant \Theta \leqslant 1$.

Substituting the inequality target (logI^T) given by Equation 7 into Equation 6 and substituting the resulting equation for transfer spending targets, trans^T, into Equation 8 yields

$$\begin{aligned}\text{trans}_t = {} & \Theta(\delta_0 + \delta_1\pi_0) \\ & + (1 - \Theta + \Theta\delta_2)\text{trans}_{t-1} \\ & + \Theta\delta_1\pi_1\text{Dempres}_t \\ & + \Theta\delta_1\pi_2\text{Demcong}_t + \Theta\delta_1\pi_3\text{logI}_{t-1} \\ & + k_1 dU_t + k_2 dU_{t-1} + e_t \qquad (9)\end{aligned}$$

It is obvious from Equation 9 that only composite parameters may be estimated. The estimation equation that follows naturally from Equation 9, however, preserves the signs of political effects anticipated by the underlying theory:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{trans}_t &= \pi_0^* + \Theta^*\text{trans}_{t-1} \\ &+ \pi^*_1\text{Dempres}_t + \pi^*_2\text{Demcong}_t \\ &+ \pi^*_3\log\text{I}_{t-1} + k_1 dU_t \\ &+ k_2 dU_{t-1} + e_t \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

where $\pi_0^* = \Theta(\delta_0 + \delta_1\pi_0)$; $\Theta^* = (1 - \Theta + \Theta\delta_2)$; $\pi^*_1 = \Theta\delta_1\pi_1$; $\pi^*_2 = \Theta\delta_1\pi_2$; and $\pi^*_3 = \Theta\delta_1\pi_3$. Given the theoretically required signs of Θ, δ_1, δ_2, π_1, π_2, and π_3 in Equations 6–8, the anticipated signs of the composite parameters in Equation 10 are $0 < \Theta^* \leqslant 1$, $\pi^*_1 \geqslant 0$, $\pi^*_2 \geqslant 0$ and $\pi^*_3 < 0$. (The sign of π_0^*, though likely to be positive, is indeterminate.) Although individual parameters in target and adjustment equations cannot be estimated from observables, it is clear from Equation 10 that political pressure to raise transfer spending, net of recent movements in unemployment (which, as we shall see ahead, is an important qualification), is greatest when the partisan balance favors the Democrats. (For quantitative analyses of spending appropriations and spending trends that include partisan variables, see Browning 1985 and Kiewet and McCubbins n.d.).

Estimates for two variants of the transfer spending equation appear in the last two columns of Table 2 (Regression Models 7 and 8). The regression results, as anticipated, show that the transfer spending share of personal income responds systematically to economic contractions and expansions. A transitory, one-year jump in the unemployment rate directly raises transfer spending over two years, with most of the effect coming during the first year (.45 as compared to .16). And cyclical expansions lower the transfer share by an equivalent magnitude per point of declining unemployment. Steady rates of unemployment have no influence on the flow of transfers in relation to personal income, though any sustained shift in the level of unemployment has a prolonged effect on the stock, or level, of transfers in personal income via the lagged feedback term, .92 trans_{t-1}.

It is also clear from the empirical results that the strength of the Democrats in Congress is the main direct source of politically induced increases in the share of transfers in gross personal income. Although the major income security programs were promoted by and established during Democratic presidential administrations, changes in the resources devoted to these programs, once they were in place, were driven by the congressional strength of the Democrats. Shifts in party control of the presidency had negligible direct influence.

It is important to recognize, however, that our conclusion that changes in party control of the White House typically have little *direct* influence on spending trends is conditional on unemployment fluctuations. Indeed, to the degree that unemployment rises under Republican administrations and falls under the Democratic administrations (Regression Model 5 of Table 2) at any given partisan balance of power in Congress one would tend to observe *positive* statistical correlations between Republican control of the White House and spending as a fraction of aggregate income, because recessions increase the pool of eligible transfer recipients and at the same time shrink total income and output. Consequently, policy-induced contractions yielding extra unemployment may be an important indirect channel by which transfer spending rises during Republican presidencies.

Finally, the estimates for the lagged equality gap term ($\log\text{I}_{t-1}$) in regression Models 7 and 8 of Table 2 show that transfer spending tends to fall with increases in income inequality, after a one-

Table 2. Estimates for Unemployment (U), Inflation (P), and Transfer Spending (trans) Equations, Annual 1950–83

	Regression Models				
Variables	U (5)	P (6)	trans (7)	trans (8)	Means
π_0^*			2.22 (1.60)	2.02 (1.52)	
ϕ					
(U_{t-1}, N^N)	.379** (.11)				5.53 (U^N)
$(U_t - U^N_t)$		-.517** (.09)			.04
trans_{t-1}			.917** (.029)	.919** (.027)	
Dempres_{t-1}	-2.60** (.86)		.041 (.18)		.47
Demcong_{t-1}			.024* (.014)	.026* (.011)	58.3
$\log I_{t-1}$ (equality gap)			-.038** (.015)	-.036** (.013)	68.2
P_{t-1} (inflation rate)	.296** (.12)	.987** (.03)			4.0
shock_t (in % of GNP)		1.64** (.31)			.11
shock_{t-1}	.791* (.35)				
$dU_t(U_t - U_{t-1})$			.450** (.060)	.448** (.058)	.17
dU_{t-1}			.170** (.061)	.163** (.051)	
Adjusted R^2	.757	.884	.992	.992	
Standard error of regression	.853	.871	.349	.344	
Method	nonlinear LS	AR1 rho = -.51** (.17)	OLS	OLS	

Note: Models:

$$U_t = (1 - \phi)U_{t-1} + \phi U^N_t + \phi\beta_1 \text{Dempres}_{t-1} + \phi\beta_2 P_{t-1} + \beta_3 \text{shock}_{t-1}.$$

$$P_t = \alpha_1 P_{t-1} + \alpha_2(U_t - U^N_t) + \alpha_3 \text{shock}_t.$$

$$\text{trans}_t = \pi_0^* + \Theta^* \text{trans}_{t-1} + \pi_1^* \text{Dempres}_{t-1} + \pi_2^* \text{Demcong}_t + \pi^*_3 \log I_{t-1} + k_1\, dU_t + k_2\, dU_{t-1}.$$

Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses; inflation equation excludes Korean War period.

*$p < .05$.
**$p < .01$.

period lag. Although this result is consistent with the theoretical derivation of the model presented earlier, it may at first seem counterintuitive. Remember, though, that inequality targets are proportional (positively) to the actual income distribution observed the previous period. Hence, at a given balance of power between the parties, a downward shift in observed inequality leads to more ambitious (egalitarian) distribution goals, which in turn lead to higher transfer spending. In a sense the model implies that nothing succeeds like success: transfer efforts that successfully reduce the equality gap help sustain future transfer spending. The dynamic works just the opposite way for upward movements in inequality.

Moreover, the response of transfer spending to inequality outcomes augments the direct impact on spending trends of the Democrats' strength in Congress. Higher Democratic congressional strength tends to push up transfer spending because, other things equal, Democrats entertain a lower inequality target than Republicans. In turn, higher spending directly lowers income distribution inequality, which leads to more ambitious income distribution goals and fuels continued higher spending in subsequent periods. Here, as previously, it is apparent that we cannot accurately gauge the quantitative effects (and in some cases even the qualitative effects) of political and economic events on income inequality by looking at the equations of the model individually. They must be analyzed as a system.

Numerical Analysis of the System

The equations developed in the last section represent a small dynamic system of the politics and economics of income distribution in the postwar United States. Unemployment, inflation, transfer spending, and inequality are determined endogenously, and they are driven politically by the party controlling the White House and the partisan balance in Congress. External economic shocks and changes in the natural rate of unemployment, which lie beyond the control of conventional policies, also affect the macroeconomy (directly) and spending and inequality (indirectly). Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the system and shows the estimated equations used to analyze its dynamics. The Appendix presents further statistical tests of the central causal assumptions of the model and of its robustness for partisan presidential periods.

We saw from regression Model 4 in Table 1 that both the rate of unemployment and the share of transfers in personal income have powerful effects on inequality of income distribution over time. These are the main channels by which party politics affects distributional outcomes. The discussion associated with Models 5 and 6 in Table 2 showed that estimation of political influence on inequality via the unemployment channel required building inflation explicitly (endogenously) into the system. And Models 5 and 7 in Table 2 implied that the parties indirectly affect income distribution through partisan-based movements in unemployment rates and directly affect inequality by influencing transfer spending flows. Clearly, estimation of the ultimate impact of political forces on income inequality requires that we take account of these various direct, indirect, and feedback lines of influence by analyzing the equations explicitly as a system. This is most conveniently accomplished by dynamic simulation of the estimated equations.

Since the natural rate of unemployment and external supply shocks are incidental to our purposes (though it was necessary to include these variables in the regres-

Figure 1. The Politics and Economics of Personal Income Inequality



Note: These are the estimated equations of the model:

$U_t = (1 - .38)\, U_{t-1} + .38U^N_t - 2.6^{*}.38\text{Dempres}_{t-1} + .38^{*}.30P_{t-1} + .79\text{shock}_{t-1}$

$P_t = .99P_{t-1} - .52(U_t - U^N_t) + 1.64\text{shock}_t - .51\, e_{t-1}$

$\text{trans}_t = 2.02 + .92\text{trans}_{t-1} + .026\text{Demcong}_t - .036\, \text{logI}_{t-1} + .45\, dU_t + .16\, dU_{t-1}$

$\text{logI}_t = 24.1 + 64\, \text{logI}_{t-1} + 1.85\, U_t - 1.0\text{trans}_t$

U: unemployment rate, civilian labor force

dU: $U_t^{-1} U_{t-1}$

P: year-on-year percentage rate of change of GNP deflator

trans: transfers to persons as a percentage share of aggregate personal income (inclusive of in-kind benefits)

logI: natural log (times 100) of the ratio of the income share of the top quintile to the lowest two quintiles of the family distribution, inclusive of taxes, cash, and in-kind transfers and the imputed value of unreported income

shock: annual inflation rate of energy prices less inflation rate of GNP deflator weighted by net share (imports over exports) of energy in GNP

Dempres: 1 during Democratic presidential administrations, 0 otherwise

Demcong: average percentage share of Democratic seats in the House and Senate

Figure 2. Unemployment and Inflation under the Parties



sions to secure unbiased estimates of parameters), they are not varied in the dynamic calculations. Shock is kept at zero, and U^N is held at 6%—Robert J. Gordon's estimate of the natural rate of unemployment for the mid-1970s and after. The simulation calculations therefore do not reflect the one-percentage-point rise in U^N from the 1950s to the 1970s. (Given recent declines in the relative numbers of teenagers in the labor force, computations of U^N for the last half of the 1980s, which lies beyond our estimation range, show a decline from the 6% natural rate prevailing earlier. In fact, recent estimates of the natural rate suggest that it fell from approximately 6% in 1980 to approximately 5.2% by 1984.) Because neither party has held the presidency for more than two terms in succession in the postwar period, we analyze the system for eight-year cycles of party control of the White House. The strength of the parties in Congress is evaluated at "high," "average," and "low" values corresponding to postwar experience. Initial conditions for endogenous variables are based on their average values for the early 1950s.

Macroeconomic Cycles under the Parties

Figure 2 shows the time path of unemployment and inflation for two pairs of eight-year regimes of Republican and Democratic control of the presidency. The strength of the parties in Congress does not enter the story here because, as we pointed out earlier, macroeconomic policy lies primarily under the control of the executive branch. Since the equations underlying these results are stripped of random shocks, supply shocks, and macroeconomic influences beyond the control of conventional economic policy, the time paths graphed in the figure, unlike "real world" outcomes, are quite smooth. Yet they reveal the fundamental influence of differences in the parties' economic goals and priorities on postwar unemployment and inflation performance.

Two features of the results are immediately apparent. First, the unemployment and inflation cycles observed under the two-term presidential regimes are stable. Neither economic variable exhibits the sort of unbounded growth or decline that (in this case) would be a sure sign of a poorly specified model. Second, the peak interparty differences in unemployment performance occur several years before the end of each eight-year stretch of party control of the White House. Under the typical Democratic presidency, unemployment falls steadily (at a declining rate) over the first six years, bottoms out at a value just above 4.5%, and then begins to creep upward toward the end of the second presidential term. Unemployment rises steadily (again, at a declining rate) over the first six years of the typical two-term run of Republican presidents, reaches a peak value of about 7.25%, and then declines over the last few years of the second term.

The response of inflation to unemployment in the economic system combined with the sensitivity of party unemployment goals to inflation in the political system underlie these characteristic unemployment time paths. Falling unemployment under Democratic presidencies yields rising inflation, which eventually prompts reevaluation and relaxation of unemployment goals. This usually occurs as the inflation rate approaches 5%. The reverse process tends to work during Republican regimes. As inflation falls to 3% in response to rising unemployment, the desire to create still more slack dissipates, policy changes course, and unemployment begins to decline somewhat. These inflation-induced shift points in the parties' unemployment goals and performance, implied by the model and illustrated in Figure 2, closely track Hibbs's independent estimates, obtained from opinion survey data, of the macroeconomic configurations underlying shifts in the electorate's relative concern about the problems of inflation and unemployment (Hibbs 1987, chap. 4).

Viewed from the end of one eight-year partisan regime to another, the results graphed in Figure 2 indicate that the difference between the unemployment performance of the typical Democratic and Republican administration is about two percentage points, again assuming a steady natural rate of 6% and no supply shocks. The corresponding difference for inflation performance is just over four percentage points. The difference in the parties' unemployment performances would dwindle to much smaller proportions (and for a completely accelerationist inflation equation would vanish completely), and the difference in inflation performance would become larger, if we analyzed the implications of the model for much longer stretches of party control of the White House. But neither party has held the White House for more than eight years in the postwar era, and so no political-economic model can yield reliable empirical estimates of the likely consequences of prolonged runs of party control of the presidency for economic performance. (On the issue of duration see also Alesina and Sachs n.d.; Alt 1985; Chappel and Keech 1986a, 1986b; and Hibbs 1977, 1986, and 1987.)

Naturally the stylized results shown in Figure 2 for the macroeconomic consequences of shifts in control of the presidency (that is, shifts in control of the macroeconomic policy machinery) do not conform precisely to observed performance under any particular Democratic or Republican presidential administration. But they do give a realistic idea of the characteristic macroeconomic cycles, net of external shocks and stochastic variation, that accompany change in partisan control of the White House. And as we pointed out earlier, such party-based differences in economic performance have important consequences for transfer spending flows and income distribution outcomes.

Trends in Transfer Spending under the Parties

Figure 3 graphs trends in transfer spending in percentage of aggregate personal income under the parties. The figure illustrates the time path of transfer spending under Democratic and Republican presidential administrations at different levels of the party balance of power in

Figure 3. Transfer Spending in Percentage of Personal Income under the Parties



Congress. Party strength in Congress is varied at "average," "high," and "low" values, corresponding to the postwar mean and deviations of plus- and minus-one standard deviation from the mean, respectively.[8] As before, results for two stretches of eight-year party regimes, or thirty-two years of stylized political-economic history, are shown. And, also as before, the simulations are fully dynamic and are based on all relevant equations in the recursive system (the unemployment and inflation equations, the endogenous effect of lagged inequality, and the transfer spending equation itself). The initial condition for lagged spending is based on the average transfer spending rate of the early 1950s.

The vertical distances between the calculated time paths in Figure 3 show the response of transfer spending over time to shifts in Democratic strength in Congress by the party holding the White House. An increase in the Democrats' share of seats in Congress yields upward pressure on spending, which in turn puts downward pressure on inequality. Any decrease in inequality prompts more ambitious equality targets than otherwise would have been the case and consequently higher spending than otherwise would have been the case in subsequent periods. In this way the impact of a shift in Democratic congressional strength is magnified in future periods. The process works in reverse for a sustained downward shift in Democratic congressional strength; the impact on spending is magnified in a negative direction over subsequent periods. But one should not take the magnitudes of the time magnifications shown in the figure literally, because the congressional balance of power has never been at "high" or "low" values for very long periods.

The results in Figure 3 also indicate that when the Democrats are at average or above average strength in Congress, transfer spending in percentage of personal income tends to trend upward, no matter which party controls the White House. In fact, experiments not graphed here show that when unemployment is held fixed at the natural rate, which excludes the impact of shifts in party control of the presidency from the model, transfer spending begins to trend upward when the Democrats' congressional seat share exceeds 53%–54%. Democratic congressional strength in the vicinity of 53%–54% appears to be a critical political threshold for increasing transfer efforts. Since the Democratic seat share in Congress averaged about 58% over 1950–83, the broad upward trend of spending under the "average" and "high" scenarios shown in Figure 3 corresponds, as it should, to actual postwar developments (transfer spending in gross personal income rose from around 6% in the mid-1950s to just above 15% in the early 1980s).

Indeed, the only significant decline in transfer spending in relation to personal income during the postwar period occurred from 1950 to 1952, when the spending share fell by almost two percentage points. This decline was fueled by the unusually low Democratic congressional strength of the period (the Democrats were even weaker in 1953–54 when the Republicans gained numerical majorities in both the House and Senate) and the coincident decline in unemployment under Truman. In Figure 3 this scenario (the only situation in the model—and in the real world—in which the transfer spending share of personal income actually falls significantly) is illustrated by the time path of spending during Democratic presidential administrations when the Democrats are weak in Congress.

The slopes of the simulation time paths in Figure 3 give the typical growth rates of transfer spending under Republican and Democratic presidential administrations at each level of the congressional balance of power between the parties. Here we see that at any given Democratic strength in Congress, the average rate of growth of transfers in personal income over each eight-year presidential regime tends to be *higher* under Republican presidents than under Democratic presidents. (This pattern, which is consistent with postwar experience, turns up in Browning's 1985 single-equation regression analysis of the correlates of postwar welfare spending trends.) The model developed here implies that the main source of this pattern is the tendency of Republican administrations to create extra unemployment (see Figure 2 and the previous discussion), which automatically raises income- and employment-contingent transfer spending and at the same time slows the growth of aggregate income and output, thereby raising the share of spending in aggregate income.

Events during President Reagan's first three years provide a graphic example of the stylized results shown in the figure for the "low"-Democratic-congressional-strength–Republican-president scenario. The Reagan administration assumed power with greater commitment to reversing the postwar trend of social spending than any other Republican government in the modern era. The unusually low strength of the Democrats in Congress gave the President something of a golden opportunity. Yet the administration was also determined to bring inflation under control. The severe policy-induced disinflationary contraction of 1981–83, which lowered personal income and output and produced the highest unemployment rates since the end of the Great Depression, overwhelmed the administration's spending plans. The sharp economic downturn automatically raised income- and employment-contingent spending. As a result, the transfer spending share of personal income rose continuously from 1980 to 1983 (though, to be sure, at a slower rate than would have occurred had the Democrats been stronger in Congress). The first Reagan administration did not succeed in bringing the transfer share of personal income down to the levels inherited from Carter until the last year of the president's term. (Events under Mrs. Thatcher's government in Britain illustrated the same pattern.)

The joint potency of shifts in the congressional balance of power in favor of the Democrats and rising unemployment under Republican presidential administrations is illustrated well by the events of 1973–75. Transfer spending in relation to personal income jumped more than three percentage points during these years (from 12.7% to 15.9%), the largest rise over such a short period in postwar history. (Two-thirds of the jump occurred over 1974–75.) One important reason for the spending surge was the big increase in the Democrats' muscle in Congress. Following the Watergate debacle the Democrat's share of congressional seats rose by 7.7 percentage points to 63.5%, way above their average strength under Republican presidents. All by itself, this increased pressure on spending. A second reason was the enormous rise in unemployment from 4.9% to 8.5%, though both our model and common sense suggest that only some of extra joblessness (perhaps half of the 3.5-point rise) can be attributed to the higher unemployment targets typical of Republican administrations. The rest of the increase in unemployment and therefore some of the increase in spending should be laid at the door of the first OPEC supply shock rather than partisan politics. The main message of the results shown in Figure 3, however, is that both direct and indirect channels of influence must be modeled explicitly in order to understand properly the dynamic process underlying statistical correlations among politics, economics, and policy outcomes.

Figure 4. Income Distribution Outcomes under the Parties



Income Distribution under the Parties

Our main purpose was to develop a plausible macro model, consistent with postwar empirical data, of the politics and economics of income distribution in the United States. Figure 4 graphs the impact of shifts in party control of the presidency and changes in the party balance of power in Congress on inequality of income distribution over time, as transmitted through movements in unemployment and transfer spending (shown in Figures 2 and 3). The format of the figure is the same as that used earlier, and the results are again based on a fully dynamic simulation of the estimated equations of the system.

As in Figure 3, the vertical distances between the calculated time paths in Figure 4 show the estimated response of the equality gap to changes in the partisan balance of power in Congress. We learned earlier that the congressional strength of the parties influences income distribution through the flow of funds to transfer programs in relation to the growth of aggregate personal income. And we saw that the impact of any sustained change in the partisan balance in Congress on transfer spending tends to be magnified over time. This is why the response of inequality to shifts in the Democratic share of seats in Congress is also magnified over time. Assuming that the parties alternate in control of the White House, the calculations in Figure 4 indicate that a change of one standard deviation in the strength of the Democrats in Congress (a change, for example, of about 12 seats in the House and 5 in the Senate), sustained for 32 years, would yield changes in the equality gap that grow from around 1 percentage point in the first period to nearly 15 percentage points in the last. As in the case of transfer spending, the scale of the time magnification should not be taken literally, because neither party has experienced unusually high or low congressional strength for such a long period. Yet the calculations from the model estimates do illustrate an important dynamic tendency in the U.S. political economy.

Secular trends in income distribution outcomes shown in Figure 4 also resemble those in transfer spending discussed previously, but now we see the distributional consequences of movements in unemployment and transfer spending induced directly and indirectly by partisan change. If the Democrats were perpetually at sub-par strength in Congress, dynamic calculations of the system illustrated by the "low" simulation time path suggest that income inequality would tend to be flat over the long run, assuming that the parties oscillated in control of the presidency. In the "low" scenario the increase in the equality gap occurring over a typical two-term Republican presidency is just offset by an equivalent decline in the equality gap over a typical two-term Democratic administration. Luckily for those in the bottom quintiles of the income distribution, postwar history provides no prolonged stretch of Democratic weakness in Congress.

The first three years of President Reagan's administration (the only Reagan years for which complete data for our income distribution variable are currently available), illustrate empirically the impact of limited duration Democratic weakness in Congress under a Republican president committed to achieving substantial disinflation. The Republicans' above-average strength in Congress (particularly during Reagan's first two years) made it possible for the administration to reduce income maintenance spending well below what it would have been in a comparable economic environment with a stronger Democratic congressional presence (see Hibbs 1987, chap. 9). In conjunction with the policy-induced rise in unemployment, which was designed to attack (successfully) inflation, the assault on discretionary transfer spending helped produce a five-percentage-point rise in the equality gap (from 60.5% in 1980 to 65.8% in 1983).

Figure 4 indicates that when the Democrats are at average or above-average congressional strength, inequality tends to fall over the long run. The rise of the equality gap during Republican presidential administrations is more than countered by a larger decline during Democratic administrations. Events under President Johnson, whose party enjoyed above-average congressional strength for most of time LBJ occupied the White House, illustrate empirically the course of income distribution when the political balance runs strongly in the Democrats' favor. The Johnson administration gave high priority to achieving full employment, and the unemployment rate fell by more than two percentage points during LBJ's tenure. (Some of the decline was surely due to the escalation of the Vietnam War, but here we make no attempt to net out the war's effects.) Despite the cyclical expansion, transfer spending in relation to personal income nonetheless rose because of Democratic strength in Congress. In combination with falling unemployment, the expansion of transfer spending produced the biggest sustained reduction of inequality in postwar U.S. history. From 1963 to 1968 the equality gap variable declined by more than 15 percentage points.

The trends from Republican to Democratic presidential administrations in the "average" congressional strength scenario track the postwar experience as a whole most closely, as they should. In the absence of supply shocks and with the natural unemployment rate fixed at 6%, the equality gap tends to rise by 4–5 percentage points under the typical two-term Republican presidential regime and to fall by around 12 points over eight years of Democratic control of the White House. If the parties oscillate in control of the presidency, as they have done over the postwar period, inequality tends to fall over the long run, which, taking in-kind benefits into account, has been the postwar empirical pattern. Despite the large increase during President Reagan's first three years, the equality gap stood about 12 percentage points lower in 1983 than it was in 1952 (65.8% versus 77.5%). And in 1980 it was 17 percentage points lower than in 1952. Twelve, or even 17 percentage points in our equality gap variable hardly amount to revolutionary movements in inequality of income distribution. Yet for those in the bottom 40% of income classes, changes of these magnitudes represented significant shifts in economic well-being.

A Concluding Word about the Future Research Agenda

In the model presented, changes in the balance of political power between the parties are treated as exogenous to macroeconomic, spending, and distributional outcomes. In order to "close the system" and analyze more completely cyclical, as well as equilibrium, properties of the U.S.

Table A-1. Time-Series Causality Tests

Endogenous Variable	Test Equation (1) Pure Autoregressive	(2) Autoregressive Plus Exogenous Economic	(3) Autoregressive Plus Economic and Political
Unemployment	100 (1.34)	77.8	55.0
Inflation	100 (1.78)	83.8	53.6
Transfer spending	100 (.32)		25.4
Inequality	100 (6.20)		63.5

Note: Models: $Y_t = f(Y_{t-1}, Y_{t-2}, Y_{t-3},$ economic variables, political variables), annual 1952–83. The residual variance from each test regression is expressed in percentage of the residual variance of the appropriate autoregressive benchmark. Actual residual variances from the purely autoregressive equations are shown in parentheses.

political economy, the partisan balance of power must be made endogenous.

We know from the literally hundreds of papers on the topic that a government's macroeconomic performance exerts important influence on electoral outcomes. Experience suggests that the Democrats have been more likely than the Republicans to get into difficulty with the voters by pursuing overly ambitious unemployment goals creating extra inflation. The Republicans, on the other hand, appear more frequently to have suffered electoral setbacks because of their enthusiasm for disinflationary bouts of economic slack. In an era when elections have increasingly turned on economic performance, such policy "overshooting" may help explain why neither party has managed to hold the U.S. presidency for more than two consecutive terms since the Second World War.

Yet, surprisingly, relatively little is known about how fiscal outcomes, or, more important, how shifts in income distribution, affect the party balance of power over time. In fact, the only paper we know of that analyzes the interdependence of distribution and political support for U.S. parties in a dynamic setting is Sprague's unpublished study, which appeared more than a dozen years ago (1975). We believe this important and neglected topic should receive high priority in future work on politics and economics in the United States.

Appendix: Some Regression Diagnostics

Tables A-1 and A-2 present regression diagnostic tests of the central causal assumptions of the political-economic model for income distribution presented in the main text and of the robustness of the fits generated by each equation in the model for partisan presidential periods.

Table A-1 reports results from standard time-series regressions testing whether right-side variables in the model equations "Granger-cause" the left-side variables. (See Geweke 1984 for a comprehensive review of causality testing in time-series models.) The entries in this table are

Table A-2. Equation Prediction Errors for Partisan Presidential Periods: Mean Residuals and Associated Significance Levels

Period	Unemployment	Inflation	Transfer Spending	Inequality
Republican				
Reagan	.68	.066	-.007	.29
	(.34)	(.89)	(.96)	(.81)
Nixon-Ford	-.43[a]	-.26	.074	-.37
	(.04)	(.45)	(.52)	(.46)
Eisenhower	.0039	.15	-.091	-.096
	(.99)	(.46)	(.43)	(.55)
Democratic				
Carter	.075	.67	-.10	1.38
	(.83)	(.43)	(.52)	(.13)
Kennedy-Johnson	.25	.0013	.035	-.87
	(.23)	(.99)	(.73)	(.22)
Truman	-.38		.095	1.43
	(.55)		(.83)	(.51)
Means of the variables	5.6	4.0	10.3	67.6

Note: Residuals are from the final model equations shown with Figure 1. Associated significance levels are shown in parentheses.

[a] Significant departure from mean residual of zero.

based on residual variances obtained from the following sets of test regressions for each endogenous variable in the model: (1) benchmark, purely autoregressive test equations specified with three year lags; (2) test regressions in which the exogenous economic variables (energy price shocks and the natural unemployment rate) that are postulated by the theoretical setup to appear in a particular equation are added to the benchmark autoregressions; and (3) test regressions in which all variables postulated by the theoretical setup to appear in a particular equation are added to the benchmark autoregressions.

For ease of interpretation, the residual variance from each test regression is expressed in percentage of the residual variance of the appropriate benchmark autoregression, and so this percentage equals 100 in the first column of Table A-1. (Actual residual variances from the benchmark autoregressions are given in parentheses.) Other than the autoregressive terms, the dating of right-side economic and political variables and the functional forms of the equations yielding the results in Table A-1 are based on the theoretical specifications presented in the main text. Parallel time-series test regressions in which a trend term was added to each equation yield the same pattern shown in Table A-1 and are available by request. (Trend terms are often included in Granger causality test regressions to ensure conditional stationarity.)

With the direction of time-*t* relations as part of the maintained hypotheses, the results in Table A-1 show that the economic and political determinants of the dependent variables in the model easily satisfy the Granger standard of causality. Of particular importance are the results showing that the unbiased residual variances in the unemployment and transfer spending equations (unemployment and transfers being the main proximate sources of movements in inequality) decline substantially with the inclusion of political and endogenous economic variables. (The political variables and endogenous economic variables also pass Granger causality tests when added separately to autoregressive test equations.)

Table A-2 reports residual means and associated significance levels, computed by partisan presidential period, for each structural equation of the political-economic model of income distribution. If the global results in Tables 1 and 2, which, in turn, underlie the simulation analyses illustrated in Figures 2–4, are robust for partisan periods, the residual means should be insignificantly different from zero. By conventional significance levels the only failure of the model to generate robust fits for partisan periods appears in the unemployment equation during the Nixon-Ford years. The residual mean of −.4 is significant at the .04 level, implying that the equation overpredicts unemployment for this Republican period.

Notes

This is revised composite of papers delivered at the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, Chicago, 1985; the Growth of Government in Developed Economies conference, Onasbruck, West Germany, 1986; and the Western Political Science Association annual meeting, Eugene, Oregon, 1986. The work is a joint effort, in which Hibbs had primary responsibility for model specification, statistical analysis, and writing, and Dennis had primary responsibility for research on, and compilation of, the income distribution data series (see Dennis 1986). The authors are grateful to Ulf Christoffersson, Henry Chappel, and Hans Jørgen Nielsen for many useful comments on an earlier draft. Hibbs also thanks the Institute of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen; the Danish Social Science Research Council; and the Department of Economics at Göteborg University, Sweden for supporting his contribution. All data series and computations used for the article are available from Hibbs by request.

1. The relation of partisanship to income appears to have been strengthened somewhat from the Eisenhower to the Reagan presidency. See the SRC/CPS data reported by Wattenberg 1986, tbl. 9.3, p. 145.

2. The income data are net of taxes, cash, and in-kind transfers and the estimated magnitude of unreported income. The income concept therefore equals disposable income adjusted for in-kind benefits and income underreporting. Because we include in-kind benefits, which have made an increasingly important contribution to the economic well-being of low-income groups, our data show less inequality (as they should) than cash income data alone. Also, by focusing on post-tax-transfer data (rather than, say, comparing differences between pre- and post-tax-and-transfer distributions) the analysis is not distorted by actions in the market designed to offset the potential redistributional effects of tax-transfer policies. Over time families are a more comparable unit than all households and so we use data on family income shares. Note, however, that we make no attempt to adjust the data to a life cycle conception of income inequality. For further information about our income data consult Dennis's data appendix (1986).

3. Demcong is the percentage share of Democrats in the House plus the percentage share in the Senate divided by two. This measure of the strength of the Democrats in Congress was superior to plausible alternatives (for example, the Democratic shares in the House and Senate measured separately) in all equations we estimated.

4. We might just as well have used real output movements in place of unemployment throughout because unemployment and output are intimately connected through the macroeconomic relation known as Okun's law.

5. Analysis of quarterly models in Hibbs 1986 and 1987 shows that the fiscal and monetary policies observed under the parties are consistent with the differences in party targets implied by the partisan model. To conserve space, only the unemployment results necessary for our analysis of political influences on distribution are developed here.

6. This equation was also run with a constant, which was indistinguishable from zero. For a more elaborate setup, which yields nominal-real trade-off estimates broadly consistent with the results for the simpler equation used here, see Gordon and King 1982.

7. Lindbeck (1983) believes that similar forces underlay increases in social spending in Europe. He argues that the rapid rise of expenditure "is largely a result of the increased use of government budget policies for attempted redistributions of income and welfare" (p. 288).

8. Party strength in Congress and party control of the presidency are positively correlated. The values of party congressional strength used in the simula-

tions therefore depend on the party of the president. During Democratic presidencies the low, average, and high values for Democratic congressional strength (which are based on the mean and standard deviation of sample period data) are 56.9%, 61.4%, and 65.9%. During Republican presidencies the corresponding values are 50.4%, 55.6%, and 60.8%.

References

Alesina, Alberto, and Jeffrey Sachs. N.d. Political Parties and the Business Cycle in the United States, 1948–1984. *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking.* Forthcoming.

Alt, James E. 1985. Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment. *American Political Science Review* 79:1016–40.

Becker, Gary. 1967. *Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Blank, Rebecca, and Alan Blinder. 1986. Macroeconomics, Income Distribution, and Poverty. In *Fighting Poverty,* ed. Sheldon Danziger and D. Weinberg. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Blinder, Alan, and Howard Esaki. 1978. Macroeconomic Activity and Income Distribution in the Postwar United States. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 60:604–9.

Bowles, Samuel. 1972. Schooling and Inequality from Generation to Generation. *Journal of Political Economy* 80:S219–51.

Browning, Robert X. 1985. Presidents, Congress, and Policy Outcomes: U.S. Social Welfare Expenditures, 1949–1977. *American Journal of Political Science* 29:197–216.

Chappel, Henry W., and William R. Keech. 1986a. Party Differences in Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes. *American Economic Review* 76: 71–74.

Chappel, Henry W., and William R. Keech. 1986b. The Unemployment Rate Consequences of Partisan Monetary Policies. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Typescript.

Cowell, Frank A. 1977. *Measuring Inequality.* Oxford: Philip Allan.

Danziger, Sheldon, Robert Haveman, and Robert Plotnick. 1981. How Income Transfer Programs Affect Work, Savings, and the Income Distribution: A Critical Review. *Journal of Economic Literature* 19:975–1028.

Davis, Otto, M. A. H. Dempster, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1966. A Theory of the Budgetary Process. *American Political Science Review* 60: 529–47.

Dennis, Christopher. 1986. *Income Shares Data Appendix.* California State University. Mimeo.

Edsall, Thomas. 1984. *The New Politics of Inequality.* New York: Norton.

Geweke, John. 1984. Inference and Causality in Economic Time-Series Models. In *Handbook of Econometrics,* ed. Zvi Griliches and Michael Intrilligator. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Gordon, Robert J. 1984a. Supply Shocks and Monetary Policy Revisited. *American Economic Review* 74:38–43.

Gordon, Robert J. 1984b. *Macroeconomics.* 3d ed. Boston: Little Brown.

Gordon, Robert J., and Stephen R. King. 1982. The Output Cost of Disinflation in Traditional and Vector Autoregressive Models. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 2:205–42.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. 1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. *American Political Science Review* 71:1467–87.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. 1986. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policies and Outcomes in the United States. *American Economic Review* 76: 66–70.

Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. 1987. *The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral Politics.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Jencks, Christopher, Marshall Smith, Henry Acland, Mary Jo Bane, David Cohen, Herbert Gintis, Barbara Heyns, and Stephen Michelson. 1972. *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America.* New York: Basic.

Kiewiet, Roderick, and Mathew McCubbins. N.d. Presidential Influence on Congressional Appropriation Decisions. *American Journal of Political Science.* Forthcoming.

Lindbeck, Assar. 1983. Budget Expansion and Cost Inflation. *American Economic Review* 73:285–90.

Mincer, Jacob. 1974. *Schooling, Experience, and Earnings.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Musgrave, Richard, and Peggy Musgrave. 1984. *Public Finance in Theory and Practice.* 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Page, Benjamin. 1983. *Who Gets What from Government.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Pechman, Joseph. 1985. *Who Paid the Taxes, 1966–1985?* Washington: Brookings.

Sprague, John. 1975. The Democrats as Predaceous Do-Gooders: A Study of the Interdependence of Public Problems, Public Policies, and Politics. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society. Chicago.

Tullock, Gordon. 1983. *Economics of Income Redistribution.* Hingham, MA: Kluwer-Nijhoff.

Verba, Sidney, and Gary Orren. 1985. *Equality in America.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Wattenberg, Martin. 1986. *The Decline of American Political Parties.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. is Professor of Economics, Göteborg University, Göteborg 41125, Sweden.

Christopher Dennis is Assistant Professor of Political Science, California State University, Long Beach, CA 90840.

RULERS AND THE RULED: PATTERNED INEQUALITY AND THE ONSET OF MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE

MANUS I. MIDLARSKY
University of Colorado
Boulder

The theory of patterned inequality between rulers and ruled provides a valuable analytic approach to the relationship between inequality and political violence. Under conditions of a bifurcated pattern of inequality, the probability of political violence is likely to be greater than under a more generalized inequality typically measured by the Gini index. A strong systematic relationship between patterned inequality in Latin American landholdings and deaths from political violence was discovered using the exponential distribution as a model for the lower portion of the land distribution and the log-exponential for the upper. This degree of association was far stronger than that found between the Gini index of land inequality in Latin America and deaths from political violence. Evidence supporting the theory was also found in an analysis of Middle Eastern landholdings.

I set out to explore a conundrum that has emerged in the systematic literature on inequality and political violence. This is the fairly typical finding of a weak, barely significant relationship between inequality and political violence. Sometimes the relationship is above the level of significance (generally $p < .05$: Muller 1985; Nagel 1976; Parvin 1973; Russett 1964; Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Tanter and Midlarsky 1967), sometimes below it (Hardy 1979; Nagel 1974; Weede 1981, 1987); but rarely is there a robust relationship discovered between the two variables. Equally rarely does the relationship plunge into the depths of the black hole of nonsignificance. Thus the findings on the whole hover around the most commonly accepted significance level while continuing the controversy as exemplified by the exchange between Muller (1986) and Weede (1986).

As will be seen, a principal outcome of this study is the development of a measure of land inequality that will demonstrate a far stronger relationship with political violence than the Gini index. At the same time, serious doubt will be cast on the validity of recent findings claiming the relative unimportance of land inequality as a progenitor of political violence (Muller and Seligson 1987).

Theoretical Foundations

Theories of the relationship between inequality and political violence have been far more decisive in their assertions. From Aristotle to Marx and Tocqueville, the nexus between inequality and political violence has been claimed to be strong and direct, with little or no quibbling as to the ultimate outcome—in most cases revolution.

Here, at the outset I will assume a position somewhat different from that of previous efforts. First because of the anomalous or at least divergent findings, I will assume that the relationship between inequality and political violence is context-specific. By that I mean that different regions of the world may yield different sorts of relationships between these variables because of large-scale historical and geographical differences. The term *context* also will have an additional meaning pertaining to the *pattern* of inequalities. I hasten to add that the choice of context specificity does not automatically imply that the relationship between inequality and political violence is not of universal validity, although it may not be. It merely suggests that different world regions could have different empirical *expressions* of inequality, which in the end yield political violence.

The theoretical structure upon which this study is based also will depart somewhat from previous efforts particularly in the choice of intellectual tradition. It emerges from a concern for social and, in particular, distributive justice that is really as old as Aristotle, but which has modern exponents.

A modern theorist of justice approaches this problem from the need for a requirement for justice that will at the same time be stabilizing. This is the requirement by Rawls (1971, 302) that each gain to the most advantaged in society be accompanied by a gain to the least advantaged. This "difference principle," as articulated by Rawls, is stated to ensure that whatever inequalities are the result of differences in talent or inheritance are not perpetuated to the point of generating really severe societal inequalities. In this expanding economic scenario there can occur a minimal sort of identification between the wealthy and worst-off, for both are gaining from the newly created largesse.

However, this positive form of the difference principle in which all gain as the result of economic expansion should be complemented by the negative form in which all lose as the result of economic contraction.[1] In the event of a depression or some other social or natural calamity, the declines of both rich and poor should be evident. It is this identification between rich and poor simultaneously losing that may have prevented mass political violence from occurring in many instances. The image of rich investors leaping from tall buildings in the 1929 Wall Street Crash may have done much to establish the common sense of identity between haves and have-nots that would forestall any serious successful efforts at massive political change that could result in mass political violence. In contrast, in two recent instances of mass political violence in Nicaragua and in Iran such mutual identification was absent. Immediately after the earthquake of 1972, the Somozas of Nicaragua were perceived as gaining in wealth from the Red Cross aid while many, mostly the poor, suffered. In Iran, the severe decline in economic activity, especially in the building trades in Tehran, differentially affected rulers and ruled, for the shah and his family were hardly at all affected while unemployment increased dramatically and the poor were still further impoverished (Nejad 1986).

Another aspect of the modern scholarly tradition is the emphasis on relative deprivation that includes, among others, Davies 1962, Feierabend and Feierabend 1966, Gurr 1968, 1970, and Huntington 1968 in its ranks. Although the present effort is not firmly rooted in that tradition, the concluding section will develop relationships with it.[2]

Identification between rulers and ruled is the intellectual anchor of this study.

This identification does not have to be uniform or complete, but means only that in a Rawlsian sense, if one societal sector is increasing in wealth or at least holding its own while another poorer sector is declining, then identification between ruler and ruled is virtually nonexistent. If the absence of identification along with continued emiseration of the population relative to the ruling sector continues for long, then large-scale political violence becomes more likely. In the societies to be examined below, landed elites generally have constituted the ruling oligarchies, which, if not directly in control of governments, at least have exercised considerable influence from a short distance. Land distributions in such societies can become potent indicators of bifurcation between rulers and ruled if the appropriate models are applied to extract the bifurcations.

As will become apparent in the empirical analysis, I am dealing here with patterned instead of generalized inequalities as measured by the Gini index. By *patterned inequality* is meant a systematic departure of the pattern of holdings of one societal sector relative to the pattern of holdings of another. Here I will be measuring the pattern of landholdings although, in principle, any societal good can be treated in this fashion. Intrinsic to this analysis is the assumption that human beings are pattern recognizers par excellence. It may even be our ability to recognize the pattern of an environment and react to it successfully that accounts for our evolutionary success as a species (Pagels 1982, 110). The peasant is in a unique position to observe and assess the environment for the peasant spends much time in the fields and is keenly aware of his or her holdings relative to others'. It is not that the peasant is expected to accept or reject a mathematical model at some probability level, as I shall do shortly, but that the constant exposure to the agricultural environment along with family and village histories passed down from one generation to the next, make of the peasant, even if illiterate, an acute observer and interpreter of the environment.[3]

Empirical Foundations

As indicated at the outset, the empirical results on inequality and political violence certainly are not uniform; they suggest mixed findings on the relationship between inequality and political violence. Moreover, most of these studies (with the obvious exception of Russett 1964, Tanter and Midlarsky 1967, and Nagel 1976) have emphasized income inequality as opposed to land inequality. Several recent exceptions emphasize population growth and an attendant land inequality as progenitors of the French, Russian, Chinese (Midlarsky 1982), English (Goldstone 1983), and Salvadoran (Midlarsky and Roberts 1985) revolutions.

In the last of these, Nicaragua is contrasted with El Salvador in the coalition-based insurgency against the Somozas versus the largely rural-class-based insurrection in El Salvador. With increased population growth on the same amount of arable land, an exponential distribution of landholdings was predicted in situations of land scarcity relative to population size. That was found to be the case in El Salvador but not in Nicaragua, suggesting an absence of land scarcity and inequality to the extent found in El Salvador. In turn, a broad-based coalition of business, banking, urban groups, and peasants participated in the Nicaraguan revolution, not terribly dissimilar to that which developed earlier in Cuba (Dominguez 1978) under conditions of similar personalist dictatorship. A general conclusion of these analyses was that rural-class-based revolutions are more likely where the land is scarce and the exponential distribution is an adequate descriptor as in El Salvador. Where the land is less scarce as in Nicaragua or Cuba, other types of revolutionary behaviors can arise and broad-based revolutionary coalitions are more likely.

A Sequential Analysis

These probabilistic analyses were based on random subdivisions of land, leading ultimately in the limiting case, to the exponential distribution. Land scarcity and the random subdivision process (based principally on a large birth rate and the absence of primogeniture) yield the exponential distribution. In this stochastic process there are no strongly favored or least favored actors. All families and landholdings (mostly peasant) are treated equally in their susceptibilities to subdivision over time as the result of their need to accommodate the new family members maturing into adulthood.

Suppose however, that there is a programmed inequality. Instead of each of the early landholdings being approximately equal in size and the subdivision process over time inducing inequality as in the earlier treatments, the inequality is inherent in the distribution at the outset. There are processes that exhibit such severe inequalities. Any sequestering of a scarce resource that also requires a surrounding "cushion" or margin of safety is a case in point. Those who come later to the process must defer to the earlier arrivals who already have established their control with the accompanying margin of safety to ensure continued control.

The history of the British in India expanding to the northwest frontier is a case in point. Later the French in Asia could colonize only on the fringes of the large British holdings. Still later the Germans, especially in Africa, could colonize only on the fringes of the British and French holdings. In successive stages each of the arrivals determines the smaller proportionate share of the later arrivals in contrast to the equiprobability of initial access assumed in ordinary stochastic models.

Land distribution is another variable likely to be modeled successfully by this sequential process. As in the sequence of colonial acquisitions, the first arrivals to a sparsely settled area will have first choice, or at least will be in the best position to oust the indigenous population. Proximal land with required resources such as water also will likely be taken by the first arrivals. Later arrivals will be able to take only some (smaller) proportion of the remaining area. Land distribution in Latin America as territory settled by the Iberian arrivals after the fifteenth century is one case in point, as we shall see shortly.

The assumption of a progressive sequential inequality leads to the Pareto distribution or its mathematical equivalent, the log-exponential (Gumbel 1958, 151; Johnson and Kotz 1970, 1:240) as the theoretical distribution for the upper tail of a land distribution.[4] As in the specification of the exponential model for the lower portion of the distribution, the Pareto or log-exponential for the upper is also based on the assumption of land scarcity although certainly not as severe as that found in the lower portion. Indeed, the derivation of a sophisticated mathematical model of income distribution (Badger 1980) relied on the introduction of the scarcity assumption in the final steps of the derivation in order to achieve an excellent fit to the upper tail.

Theoretical Expectations

The analysis proceeds now according to the following expectations: Where there exists scarcity of agricultural land for the peasantry, the exponential is expected to be the theoretical model for the lower portion of the land distribution. This should be so not only because of the prior finding of the applicability of this distribution to the Chinese and Salvadoran cases at the time of the outbreak of their revolutions but because of the reasoning invoked earlier. The peasantry situated on fixed plots of land would reproduce over time, thus leading in the limit to the exponential distribution of land holdings at the lower end. At the upper end of that distribution, however, the process should be Pareto-log-exponentially distributed. The tendency for primogeniture to prevail at this societal level or simply the financial ability to send younger sons to the city or abroad would leave most of these holdings largely intact. If there is subdivision, then it would likely occur at a much slower rate than for the peasantry with ordinarily a much larger birth rate (often necessary for working the land) and the financial inability to help male offspring other than by the process of land subdivision and inheritance.

These are the expectations for the distributions of land at the upper and lower portions of the curve. They are the limiting equilibrium statistical distributions which evolve after a relatively long time period. The feeling that the large landowner as a human being is essentially no different from the peasant can be exacerbated with extreme envy and ultimately even lead to violence if the land distributions are vastly different for peasant and large landowner and if the differences are in fact worsening as the result of differential rates of subdivision. The "limited good" theory of the peasant environment leading to extreme envy has been developed by Foster (1967) and further amplified into a theory of the "tunnel effect" by Hirschman (1981), wherein societies will tolerate extreme inequalities only for a certain time period after they are instituted, after which revolutionary behavior is to be expected if benefits do not accrue to the worst-off in society. A dichotomized agricultural universe would also more likely lead to a radicalized peasant response than a more graduated environment with inherently more options available.[5] As we shall soon see, El Salvador, with the history of the most intense recent conflict in Latin America has a classic bifurcated distribution between rulers and ruled.

Empirical Tests

Ideally, of course, one would want to have a cross-national test across as many country units as possible. Yet the preceding arguments constrain the boundaries of the country universe. First, the distribution of land must be relevant to at least some significant proportion of the population, else the theoretical connection with political violence is virtually meaningless. The numbers of persons affected by land distributions must be large enough to have at least some influence on social turmoil. This requirement effectively excludes the United States, Canada, and the European countries as well as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, for all of these cluster at the low end of the data on percentage labor force in agriculture (Taylor and Jodice 1983, 1:208–10).

Second, the sequential acquisition process must have had some chance of operating, mostly in colonial contexts within recent history, in order to generate a bifurcated distribution. This too would exclude the European countries and, interestingly, several African countries, largely governed by the French in colonial times. Cameroon, Chad, Congo and Gabon, are examples of countries which simply do not have a distribution at the upper end that could conform to the log-exponential (Food and Agriculture Organization 1981, 36), likely because of the absence of large-scale European settlement.

Another reason for excluding Africa in addition to the heterogeneity of historical experience, language, religion and ethnicity, is the differential experience with regard to anticolonial activity. Whereas most of the African countries experienced a peaceful transition to independence, others such as Algeria, Kenya, Angola, and Mozambique experienced violent revolutions against the colonial authorities (or their immediate legacies as in Nigeria and its bloody civil war or in Zaire), thus introducing a large domestic violence component mostly independent of recent land distributions. The majority of data available for African countries are found in the results of the *1970 World Census of Agriculture* (Food and Agriculture Organization 1981, 33–38), which, for the most part, do not reflect the colonial experience.

The Middle East—as a more homogeneous region historically, linguistically, and even in race, religion, and ethnicity—does qualify; but much of the data available are for the early 1970s, which would be inappropriate for an examination of political violence between 1948 and 1977. Some time lag is required for the development of discontent by the peasantry. As we shall see, five countries in the Middle East do have data available from an earlier period and will be analyzed separately.

A test of the theory, therefore, requires a set of countries that can at least potentially meet the preceding requirements. Latin American countries, being for the most part agrarian and having been settled by Iberian colonists, would be suitable, as the land distributions of these countries would satisfy the requirement of sequential acquisition.[6] The fair degree of cultural homogeneity (i.e., relative to other regions of the world) also makes it an appropriate choice. Incidence of mass political violence is frequent enough to provide considerable numbers of instances of such violence and more importantly, variation on the dependent variable, deaths due to political violence, 1948–77 (Taylor and Jodice 1983, 2:48–51).[7] Land distribution data for Latin American countries during almost the entire post-World-War-II period are found in the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (Wilkie and Perkal 1986).

In one sense at least, the following should be viewed as a cross-national test of the theory and not as an examination of the details of Latin American politics. For I am concerned only with the validity of the proposed relationship in *any* context that would prove to be suitable, Latin America having emerged as the result of the presence of sequential acquisition in recent history and other properties of this region. Any other area of the world with a similar historical experience would be equally acceptable.

The case of El Salvador is instructive, for it is the country that has experienced the most intense class-related conflict in recent years and at the same time demonstrates one of the most clearly bifurcated distributions of any Latin American country. Table 1 gives the most recent detailed land distribution for El Salvador. The predicted values for the lower[8] portion of the distribution are given by the exponential distribution

$$p_i = Ae^{-kx_i} \qquad k > 0, \qquad 0 \leqslant x < \infty, \qquad (1)$$

where p_i is the proportion of holdings held by the ith category x_i; k is a constant, generally estimated from the empirical distribution; and A is a normalization constant designed to make the sum of the p_i equal to one. The log-exponential (Pareto) model for the upper portion is given by

$$p^1{}_i = A_1 e^{-k_1 \log_e x_i} \qquad k_1 > 0, \qquad 1 \leqslant x < \infty, \qquad (2)$$

where as before k_1 and A_1 (normalization) are constants.

The theoretical values in Table 1 are calculated by first linearizing the probability distributions as a consequence of taking logarithms of both sides of equations 1 and 2. This leads to

$$\log_e p_i = \log_e A - kx_i$$

Table 1. Tests of the Exponential and Log-Exponential Models of Landholdings in El Salvador

Size of Holdings (Hectares)[a]	Observed Number of Holdings	Observed Proportion of Holdings (× 100)	Predicted Proportion of Holdings (× 100)
Lower Portion (Exponential)[b]			
.00– .99	107,054	55.38	52.54
1.00–1.99	48,501	25.09	25.71
2.00–2.99	22,038	11.40	12.58
3.00–3.99	8,527	4.40	6.16
4.00–4.99	7,178	3.71	3.01
$\chi^2 = .945$, $df = 3$, $p < .90$			
Upper Portion (Log-Exponential)[c]			
50.00– 99.99	2,214	51.16	54.80
100.00– 199.99	1,121	25.90	26.80
200.00– 499.99	713	16.47	11.18
500.00– 999.99	189	4.37	5.09
1,000.00–2,499.99	91	2.10	2.12
$\chi^2 = 2.877$, $df = 3$, $p < .50$			

[a] Category ranges are the same as those presented in the source (Wilkie and Perkal 1986, 36). Data are for 1960 as the last year such differentiated data are available. Values of a_i were estimated by the midpoints of each category of the size of holding.

[b] $k = .7147$, $A = .7511$.

[c] $k_1 = 1.0319$, $A_1 = 47.1698$.

for the exponential and

$$\log_e p^1_i = \log_e A_1 - k_1 \log_e x_i$$

for the log-exponential. The values of k and k_1 are estimated by regressing $\log_e p_i$ and $\log_e p^1_i$ on the independent variables and the regression coefficients serve as least squares estimates. The values of A and A_1 are chosen to normalize the equations so that the sum of the proportions equals unity, or

$$A = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} e^{-kx_i}}$$

and

$$A_1 = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} e^{-k_1 \log_e x_i}}$$

Predicted and observed distributions are compared by means of the chi-square goodness-of-fit statistic. A higher probability value for the chi-square statistic implies a better fit between observation and prediction while a lower value implies a poorer fit. In order to adopt a conservative policy on acceptance of either model (equations 1 or 2), a model will be rejected at $p < .20$ (instead of the usual $p < .05$), which indicates of course that any probability levels higher than .20 imply acceptance of the model. Acceptance or rejection will be modified in one instance to allow for the introduction of approximations to continua that are probably better reflective of social reality.

Both chi-square values for the upper and lower distributions in El Salvador are well above the chosen probability level and in fact indicate an excellent fit between observation and prediction. This of

Table 2. Results of the Exponential and Log-Exponential Analyses of Latin American Land Distributions

Country	Upper (Log-Exponential)			Lower (Exponential)		
	χ^{2a}	*df*	$p <$	χ^2	*df*	$p <$
Argentina (1960)	4.433	3	.30			
Bolivia (1950)[b]	4.381	4	.50	3.584	2	.20
Brazil (1960)	3.815	3	.30			
Chile (1950)[c]	3.126	3	.50	1.310	3	.80
Colombia (1960)	2.862	3	.50	4.086	4	.50
Costa Rica (1960)	4.167	2	.20			
Cuba (1952)	.120	3	.99			
Dominican Republic (1960)[d]	1.717	3	.70			
Ecuador (1954)	1.205	3	.80			
El Salvador (1960)	2.877	3	.50	.945	3	.90
Guatemala (1950)	2.737	2	.30			
Haiti (1970)[e]	1.672	3	.70			
Honduras (1960)	1.021	3	.80			
Mexico (1960)	2.696	5	.80			
Nicaragua (1960)	3.712	3	.30			
Panama (1960)	.302	2	.90			
Paraguay (1960)	6.230	6	.50			
Peru (1961)[d]	1.186	3	.80	3.057	2	.30
Uruguay (1960)	5.680	3	.20			
Venezuela (1960)	1.287	3	.80			

Source: Wilkie and Perkal 1986, except where noted.

[a] Where the expected value was below 1.5, adjacent categories were combined for the chi-square test until that figure was obtained, as suggested in Gibbons 1971 (p. 72).

[b] Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler 1969 (p. 35).

[c] Log-exponential lower.

[d] Food and Agriculture Organization 1966–70.

[e] Exponential upper.

course is but one illustration; however, it does suggest that I perform a general systematic analysis of the relationship between patterned inequality as defined by the two segments of land distribution, and mass political violence in Latin America.

Note that the observed distributions are aggregations of landholdings of similar sizes, in the ranges specified, from all parts of a single country. Thus, it is probable that a single hacienda or other large holding will be surrounded by much smaller holdings. It is possible to imagine the growing decrement of identification between the large and small landowner, if it ever existed in large measure, as the smallholdings subdivide over time while the hacienda or large holding in the same vicinity remains mostly intact.[9] These data then aggregate the number of such instances over the entire country, yielding the two distributions shown in Table 1.

Table 2 lists the results of the chi-square goodness-of-fit tests between the theoretical distributions and the observed values, first for the upper portion of the distributions and then for the lower. The year for each distribution was chosen based on the availability of the most detailed information for that distribution. Where the amount of information given was equal for two years, the earlier one was chosen to allow for the development and mobilization (generally slow) of antiregime organizations (Tilly 1978), if that indeed were to be the case. Only a few countries are listed for the lower portion because so many can be rejected simply by inspection; they are not monotonically decreasing as demanded by the exponential distribution but rise to a given peak and then fall. Most of the cases, however, do conform to the log-exponential for the upper portion as suggested by the theory of sequential acquisition.

Five distinct patterns emerge from the table: instances (1) where both models can be rejected, (2) where only the exponential is applicable to the upper portion, (3) where only the log-exponential is applicable to the upper, (4) where the log-exponential is applicable to the upper and there is a near applicability (to be defined) of the exponential to the lower portion and (5) where both are applicable respectively to their theoretically suggested domains.

Five categories of increasing violence potential are now suggested for the examination of the proposed relationship. They arise from the five groupings that emerged from Table 2. First, both models can be rejected—a category that is to be associated with the least amount of violence—for neither model is applicable. Next we find the exponential—a less severe inequality distribution than the log form (see the Appendix)—associated with the upper portion but not the lower, followed by the log-exponential for the upper, but again no goodness of fit of any distribution for the lower portion. The next to highest category of violence potential would have the log-exponential fit the upper portion and a *near* fit of the exponential to the lower portion.

This near fit can be accomplished in one of two ways. There can be doubt as to whether the exponential or some other distribution, such as the log-exponential, fits the data. This would eliminate the bifurcation suggested by theory, as well as possible identifications among the peasantry because of the increased degree of inequality within that societal sector. The second way a land distribution can be included in this category is by obtaining $p < .20$ for the exponential distribution in the lower portion in addition to the precise fit of the log-exponential to the upper—a near overall fit but not precisely meeting the adopted criterion. Finally, the precise fit of the two models to their respective portions of the distribution is to be included in the highest-potential-violence category. Effectively, an incremental procedure is used to accommodate the variation in fit of these models to the data in order to begin to approximate a continuum of applicability.

Deaths from political violence (Taylor and Jodice 1983, vol. 2) is treated in a similar fashion. The range for the 20 Latin American countries (as identified in Wilkie and Perkal 1986 [pp. 34–35]) is segmented into quintiles with four countries in each. This particular variable is chosen because it can reflect the experience of instability from various sources. There is no necessity for the agrarian structure described here to eventuate in any one type of instability. There can occur a variety of either anomic or organized, violent activities simply based on the availability of a large number of persons with severe disaffection from the prevailing authority structure. An additional element in favor of the deaths from political violence variable is the fact that reporting of deaths tends to be more accurate than other measures of instability (Weede 1981).

Table 3 lists the cross tabulation of deaths by the five patterns that emerged from Table 2. The value of tau-*b* is significant at $p < .005$ as can be seen in the table. In addition, the value of gamma that is conditional on a distribution of this type without tied ranks is fairly robust at .70. These values should be compared

Table 3. Association between Patterned Inequality and Political Violence for the 20 Latin American Countries

	Patterned Inequality				
Political Violence	1 None	2 Upper Exp	3 Upper Log-Exp	4 Near Both	5 Both
5			Argentina Nicaragua		Colombia El Salvador
4			Cuba Dominican Republic Venezuela	Bolivia	
3			Guatemala Mexico	Chile	Peru
2		Haiti	Brazil Ecuador Paraguay		
1	Costa Rica Uruguay		Honduras Panama		

Note: $\tau_b = .51$, $p < .005$, $\Gamma = .70$.

with that between the Gini index of land inequality itself (Taylor and Hudson 1972, 267–68, in order to maximize the number of cases) and the same violence variable with tau-*b* equal to .36 ($N = 15$, significant at $p < .05$) and a value of gamma equal to .43. When compared with the results of the analysis of Table 3, there has been a tenfold increase in significance level for the patterned inequality variable and its relationship to political violence over and above the Gini index.

It is further instructive to consider the relationship between patterned inequality and the Gini index. A value of tau-*b* equal to .27 ($N = 15$, not significant at $p < .05$) was calculated with an associated value of gamma equal to .40. These statistics suggest a low level of association between the two measures of inequality. They further suggest that generalized land inequality, at least as measured by the Gini index in the Latin American context, either is more heavily influenced by random factors or is tapping a somewhat different dimension than is the patterned inequality variable.

We should note here that the finding of a significant relationship at $p < .05$ between the Gini index and political violence is thoroughly consistent with earlier findings of either a barely significant relationship, just nonsignificant, or just about at the significance level as was found here (actually $p = .048$). This suggests that this finding conforms to the majority of studies undertaken thus far, and perhaps even implies some degree of generalizability of these findings beyond the strict confines of Latin America. What distinguishes the present analysis from these earlier ones using the Gini index is the substantially improved degree of association between patterned inequality and political violence.

There is an additional aspect of Table 3 to be noted. This is the commonality of experience of all countries in the fourth to fifth quintiles for patterned inequality. All of them—Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and El Salvador—experienced either intense political violence or redistributive governments.

In the case of Chile, a Marxist-redistributive government—that of Salvador

Allende—received a plurality of votes in 1970 (and even earlier in 1964) leading to a government whose policies were sufficiently antithetical to the preferences of the military to lead to the coup of 1973 and the subsequent repression. In Peru, the 1968 coup by the military completed the work begun by the 1962 effort and a major land redistribution was undertaken. Bolivia experienced the successful revolution of 1952 with its associated violence and land redistribution. Colombia and El Salvador, with both models entirely applicable (cell no. 5-5 in Table 3), of course, have experienced intense violence, the former in *La Violencia* stretching approximately from 1948 until its gradual decline in the late 1950s and denouement in 1964 (Dix 1967; Hamby 1986; Oquist 1980). It is of interest that the land redistribution of 1961, which was not insubstantial (Wilkie and Perkal 1986, 39), apparently was instrumental in ending *La Violencia* several years later. The El Salvador violence of course has been extremely intense and is still ongoing with no end in sight. At the other end of the diagonal of Table 3, we have Uruguay and Costa Rica which in most respects have been among the least prone to violence of any of the Latin American countries and at the same time both theoretical distributions do not apply.[10]

Variation in political violence but none in pattern of holdings in the middle column suggests the invariance properties of the Pareto-log-exponential distribution. It is known that the Pareto-Lévy-type distribution is only one of two types of distribution (the other being the Gaussian) that are invariant upon the addition of other random variables (Mandelbrot 1960, 1961). Thus it would be expected that once formed, only serious redistribution would be capable of breaking the pattern of the Pareto-log-exponential and we find this to be the case in the conformity of so many of these countries to this model in the upper portion of the distribution.

The results for Latin America are encouraging. Are there other regions of the world that also exhibit this association between patterned inequality and political violence? There does exist another region of the world with a similar kind of homogeneity (relative to other regions of course)—the Middle East. There also can exist here a sequential parceling of land for the upper portion of the distribution, as in a massive land reshuffling for both rulers and ruled, as frequently occurs upon the advent of a new political order (Wesson 1967, 63–65). The frequency of such change of course has been endemic to the Middle East. Unfortunately, early data are not available for all countries of the Middle East and as a consequence we cannot perform a systematic test as was done for Latin America. Nor can we really combine the two regions, for, as we shall see, there is a somewhat different pattern of landholding for the Middle East, which does not readily integrate with that for Latin America. Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the five countries for which data are available at an early enough time to predict to the revolutions of the 1950s and 1960s.

Egypt and Lebanon have both portions of their distributions conform to the expected theoretical models and would fit in the fifth column of Table 3. The pattern for Egypt is shown in Table 4 with excellent degrees of fit between observation and prediction. Iraq's pattern of landholdings is the same as that of Bolivia and Chile (a fit of the log-exponential to the upper and a near fit of the exponential to the lower), while that for Iran and Turkey is the expected fit of the exponential model to the lower portion of the distribution but no fit of either model to the upper. (This is the major departure from the Latin American pattern, suggesting perhaps that a fairly recent historical settlement *is* required for a regional uniformity of fit of the log-exponential to the upper portion.) The findings are shown in Table 5.

Results pertaining to redistributive political violence generally support those found for Latin America. As in the cases of Bolivia, Colombia, and El Salvador—the three Latin American instances most closely conforming to the theory—Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon either experienced redistributive revolutions or have been experiencing intense political violence. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 led by Naguib and Nasser resulted in an almost immediate land redistribution (extended later in 1961) as did the 1958 revolution of Kassem in Iraq. Lebanon, of course, has been experiencing the most intense sort of political violence, with a highly complex bifurcation approximating roughly the Christian-Muslim division.

The two remaining cases, Turkey and Iran, are of interest because of their

Table 4. Tests of the Exponential and Log-Exponential Models of Landholdings in Egypt

Size of Holdings (Hectares)[a]	Observed Number of Holdings	Observed Proportion of Holdings (× 100)	Predicted Proportion of Holdings (× 100)
Lower Portion (Exponential)[b]			
.0- .4	434,219	31.44	36.55
.4- .8	385,901	27.94	25.82
.8- 1.3	286,804	20.76	17.46
1.3- 1.7	174,595	12.64	11.81
1.7- 2.1	99,722	7.22	8.34
$\chi^2 = 1.721$, $df = 3$, $p < .70$			
Upper Portion (Log-Exponential)[c]			
2.1- 4.2	170,019	66.17	64.62
4.2- 8.4	56,705	22.07	24.90
8.4-21.0	23,811	9.27	7.76
21.0-42.0	6,424	2.50	2.72
$\chi^2 = .670$, $df = 2$, $p < .80$			

[a] The data source is the Food and Agriculture Organization (1970, 212-13) and the year is 1961. Although listed under the name of the United Arab Republic, the data refer only to Egypt.

[b] $k = .8689$, $A = .4349$.

[c] $k_1 = 1.3758$, $A_1 = 3.1327$.

Table 5. Results of the Exponential and Log-Exponential Analyses of Middle Eastern Land Distributions

	Upper (Log-Exponential)			Lower (Exponential)		
Country	χ^2	df	$p <$	χ^2	df	$p <$
Egypt (1961)	.670	2	.80	1.721	3	.70
Iran (1960)	7.984	2	.02	2.905	4	.70
Iraq (1958)	.751	2	.70	7.248	4	.20
Lebanon (1961)	1.069	2	.70	3.457	4	.50
Turkey (1963)	11.513	2	.01	2.330	4	.70

Source: Food and Agriculture Organization 1966-70.

departures from the other patterns. These countries in the recent past did not—as their land distributions would suggest—experience serious redistribution.[11] And the Ataturk revolution in Turkey after World War I was not essentially redistributive but more cultural and political, as Turkey sought to Westernize rapidly. Khomeini's revolution of course was urban-based initially (Nejad 1986) and then increasingly relied on the Shiite clergy as its revolutionary vanguard to the exclusion of most redistributive questions aside from the shah's wealth and that of his supporters.

The Egyptian case deserves additional mention because of its intrinsic interest in light of the current theory. Note first that the excellent fit of the models to both the upper and lower portions of the land distribution (1961) occurred *after* the redistribution of 1952. This suggests that the implied state of patterned inequality prior to the redistribution of 1952 must have been horrendous.[12] It further implies that despite the earlier redistribution, the very rapid population growth—one of the world's fastest—along with encroachments of the desert onto the Nile Valley, diminishing the amount of arable land, was sufficient either to maintain or to create anew a state of patterned inequality. Now perhaps we can understand the readiness of the United States to support the Egyptian government, the second highest aid recipient, in the amount of several billion dollars per year. The state of patterned inequality worsening under rapid population growth and increased land scarcity could lead to a new, more extreme redistributive revolution, with a likely increased Soviet involvement in the country and region.

The Gini Index and Related Findings

Although the use of patterned inequality has shown strong improvement over the Gini index in a systematic analysis, it will be useful to compare individual country scores on the two measures. In so doing we also will be able to reflect on the validity of recent findings claiming the relative unimportance of land inequality in the explanation of political violence (Muller and Seligson 1987). As one would expect, in extreme cases there is agreement between the two methods. In the Muller and Seligson study Haiti received a Gini index of inequality of .47; and in the present study Haiti had only the exponential distribution—an indicator of less inequality—fit the upper part of the land distribution. Given this relatively low level of inequality found in both studies, it is likely that the recent Haitian violence is far more a product of a population mostly unified against the political thuggery left over from the personalist Duvalier regime(s) than of any class-related bifurcation in land holdings. Beyond this agreement at the margins, the two approaches diverge strongly.

The most important of these divergences is that the Gini index simply does not reveal important differences between cases and perhaps even distorts them. Some of these are egregious. Costa Rica and Uruguay were found by Muller and Seligson (1987, 445–46) to have a slightly higher Gini index of land concentration (both at .82) than does El Salvador (.81); yet the first two countries fall into the lowest quintile of both patterned inequality and political violence in this study, and El Salvador the highest (Table 3). Guatemala was found by Muller and Seligson to have exactly the same value as Costa Rica, yet has an intermediate position in patterned inequality between Costa Rica and El Salvador in this study. Mexico and Venezuela were reported to have the highest Gini values (.93 and .91, respectively) of all Latin American countries (along with Peru at .91) but have intermediate positions here and generally moderate levels of political violence. Nicaragua, also intermediate here in patterned inequality, has virtually the same value (.80) as El Salvador (.81) despite the basic differences in revolutionary process experienced by the two countries.

Similarly, in the Middle East data we find serious anomalies. Iran and Iraq have experienced very different revolutionary processes, as would be suggested by the different patterns of landholdings identified in Table 5, yet have almost the same Gini value in Muller and Seligson (.63 and .61, respectively). Israel (Food and Agriculture Organization 1981, 37) and Lebanon here also have very different patterns of landholdings (Israel's is not even monotonically decreasing in the lower range) and histories of domestic political violence yet have almost identical Gini values (.75 and .77, respectively).

While the Gini index can isolate the fundamentally different instances as in the case of Haiti, if there are substantial inequalities but of different patterns and forms, then the Gini index is virtually useless as an instrument of differentiation among them. Worse yet, in certain instances, it may actually distort the findings by reversing the rank order of inequality most relevant to politics (Costa Rica and Uruguay vs. El Salvador). If one seeks to disclose relationships between inequality and political violence, the more sensitive procedure and one with stronger systematic variation with the dependent variable is to be preferred.

Although in a strict sense, the findings here pertain only to Latin America with some extension to the Middle East, they clearly have strong implications for any systematic study that uses the Gini index as a measure of inequality. The findings here are especially relevant for studies that claim to have found no direct relationship between the Gini index of land inequality and a dependent variable such as political violence, or at most an indirect relationship (Muller and Seligson 1987); for clearly now a more sensitive measure is available to distinguish among seemingly undifferentiated cases. In the final analysis, a major advantage of the patterned inequality measure is that it is theoretically based, in contrast to the Gini index, which is simply a mathematical measure (the area between one curve and another), without theoretical content.

Conclusion

The analysis has shown that the patterned inequalities implied by the two models for land distribution bear a strong association with political violence in Latin America, with supportive evidence emerging from the Middle East. Patterned inequalities of this type constitute better predictors of political violence than more generalized but less context-specific measures like the Gini index. This measure is subject to random influences throughout the range of holdings in contrast to the more focused analysis here on the patterns that obtain at the two ends of the land distribution.

At the same time, we have seen that political violence is not the inevitable outcome of patterned inequalities. Redistributive measures can be undertaken even after a military coup with relatively few deaths associated with it, as in Peru. The current extreme economic difficulties in Egypt can be alleviated, at least temporarily, by the massive infusion of monies from abroad. The effectiveness of such policies still must be tempered with caution; for despite the redistribution in Peru, there is an ongoing rural guerrilla insurrection suggested in part by the patterned inequality of Table 3, wherein Peru is found in the highest inequality category, perhaps not sufficiently equalized by the later redistributive policies.

One caveat: it must be remembered that the mostly agrarian status of many of these countries has been changing over time. Although the findings of this study apply to the post-World-War-II period

Table A-1. Illustrations of Exponential and Log-Exponential (Pareto) Distributions

Resource Units (Exponential)	Population	Proportion of Population	Resource Units (Log-Exponential)
2	10,000	.5020	1
4	5,000	.2509	2
6	2,500	.1255	4
8	1,250	.0627	8
10	625	.0314	16
12	312.5	.0157	32
14	156.25	.0078	64
16	78.125	.0039	128

and provide an explanatory basis for the occurrence of political violence in that time period, the results concerning land distributions alone may be less applicable to the future if urbanization increases rapidly in the developing world. On the other hand, the contemporary relevance of El Salvador, Peru, Egypt, and Lebanon is manifest in the realm of political violence with perhaps portent for the future in those societies that will continue to have a significant agrarian component.

Finally, the theory and analysis here have put forward a specific referent for those who may feel themselves deprived relative to some other social entity. This is the distribution of holdings that differs from one societal sector to another. The significance of the different distributions is not only that they suggest different patterns of inequality as indicated in this study but that they imply a degree of *predictability* to the impoverishment of the peasantry—the inevitable subdivision of holdings—relative to another land distribution that is predicted to change at a much slower rate if at all. If the preceding mode of investigation could be generalized to other scarce utiles, then it might serve as a basis for future extended research on the sources of political violence.

Appendix: Comparison of Exponential and Log-Exponential Distributions

Intuitively, it appears obvious that the log-exponential (Pareto) distribution represents a greater degree of inequality than the exponential itself. Perhaps an example will fix ideas more exactly. Table A-1 presents eight categories of resource holdings (land, financial, or industrial). To represent the scarcity condition, the total number of resource units is approximately equal for both distributions (78,438 vs. 80,000—it is difficult to achieve exact equality) but sufficiently close for our illustrative purposes. The proportions of the population also are held constant; all that is allowed to vary is the exponential versus log-exponential distributions of these holdings. (I will now refer to this distribution as log-exponential to emphasize both its connection and contrast with the exponential distribution of scarce resources. Clearly it is also understood to be a Pareto distribution.) Even the overall means are approximately equal with $\bar{x} = 3.9362$ for the exponential and $\bar{x} = 4.0106$ for the log-exponential.

Columns 1 and 3 together yield an exponential distribution, while columns 3 and 4 yield a log-exponential. Comparison of each of the categories indicates the extent of inequality. First, the richest 6% of the population hold 50% of the resources in the log-exponential, with a mean of 34.13; while in the exponential distribution, the top 6% hold 17% of the resources, with a mean of 11.47, approximately one-third the mean value of the log-exponential. In the log-exponential, the poorer 75% of the population own 25% of the resources with a mean of 1.33; while in the exponential they own 51% with twice the mean at 2.66. The rich are richer and the poor are poorer in this distribution of extreme inequality. And this is in addition to the blatant inequality already inherent in the exponential distribution itself. Thus, in the analyses of this study, when the lower (peasant) portions of the holdings subdivide, leading to the exponential distribution at this level, the resultant inequality is built upon and added to the substantial inequality already existing between the upper and lower portions of the log-exponential distribution.

Notes

A version of this paper was presented at the 1987 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago. I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Roki Mounce, supported by an enrichment grant to the Center for International Relations, University of Colorado, Boulder from the Office of the vice chancellor for academic affairs.

1. This point is developed at greater length in Midlarsky 1983 (pp. 195–99).

2. This study departs from the relative deprivation tradition not in the denial of its basic postulates, such as *frustration leads to aggression,* but in emphasis. Instead of the frustration-aggression nexus, the present analysis emphasizes identification between rulers and ruled as a basis for political stability that would be seriously disrupted under conditions of bifurcated landholdings and associated patterned inequalities. This form of inequality can be interpreted as a structural condition that can be added to a self-generative model of political violence (Lichbach and Gurr 1981) for a more complete explanation of this phenomenon.

3. As Finley (1982, 214) remarked in connection with Mycenaean peasants,

> Illiterate peoples, even rather primitive ones, are capable of considerable feats of memory in the ordinary routines of living. They transmit their mythologies and genealogies, they sort out rather complicated kinship patterns, they know exactly where their hunting and agricutural lands are located, and what the precise status of obligations is at any moment in potlatch or bridewealth arrangements—all without any records whatsoever. To them it would be accepted as a matter of course that Eumaeus, without consulting documents, could say to a stranger: "My master is so rich that not twenty men together have so much wealth. I will enumerate it for you: twelve herds of cattle on the mainland, twelve of sheep, twelve of swine, and so on."

4. Midlarsky (n.d.) includes a geometric derivation of this distribution applied to colonial holdings. The Pareto-log-exponential distribution, of course, can be derived using other approaches, such as a Markov chain that incorporates a stability condition of decreasing income (Champernowne 1953) or a multiplicatively increasing mean (West 1985, 89). However one arrives at this distribution, it is markedly different from the exponential that is the essence of the theory of bifurcation offered here.

5. Recent evidence has emerged from another cultural context that suggests a political radicalization, especially in the egalitarian direction, of those who perceive a dichotomous social universe (Zaborowski 1986, 117).

6. Two Latin American countries, Argentina and Uruguay, are situated just above the European countries in percentage labor force in agriculture (Taylor and Jodice 1983, 1:209–10). It was decided not to exclude them from this study (1) for the sake of completeness of the country universe and (2) more importantly because in contrast to the European countries and Japan the sequential acquisition process occurred in the Latin American countries more recently, thus distinguishing these countries from those just below them in percentage labor. The political residues of such an agrarian bifurcation could still affect contemporary social turmoil, even as the country moves away from dependence on the agrarian sector. It has been estimated that at least 70 years are required to establish a stable party system (Converse 1969), a figure that is likely equal to that required to reverse the remains of earlier political conflict.

7. In order to update the dependent variable, more recent (until 1982) data on deaths from domestic violence were obtained from the Inter-university Consortium on Political and Social Research. However, very little difference was observed between these data and the published data (until 1977) even for countries, such as El Salvador and

Nicaragua, that are known to have experienced intense violence in this period. LaFeber (1983, 239) for example estimates the dead in Nicaragua during this period to be on the order of tens of thousands, which would place Nicaragua in the first quintile of deaths. As a result, both Nicaragua and El Salvador were placed in the upper quintile with no other changes effected in the 1977 data.

8. The point at which the exponential was chosen to end, and the log-exponential to begin, was selected by inspection. As a result of this, the degrees of freedom will vary from case to case, in addition to the differences in reporting of landholdings by various countries. In many instances, the point was fairly clear, as shown in Table 1, with, in most instances, the middle of the distribution omitted because of mixing of the two models over time. Where there was doubt as to the accuracy of the point selected, at least one point below and one above were also selected for additional calculations to ensure that the reported findings represent the best possible fit between model and data.

9. Although the land distribution data are not available for Latin America prior to World War II—so we cannot examine long-term effects of this type for this region—one can see such a pattern in Irish landholdings (*Agricultural Statistics* 1913 [for 1912]; *Returns* 1854 [for 1853]). Whereas the upper distribution remains largely the same between 1852 (contained in the 1853 report) and 1912 (e.g., 20,436 holdings between 100 and 200 acres in 1852 and 22,728 in 1912), the lower has changed radically wherein there were 35,058 holdings with less than 1 acre in 1852 but 87,451 in 1912. Concomitantly, there was a decline in the number of somewhat larger holdings of 1–5 and 5–15 acres between 1852 and 1912, which almost exactly equaled the rise in the number of holdings with less than 1 acre, thus directly indicating the subdivision process. Of course, the absence of identification between the Irish Catholics and Protestant "ascendancy" situated on the larger, relatively unchanging holdings was evident and likely contributed strongly to the eventual break between Great Britain and Ireland in 1922.

10. Although the Tupamaros were active in Uruguay in the late 1960s and 1970s, they were urban guerrillas, without significant connections with the countryside. Even with their guerrilla activity, the total deaths from political violence in Uruguay still place it in the lowest quintile for all Latin American countries (Taylor and Jodice 1983, 2:50).

11. In the early 1960s, the shah effected the so-called white revolution, which included, as a major emphasis, land reform. However, as has been widely observed (see for example Hooglund 1982 or Goodell 1981), this reform was inadequate because of the sizes of the new holdings and financial procedures that ended in the impoverishment of much of the peasantry and their relocation to the city.

12. The earlier distribution (circa 1950 [Tuma 1965, 148]) indeed suggests a degree of inequality that far exceeds that reported here, and appears to approximate the log-exponential throughout the entire range of holdings. The absence of a finer breakdown for the lower categories (especially 1–5 *feddan*) prevented a systematic test of these data along the lines of the material in Table 4.

References

Agricultural Statistics of Ireland, with Detailed Report for the Year 1912. 1913. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office.

Badger, Wade W. 1980. An Entropy-Utility Model for the Size Distribution of Income. In *Mathematical Models As a Tool for the Social Sciences,* ed. Bruce J. West. New York: Gordon & Breach.

Champernowne, D. G. 1953. A Model of Income Distribution. *Economic Journal* 63:318–51.

Converse, Philip E. 1969. Of Time and Partisan Stability. *Comparative Political Studies* 2: 139–71.

Davies, James C. 1962. Toward a Theory of Revolution. *American Sociological Review* 27:5–19.

Dix, Robert H. 1967. *Colombia: The Political Dimensions of Change.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dominguez, Jorge I. 1978. *Cuba: Order and Revolution.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap.

Feierabend, Ivo K., and Rosalind L. Feierabend. 1966. Aggressive Behaviors within Polities, 1948–62: A Cross-National Study. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10:249–71.

Finley, Moses I. 1982. *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece.* Eds. Brent D. Shaw and Richard P. Saller. New York: Viking.

Food and Agriculture Organization. 1966–70. *Report on the 1960 World Census of Agriculture.* Vol. 1. *Census Results by Countries.* Rome: author.

Food and Agriculture Organization. 1981. *1970 World Census of Agriculture: Analysis and International Comparison of the Results.* Rome: author.

Foster, George M. 1967. *Tzintzuntzan: Mexican Peasants in a Changing World.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Gibbons, Jean D. 1971. *Nonparametric Statistical Inference.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Goldstone, Jack A. 1983. Capitalist Origins of the English Revolution: Chasing a Chimera. *Theory and Society* 12:143–80.

Goodell, Grace E. 1981. How the Shah De-Stabilized Himself. *Policy Review* 16:55–72.

Gumbel, Emil J. 1958. *Statistics of Extremes.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Gurr, Ted R. 1968. A Causal Model of Civil Strife:

A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices. *American Political Science Review* 62:1104–24.

Gurr, Ted R. 1970. *Why Men Rebel.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hamby, Russell R. 1986. Coffee and Conflict in Colombia: Spatial, Temporal, and Class Patterns of *La Violencia.* In *Inequality and Contemporary Revolutions,* Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 22, bk. 2, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky. Denver: University of Denver.

Hardy, Melissa A. 1979. Economic Growth, Distributional Inequality, and Political Conflict in Industrial Societies. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 7:209–27.

Heath, Dwight B., Charles J. Erasmus, and Hans C. Buechler. 1969. *Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia.* New York: Praeger.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1981. *Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hooglund, Eric J. 1982. *Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960–1980.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Johnson, Norman L., and Samuel Kotz. 1970. *Continuous Univariate Distributions,* 2 vols. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

LaFeber, Walter. 1983. *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America.* New York: W. W. Norton.

Lichbach, Mark I., and Ted R. Gurr. 1981. The Conflict Process: A Formal Model. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25:3–29.

Mandelbrot, Benoit. 1960. The Pareto-Lévy Law and the Distribution of Income. *International Economic Review* 1:79–106.

Mandelbrot, Benoit. 1961. Stable Paretian Random Functions and the Multiplicative Variation of Income. *Econometrica* 29:517–43.

Midlarsky, Manus I. 1982. Scarcity and Inequality: Prologue to the Onset of Mass Revolution. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26:3–38.

Midlarsky, Manus I. 1983. The Balance of Power as a "Just" Historical System. *Polity* 16:181–200.

Midlarsky, Manus I. N.d. A Distribution of Extreme Inequality with Applications to Conflict Behavior: A Geometric Derivation of the Pareto Distribution. *Mathematical Modelling.* Forthcoming.

Midlarsky, Manus I., and Kenneth Roberts. 1985. Class, State, and Revolution in Central America: Nicaragua and El Salvador Compared. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 29:163–93.

Muller, Edward N. 1985. Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Political Violence. *American Sociological Review* 50:47–61.

Muller, Edward N. 1986. Comment: Income Inequality and Political Violence: The Effect of Individual Cases. *American Sociological Review* 51:441–45.

Muller, Edward N., and Mitchell A. Seligson. 1987. Inequality and Insurgency. *American Political Science Review* 81:425–51.

Nagel, Jack H. 1974. Inequality and Discontent: A Nonlinear Hypothesis. *World Politics* 26:453–72.

Nagel, Jack H. 1976. Erratum. *World Politics* 28: 315.

Nejad, Hassan M. 1986. Inequality in an Urban Revolution: The Case of Iran. In *Inequality and Contemporary Revolutions,* Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 22, bk. 2, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky. Denver: University of Denver.

Oquist, Paul H. 1980. *Violence, Conflict, and Politics in Colombia.* New York: Academic Press.

Pagels, Heinz R. 1982. *The Cosmic Code.* New York: Bantam Books.

Parvin, Manoucher. 1973. Economic Determinants of Political Unrest: An Econometric Approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17:271–96.

Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Returns of Agricultural Produce of Ireland in the Year 1853. 1854. Dublin: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Russett, Bruce M. 1964. Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics. *World Politics* 16:442–54.

Sigelman, Lee, and Miles Simpson. 1977. A Cross-National Test of the Linkage between Economic Inequality and Political Violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21:105–28.

Tanter, Raymond, and Manus I. Midlarsky. 1967. A Theory of Revolution. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 11:264–80.

Taylor, Charles L., and Michael C. Hudson. 1972. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.* 2d ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Taylor, Charles L., and David A. Jodice. 1983. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.* 3d ed. 2 vols. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution.* Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Tuma, Elias H. 1965. *Twenty-Six Centuries of Agrarian Reform: A Comparative Analysis.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Weede, Erich. 1981. Income Inequality, Average Income, and Domestic Violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 25:639–54.

Weede, Erich. 1986. Comment: Income Inequality and Political Violence Reconsidered. *American Sociological Review* 51:438–41.

Weede, Erich. 1987. Some New Evidence on Correlates of Political Violence: Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness, and Economic Development. *European Sociological Review* 3:97–108.

Wesson, Robert G. 1967. *The Imperial Order.*

Berkeley: University of California Press.
West, Bruce J. 1985. *An Essay on the Importance of Being Nonlinear.* New York: Springer-Verlag.
Wilkie, James W., and Adam Perkal, eds. 1986. *Statistical Abstract of Latin America.* Vol. 24 (for 1985). Los Angeles: University of California.
Zaborowski, Wojciech. 1986. Dichotomous Class Images and Worker Radicalism. In *Social Stratification in Poland: Eight Empirical Studies,* ed. Kazimierz M. Slomczynski and Tadeusz K. Krauze. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Manus I. Midlarsky is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International Relations, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309.

POLITICAL INTOLERANCE AND POLITICAL REPRESSION DURING THE McCARTHY RED SCARE

JAMES L. GIBSON
University of Houston

I test several hypotheses concerning the origins of political repression in the states of the United States. The hypotheses are drawn from the elitist theory of democracy, which asserts that repression of unpopular political minorities stems from the intolerance of the mass public, the generally more tolerant elites not supporting such repression. Focusing on the repressive legislation adopted by the states during the McCarthy era, I examine the relationships between elite and mass opinion and repressive public policy. Generally it seems that elites, not masses, were responsible for the repression of the era. These findings suggest that the elitist theory of democracy is in need of substantial theoretical reconsideration, as well as further empirical investigation.

Over three decades of research on citizen willingness to "put up with" political differences has led to the conclusion that the U.S. public is remarkably intolerant. Though the particular political minority that is salient enough to attract the wrath of the public may oscillate over time between the Left and the Right (e.g., Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982), generally, to be much outside the centrist mainstream of U.S. politics is to incur a considerable risk of being the object of mass political intolerance.

At the same time, however, U.S. public policy is commonly regarded as being relatively tolerant of political minorities. Most citizens believe that all citizens are offered tremendous opportunities for the expression of their political preferences (e.g., McClosky and Brill 1983, 78). The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is commonly regarded as one of the most uncompromising assertions of the right to freedom of speech to be found in the world ("Congress shall make no law. . ."). Policy, if not public opinion, appears to protect and encourage political diversity and competition.

The seeming inconsistency between opinion and policy has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Some argue that the masses are not nearly so intolerant as they seem, in part due to biases in the questions used to measure intolerance (e.g., Femia 1975) and in part because the greater educational opportunity of the last few decades has created more widespread acceptance of political diversity (e.g., Davis 1975; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978). Most, however, are willing to accept at face value the relative intolerance of the mass public and the relative tolerance of public policy but to seek reconciliation of the seeming contradiction by turning to the processes linking opinion to policy. Public policy is tolerant in the United States because the processes through which citizen preferences are linked to government action do not faith-fully translate intolerant opinion inputs into repressive policy outputs. Just as in so many other substantive policy areas, public policy concerning the rights of political minorities fails to reflect the intolerant attitudes of the mass public.

Instead, the elitist theory of democracy asserts, policy is protective of political minorities because it reflects the preferences of elites, preferences that tend to be more tolerant than those of the mass public. For a variety of reasons, those who exert influence over the policymaking process in the United States are more willing to restrain the coercive power of the state in its dealings with political opposition groups. Thus there is a linkage between policy and opinion, but it is to *tolerant elite opinion*, not to *intolerant mass opinion*. Mass opinion is ordinarily not of great significance; public policy reflects elite opinion and is consequently tolerant of political diversity. The democratic character of the regime is enhanced through the political apathy and immobility of the masses, according to the elitist theory of democracy.[1]

The elitist theory nonetheless asserts that outbreaks of political repression—when they occur—are attributable to the mass public. While the preferences of ordinary citizens typically have little influence over public policy—in part, perhaps, because citizens have no real preferences on most civil liberties issues—there are instances in which the intolerance of the mass public becomes mobilized. Under conditions of perceived threat to the status quo, for example, members of the mass public may become politically active. In the context of the general propensity toward intolerance among the mass public, mobilization typically results in demands for political repression. Thus, the elitist theory of democracy hypothesizes that political repression flows from demands from an activated mass public.

The theory of "pluralistic intolerance"—recently proposed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979, 1982) and Krouse and Marcus (1984)—provides a nice explanation of the process through which mass intolerance is mobilized (see also Sullivan et al. 1985). The theory asserts that one of the primary causes of political repression is the *focusing* of mass intolerance on a specific unpopular political minority. To the extent that intolerance becomes focused, it is capable of being mobilized. Mobilization results in demands for political repression, demands to which policymakers accede. The authors claim support for their theory from recent U.S. history:

> During the 1950s, the United States was undoubtedly a society characterized by considerable consensus in target group selection. The Communist Party and its suspected sympathizers were subjected to significant repression, and there seemed to be a great deal of support for such actions among large segments of the political leadership as well as the mass public. . . .The political fragmentation and the proliferation of extremist groups in American politics since the 1950s has undoubtedly resulted in a greater degree of diversity in target group selection. If this is the case, such a situation is less likely to result in repressive action, even if the mass public is roughly as intolerant *as individuals* as they were in the 1950s (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982, 85, emphasis in original).

Thus both the elitist theory of democracy and the theory of pluralistic intolerance are founded upon assumptions about the linkage between opinion and policy.

Despite the wide acceptance of the elitist theory of democracy, there has been very little empirical investigation of this critical linkage between opinion and policy.[2] Consequently, this research is designed as an empirical test of the policy implications of the widespread intolerance that seems to characterize the political culture of the United States. Using data on elite and mass opinion and on public policy in the states, the linkage hypothesis is tested. My focus is on the era of the McCarthy Red Scare, due to its political and theoretical importance. Thus I assess whether there are any significant policy implications that flow from elite and mass intolerance.

Public Policy Repression

Conceptualization

A major impediment to drawing conclusions about the linkage between political intolerance and the degree of repression in U.S. public policy is that rigorous conceptualizations and reproducible operationalizations of policy repression do not exist. Conceptually, I define *repressive public policy* as statutory restriction on *oppositionist political activity* (by which I mean activities through which citizens, individually or in groups, compete for political power [cf. Dahl 1971]) upon some, but not all, competitors for political power.[3] For example, policy outlawing a political party would be considered repressive, just as would policy that requires the members of some political parties to register with the government while not placing similar requirements on members of other political parties. Though there are some significant limitations to this definition, there is utility to considering the absence of political repression (political freedom) as including unimpaired opportunities for all full citizens

1. to formulate their preferences
2. to signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the government by individual and collective action
3. to have their preferences weighted equally in the conduct of the government, that is, weighted with no discrimination because of the content or source of the preference (Dahl 1971, 1–2).

That is the working definition to be used in this research.

Operationalizing Political Repression—the 1950s

There have been a few systematic attempts at measuring political repression as a policy output of government. Bilson (1982), for instance, examined the degree of freedom available in 184 polities, using as a measure of freedom the ratings of the repressiveness developed by Freedom House. Dahl provides system scores on one of his main dimensions of *polyarchy* (opportunities for political opposition) for 114 countries as they stood in about 1969 (Dahl 1971, 232). In their various research reports Page and Shapiro (e.g., 1983) measure civil rights and civil liberties opinions and policies in terms of the adoption of specific sorts of public policy. Typically, however, the endogenous concept in most studies of state policy outputs is some sort of expenditure variable. (See Thompson 1981 for a critique of this practice.) These earlier efforts can inform the construction of a measure of political repression in the policy outputs of the American states.

The measure of policy repression that serves as the dependent variable in this analysis is an index indicating the degree of political repression directed against the Communist party and its members during the late 1940s and 1950s. A host of actions against Communists was taken by the states, including disqualifying them from public employment (including from teaching positions in public schools); denying them access to the ballot as candidates, and prohibiting them from serving in public office even if legally elected; requiring Communists to register with the government; and outright bans on the Party. Forced registration was a means toward achieving these ends.

Of the fifty states, twenty-eight took none of these actions against Communists.[4] Two states—Arkansas and Texas—banned Communists from the ballot and from public employment, as well as banning the Party itself and requiring that

Communists register with the government. Another five states adopted all three measures against the Communists, but did not require that they register with the government. Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Washington did not formally bar Communists from public employment but did outlaw the party and forbade its members from participating in politics. The remaining twelve states took some, but not all, actions against the Communists. From these data, a simple index of political repression has been calculated. The index includes taking no action, banning Communists from public employment, banning Communists from running candidates and holding public office, and completely banning Communists and the Communist Party. A "bonus" score of .5 was given to those states requiring that Communists register with the government.[5] Table 1 shows the scores of the individual states on this measure.

This measure can rightly be considered to be a valid indicator of political repression by the states.[6] In asserting this I do not gainsay that the state has the right—indeed, the obligation—to provide for its internal security. Consequently, statutes that prohibit such actions as insurrection do not necessarily constitute political repression. For instance, Texas made it unlawful to "commit, attempt to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow" the Texas government (Art. 6689-3A, Sec. 5). This section proscribes action, not thought or speech, and is therefore not an appropriate measure of political repression. However, the next subsection of the statute made it illegal to "advocate, abet, advise, or teach by any means any person to commit" a revolutionary act. Indeed, even conspiracy to advocate is prohibited (Art. 6889-3A, Sec. 5 [3]). This is indeed a constraint on the speech of political minorities and therefore is treated as repressive. As the action prohibited moves beyond a specific, criminal behavior, the line between repressive and nonrepressive legislation becomes less clear. Gellhorn (1952) commented,

> Traditionally the criminal law has dealt with the malefactor, the one who himself committed an offense. Departing from this tradition is the recent tendency to ascribe criminal potentialities to a body of persons (usually, though not invariably, the Communists) and to lay restraints upon any individual who can be linked with the group. This, of course, greatly widens the concept of subversive activities, because it results, in truth, in forgetting about activities altogether. It substitutes associations as the objects of the law's impact. Any attempt to define subversion as used in modern statutes must therefore refer to the mere possibility of activity as well as to present lawlessness (p. 360).

There can be little doubt as to the effectiveness of this anti-Communist legislation. Not only were the Communist Party U.S.A. and other Communist parties essentially eradicated, but so too were a wide variety of non-Communists. It has been estimated that of the work force of 65 million, 13 million were affected by loyalty and security programs during the McCarthy era (Brown 1958). Brown calculates that over 11 thousand individuals were fired as a result of government and private loyalty programs. More than 100 people were convicted under the federal Smith Act, and 135 people were cited for contempt by the House Un-American Activities Committee. Nearly one-half of the social science professors teaching in universities at the time expressed medium or high apprehension about possible adverse repercussions to them as a result of their political beliefs and activities (Lazarsfeld and Thielens 1958). Case studies of local and state politics vividly portray the effects of anti-Communist legislation on progressives of various sorts (e.g., Carleton 1985). The "silent generation" that emerged from McCarthyism is testimony enough to the widespread effects—direct and indirect—of the political repression of the era (see also Goldstein 1978, 369–96).

Table 1. Political Repression of Communists by American State Governments

State	Banned from Public Employment	Banned from Politics	Banned Outright	Scale Score
Arkansas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3.5
Texas	Yes	Yes	Yes	3.5
Arizona	Yes	Yes	Yes	3.0
Indiana	Yes	Yes	Yes	3.0
Massachusetts	Yes	Yes	Yes	3.0
Nebraska	Yes	Yes	Yes	3.0
Oklahoma	Yes	Yes	Yes	3.0
Pennsylvania	No	Yes	Yes	3.0
Tennessee	No	Yes	Yes	3.0
Washington	No	Yes	Yes	3.0
Alabama	Yes	Yes	No	2.5
Louisiana	Yes	Yes	No	2.5
Michigan	Yes	Yes	No	2.5
Wyoming	Yes	Yes	No	2.5
Florida	Yes	Yes	No	2.0
Georgia	Yes	Yes	No	2.0
Illinois	Yes	Yes	No	2.0
California	Yes	No	No	1.0
New York	Yes	No	No	1.0
Delaware	No	No	No	.5
Mississippi	No	No	No	.5
New Mexico	No	No	No	.5
Alaska	No	No	No	.0
Colorado	No	No	No	.0
Connecticut	No	No	No	.0
Hawaii	No	No	No	.0
Iowa	No	No	No	.0
Idaho	No	No	No	.0
Kentucky	No	No	No	.0
Kansas	No	No	No	.0
Maryland	No	No	No	.0
Maine	No	No	No	.0
Minnesota	No	No	No	.0
Missouri	No	No	No	.0
Montana	No	No	No	.0
North Carolina	No	No	No	.0
North Dakota	No	No	No	.0
New Hampshire	No	No	No	.0
New Jersey	No	No	No	.0
Nevada	No	No	No	.0
Ohio	No	No	No	.0
Oregon	No	No	No	.0
Rhode Island	No	No	No	.0
South Carolina	No	No	No	.0
South Dakota	No	No	No	.0
Utah	No	No	No	.0
Vermont	No	No	No	.0
Virginia	No	No	No	.0
West Virginia	No	No	No	.0
Wisconsin	No	No	No	.0

Note: The scale score is a Guttman score. A "bonus" of .5 was added to the scale score if the state also required that Communists register with the government. See note 4 for details of the assignments of scores to each state.

Nor was the repression of the era a function of the degree of objective threat to the security of the state. Political repression was just as likely to occur in states with virtually no Communists as it was to occur in states with large numbers of Communists.[7] The repression of Communists bore no relationship to the degree of threat posed by local Communists.

It might seem that the repression of Communists, though it is clearly repression within the context of the definition proffered above, is not necessarily "antidemocratic" because the objects of the repression are themselves "antidemocrats." To repress Communists is to preserve democracy, it might be argued. Several retorts to this position can be formulated. First, for democracies to preserve democracy through nondemocratic means is illogical because democracy refers to a set of means, as well as ends (e.g., Dahl 1956, 1961, 1971; Key 1961; Schumpeter 1950). The means argument can also be judged in terms of the necessity of the means. At least in retrospect (but probably otherwise as well), it is difficult to make the argument that the degree of threat to the polity from Communists in the 1940s and 1950s in any way paralleled the degree of political repression (e.g., Goldstein 1978). Second, the assumption that Communists and other objects of political repression are "antidemocratic" must be considered as an empirical question itself in need of systematic investigation. As a first consideration, it is necessary to specify which Communists are being considered, inasmuch as the diversity among those adopting—or being assigned—the label is tremendous. Merely to postulate that Communists are antidemocratic is inadequate. Third, the repression of Communists no doubt has a chilling effect on those who, while not Communists, oppose the political status quo. In recognizing the coercive power of the state and its willingness to direct that power against those who dissent, the effect of repressive public policy extends far beyond the target group.

Public Opinion Intolerance

Conceptualization

"Political tolerance" refers to the willingness of citizens to support the extension of rights of citizenship to all members of the polity, that is, to allow political freedoms to those who are politically different. Thus, "tolerance implies a willingness to 'put up with' those things that one rejects. Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests that one opposes. A tolerant regime, then, like a tolerant individual, is one that allows a wide berth to those ideas that challenge its way of life" (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1979, 784). Thus, political tolerance includes support for institutional guarantees of the right to oppose the existing regime, including the rights to vote, to participate in political parties, to organize politically and to attempt political persuasion. Though there may be some disagreement about the operationalization of the concept, its conceptual definition is relatively noncontroversial (see Gibson and Bingham 1982).

Operationalization

The simple linkage hypothesis is that where the mass public is more intolerant, state public policy is more repressive. Though the hypothesis is simple, deriving measures of mass intolerance is by no means uncomplicated. Indeed, the study of state politics continually confronts the difficulty of deriving measures of state public opinion. Though there are five general alternatives—ranging from simulations to individual state surveys—the only viable option for estimating state-level opinion intolerance during the

McCarthy era is to aggregate national surveys by state.

The source of the opinion data is the Stouffer survey, conducted in 1954. This survey is widely regarded as the classic study that initiated inquiry into the political tolerance of elites and masses (even though earlier evidence exists, e.g., Hyman and Sheatsley 1953). Two independent surveys were actually conducted for Stouffer: one by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) and the other by the American Institute for Public Opinion (AIPO-Gallup). This design was adopted for the explicit purpose of demonstrating the accuracy and reliability of public opinion surveys based on random samples. Each agency surveyed a sample of the mass public and of the political elites.[8]

Stouffer created a six-point scale to indicate political intolerance (see Stouffer 1955, 262–69). The index is a Guttman scale based on the responses to fifteen items concerning support for the civil liberties of Communists, socialists, and atheists (see Appendix for details). The items meet conventional standards of scalability and are widely used today as indicators of political tolerance (e.g., Davis 1975; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978; McCutcheon 1985; and the General Social Survey, conducted annually by NORC).

The process of aggregating these tolerance scores by state is difficult because the states of residence of the respondents in the Stouffer surveys were never entered in any known version of the data set. Through an indirect process, using the identity of the interviewer and the check-in sheets used to record the locations (city and state) of the interviews conducted by each interviewer, state of residence could be ascertained for the NORC half of the Stouffer data set. The respondents were aggregated by state of residence to create summary indicators of the level of intolerance in each of the states. The Appendix reports the means, standard deviations, and numbers of cases and primary sampling units for this tolerance scale for the states represented in the NORC portion of the Stouffer survey. Evidence that this aggregation process produces reasonably valid state-level estimates of political intolerance is also presented.

Aggregating the elite interviews to the state level is in one sense more perilous and in another sense less perilous. With a considerably small number of subjects (758 in Stouffer's NORC sample), the means become more unstable. On the other hand, the aggregation is not done for the purpose of estimating some sort of elite population parameter. The elites selected were in no sense a random sample of state elites, so it makes little sense to try to make inferences from the sample to some larger elite population. Instead, the elite samples represent only themselves. The Appendix reports the state means, standard deviations, and numbers of cases.

There is a moderate relationship between elite and mass opinion in the state ($r = .52$). To the extent that we would expect elite and mass opinion in the states to covary, this correlation serves to validate the aggregate measures of opinion. The substantive implications of this correlation are considered below.

The Simple Relationship between Opinion and Policy

Figure 1 reports the relationships between mass and elite political intolerance and the adoption of repressive public policies by the states. There is a modest bivariate relationship during the McCarthy era between mass opinion and repressive public policy. In states in which the mass public was more intolerant, there tended to be greater political repression, thus seeming to support the elitist theory. However, the relationship is

Figure 1. Relationships between Opinion and Policy



Note: Boldfaced entries are bivariate correlation coefficients, with pairwise missing data deletion. The nonboldfaced entries are standardized regression coefficients from a weighted least squares analysis using listwise missing data deletion. The numbers of cases are shown in parentheses.

somewhat stronger between elite opinion and repression. From a weighted least squares analysis incorporating both elite opinion and mass opinion, it is clear that it is elite preferences that most influence public policy. The *beta* for mass opinion is −.06; for elite opinion, it is −.35 (significant beyond .01).[9] Thus political repression occurred in states with relatively intolerant elites. Beyond the intolerance of elites, the preferences of the mass public seemed to matter little.

Table 2 reports a cross-tabulation of policy outputs with elite and mass opinion. The opinion variables have been dichotomized at their respective means. Though the number of cases shown in this table is small—demanding caution in interpreting the percentages—the data reveal striking support for the conclusion that elite opinion, not mass opinion, determines public policy. In eight of the ten states in which elites were relatively less tolerant, repressive legislation was adopted. In only six of the sixteen states in which elites were relatively more tolerant was repressive legislation passed. Variation in mass opinion makes little difference for public policy.[10]

It is a little surprising that elite opinion has such a significant impact on policy repression. After all, elites tend to be relatively more tolerant than the masses. Indeed, this finding is the empirical linchpin of the elitist theory of democracy.[11] This leads one to wonder just how much intolerance there was among the elites in the Stouffer data.

The survey data in fact reveal ample evidence of elite intolerance. For instance, fully *two-thirds* of the elites were willing to strip admitted Communists of their U.S. citizenship (Stouffer 1955, 43). Indeed, one reading of the Stouffer data is that elites and masses differed principally on the degree of proof of Communist party membership necessary before repression was thought legitimate. Much of the

Table 2. The Influence of Elite and Mass Opinion on the Repression of Communists (percentages)

	Elite Opinion Less Tolerant		Elite Opinion More Tolerant	
Action	Mass Opinion Less Tolerant	Mass Opinion More Tolerant	Mass Opinion Less Tolerant	Mass Opinion More Tolerant
Adopted repressive legislation	71	100	33	39
Did not adopt repressive legislation	29	0	67	62
Total	100	100	100	101*
Number of cases	7	3	3	13

*Does not total 100 because of rounding error.

mass public was willing to accept a very low level of proof of party membership (e.g., innuendo), while many elites required a legal determination of Communist affiliation. Once convinced of the charge, however, elites were very nearly as intolerant of Communists as members of the mass public. Just as McClosky and Brill (1983) have more recently shown significant intolerance within their elite samples, there is enough intolerance among these state elites to make them the driving force in the repression of Communists. Thus it is plausible that elite intolerance was largely responsible for the repressive policies of the era.

At the same time, there is little evidence that the communism issue was of burning concern to the U.S. public. For instance, Stouffer reported that "the number of people who said [in response to an open-ended question] that they were worried either about the threat of Communists in the United States or about civil liberties was, even by the most generous interpretation of occasionally ambiguous responses, *less than 1%*" (Stouffer 1955, 59, emphasis in original). Only one-third of the subjects reported having talked about communism in the United States in the week prior to the interview, despite the fact that the Army-McCarthy hearings were in progress during a portion of the survey period. Stouffer asserted, "For most people neither the internal Communist threat nor the threat to civil liberties was a matter of universal burning concern. Such findings are important. They should be of interest to a future historian who might otherwise be tempted, from isolated and dramatic events in the news, to portray too vividly the emotional climate of America in 1954" (Stouffer 1955, 72).

The issue of communism in the United States was of much greater concern to the elites. Nearly two-thirds of them reported having talked about communism in the United States during the week prior to the interview. When asked how closely they followed news about Communists, fully 44% of the mass sample responded "hardly at all," while only 13% of the elite sample was as unconcerned (Stouffer 1955, 84). Just as elites typically exhibit greater knowledge and concern about public issues, they were far more attentive to the issue of domestic Communists.

Thus it is difficult to imagine that the repression of the 1950s was inspired by demands for repressive public policy from a mobilized mass public. Indeed, the most intense political intolerance was concentrated within that segment of the mass public *least* likely to have an impact on public policy (see also Gibson 1987). There can be no doubt that the mass public was highly intolerant in its attitudes during the 1950s. Absent issue salience, however, it is difficult to imagine that the U.S. people had mobilized sufficiently to have created the repression of the era.[12]

The actual effect of mass opinion may be masked a bit in these data, however. Perhaps it is useful to treat mass intolerance as essentially a constant across the states during the McCarthy era. Because the mass public was generally willing to support political repression of Communists, elites were basically free to shape public policy. In states in which the elites were relatively tolerant, tolerant policy prevailed. Where elites were relatively less tolerant, repression resulted. In neither case did mass opinion *cause* public policy. Instead, policy was framed by the elites. Nonetheless, the willingness of the mass public to accept repressive policies was no doubt important. Thus, the policy-making process need not be seen as a "demand-input" process with all its untenable assumptions but rather can be seen as one in which the preferences of the mass public—perhaps even the political culture of the state—set the broad parameters of public policy. In this sense, then, mass political intolerance "matters" for public policy.

We must also note that even if the

broader mass public has little influence upon public policy, specialized segments of the public may still be important. For instance, there is some correlation (r = .31) between the number of American Legion members in the state and political repression.[13] Since the American Legion had long been in the forefront of the crusade against communism (see, e.g., American Legion 1937), it is likely that greater numbers of members in the state translated into more effective lobbying power. Thus particular segments of the mass public can indeed be mobilized for repressive purposes.

I should also reemphasize the strong correlation between elite opinion and mass opinion. This correlation may imply that elites are responsive to mass opinion or that they mold mass opinion or that elite opinion is shaped by the same sort of factors as shape mass opinion. Though it is not possible to disentangle the causal process statistically, there is some evidence that both elite and mass opinion reflect the more fundamental political culture of the state. The correlation between a measure of Elazar's state-level political culture and mass intolerance is −.68; for elite opinion the correlation is −.66. In states with more traditionalistic political cultures *both* mass and elites tend to be more intolerant. Moreover, there is some direct relationship between political culture and political repression (r = .31). Perhaps elite and mass preferences generally reflect basic cultural values concerning the breadth of legitimate political participation and contestation. In the moralistic political culture everyone should participate; only professionals should be active in the individualistic culture; and only the appropriate elite in traditionalistic political cultures (Elazar 1972, 101–2). Perhaps the political culture of the state legitimizes broad propensities toward intolerance, propensities that become mobilized during political crises.

One might also look at the data in Figure 1 from a very different perspective. Rather than mass opinion causing public policy, perhaps mass opinion *is caused by* policy (cf. Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987). To turn the elitist theory on its head, it is quite possible that the U.S. mass public is intolerant precisely because they have been persuaded and reinforced by the intolerance of U.S. public policy. Through the intolerance of public policy, citizens learn that it is acceptable, if not desirable, to repress one's political enemies. Though I do not gainsay that there are significant norms in U.S. society supportive of political tolerance (see Sniderman 1975), in practice citizens have been taught by federal and state legislation that Communists should *not* be tolerated. It is not surprising that many citizens have learned the lesson well.[14]

This argument is somewhat at variance with those who argue that greater exposure to the dominant cultural norms in the United States contributes to greater political tolerance. If the norms are tolerant, then greater exposure should create tolerance. But greater awareness of *repressive* norms—as expressed in public policies—should be associated with greater *intolerance*. Thus the result of political activism, high self-esteem, and other qualities that make us assimilate social norms will vary according to the nature of the norms (see Sullivan et al. 1985).

The norms of U.S. politics are at once tolerant and intolerant. Certainly, no one can doubt that support for civil liberties is a widely shared value. The key question, however, is "civil liberties for whom?" The U.S. political culture has long distinguished between "true Americans" and others and has always been willing to deny civil liberties to those who are "un-American." Foreign "isms" have repeatedly become the bogeymen in ideological conflict in the United States. Thus, citizens learn that civil liberties are indeed important to protect, but only for those who have a "legitimate" right to the liberty.

Thus the initial evidence is that political repression during the McCarthy era was most likely initiated by elites even if the mass public in most states would have acquiesced. These findings are not compatible with the elitist views that mass intolerance threatens democracy and that elites are the carriers of the democratic creed.

The Political Culture of Intolerance and Repression

These findings may very well be limited to the specific historical era of McCarthyism. Due to the unavailability of historical data on elite and mass opinion it is difficult to judge whether earlier outbreaks of political repression can also be attributed to elite intolerance. Building on the discussion of political culture above, however, it is possible to give this issue further consideration.

Following World War I roughly one-half of the U.S. states adopted criminal syndicalism statutes.[15] For example, the statute adopted by California shortly after World War I defined the crime as "any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting the commission of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined as meaning willful and malicious physical damage or injury to physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change" (Calif. Statutes, 1919. Ch. 188, Sec. 1, p. 281). Though no opinion data exist for the 1920s, it is possible to examine the relationship between state-level political culture and political repression during this earlier era.

The correlation between state political culture and the adoption of criminal syndicalism statutes is .40 ($N = 50$), indicating once again that more traditionalistic states were more likely to engage in political repression. That this correlation is slightly stronger than the coefficient observed for the 1950s might speak to the breakdown of homogeneous state cultures as the population became more mobile in the twentieth century. In any event, we see in this correlation evidence that the more detailed findings of the McCarthy era may not be atypical.[16]

Discussion

What conclusions about the elitist theory of democracy and the theory of pluralistic intolerance does this analysis support? First, I have discovered no evidence that political repression in the U.S. states stems from demands from ordinary citizens to curtail the rights and activities of unpopular political minorities. This finding differs from what is predicted by the elitist theory of democracy. Second, I find some evidence of elite complicity in the repression of the McCarthy era, a finding that is also incompatible with the elitist theory. Generally, then, this research casts doubt on the elitist theory of democracy.

Nor are these findings necessarily compatible with the theory of pluralistic intolerance advocated by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus. Though political intolerance in the 1950s was widespread and highly focused, there seems to have been little direct effect of mass opinion on public policy. Like the elitist theory of democracy, the theory of pluralistic intolerance places too much emphasis on mass opinion as a determinant of public policy.

The "demand-input" linkage process implicitly posited by these theories is probably their critical flaw. Early public opinion research that found high levels of mass political intolerance too quickly assumed that mass intolerance translated directly into public policy. The assumption was easy to make since little was known of the processes linking opinions with policy. As linkage research has accumulated, however, the simple hypothesis relating opinion to policy has become increasingly untenable. The justification for studying mass political tolerance therefore cannot be found in the hypothesis that survey responses direct public policy.

At the same time, however, public opinion may not be completely irrelevant. Tolerance opinion strongly reflects the political cultures of the states, and, at least in the 1950s, political culture was significantly related to levels of political repression. Opinion is important in the policy process because it delimits the range of acceptable policy alternatives. It may well be that mass opinion is manipulated and shaped by elites; nonetheless, those who would propose repressive policies in California face a very different set of political constraints than those who propose repressive policies in Arkansas. This is not to say that repression is impossible—indeed, California has a long history of significant levels of political repression—but rather that the task of gaining acceptance for repression is different under differing cultural contexts.

For over three decades now, political scientists have systematically studied public policy and public opinion. Significant advances have been made in understanding many sorts of state policy outputs, and we have developed a wealth of information about political tolerance. To date, however, little attention has been given to repression as a policy output, and even less attention has been devoted to behavioral and policy implications of tolerance attitudes. The failure to investigate the linkage between opinion and policy is all the more significant because one of the most widely accepted theories in political science—the elitist theory of democracy—was developed on the basis of an assumed linkage between opinion and policy. I hope that this research, though only a crude beginning, will serve as an early step in continuing research into these most important problems of democracy.

Appendix: Measurement and Aggregation Error in the State-Level Estimates of Mass Political Intolerance

Measurement

The measure of political tolerance employed here is an index originally constructed by Stouffer. He used fifteen items to construct the scale. Eleven of the items dealt with communists; two with atheists (those who are against all churches and religion); and two with socialists (those favoring government ownership of all railroads and all big industries). Stouffer reported a coefficient of reproducibility of .96 for the scale, a very high level of reliability. He also reported that reproducibility was approximately the same at all educational levels.

I decided to use Stouffer's scale even though it includes items on atheists and socialists (1) in order to maintain comparability to Stouffer's research, (2) because an identical scale was created from a survey in 1973 that is very useful for assessment of aggregation error, and (3) because the scale is so reliable. Stouffer had a strong view of what his scale was measuring. He asserted, "But again let it be pointed out, this scale does not measure . . . tolerance *in general.* It deals only with attitudes toward certain types of nonconformists or deviants. It does not deal with attitudes toward extreme right-wing agitators, toward people who attack minority groups, toward faddists or cultists, in general, nor, of course, toward a wide variety of criminals. For purposes of this study, the tolerance of nonconformity or suspected nonconformity is *solely* within the broad context of the

Communist threat" (Stouffer 1955, 54, emphasis in original).

The Stouffer measures of tolerance have recently been criticized (e.g., Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of this criticism is the assertion that the Stouffer items measure tolerance only for a specific group and thus are not generalizable. Because Stouffer was concerned only about intolerance of Communists, his findings may be time-bound; as the objects of mass displeasure evolve, the Communist-based approach to tolerance becomes less relevant and useful. This difficulty does not affect my analysis of policy and opinion from the 1950s, however, because Communists were probably a major disliked group for nearly all citizens in the survey. For instance, only 256 out of 4,933 of the mass respondents were willing to assert that someone believing in communism could still be a loyal U.S. citizen. Even if Communists were not the least-liked group for all U.S. citizens, they were certainly located in the "disliked-enough-not-to-tolerate" range for nearly everyone. Thus the Stouffer measure of tolerance is a valid and reliable indicator.

Aggregation Error

Table A-1 reports the state-level means, standard deviations, and numbers of cases for the aggregation of elite and mass opinion. Not all states are included in Table A-1 because survey respondents were not located in every state. Since the Stouffer survey was not designed to be aggregated by state, it is necessary to try to determine whether there is any obvious bias in the state-level estimates. A few empirical tests can be conducted that, while not assuaging all doubts about the aggregation process, may make us somewhat more comfortable about using the state means.

The Stouffer survey was replicated in 1973 by Nunn, Crockett, and Williams (1978). Their survey was very nearly an exact replication of the Stouffer survey. In terms of the indicators of tolerance, it was an exact replication. Nunn, Crockett, and Williams were even extremely careful to reproduce Stouffer's scaling methodology in creating a summary index of intolerance (pp. 179–91). Thus it is possible to aggregate the same scale variable by state and derive a measure of political tolerance for the early 1970s.

With completely independent samples (including independent sampling frames), one would not expect that there would be much of a correlation between the Stouffer and the Nunn, Crockett, and Williams state-level estimates. Chance fluctuations in the distributions of primary sampling units (PSUs) per state would tend to attenuate the correlation between the state-level estimates. (The average number of PSUs in Stouffer's NORC survey is 2.3; for the Nunn, Crockett, and Williams survey it is 7.8.) Yet the correlation between the estimates from the two surveys is a remarkable .63 ($N = 29$). If I were to exclude the 1973 estimate for Connecticut, an estimate that shows that state to be quite intolerant, then the correlation increases to .77 ($N = 28$). It is difficult to imagine an explanation for this correlation other than that it is due to a common correlation with the true score for the state.

I have also investigated the relationship between state sample size and number of primary sampling units and aggregation error. I first assumed that differences between the t_1 and t_2 estimates of state opinion were due to aggregation error. The residuals resulting from regressing t_2 opinion on t_1 opinion represent this error; if squared, the residuals represent the total amount of error. The correlations between the squared residuals and t_1 sample size and number of PSUs are −.30 and −.27. The correlations between the residuals and t_2 sample size and number of

PSUs are −.29 and −.29. These correlations indicate that aggregation error is larger in states in which the number of subjects and number of PSUs is smaller—a not unexpected finding. However, since the relationships are modest, they do not undermine the basic aggregation procedure.

Another bit of evidence supporting the aggregation process comes from the correlations of tolerance and political culture. The correlation between Elazar's measure of political culture and average state tolerance in the 1950s is −.68. This correlation enhances my confidence in the utility of the state-level estimates.

Another, very different tack that can be taken is to estimate the error associated

Table A-1. State Mean Tolerance Scores, Mass Public, and Elites, NORC Stouffer Survey, 1954

	Mass Public				Elites		
State	Mean	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases	Number of PSUs	Mean	Standard Deviation	Number of Cases
California	4.47	1.50	174	4	5.09	1.43	65
Missouri	4.44	1.20	18	2	5.45	.69	11
New Jersey	4.41	1.43	61	1	4.90	1.28	60
Washington	4.33	1.44	52	2	5.14	.66	14
Iowa	4.26	1.42	23	1	—	—	—
Wisconsin	4.24	1.56	41	2	5.44	.87	25
Massachusetts	4.22	1.47	81	2	4.51	1.21	41
New York	4.21	1.40	273	6	5.06	1.08	81
Oregon	4.20	1.47	15	1	—	—	—
Colorado	4.13	1.46	23	1	5.29	1.33	14
Connecticut	4.12	1.17	17	1	5.17	.83	12
Nebraska	4.06	1.24	16	1	4.40	1.35	10
Minnesota	3.92	1.43	64	3	5.33	.96	27
Ohio	3.83	1.57	103	4	5.02	1.04	54
Illinois	3.81	1.55	86	2	4.97	1.39	39
Nevada	3.77	1.61	31	1	—	—	—
North Dakota	3.76	1.46	41	1	5.17	1.27	12
Pennsylvania	3.75	1.41	179	6	4.77	1.29	43
Michigan	3.75	1.34	163	4	4.92	1.26	38
Kansas	3.64	1.26	59	2	—	—	—
Florida	3.61	1.43	84	2	4.46	1.47	24
New Hampshire	3.58	1.71	19	1	5.36	1.03	11
Maryland	3.45	1.46	51	2	—	—	—
Idaho	3.45	1.65	22	1	5.15	1.07	13
Oklahoma	3.43	1.44	67	3	5.31	.85	13
Virginia	3.40	1.68	15	1	—	—	—
Indiana	3.36	1.32	129	5	4.61	1.40	36
Alabama	3.32	1.27	37	2	4.30	1.46	27
Texas	3.28	1.05	156	5	4.30	1.49	40
Louisiana	3.27	1.34	26	1	4.33	1.67	12
North Carolina	3.17	1.17	65	3	3.60	1.90	10
Tennessee	2.98	1.62	44	2	—	—	—
Georgia	2.86	1.39	50	3	—	—	—
Kentucky	2.86	1.25	22	1	4.77	1.39	26
West Virginia	2.34	.90	29	2	—	—	—
Arkansas	1.79	1.27	19	1	—	—	—
Average	3.65	1.40	65	2.3	4.88	1.22	29

with the aggregation process. For each survey, I aggregated the proportion of the respondents having twelve or more years of formal education. These percentages can be compared to census estimates of the level of education in the state. The comparison is not perfect due to two considerations. First, the census data are themselves population estimates drawn from survey samples. Second, the census reports the percentage of residents over the age of twenty-five with twelve or more years of education. I assume that those with twelve or more years of education have a high school degree, although this might not be true for every single respondent. Moreover, it is not possible to isolate those respondents twenty-five years and older in the Stouffer survey. Nonetheless, the correlation for the 1950s data between the survey and census estimates of education is a substantial .72 ($N = 36$). While this correlation does not speak directly to the utility of the state-level estimates of tolerance, it does suggest that aggregation from the survey to the state is not completely inappropriate.

The correlation between elite opinion in the 1950s and elite opinion in the 1970s is .25 (.28 with a minimum-number-of-respondents requirement). That the correlation is not higher is a bit worrisome, although it is not difficult to imagine that there is greater flux in elite opinion over the two decades separating the two surveys than there is in mass opinion. Moreover, there were some slight differences in the composition of the elite samples drawn in 1954 and 1973.

As a means of assessing the validity of the aggregation of elite opinion, it is possible to compare elite tolerance with other elite attitudes. Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1987) have developed a separate measure of the degree of liberalism of state elites. The measure summarizes the ideological positions of the state's congressional candidates, state legislators, political party elites, and national convention delegates. As an overall index of the liberalism-conservatism of state elites, they take the average score of the Democrats and the Republicans. Thus each state receives a score indicating the degree of liberalism-conservatism of state elites. Though most of the indicators are drawn from the 1970s, the authors believe this to be a more stable attribute of state elites. According to their index, the most conservative elites are found in Mississippi; the most liberal elites are found in Massachusetts.

The correlation of state elite conservatism and political tolerance is $-.46$ ($N = 26$) for the Stouffer elites and $-.22$ ($N = 29$) for the Nunn, Crockett, and Williams elites. Though liberalism-conservatism is conceptually distinct from political tolerance, some solace can be taken in this correlation. The aggregation process seems not to have introduced unexpected or obviously biased estimates of state-level elite opinion.

Notes

This research has been conducted through the generous support of the National Science Foundation, SES 84-21037. NSF is not responsible for any of the interpretations or conclusions reported herein. For research assistance, I am indebted to David Romero, James P. Wenzel, and Richard J. Zook. This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the 1986 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1986. Several colleagues have been kind enough to comment on an earlier version of this article, including Paul R. Abramson, David G. Barnum, Lawrence Baum, James A. Davis, Thomas R. Dye, Heinz Eulau, George E. Marcus, John P. McIver, Paul M. Sniderman, Robert Y. Shapiro, and Martin P. Wattenberg. I am also indebted to Patrick Bova, librarian at NORC, for assistance with the Stouffer data.

1. The elitist theory of democracy is actually an amalgam of the work of a variety of theorists, including Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954); Kornhauser (1959); Lipset (1960); and Key (1961). The most useful analysis of the similarities and differences among the theories can be found in Bachrach 1967. Some elite theorists emphasize the dominance and control of public policy by elites,

while other theorists emphasize the antidemocratic tendencies of the mass public. The single view most compatible with the hypotheses tested in this article is Kornhauser's (1959). The hypotheses are also to be found in Dye and Zeigler 1987 (see also Dye 1976). Earlier empirical work on the tolerance of elites and masses includes Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lipset 1960; Prothro and Grigg 1960; and McClosky 1964. A more recent analysis of some of the propositions of elitist theory can be found in Gibson and Bingham 1984.

2. Linkage research is fairly common in other areas of substantive policy (e.g., Erikson 1976; Weissberg 1978), but the only rigorous investigation of civil liberties is that of Page and Shapiro (1983). They assessed the relationship between change in opinion and change in policy, and found that in eight of nine policy changes in the area of civil liberties there was opinion-policy congruence. They also found that state policies were more likely to be congruent with opinion than national policies, although the relationship did not hold in the multivariate analysis. Though their analysis was conducted at the national level, their findings seem to suggest that political repression results from demands from the mass public.

3. This is similar to Goldstein's definition, "Political repression consists of government action which grossly discriminates against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key governmental policies, because of their perceived political beliefs" (1978, xvi).

4. The source for these data is a 1965 study requested by a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary in the U.S. Senate. See also Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, 1965; Gellhorn 1952; and Prendergast 1950. Care must be taken in using the Legislative Reference Service data because there are a variety of errors in the published report. Corrected data, based on an examination of all of the relevant state statutes, are available from the author.

The scores shown in Table 1 reflect actions taken by the state governments between 1945 and 1965. The decision to limit the policy measures to this period is based on the desire to have some temporal proximity between the opinion and policy data. This decision has implications for the scores of three states. Kansas and Wisconsin both barred Communists from political participation in legislation adopted in 1941. This legislation is excluded from Table 1. Arkansas is shown as having banned Communists from public employment, from politics, and outright. Only the outright ban was adopted in the 1945-65 period. Because a complete ban necessarily excludes Communists from public employment and from political participation, the score for Arkansas is shown as 3.5.

5. These three items scale in the Guttman sense. That is, nearly all of the states outlawing the Communist party also denied it access to the ballot and public employment. Nearly all of the states that denied Communists access to the ballot as candidates also made them ineligible for public employment. The registration variable does not, however, exhibit this pattern of cumulativeness. Registration seems to have been a means of enforcing a policy goal such as banning membership in the Party. Because registration can raise Fifth Amendment self-incrimination issues, some states chose not to require it. Statutes requiring registration are treated for measurement purposes as representing a greater degree of commitment to political repression, and for that reason the "bonus" points were added to the basic repression score.

6. Validity means not only that measures of similar concepts converge; measures of dissimilar concepts must also diverge (Campbell and Fiske 1959). Thus it is useful to examine the relationship between the repression measures and measures of other sorts of policy outputs. Klingman and Lammers (1984) have developed a measure of the "general policy liberalism" of the states. General policy liberalism is a predisposition in state public policies toward extensive use of the public sector and is thought to be a relatively stable attribute. I would expect that political repression is not simply another form of liberalism, and indeed it is not. The correlation between general policy liberalism and political repression during the 1950s is only −.18. Moreover, the relationship between repression and a measure of New Deal social welfare liberalism policy (see Holbrook-Provow and Poe 1987; Rosenstone 1983) is only −.22. Repression occurred in states with histories of liberalism just about as frequently as it did in states typically adopting conservative policies. Thus the measure of repression is not simply a form of political liberalism, a finding that contributes to the apparent validity of the measure.

7. This conclusion is based on figures compiled by Harvey Klehr on the size of the Communist Party U.S.A. during the 1930s (Klehr 1984, tbl. 19.1 and personal communication with the author, 21 May 1986). The data are from the Party's own internal record. Klehr believes the data to be reasonably reliable, and others seem to agree (see, e.g., Glazer 1961, 208, n. 3; and Shannon 1959, 91). There is also a strong relationship between Party membership and votes for Communist candidates for public offices in the 1936 elections (as compiled by the American Legion 1937, 44), as well as a strong relationship with FBI estimates of Party membership in the states in 1951 (U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary 1956, 34).

8. Stouffer defined *elites* as those who hold certain positions of influence and potential influence in local politics. The elite sample was drawn from those holding the following positions: community chest chairmen; school board presidents; library

committee chairmen; Republican county chairmen; Democratic county chairmen; American Legion commanders; bar association presidents; chamber of commerce presidents; PTA presidents; women's club presidents; DAR regents; newspaper publishers; and labor union leaders.

9. Weighted least squares was used because I could not assume that the variances of the observations were equal. Following Hanushek and Jackson (1977, 151–52), I weighted the observations by the square root of the numbers of respondents within the state. The r-square from this analysis is .14. The regression equation with unstandardized coefficients is: $Y = 7.31 - .14$ (mass opinion) $- 1.11$ (elite opinion).

10. The data in Table 2 suggest that where the state elites are relatively less tolerant, increases in mass tolerance are associated with an increase in political repression. Caution must be exercised in interpreting the percentages, however, due to the small number of cases available. The data reveal that in five of the seven states with a relatively less tolerant mass public, repressive legislation was adopted, while in all three of the states with a relatively more tolerant mass public repressive legislation was adopted. In the context of the numbers of cases, I did not treat this difference as substantively significant.

11. It might be argued that elite opinion serves only to neutralize intolerant mass opinion. This suggests an interactive relationship between elite and mass opinion. Tests of this hypothesis reveal no such interaction. The impact of elite opinion on public policy is not contingent upon the level of tolerance of the mass public in the state.

12. Though it is a bit risky to do so, it is possible to break the policy variable into time periods according to the date on which the legislation was adopted. A total of sixteen states adopted repressive legislation prior to 1954; ten states adopted repressive legislation in 1954 or later. The correlations between pre-1954 repression and mass and elite tolerance, respectively, are $-.05$, and $-.35$. Where elites were more intolerant, policy was more repressive. Mass intolerance seems to have had little impact on policy.

The correlations change rather substantially for the post-1954 policy measure. There is a reasonably strong correlation between mass intolerance and repression ($r = -.32$) but little correlation with elite intolerance ($r = -.13$). If one were willing to draw conclusions based on what are surely relatively unstable correlations, based on limited numbers of observations, one might conclude that early efforts to restrict the political freedom of Communists were directed largely by elites, while later efforts were more likely to involve the mass public. The initiative for political repression therefore was with the elites, though the mass public sustained the repression once it was under way.

At the same time, however, the slight correlation between pre-1954 policy and mass intolerance suggests that mass opinion was not shaped by public policy. Where policy was more repressive, opinion was not more intolerant. The close temporal proximity here should give us pause in overinterpreting this correlation, however.

13. Note that Stouffer found that the leaders of the American Legion were the most intolerant of all leadership groups surveyed (Stouffer 1955, 52). Indeed, the commanders interviewed were only slightly less intolerant than the mass public.

14. At the same time, it should be noted that U.S. citizens became substantially more tolerant of Communists by the 1970s (e.g., Davis 1975; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978). This too might reflect changes in public policy, as well as elite leadership of opinion. As the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated some of the most repressive state and federal legislation of the McCarthy era, and as U.S. political leaders (including Richard Nixon) sought improved foreign relations with Communist nations, it became less appropriate to support the repression of Communists. These comments illustrate, however, the difficulty of sorting out the interrelationships of opinion and policy and also reveal that many efforts to do so border on nonfalsifiability.

15. Between 1917 and 1920, twenty-four states adopted criminal syndicalism statutes. There is some ambiguity in published compilations about the number of states with such laws. Dowell (1969) lists twenty states with such legislation, not counting the three states that adopted but then repealed syndicalism laws. Dowell apparently overlooked Rhode Island, at least according to the compilations of Chafee (1967) and Gellhorn (1952). On the other hand, neither Chafee nor Gellhorn listed Colorado or Indiana as having such statutes (though Chafee did list the states that had repealed their legislation). This latter problem is in part a function of determining whether specific statutes should be classified as banning criminal syndicalism. By 1937, three states had repealed their statutes (although one of these—Arizona—apparently did so inadvertently during recodification). As of 1981, seven of these states still had the statutes on their books, and one additional state—Mississippi—had passed such legislation (Jenson 1982, 167–75). For purposes of this analysis, Dowell's twenty-three states and Rhode Island are classified as having criminal syndicalism laws as of 1920.

16. It should also be noted that political culture is fairly stably related to mass political intolerance. Estimates of state opinion were derived from Roper data on an item about loyalty oaths asked in a 1937 survey. Opinion in more traditionalistic states was more supportive of mandatory loyalty oaths ($r = -.44$, $N = 47$). Similarly, the correlation between political culture and the state aggregates from the Stouffer replication in 1973 (see the Appendix) is

−.58 ($N = 35$). These coefficients are nothing more than suggestive, but they do suggest that political intolerance is a relatively enduring attribute of state political culture.

References

The American Legion. 1937. *Isms: A Review of Alien Isms, Revolutionary Communism, and their Active Sympathizers in the United States.* 2d Edition. Indianapolis: author.

Bachrach, Peter. 1967. *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Bilson, John F. O. 1982. Civil Liberty: An Econometric Investigation. *Kyklos* 35:94–114.

Brown, Ralph S. 1958. *Loyalty and Security.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Campbell, Donald T., and Donald W. Fiske. 1959. Convergent and Discriminant Validity by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix. *Psychological Bulletin* 56:81–105.

Carleton, Donald E. 1985. *Red Scare!* Austin: Texas Monthly.

Chafee, Zechariah, Jr. 1967. *Free Speech in the United States.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1956. *A Preface to Democratic Theory.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davis, James A. 1975. Communism, Conformity, Cohorts, and Categories: American Tolerance in 1954 and 1972–73. *American Journal of Sociology* 81:491–513.

Dowell, Eldridge. 1969. *A History of Criminal Syndicalism Legislation in the United States.* New York: Da Capo.

Dye, Thomas R. 1976. *Who's Running America: Institutional Leadership in the United States.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Dye, Thomas R., and Harmon Zeigler. 1987. *The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics.* 7th ed. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Elazar, Daniel. 1972. *American Federalism: A View from the States.* 2d ed. New York: Harper & Row.

Erikson, Robert S. 1976. The Relationship between Public Opinion and State Policy: A New Look Based on Some Forgotten Data. *American Journal of Political Science* 22:25–36.

Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, Jr., and John P. McIver. 1987. Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State Policy. Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Femia, Joseph V. 1975. Elites, Participation, and the Democratic Creed. *Political Studies* 27:1–20.

Gellhorn, Walter, ed. 1952. *The States and Subversion.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Gibson, James L. 1987. Homosexuals and the Ku Klux Klan: A Contextual Analysis of Political Intolerance. *Western Political Quarterly* 40: 427–48.

Gibson, James L., and Richard D. Bingham. 1982. On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance. *American Political Science Review* 76:603–20.

Gibson, James L., and Richard D. Bingham. 1984. Skokie, Nazis, and the Elitist Theory of Democracy. *Western Political Quarterly* 37:32–47.

Glazer, Nathan. 1961. *The Social Basis of American Communism.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

Goldstein, Robert Justin. 1978. *Political Repression in Modern America.* Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.

Hanushek, Eric A., and John E. Jackson. 1977. *Statistical Methods for Social Scientists.* New York: Academic.

Holbrook-Provow, Thomas M., and Steven C. Poe. 1987. Measuring State Political Ideology. *American Politics Quarterly* 15:399–416.

Hyman, Herbert H., and Paul B. Sheatsley. 1953. Trends in Public Opinion on Civil Liberties. *Journal of Social Issues* 9:6–16.

Jenson, Carol E. 1982. *The Network of Control: State Supreme Courts and State Security Statutes, 1920–1970.* Westport, CT: Greenwood.

Key, Valdimir O., Jr. 1961. *Public Opinion and American Democracy.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Klehr, Harvey. 1984. *The Heyday of American Communism: The Depression Decade.* New York: Basic Books.

Klingman, David, and William W. Lammers. 1984. The "General Policy Liberalism" Factor in American State Politics. *American Journal of Political Science* 28:598–610.

Kornhauser, William. 1959. *The Politics of Mass Society.* Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Krouse, Richard, and George Marcus. 1984. Electoral Studies and Democratic Theory Reconsidered. *Political Behavior* 6:23–39.

Lazarsfeld, Paul, and Wagner Thielens, Jr. 1958. *The Academic Mind.* Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Library of Congress. Legislative Reference Service. 1965. *Internal Security and Subversion: Principal State Laws and Cases.* Prepared by Raymond J. Celanda. Washington: GPO.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1960. *Political Man.* New York: Doubleday.

McClosky, Herbert. 1964. Consensus and Ideology in American Politics. *American Political Science Review* 58:361–82.

McClosky, Herbert, and Alida Brill. 1983. *Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe about Civil Liberties.* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

McCutcheon, Allan L. 1985. A Latent Class Analysis of Tolerance for Nonconformity in the American Public. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49:474–88.

Nunn, Clyde Z., Harry J. Crockett, Jr., and J. Allen Williams, Jr. 1978. *Tolerance for Nonconformity.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1983. Effects of Public Opinion on Public Policy. *American Political Science Review* 77:175–90.

Page, Benjamin I., Robert Y. Shapiro, and Glenn R. Dempsey. 1987. What Moves Public Opinion? *American Political Science Review* 81:23–43.

Prendergast, William B. 1950. State Legislatures and Communism: The Current Scene. *American Political Science Review* 44:556–74.

Prothro, James W., and Charles M. Grigg. 1960. Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement. *Journal of Politics* 22:276–94.

Rosenstone, Steven J. 1983. *Forecasting Presidential Elections.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Schumpeter, Joseph. 1950. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.* New York: Harper & Row.

Shannon, David A. 1959. *The Decline of American Communism: A History of the Communist Party of the United States since 1945.* Chatham, NJ: Chatham Bookseller.

Sniderman, Paul M. 1975. *Personality and Democratic Politics.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stouffer, Samuel A. 1955. *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Sullivan, John L., James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1979. A Reconceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases, 1950s–1970s. *American Political Science Review* 73:781–94.

Sullivan, John L., James Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1982. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sullivan, John L., Michal Shamir, Patrick Walsh, and Nigel S. Roberts. 1985. *Political Tolerance in Context: Support for Unpopular Minorities in Israel, New Zealand, and the United States.* Boulder, CO: Westview.

Thompson, Joel A. 1981. Outputs and Outcomes of State Workmen's Compensation Laws. *Journal of Politics* 43:1129–52.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. 1956. *The Communist Party of the United States of America: What It Is, How It Works.* 84th Cong., 2d sess., S. Doc. 117.

Weissberg, Robert. 1978. Collective versus Dyadic Representation in Congress. *American Political Science Review* 72:535–47.

Wright, Gerald C., Jr., Robert S. Erikson, and John P. McIver. 1985. Measuring State Partisanship and Ideology with Survey Data. *Journal of Politics* 47:469–89.

James L. Gibson is Professor of Political Science, University of Houston, TX 77004.

CHURCHES AS POLITICAL COMMUNITIES

KENNETH D. WALD
DENNIS E. OWEN
SAMUEL S. HILL, JR.
University of Florida

Most studies of contextual influences on political attitudes and behavior have treated geographical areas as the operative social environment. As early research on social influence processes noted, the conditions that promote consensus among inhabitants of a common environment are likely to be present in formal organizations that encourage face-to-face interaction. Churches possess many of the characteristics that should maximize behavioral contagion and are thus fertile ground for the dissemination of common political outlooks. This expectation is tested by assessing the link between theological and political conservatism in 21 Protestant congregations. The theological climate in the churches is found to contribute strongly to the members' political conservatism over and above the personal commitment of respondents to traditional Christian values and a variety of social and attitudinal variables. As churches constitute the single most widespread form of voluntary organizational affiliation in the United States, their potential political impact appears to be considerable.

Ever so slowly, political scientists have come to appreciate the influence of social environment on individual political behavior. The "contextual" approach, identified by Durkheim (1951) and first applied to electoral data by Tingsten (1937), asserts the "dependence of individual political behavior on variation in properties in the individual's environment" (Sprague 1982, 99). While scholars have not abandoned the individual as the unit of analysis, there is growing acceptance for the proposition that the salience of politically relevant characteristics may be reinforced or undermined by the larger environment that surrounds the individual (Huckfeldt 1986). The operation of contextual influences has been documented for several different types of political behavior—participation, vote choice, candidate evaluation, attitude formation—in local, national and cross-national samples. The environmental properties found to exert behavioral influence have included racial and ethnic composition, social class distribution, and the level of partisan competition.

For the most part, these studies have operationalized social context in terms of residential areas such as neighborhoods (census blocks or tracts), counties, communities, and regions. The choice of areal units has been dictated partly by the assumption that residential context is politically significant and partly by the ready availability of social and political data for geographic areas. As scholars have recognized, the residential context may not be the most important social environment that operates on the political attitudes and behavior of individuals. Practitioners have similarly suggested that "social precincts" defined by the

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 82 NO. 2 JUNE 1988

work place, secondary associations, and personal friendship networks may have replaced the traditional geographical precincts as the locus of attitude formation for some individuals (Mahe 1987). Consistent with this insight, systematic studies that hone in on intimate social environments—the family or friendship networks— report very strong behavioral influences associated with these more immediate contexts (Eulau and Rothenberg 1986; Finifter 1974; McCloskey and Dahlgren 1959; MacKuen and Brown 1987).

Our research shifts the analysis to yet a new level of social context—the church attended by the individual. As voluntary associations of individuals bound by strong affective ties and regular social interaction, churches constitute genuine communities that are well suited to the transmission and maintenance of group norms (White 1968). Churches also form by far the most extensive network of voluntary organizations in the United States, reaching perhaps two-thirds of the adult population (Stark 1987). This combination of characteristics favorable to social influence warrants the attention of political scientists because of the recent renewal of political activism in the churches. As it did in earlier periods of U.S. history, the religious factor now helps to define the national political agenda and to structure mass preferences for candidates, parties, and issue positions (Wald 1987). With the exception of otherwordly faiths that counsel withdrawal from corrupt secular institutions, church attendance is positively correlated with electoral participation. Religious activists have entered the political arena as the shock troops for several controversial political movements and candidacies. Yet despite the apparent growth in religiously based political conflict, scholars have paid little systematic attention to the environment where religious influence is most likely to be brought to bear on citizens—the local church.

Research on religion and politics has adopted the essentially individualistic approach to political behavior so long dominant in U.S. voting studies. This limitation is due largely to a reliance on surveys that pluck respondents randomly from a community or nation and thus provide too few cases to allow analysis of the influence of specific congregations (but see Leege and Gremillion 1986). The type of data available in national or community-wide surveys forces scholars to assess church influence with denominational preference items or measures of individual religious belief systems.[1] If the linkage between religion and politics is forged in the context of the congregation or parish, then measures derived from personal religious values or denominational identity will underestimate the political significance of religion generally and the specific impact of the immediate religious community—the congregation or parish. With data obtained from a sample of churches, this study provides a unique opportunity to assess the contribution of proximate religious environments to individual political behavior.

Churches as Contexts

Contextual research has identified a variety of influence mechanisms that promote consensus among members sharing an environment. At a minimum, a contextual effect would seem to require (1) the communication of political messages and (2) opportunities for members to observe the reactions of fellow members to these messages and to bring their own behavior into conformity with them. Like similar organizations that provided the basis for early theoretical work on contextual influence (Blau 1960a, 1960b), churches are environments with the capacity to facilitate both processes.

There are ample opportunities for church authorities to communicate political messages through direct channels such as sermons, pastoral messages, adult education classes, poster displays, and church publications. Implicit political messages may also be transmitted through aspects of what Parenti (1967) aptly described as the latent "political culture" associated with religious traditions—attitudes toward authority, knowledge, the requirements for salvation, and so on. Because of the high esteem in which churches are held and the voluntary nature of membership, any political messages transmitted by church authorities are likely at least to receive a respectful hearing, to enjoy substantial credibility, and potentially to alter opinions not initially in conformity with the prevailing views. In addition to the messages transmitted by religious leaders, political cues may also be disseminated among parishioners through conversation and other modes of social intercourse. The church provides many avenues for the reinforcement of such messages by bringing the membership together on a regular basis for formal worship and promoting informal social interaction among congregants. Similarly, the congregation has the capacity to punish deviations from collective norms by withdrawing approval from members who stray from acceptable attitudes or exhibit proscribed forms of behavior. This potent array of social influence mechanisms equips congregations with the capacity to promote uniformity in sociopolitical outlook.

The manner in which churches utilize these mechanisms was demonstrated in two of the congregations we observed during the data collection phase of the study. In a "mainline" Protestant church, the sanctuary was festooned with posters promoting solidarity with Central American victims of rightist oppression, the minister's sermon lauded the resistance of women to tyranny throughout history, the explanation of harvest symbols stressed the need to combat poverty and hunger, and the choice of hymns included folk songs from the civil rights era. During the announcement period of the service, several congregants encouraged their fellow members to attend demonstrations, meetings, and workshops in support of the causes that had received ministerial endorsement. A cursory inspection of the bumper stickers on vehicles parked around the church suggested that a considerable proportion of church members had indeed been active in such liberal organizations. A fundamentalist church visited one week later presented somewhat more indirect political tutelage. Though the sermon took as its text a verse from Exodus, a biblical book pregnant with political implications (Walzer 1985), the minister used it to encourage contributions for building a fence around church property. The fence was necessary, he said, to protect against beer parties and other rowdy activities taking place nearby. The church bulletin included a request for volunteers to help staff the local "right-to-life" office. Without formally endorsing either abstention from liquor or antiabortion activities, the church nonetheless conveyed clear social messages. The conservative line propounded on these issues was consistent with the church's past sponsorship of visits by conservative evangelists like the Rev. Jerry Falwell and the pastor's previous campaign for public office on a platform of moral conservatism. Each of the divergent churches offered a distinctive "climate of opinion" that linked Christianity to a particular political agenda.

Rather than isolated instances of political activism, these examples illustrate the growing willingness of churches in the United States to communicate political messages to their members. While tax-exempt status is theoretically dependent upon refraining from overt endorsement of candidates for public office, even that restriction can be evaded quite easily. No such restriction hampers the church that takes public stands on issues or policy debates. During the 1960s, the more liberal churches, especially those from mainline Protestant denominations, took advantage of the leeway accorded churches to press for causes such as racial justice, opposition to the Vietnam war, and campaigns for economic reform (Quinley 1974); they have continued to carry the torch for various liberal causes on the national agenda. The conservative Protestant clergy, who were slower to accept a political role for the church, now seem bent upon emulating their activist colleagues, though on behalf of different issues and positions. Once regarded as politically quiescent or at least as uncritically accepting of U.S. public policy, the Roman Catholic clergy have recently weighed in with pronouncements regarding the contemporary controversies of abortion, arms control, Central American policy, and the U.S. economy. In the black community, members of the clergy maintain the strong political leadership role that was evident during the civil rights movement (Walton 1985, 47–49).

Of course, churches are not primarily intended to function as political movements but as spiritual agencies. Perhaps the most effective limit upon their political capacity is the resistance of members to "excessive" political entanglement. The strong U.S. tradition of separation between church and state may lead some parishioners to resist attempts to foist a political line on churches, whether such attempts emanate from the clergy, denominational bodies, or self-appointed spokespersons lacking official standing. During a period of retrenchment that followed the activism of the 1960s, the backlash against such politicization resulted in ferocious internal conflict, forced some liberal clergy from their pulpits, and may even have contributed to declining membership in some of the most politically active denominations (Hadden 1969). Even if church members accept the legitimacy of social action, churches rarely circumscribe the lives of adherents. Thus church members are exposed to other agencies that may compete with the church as sources of political information and influence.

We examine the contextual dimension to the often-asserted affinity between conservatism in religion and politics. Despite the example of liberation theology in South America, the precedent of Christian socialism, and the social gospel tradition in U.S. religious life, many students of politics reflexively treat religion as a force for order, social control, and conservative positions on public policy. The assumption also persists despite a preponderance of disconfirming evidence in the scholarly literature (Wuthnow 1973) and repeated findings that it is the content of religious values rather than intensity of commitment that seems to influence political outlooks (Benson and Williams 1982; Gorsuch and Aleshire 1974; Welch and Leege, n.d.). Despite these caveats, there are some good reasons to hypothesize a connection between conservative orientations in religion and politics. Scholars have identified asceticism, otherworldliness, transvaluation, and respect for authority as characteristics of Christianity that comport comfortably with resistance to social and political change. To the extent that church attendance and involvement are positively correlated with social class, that too should promote political conservatism among churchgoers. The social values of Christianity have generally, if not universally, been interpreted to promote respect for tradition and conventional behavior. Though speaking of antiabortion sentiment, Himmelstein (1986, 9) made a point generally applicable to traditionalist Christianity when he noted a common theme of "opposition to too much individual autonomy, too much freedom from constraints imposed by traditional roles and norms (especially those of the family), and too much emphasis on individual self-determination and self-fulfillment." So long as one does not elevate these affinities into iron laws and overlook the conditions that may breed exceptions, there is a sound basis to hypothesize a tie between traditionalist religion and conservative politics. The connection may have been underestimated in past empirical research by the decision to operationalize religion as a personal belief system or denominational self-identification.

The task before us is to examine that linkage with a focus upon the forces responsible for it. Is it the individual's theology or the theology of the individual's congregation that most effectively links the domains of religion and politics? We are interested in whether such linkage operates solely at the individual level, as conventional electoral analysis would have it, or depends to some degree upon the climate of opinion within congregations. Our observations have led us to expect that congregations should indeed constitute political communities.

Data and Methods

The data for the study were obtained from questionnaires administered over the course of a calendar year to volunteer members of 21 Protestant churches in the Gainesville, Florida metropolitan area.[2] With a concern to maximize diversity among the churches sampled, we categorized churches by their perceived theological orientation and then contacted ministers or education directors from several churches within each category. Respondents were promised anonymity for their questionnaires and confidentiality for their churches. With a very high degree of cooperation, we were permitted to administer the lengthy questionnaire to members of adult education classes (the source of two-thirds of our respondents) and to persons attending various worship services on Sunday or Wednesday. This procedure produced data from a grand total of 673 respondents in 23 churches. For this analysis, we have dropped two churches whose 16 respondents were recruited directly by the minister, leaving 657 respondents from 21 different churches. Because of time pressure, the length of the questionnaire, misunderstanding, suspicion about the motives of the authors in soliciting personal information, and the general problem of securing compliance to instructions with self-administered surveys, many questionnaires contained at least some unanswered or incorrectly answered questions. There appeared to be no bias in the distribution of such questionnaires by church, so we followed the conservative strategy of including only respondents with complete information on all the items to be used for analysis.[3] This will reduce the effective *N* to between 502 and 629 cases, depending upon the number of variables included in the analysis.

The 21 churches provide the operative social contexts for this study.[4] The use of such units offers some potential advantages over studies that employ the residential neighborhood as a surrogate for social environment. The church is a distinct and bounded context, recognized as such by members who have chosen voluntarily to affiliate and who may leave if they find the congregation no longer to their liking. Because of the selection criteria, the churches in the study are strikingly diverse in their social composition, theological position, and political tendencies. By virtue of their presence on church premises when the questionnaire was administered, we know that respondents have face-to-face contact with members of the group and exposure to communication from church authorities; indeed, responses to some of the items on the interview schedule indicate the presence of strong affective commitments and extensive involvement in the life of the church. These tendencies, which should magnify the likelihood of behavioral contagion, cannot always be assumed to operate in the neighborhood setting.

By conducting on-site administration of questionnaires, we have isolated a group of respondents who are highly vulnerable to group norms. As noted, the sample consists of the subset of church members who were present at services or participants in adult education classes. We know from previous research that intensity of involvement with the church is positively correlated with the likelihood of conformity to group norms (Stark 1984). The prospects for contextual influence are less promising for weakly attached members who seldom attend services or participate in adult education classes—and who were undoubtedly underrepresented in our survey. Of course, the peripheral members are also likely to be underrepresented in mail surveys from church rosters, the major alternative data collection strategy available to us.

The other limits of our research strategy stem from the manner of selecting congregations. As all the churches were located within a single county in a region with a distinctive political culture, we cannot generalize the findings to other settings. Neither can we compare the impact of church-level influences with competing geographical contexts. By confining the survey to Protestant congregations, we gave up the opportunity to explore contextual influences associated with Catholic or Jewish congregations. Moreover, we cannot claim a random sample of churchgoers in the community as a whole. These drawbacks notwithstanding, the research design offers a rare opportunity to assess how one important social environment may structure opinions on political issues.

Dependent Variables

Two measures of political conservatism will be used in the analysis. The first, a composite scale of preferences on public issues with a moral dimension, taps support for "traditional" values in public policy. Though developed independently, it bears a strong relationship to the "moral traditionalism" battery included on the interview schedule for the 1986 National Election Study (Conover and Feldman 1986). The "moral conservatism" scale is based on items about abortion, cohabitation, homosexuality, traditional sex roles, censorship, birth control, the family, drug use, and racial intermarriage.[5] The 10 Likert-style items in the battery engendered a common reaction as indicated by an internal reliability coefficient (standardized Cronbach's alpha) of .8. These issues have historically been the source of the strongest religious differences in mass political attitudes (Hoge and Zulueta 1985). We have also employed a general measure of ideological self-definition common in the literature. Respondents were asked to pick from a list of eight phrases (including *don't know)* the one label that best described their political beliefs. The resulting measure of self-described ideology was compressed to a five-point continuum with response options of strongly conservative or liberal, conservative or liberal, and middle-of-the-road. To encourage respondents to cue their answers to political rather than religious matters, this question followed six others that inquired about past and present partisan identification, voter registration, and candidate preferences in recent national elections.

While the two measures differ in several ways, the major distinction is that the moral conservatism scale has a stronger surface relevance to church doctrine than does the ideological label. When traditionalist ministers express political opinions from the pulpit, they stress propriety and rectitude in personal conduct (Koller and Retzer 1980). To the historical injunction against the "finger sins" of drinking, smoking, and gambling, ministers have added renewed emphasis to the importance of maintaining monogamous relations within marriage and to reserving legitimacy for the traditional family—themes expressed by the items on the moral conservatism scale. Churchgoers have much greater difficulty connecting church doctrine with the question of government size and spending that undergirds the left-right political spectrum. Hence we should expect to find religious conservatism more strongly related to the moral conservatism scale than to the choice of an ideological designation.

Theological Conservatism

The measurement of religious conservatism is fraught with conceptual and methodological hazards (Kellstedt and Smidt 1985). In the absence of a single widely accepted measure, we decided to rely upon a slightly revised version of Gallup's three-part scale (Hunter 1983). The scale taps three elements in Christian thought that have been given special emphasis by Protestant traditionalists: evangelism; an intense, personal relationship with Christ; and an inerrantist approach to Scripture. We employed these specific items to assess Protestant orthodoxy:

1. Have you ever tried to encourage someone to believe in Jesus Christ or to accept Jesus Christ as his or her savior?
2. Would you say that you have been "born again" or have had a turning point in your life when you committed yourself to Christ?
3. Which of the following statements comes *closest* to your feelings about the Bible?
    a. The Bible is the actual word of God and it should be taken literally, word for word.
    b. The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word.
    c. The Bible is an ancient book of history, legends, and moral precepts recorded by men.[6]

Respondents who answered the first two items affirmatively and endorsed the literalist view of the Bible were assigned the maximum score of three on the scale. The middle position (with a value of two) was occupied by respondents who also responded positively to the first two questions but selected option b on the question about the Bible. Persons who endorsed any other combination of views, including negative responses to the first two items and support for the secularist approach to the Bible, were accorded the lowest score of one for religious conservatism. The entire sample yielded a roughly even division with 31% in the lowest category, 30% in the medium position, and the remaining 39% assigned the maximum score. Religious conservatism scores were calculated individually for each respondent and averaged within each church to obtain a measure of the congregational religious orientation. In the subsequent discussion, we will refer to individual scale scores as personal theology and use "congregational theology" to designate the congregational mean.

Results of Analysis

While it is not adequate to specify the nature of contextual influence, a simple analysis of variance with the contextual units as levels of analysis can at least suggest the possibility of church-related influence. When we performed such analysis for both moral conservatism and self-described ideology (not shown), the 21 churches in our sample differed widely. Using each church as a dummy variable, between-group differences accounted for almost 58% of the variation in moral conservatism and 35% of the variation in self-described ideology. To give some sense of the magnitude of such effects, the

Table 1. Regression of Moral Conservaatism and Conservative Identification on Congregational Theology

Designation	Congregational Theology	Constant	Adjusted R^2	Number of Cases
Churches				
Moral conservatism	9.0**	–.5	.74	21
Conservative identity	.6*	2.1**	.32	21
Individuals				
Moral conservatism	9.0**	–.2	.41	616
Conservative identity	.7*	2.0**	.17	629

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. The first two rows report analyses conducted with the church as the unit of analysis; in the last two rows, the individual respondent is the unit of analysis.

*Significant at .01.

**Significant at .001.

grand mean for moral conservatism was 18.5 with a possible range from 0 to 36. Church means ranged as low as 5.9 and as high as 30.1. On the conservative self-designation item, which was confined to values from 1 to 5 with a mean of 3.4, we observed individual church scores from 2.1 to 4.5. Something associated with the churches, if only compositional differences between them, accounts for substantial interchurch variations in receptivity to political conservatism.

To assess the impact of context more directly, we will report a series of OLS regression analyses conducted at different levels of analysis and with different sets of variables. To preview the analysis that will be presented, the first set of equations (Table 1) looks simply at the contribution of congregational theology—the mean of personal theology scores in churches—to moral conservatism and conservative self-identification. The analysis is conducted separately for churches and individuals, giving a preliminary reading on the significance of congregational opinion in forming political outlooks of church members. The analysis is then replicated in Table 2 but with personal theology substituted as a predictor variable and church-level dummy variables included as proxies for contextual influence. In the final set of analyses reported in Table 3, the joint impact of congregational and personal theology is assessed after those two variables are purged of collinearity through a statistical transformation; that analysis also includes a set of demographic and partisan variables linked by previous research to both political and religious conservatism. After the discovery of strong church-level influences on the attitudes of individual congregants, we will assess the perennial rival hypothesis offered by critics of contextual analysis, the self-selection model.

The case for contextual influence was first examined by an OLS regression equation conducted at the level of the church rather than the individual. For this analysis, the dependent variables were the average scores of church members on the two political conservatism measures. The independent variable was the mean church score on the theology index:

$$\text{conservatism} = b_0 + b_1\,(\text{congregational theology})$$

The results of the procedure are listed in the first two rows of Table 1.

We found that mean church theology was a strong predictor of moral conservatism at the congregational level—explaining just under three-fourths of the varia-

Table 2. Regression of Moral Conservatism and Conservative Identification on Personal Theology

Designation	Personal Theology	Constant	Adjusted R²	Number of Cases
Churches				
Moral conservatism	5.9**	6.3**	.33	600
Conservative identity	.5*	2.4**	.15	614
Individuals				
Moral conservatism	1.5**	15.6**	.57	600
Conservative identity	.2*	3.1**	.34	614

Note: See the note to Table 1. The equations reported in the last two rows included dummy variables representing the individual congregations.

*Significant at .01.
**Significant at .001.

tion in that measure—and a weaker but nonetheless impressive influence on self-designation as a conservative (multiple *r*-square = .32). For both dependent variables, increases in church-level theological conservatism produced the predicted conservatizing influence. The same pattern held when analysis shifted back to the individual level but the independent variable, theological conservatism, was based on aggregated data. For the analysis reported in the third and fourth rows of Table 1, we spread the church-level scores on theological conservatism (congregational theology) to each of the parishioners in a church and then used that variable to predict individual differences in political conservatism. The church-level measure contributed strongly to both forms of conservatism, producing for each one-unit increase a corresponding increment of 9 on the moral conservatism scale and .7 on the 5-point ideological spectrum. Both coefficients are strikingly stable and the equations are powerful (multiple *r*-square = .41 for moral conservatism and .17 for self-described ideology).

But a case can also be made for the significance of theology at the individual level rather than through contextual influence. To get a first reading about the contribution of individual-level theological differences to sociopolitical perspectives, we analyzed the personal theologies of the individuals who composed the sample:

$$\text{conservatism} = b_0 + b_1\,(\text{personal theology})$$

In the equations reported in the first two rows of Table 2, personal theology also proved a strong and significant predictor of individuals' political conservatism. With an *N* of 600, each unit increase in the measure of theological conservatism accounted for an almost six-point increment in moral conservatism and magnified the ideology score by almost half a point; both coefficients were highly significant. The variance explained for moral conservatism and ideological self-designation was, respectively, 33% and 15%, an impressive degree of predictability for any single independent variable in survey research. This hardly disproves contextual influence because the addition of dummy variables representing individual congregations appreciably boosted the explanatory power of the equation to 57% for moral conservatism and 34% for conservative identification. The model tested in the third and fourth rows of Table 2 took the form

$$\text{conservatism} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ (personal theology)} + b_2 \ldots b_{21} \text{ (church dummy variables)}$$

With both personal and congregational theology (the latter simply the mean of personal theology scores within a church) emerging as potent predictors of political conservatism in separate equations, the skeptical analyst will naturally want a direct comparison of effects, if only to insure that the impact of church-level variables is not simply an artifact of individual outlooks. Comparing individual and contextual impact is no easy matter because of the multicollinearity caused by the strong relationship between individual and group theology. This is not a problem in conventional contextual analysis because individuals make a negligible contribution to the overall behavior of the geographical unit where they reside. But with group means derived from samples that averaged 31 and ranged in size from only 10 to 60 per church, the correlation between personal and mean church theology rises to an unacceptably high level ($r = .8$). The same problem occurs with the multiplicative term computed to gauge the interaction of personal with church theology ($r = .9$ between this term and its two components). The inclusion of such highly correlated terms as individual theology scores, group means, and the product of their interaction massively destabilizes the coefficients for all three measures, making impossible a direct comparison of their effects.

Boyd and Iversen (1979, 60–76) have suggested an elegant solution to the problem of correlations between individual measures and aggregate values derived from them (see Tate 1984 for qualifications). The centering procedure first requires obtaining within-group slopes, means, and intercepts and then constructing new independent variables from them. The variables constructed following this procedure are orthogonal and thus free of the intercorrelation that hampers multivariate analysis. Applied to our sample, the procedure first required separate regressions in each of the 21 churches, assignment of the slopes and group means to parishioners within each church, and construction of new measures representing both conservatism measures: individual and church-level theology. The resulting theology measures are uncorrelated, which makes it possible to enter them simultaneously into regression equations explaining moral conservatism and self-described ideology.

Following the procedures suggested by Boyd and Iversen, the variables were centered and then incorporated in the following model:

$$\text{conservatism} = b_0 + b_1 \text{ (congregational theology)} + b_2 \text{ (personal theology)} + b_3 \text{ (congregational theology} * \text{personal theology)}$$

We find from the results in the first two columns of Table 3 no need to choose between personal and group theology, because both contribute to political conservatism. With each unit increase in personal theological conservatism (as transformed by the centering procedure), there is a gain of 1.7 on the moral conservatism scale. A corresponding shift in the theological climate of the church raises the score by 4.8 points. The interaction of personal with church theology magnifies the impact although the coefficient is not statistically discernible from zero. The standardized regression coefficients (not shown) confirm that congregational theology far outweighs personal religious beliefs in influence upon conservative social values. The pattern holds with conservative self-identification as the depen-

Table 3. Regression of Moral Conservatism and Conservative Identification on Personal Theology, Congregational Theology, and Selected Demographic and Partisan Variables (Centered Religious Variables)

Variables	Moral Conservatism	Conservative Identification	Moral Conservatism	Conservative Identification
Religious				
Congregational theology	4.8***	.6**	4.8***	.3**
Personal theology	1.7**	.3**	1.4*	.2
Interaction of congregational and personal theology	1.0	.1	—	—
Political				
Party			.3	.2***
1984 vote			3.0***	.5***
Demographic				
Sex (1 = female)			-.9	—
Race (1 = black)			2.7	-.9***
Number of children			-.8**	-.1*
Age			.2***	.01**
Region (1 = South)			2.9***	.3*
Place (1 = rural, small town)			.1	—
Education			-.4	—
Occupational prestige	—	—		
Marital status (1 = married)			.9	.1
Constant	14.2***	3.0***	-2.6	1.3***
Adjusted R^2	.10	.08	.32	.31
Number of cases	600	614	502	513

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with coefficients less than .01 indicated by —. The table should be read down the columns, so that the first entry indicates an almost five-point increment in moral conservatism associated with every one-point increase in congregational theological conservatism.

*Significant at .05.
**Significant at .01.
***Significant at .001.

dent variable. While personal theology enhances scale scores by over one-quarter of a point, the mean church theology raises the likelihood of conservative political identification by three-fifths of a point. The interaction effect is positive but modest in magnitude. The coefficients for personal and church theology in both equations are several times the size of the corresponding standard errors. On this evidence, the theological climate of opinion in the church has a greater impact than personal theology in promoting political conservatism among church members.

The Specter of Confounding Effects

Thus far we have demonstrated that personal religious conservatism and church conservatism (as measured by congregational averages on the theological index) both contribute significantly to individual political conservatism. The analysis presented above does not confront the possibility of spurious correlation. The influence we have attributed to environmental properties may instead be the consequence of unmeasured individual traits correlated with patterns of church membership. That members of any particular congregation evince a common political outlook may have more to do with their individual traits than to any congregational-level opinion formation. One response to this charge, audacious if not adequate, is to turn the argument around by insisting that individual influences are just as likely to function as proxies for unmeasured environmental influences. But a more satisfactory response is simply to try to identify the individual traits likely to promote a spurious relationship between the independent and dependent variables, measure them, and include the measures as controls in the analysis. For the problem at hand, social and political forces are the most obvious individual-level traits that might underlie an apparent contextual effect for theology.

The apparent impact of group theology on political outlooks may vanish with controls for what has been called the *modernization syndrome*. Christian orthodoxy is strongest in the sectors of society least exposed to modernizing influences (Hunter 1983). In practice, encapsulation in traditionalist environments has been indexed by socioeconomic variables such as education, occupational prestige, urban residence, and regional background. Traditionalists are most likely to report modest educational attainment, low occupational prestige, an upbringing in rural areas or small towns of the South. They are also more likely than the rest of the population to have large families. Three population groups—women, the elderly, and blacks—have been especially likely to exhibit strong ties to traditional religion and to reject moral liberalsim. Perhaps the apparent link between group theology and political outlooks really reflects the clustering of traditionalist groups in certain churches.

There is also a possibility that political variables associated with membership in churches may contribute to spurious contextual inferences. If theologically conservative churches attract Reaganite Republicans and political liberals gravitate to more moderate denominations, that could produce an apparent congregational tie between theology and ideology. Of course, churches rarely if ever proselytize on partisan grounds but individuals who are disposed to one party or the other may be attracted to congregations with particular theological orientations. Distinctive partisan identities may also accrue to churches because of social biases in membership. Individual partisan tendencies should thus be controlled.

The equation was expanded to include measures of modernization and partisanship:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{conservatism} &= b_0 \\ &+ b_1\,(\text{personal theology}) \\ &+ b_2\,(\text{congregational theology} \\ &\qquad * \text{ personal theology}) \\ &+ b_4\,(\text{exposure to modernization}) \\ &+ b_5\,(\text{partisanship}) \end{aligned}$$

Personal information items included at the end of the questionnaire were used to construct variables representing educational attainment (five categories), occupational prestige (the Duncan index for the chief wage earner in the household), age (in years), and number of children. Dummy variables were employed to indicate exposure to urbanism and Southern culture, marital status, gender, and race.[7] The dummies were coded with the most traditionalist category receiving the value of one. To measure partisanship, respondents picked from a five-point scale with options of *Republican; Democrat; Independent; Independent who usually agrees with the Republicans;* and *Independent who usually agrees with the Democrats.* We also included a measure of vote choice in 1984 that grouped respondents into three categories: Reagan voters, Mondale voters, and nonvoters. The political measures were coded so that high scores indicated Republicanism and nonvoters were the median category.

The results in the last two columns of Table 3 provide eloquent testimony to the power of contextual influences even in the face of controls for political and social factors. With the additional measures, the equation predicting moral conservatism does increase its predictive capacity as evidenced by an increase in explained variance from 10% to 32% and by a corresponding decrease in the standard error of estimate from 9.1 to 7.9. Some of the additional regressors, notably presidential vote in 1984, family size, Southern background, and age, contribute significantly and predictably to moral conservatism. But these additional variables leave personal and contextual theology undiminished as powerful influences on sociopolitical outlook. As it did in the equation without controls, mean congregational theology remains a powerful predictor of moral conservatism, producing almost a five-point increment in that scale for every one-point increase in the congregation's theological conservatism. Based on the standardized coefficient (not shown), congregational theology is the single most important predictor of moral conservatism among the individuals in the study. Belonging to a church whose members embrace a conservative theology—over and above an individual's own theology or a myriad of social and political traits—enhances commitment to the application of traditional social values to policy issues.

The pattern holds, albeit to a lesser degree, for self-designated ideology. The control variables raise the *r*-square from 8% to 31% and similarly reduce the standard error of estimate from 1.3 to 1.1. As with moral conservatism, several of the new regressors exert significant influence on the tendency to embrace the conservative label in politics: presidential vote, family size, Southern background, race (with whites more likely to identify as conservatives), age, and partisanship. Unlike moral conservatism, the introduction of these controls does diminish the contribution of both personal and church theology. Despite some erosion in the coefficient, there is still evidence of a strong contextual influence. A one-point increase in mean church theological conservatism moves individuals approximately one-third of a point in the direction of conservatism on a continuum with five points. Though less powerful than partisanship, race, and age (based on the standardized coefficients), the theological climate of opinion in a church contributes more strongly to conservative political identification than several social traits and the individual's personal commitment to theologically conservative Christian values. This finding, together with the even stronger pattern for moral conservatism, seems to confirm that churches function as political communities by promoting attitudinal consensus: the more conservative the congregation theologically, the more strongly individuals within it adopt conservative political positions.

The Self-Selection Hypothesis

Many U.S. citizens are loathe to admit that churches or clergy affect their political outlooks. Both the individualist culture and a tradition of strict church-state separation militate against accepting the church as a legitimate source of political information and persuasion. The evidence assembled here demonstrates nonetheless that churches do indeed promote distinctive political orientations. Subject to the limits of the data source, the results indicate that the extent of theological traditionalism prevailing in the congregation moves individual members to more con-

Table 4. Relationship between Personal Theology and Church Orientation

	Type of Denomination		
Personal Theology	Liberal	Conservative	Fundamentalist
Modernist	178 (27%)	20 (3%)	6 (1%)
Moderate	96 (15%)	73 (11%)	24 (4%)
Orthodox	23 (4%)	100 (15%)	132 (20%)

Note: Number of cases = 652.

servative preferences on social issues and makes them more disposed to identify as political conservatives. The effect operates over and above the personal theological beliefs of the individual and a variety of individual traits that contribute separately to conservatism. All other things being equal, a theologically conservative individual belonging to a theologically conservative church is more likely to develop a conservative political outlook than an equally traditionalist Protestant who belongs to a church whose members are less conservative on theological issues. Similarly, two churchgoers equally liberal in theology will differ in their propensity to adopt politically conservative positions and labels according to the theological climate in their respective churches.

If this finding is to be accepted, it is necessary to confront an alternative hypothesis that is routinely put forward in opposition to contextual theories of behavior. According to the self-selection hypothesis, what appear to be contextual influences are in reality the result of individuals choosing environments—in this case, churches—on the basis of prior political beliefs. That is, Unitarians may be politically liberal and independent Baptists politically conservative not because of anything that goes on in church but because political liberals select churches with liberal political reputations and political conservatives search for congregations with politically conservative outlooks. According to this view, self-selection on the dependent variable produces the appearance of environmental influence on behavior.

Lacking longitudinal data, it is impossible to test this assertion directly; but we do possess data that allow an indirect assessment of self-selection processes. If the choice of church membership is as rational and purposive as the self-selection hypothesis implies, then surely religious belief plays an important role in congregational affiliation. But our data show only limited congruence between the theological orientations of individuals and the denominations to which they belong. As indicated by the pattern in Table 4, the correlation is incomplete on the dimension where self-selection is most likely. The column variable represents the predominant theological orientation of the church to which the respondent belongs. It was derived from expert judgments in the literature that commonly apportion denominations between liberal, conservative, and fundamentalist camps. The rows represent the personal theology score described above. The table reveals that over 40% of the churchgoers in the sample exhibited discrepancy between personal theological beliefs and the predominant theological orientation usually ascribed to their denomination. Even allowing for measurement error and the roughness of the classification scheme, the magnitude of the inconsistency is remarkable. Despite access to a religious "marketplace" with ample options, it seems that many individuals do not seek out the church that most closely "fits" their theological views. Social factors, family traditions, a sense of fellowship, convenience, the appeal of a particular minister, intermarriage, and other factors probably account for the selection of churches that do not match foundational religious values.

The finding of imperfect correspondence between personal and congregational theology in Table 4 raises doubts about the larger claim of critics regarding self-selection of churches on political grounds. If many church members do not self-select on the basis of religious belief, surely a sensible basis for choosing a religious organization, then it is hardly persuasive to argue that they self-select on the basis of politics. In the hierarchy of factors that determine religious affiliation, it is likely that political compatibility ranks below theology and the social factors that probably weigh heavily in the selection of a church. With a research design that precludes a more direct assessment of the political self-selection hypothesis, the indirect test can do no more than call into question the logic that sustains an anticontextual interpretation of our findings. Together with analysis showing that contextual influences are not merely the residue of unmeasured individual dispositions correlated with the independent variables, the findings suggest the operation of politically relevant social influence mechanisms within the confines of the congregation.

Discussion

To recapitulate the major findings, we observed a strong association between the predominant theological temper within congregations and the political views maintained by church members. Conservatism in congregational theology was correlated both with congregants' conservative preferences on social policy and self-identification as a political conservative. Once personal and congregational theology were disentangled, the evidence suggested that the collective outlook of the church was more politically influential than the worldview of the individual church member. The relationship between congregational theology and political outlook also withstood controls for individual traits that might contribute independently to political conservatism and seems unlikely to have resulted from the selection of churches on the basis of political compatibility. We have explained this pattern from a contextual perspective. Messages from the pulpit and social interaction with congregants apparently promote a common political outlook among church members.

This analysis suggests a need to redirect inquiry on religion and politics from an individualist perspective toward models that stress the formative influence of the immediate religious environment. Typical research in the genre operationalizes "religion" as a pattern of individual religious belief; the analysis in this study suggests that religious commitment bears on politics primarily through the medium of communities of belief. The disjuncture between the individualist and congregationalist approaches can be illustrated by congregants whose religious context subverts the logical "individual" link between personal theology and political orientation. Consider the case of a theological conservative who found his or her way into a mainline church where most members subscribed to liberalism in theology and politics. To the extent it can be generalized, our evidence suggests that the liberal political messages emanating from the congregation would move that individual away from the conservative political beliefs implicit in traditionalist theology—even as the personal theology was maintained without change. By the same token, a theological liberal in a religiously conservative congregation should respond to clerical and congregational influence by embracing more conservative political positions than personal theology would otherwise dictate. Were they to be included in a typical national survey that correlated individual theology with political preference, the two individuals just described would be classified as deviants and counted as evidence *against* the political impact of religion. Inferring from Table 4 that a considerable number of churchgoers do indeed find themselves in congregations with theological traditions different from their own, the extent of such deviance among church members is likely to be substantial. Without a contextual approach sensitive to the theological milieu that confronts individuals in their churches, the true magnitude of religious-political linkage is thus likely to be significantly underestimated.

The discovery that individual churches promote political homogeneity consistent with their dominant theological orientation has serious implications for contemporary U.S. political life. The significance of church influence on mass political orientations is magnified by two factors already noted. First, churches are the most widespread form of voluntary organizational affiliation in the United States, far outstripping labor unions, political and social action groups, and other secondary associations. To the extent that churches mobilize politically, they operate on a sizable share of the population. Secondly, a large number of individuals within churches are apparently ripe for political conversion. The lack of perfect correspondence between personal and church theology, a function of the individualist strain within U.S. religion and the social selection of churches, enlarges the scope for contextual influence. If the mechanisms of influence demonstrated in our church samples apply elsewhere, then churches deserve more political attention than they have heretofore received.

To return to the major theoretical implication of contextual influence, the individualist view of political decision making requires sharp qualification. Individuals do not simply reason through the political implications of their religious views in a vacuum. When the environment sends political messages that conflict with core theological assumptions, there is a pronounced tendency among churchgoers to bend to the political guidance offered by the congregational environment. For contemporary observers of politics, as for Emile Durkheim almost a century ago, the "social fact" of religious context warrants close attention.

Appendix

Twenty-seven Protestant congregations apportioned among four theological categories were contacted and asked to participate in a survey study about "what church members think these days." Twenty-three accepted with the four refusals attributed to (1) a lack of time or opportunity for survey administration, (2) concern that many congregants would not understand the questions, or (3) objection to specific questions by members of lay governing boards. Because of the circumstances of questionnaire administration, precise refusal rates cannot be determined, but we observed very few instances when questionnaires were refused or returned unanswered.

The "moral conservatism" scale comprised the following Likert-style items. *R* indicates that the response categories were reversed for scale construction:

1. Local governments should be allowed to ban books and movies that they

think are harmful to the public.

2. Birth control devices should be available to any adult who wants them. (R)
3. Men and women should have the same legal rights. (R)
4. There are too many shows on television that make fun of traditional family values.
5. Women are happiest if they stick to keeping a home and raising children.
6. There should be laws against marriage between blacks and whites.
7. Abortion should be a private matter between a woman and her doctor. (R)
8. The government should prohibit the private use of marijuana.
9. Homosexuals should be able to do what they want to so long as they don't hurt other people. (R)
10. If a man and a woman want to live together without getting married, that's their business. (R)

Notes

We are grateful for the research assistance provided by Mark Smith and Warren Heyman, the financial support of the University of Florida's Division of Sponsored Research, and the helpful comments of Bob Huckfeldt, David Leege, Gerry Wright, Wayne Francis, and Michael Martinez. We also deeply appreciate the cooperation of the churches and parishioners who so generously participated in the study.

1. The problems of denominational measures include the presence of respondents who are minimally committed to the church, radical theological differences within denominations, and the failure of many surveys to partition large groups like Baptists, Lutherans, and Methodists into more meaningful categories.

2. We excluded church visitors and members under the age of eighteen from the analysis reported here. The restriction to Protestant congregations reflected our belief that a single survey instrument could not satisfactorily assess core theological values in more than one religious tradition.

3. Most of the excluded cases were missing information about personal characteristics used as control variables.

4. The terms *context* and *environment* are used interchangeably in much of the literature. As a center of social interaction, it is likely that the church constitutes an immediate network of relationships—a *context*—rather than an amorphous zone of existence, which should be called an *environment*.

5. The 10 items that compose the scale were balanced between expressions of conservatism and liberalism (see Appendix for exact wording). For scale construction, scores on the liberally worded items were reversed. The items were distributed among a pool of questions that also measured political efficacy, cognitive traits, and other dispositions. Each question was followed by five options of *agree* or *disagree strongly*, *agree* or *disagree somewhat*, and *neither agree nor disagree*. The neutral position was treated as a midpoint.

6. In pretests, some self-avowed theological liberals were reluctant to select this option as offered by Gallup because it contained the word *fables*. We thus reworded the item to take out the offending reference.

7. Respondents were asked to name the state and size of the community where they mainly lived while growing up. We followed the standard practice of the National Election Study in identifying southern states. Residents of farms, rural towns, towns, and cities under 50 thousand in population were assigned a dummy variable value of one indicating size of place.

References

Benson, Peter, and Dorothy Williams. 1982. *Religion on Capitol Hill: Myths and Realities*. New York: Harper & Row.

Blau, Peter. 1960a. Structural Effects. *American Sociological Review* 25:178–92.

Blau, Peter, 1960b. A Theory of Social Integration. *American Journal of Sociology* 65:545–56.

Boyd, Lawrence H., Jr., and Gudmund R. Iversen. 1979. *Contextual Analysis: Concepts and Statistical Techniques*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Conover, Patricia J., and Stanley Feldman. 1986. Morality Items on the 1985 Pilot Study. University of Michigan Center for Political Studies. Memorandum submitted to the 1985 National Election Study Pilot Study Committee.

Durkheim, Emile. 1951. *Suicide*. New York: Free Press.

Eulau, Heinz, and Lawrence Rothenberg. 1986. Life Space and Social Networks as Political Contexts. *Political Behavior* 8:130–57.

Finifter, Ada W. 1974. The Friendship Group As a Protective Environment for Political Deviants. *American Political Science Review* 68:607–25.

Gorsuch, Richard L., and Daniel Aleshire. 1974. Christian Faith and Ethnic Prejudice: A Review and Interpretation of Research. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 13:281–307.

Hadden, Jeffrey K. 1969. *The Gathering Storm in the Churches.* Garden City, NY: Doubleday-Anchor.

Himmelstein, Jerome L. 1986. The Social Basis of Antifeminism: Religious Networks and Culture. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 25:1–15.

Hoge, Dean R., and Ernesto de Zulueta. 1985. Salience as a Condition for Various Social Consequences of Religious Commitment. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 24:21–38.

Huckfeldt, Robert. 1986. *Politics in Context: Assimilation and Conflict in Urban Neighborhoods.* New York: Agathon.

Hunter, James Davison. 1983. *American Evangelicalism: Conservative Religion and the Quandary of Modernity.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Kellstedt, Lyman A., and Corwin Smidt. 1985. Defining and Measuring Fundamentalism: An Analysis of Different Conceptual and Operational Strategies. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans.

Koller, Norman B., and Joseph D. Retzer. 1980. The Sounds of Silence Revisited. *Sociological Analysis* 44:155–61.

Leege, David C., and Joseph Gremillion. 1986. The People, Their Pastors, and the Church: Viewpoints on Church Policies and Positions. Notre Dame Study of Catholic Parish Life Report No. 7. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.

McCloskey, Herbert, and Harold E. Dahlgren. 1959. Primary Group Influence upon Party Loyalty. *American Political Science Review* 53:757–75.

MacKuen, Michael, and Courtney Brown. 1987. Political Context and Attitude Change. *American Political Science Review* 81:471–90.

Mahe, Eddie, Jr. 1987. Social Precincts. A New Look at Grass Roots Organization. *Election Politics* 4:15–18.

Parenti, Michael. 1967. Political Values and Religious Cultures: Jews, Catholics, and Protestants. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 6:259–69.

Quinley, Harold E. 1974. *The Prophetic Clergy: Social Activism among Protestant Ministers.* New York: Wiley-Interscience.

Sprague, John. 1982. Is There a Micro Theory Consistent with Contextual Analysis? In *Strategies of Political Inquiry,* ed. Elinor Ostrom. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Stark, Rodeny. 1984. Religion and Conformity: Reaffirming a *Sociology* of Religion. *Sociological Analysis* 45:273–82.

Stark, Rodeny. 1987. Correcting Church Membership Rates. *Review of Religious Research* 29:69–79.

Tate, Richard L. 1984. Limitations of Centering for Interactive Models. *Sociological Methods and Research* 13:251–71.

Tingsten, Herbert. 1937. *Political Behaviour.* London: King.

Wald, Kenneth D. 1987. *Religion and Politics in the United States.* New York: St. Martin's.

Walton, Hanes. 1985. *Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior.* Albany, NY: State University of New York.

Walzer, Michael. 1985. *Exodus and Revolution.* New York: Basic Books.

Welch, Michael R., and David C. Leege. N.d. Religious Predictors of Catholic Parishioners' Sociopolitical Attitudes: Devotional Style, Closeness to God, Imagery, and Agentic/Communal Religious Identity. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion.* Forthcoming.

White, Richard H. 1968. Toward a Theory of Religious Influence. *Pacific Sociological Review* 11: 23–28.

Wuthnow, Robert. 1973. Religious Commitment and Conservatism: In Search of an Elusive Relationship. In *Religion in Sociological Perspective,* ed. Charles Y. Glock. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Kenneth D. Wald is Associate Professor of Political Science, Dennis E. Owen is Assistant Professor of Religion, and Samuel S. Hill, Jr. is Professor of Religion at the University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611.

LIBERATION THEOLOGY: THE RECOVERY OF BIBLICAL RADICALISM

H. MARK ROELOFS
New York University

Liberation theology is not a Marxism in Christian disguise. It is the recovery of a biblical radicalism that has been harbored in the Judeo-Christian tradition virtually from its founding. As such, liberation theology is the revitalization of one of the most profound social, political, economic, and religious challenges to established hierarchies that the West has ever known. Liberation theologians turn to modern Marxism chiefly to gain a comprehensive understanding of contemporary class conflict and poverty. Their primary concerns remain to define themselves as an "emergent church" in the biblical tradition, and to reflect upon the praxis of the "base community" movement they have spawned throughout Latin America. However, the principal liberation theologians of our day exhibit persistent ambiguities about how individuals should relate to their communities. The biblical materials suggest certain solutions to them, but ones so radical that not even the most extreme of the liberation theologians appear ready to embrace them.

Liberation theology is a powerful presence throughout Latin America, and is attracting increasing international attention. Recently the popular press has taken up the story, largely because of contentions between the Vatican and certain Latin American priests, most notably, Fr. Ernesto Cardenal, a prominent member of the Nicaraguan revolutionary government, and Fr. Leonardo Boff, a prolific theologian in Brazil. The press accounts leave the impression that liberation theology, with its pleas for "class struggle" against entrenched local elites and imperialist "capitalist forces"—principally located in the United States—is a Marxism only thinly *disguised* as Christianity.[1] A number of widely believed propositions appear to sustain this view.

First, Marxism is widely understood to despite all religions—and none more than Christianity—as "opiates" of the people. As such, Marxism is thought to be incapable of sustaining any authentic religious focus. This position is reenforced by Marxism's frequently declared commitment to "atheistic materialism." Second, Christianity in its turn, it is thought, must categorically reject all Marxisms not only because of their godless materialism but also because their commitment to "class struggle" collides with Christian beliefs in the need for indiscriminate love for all persons without regard to social and economic status. Moreover, Christianity is widely understood not to share Marxism's central concern with worldly social and economic issues. Christianity is supposed to be centrally concerned with "mystery" and the problems of personal redemption from sin. On this view, Christian concerns for alleviating human misery in this world should be expressed through charitable institutions, not down avenues of political activism.

The supposed incompatibility of Christianity and Marxism depends on narrow,

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 82 NO. 2 JUNE 1988

even peripheral, definitions of both. In their actual, full complexity, many points not just of similarity but of genuine congruence between them can be found. In particular, Marxism's "materialism" is far more "prophetic" and "spiritual"—and Christianity's "spiritualism," especially in its biblical mode, is, as we shall see, far more "materialistic"—than is often thought. But the concerns of this essay go well beyond issues of this sort.

It needs no detailed exposition to show that the liberation theologians are indeed, in a formal sense, mainly Marxists or that they are so for many of the same reasons that attract non-Christians to that ideology. By their Marxism, liberation theologians tilt their Christianity, decisively and consistently, to enthusiasms for the transformation of this world in its current historical dimensions. Marxism drives them not only to theories of the conflictual nature of modern society but also to an implacable outrage over the facts of poverty, especially in the extreme forms in which it is experienced in Latin America. And, most obviously, Marxism supplies the liberation theologians with a systematic, comprehensive, structural explanation for the occurrence of poverty in the modern world and, even more specifically, for the "dependence" of third-world economies on those of the major capitalist nations. In this context, the serious questions that have to be asked all pertain not to whether the liberation theologians are Marxists but to the nature of the positive, substantial, causal relationships between the liberation theologians' Christianity and their Marxism.

The thesis of this essay is that the liberation theologians are essentially Christian radicals and approach Marxism from that foundation. What they most represent is the recovery, within the general context of the Christian tradition, of a profound biblical political radicalism. This is the basis for their almost paradoxical claim that they are true to Christianity's most ancient roots and at the same time constitute the "emergent church." Biblical radicalism is also the source of the distinctively pre-Marxist, almost Rousseauian slant that the liberation theologians give to their understanding of their theology's most prominent practical expression, the Christian "base community" movement that has spread throughout Latin America.

Two Theistic Traditions

Essential to any discussion of this hypothesis is a division that can be seen running through the whole of Christianity's two-thousand-year history, a division that is most fundamentally expressed in differing conceptions of the godhead. Willis B. Glover, in an article discussing Hobbes's supposed atheism, makes the distinction well:

> The intellectual and religious heritage of Western Europe includes two theistic traditions: (1) the theism that developed out of Greek rationalism, in which God is perfect, unchanging, pure act without the possibility of action, rational and yet impersonal; and (2) the theism of the Biblical tradition in which God is personal, Creator, immediately sovereign over nature, one who acts in history. These two understandings of God are ultimately irreconcilable. The insight of Pascal at this point led to his sharp distinction between the God of the philosophers and the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Many, if not most, of the difficulties in Christian theology result from the contradictions between these theisms which are so complexly intertwined in the history of Christian thought. (1965, 163)

This distinction historically was far more than the occasion for much blind misunderstanding and for the trading of bitter charges of atheism and the like. The two sides also strongly tended to develop sharply opposed social, political, and economic outlooks that sometimes overshadowed their theological differences. Though Glover is right to emphasize the way the two sides were constantly intertwined, it can be held nevertheless as a broad generalization that the cosmological, rationalist god came to be associated with proponents of well-ordered, clearly institutionalized societies. The ordering applied to both church and state, supplying content to both political philosophy and ecclesiology. In the process, faith itself was transformed into—specifically—doctrine to be taught, studied, believed, and professed. The conservative and system-sustaining overall tendency was toward hierarchically defined orders of church and state—of bishops and kings each sovereign in their own realms yet cooperative.

On the other side, the personalist, voluntarist, virtually existentialist and historicist understanding of God, tended as powerfully toward association with separatist sects often having politically radical characteristics. It was no accident that the proliferation of such groups frequently coincided with the sudden availability of the Bible in translation in cheap, popular editions. On this side, there was a particular focus on *faith*, on a concern for personal acceptance and living commitment. Faith, in these terms, took Joan of Arc to the stake, enabled Luther to take his stand, and sent John Winthrop to Massachusetts and John Brown to Harper's Ferry. Moreover, beyond these often startling degrees of personal, evangelical commitment was a sustained evocation of a radical, wholly generous egalitarianism that extended from purely religious concerns deeply in to the social, political, and economic arenas.

The full spectrum of shadings between the polarities of this fundamental division in the Christian tradition was laid out in the period of the English seventeenth century civil wars—from divine-right Catholicism to high-church Angelicanism to middle-class Presbyterianism to the extremisms of the Levelers and Gerrard Winstanley's Diggers (Hill 1972; Morris 1949; Walzer 1965).

A Divided Church in Latin America

An assertion fundamental to the present argument is that this ancient division in the Christian tradition has now split the supposed monolithic structure of the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America. Liberation theology and its attendant Christian base community movement can be seen occupying the left wing of this division, leaving the other side to various accommodationists, rightists, and establishmentarians. In this light the liberation theologians can be seen to have recovered for their own time and place a biblically derived political radicalism. Their concerns are modern and particular, and many of their techniques are indigenous; but their mood, their overriding goals, and even much of their language is centuries old. They are the latest recruits to a line stretching back not only through contemporary radical Protestant sects such as the Amish and the Mennonites but also back through the Levelers and Diggers, the Anabaptists and Lollards, all the way back to the first century Christian communities before the time of Constantine, rooted in New Testament experiences (Acts 2:43–47; 4:32–37).

As essentially the recovery of a biblical political radicalism, liberation theology has enormous strengths and many tactical advantages. It is these biblical roots that have enabled liberation theology to use in creative and legitimate ways a wide array of Marxist concepts.

Biblical Radicalism

The Prophetic Mindset

It has been popularly suggested that the liberation theologians—like the black slaves in the United States of the nineteenth century—have recovered the memory of Moses' liberation of the Hebrew people enslaved in Egypt. But the issue cuts far deeper than this. Liberation theologians have recovered the Bible's prophetic mind-set, a mind-set that colored and formed the Moses stories, indeed, but also the historical books, the writings of the great social prophets, and the New Testament accounts of the ministries of Jesus and Paul.

The core of the Bible's prophetic mind-set, at the most fundamental philosophical level, is a concern for immediate, factual, sensuous experience, an absolute nominalism.[2] Inevitably, this is a concern for experience in its totality and without clear possibilities for categorical differentiations except as between interrelated particulars within an experienced, factual totality. What is, is what is sensed—comprehensively. It can be argued that it is this original "existentialist bias"—an innate, primal materialism—that renders the Hebrew biblical mind-set incapable of making abstract distinctions between body and soul, mortality and immortality, heaven and earth, and, at a more practical level, between public and private, religion and politics, church and state. At the one extreme, since body and soul are experienced only in factual combination, neither has any significant reality separately. In factual experience, the body is either alive (with soul) or dead (without soul). God is not an "object" to be "known," up there in a supernatural realm. "Nature" is the only realm the Hebrew knows ("experiences"). Therefore, for the Hebrew, God is a subject to be not known but *met* (feared, loved, served) in the here and now. Similarly, since religion and politics and their institutionalized expressions in church and state appear only as elements in the whole experienced life of a community, any separation between them must be artificial, prudential, and a denial of their essential theoretical and factual unity.

These reflections heavily underscore the realization that what awakens and attracts the Hebrew mind is not just *factual* existence but *active* existence as experienced, factual life. At the core of the Hebrew mind is an abiding concern with vitality and thrust—in a phrase, *factual will.* For the Hebrew mind, the whole "world" is alive; men and women hate and fear, work and love; grass grows and withers; stones hear, wind sings; and the great god Yahweh is before all else the giver and breather of life, immediate, sensuous, factual—and active.

The central concern of the Hebrew mind-set is, then, with action—action *in fact*—and this concern necessarily spills over into two further dimensions. The first of these is time, a sense of story, as in both history and biography. This is not linear time as in science but time remembered, felt, and anticipated by a subject, as in narrative literature. Time is a story told by a subject about a present—an experienced now between a past recalled and a future anticipated.

What gives the story substance is its second dimension, its meaning. This derives from judgments about the relationships between the components of time and people alive in these components. In those past, present, and future components of time people acted, are acting, will act. But will the relationships and commitments that were established between these actors in time endure? How will their story end? Will promises of life and loyalty be kept? Will identities be sustained? How will the tests of time be met? These judgmental questions are the prophetic element in the Hebraic mind-set. Characteristically, they are essentially interpretations of a present, sensed between its past and future. The prophetic mind is a mind in questioning confrontation with its existential situation; "Here I am! So? What have I done? What god have I served? By that service, who have I become? What will become of me now?"

Liberation: Old Testament Tradition

Nothing more marks the modern day liberation theologians as *biblical* than that they begin their work from a fact, a fact of their existence, an overwhelming fact that oppresses their consciousness at every turn, the indescribable misery, poverty, and marginalization of a huge proportion of the populations in the midst of which they live and work and profess to be Christians. Before that fact they feel compelled to stand and take sides. Traditional, more cosmologically inclined theologians might survey social poverty within the context of speculations about the divine nature and the ordering of creation. They might conclude by finding in the divine order a place, honorable and perhaps even deserving, for the poor. The liberation theologians (Barreiro 1982; Boff 1985; Bonino 1979; Gutierrez 1973, 1983; Metz 1981; Miranda 1974; Santa Ana 1979; Tamez 1982) reverse all those older priorities. Like the ancient prophets they not only confront poverty, they narrowly focus on it and denounce it without quarter and with the promise that the god who defines their natures commands that it be overcome here, now, in this world. Traveling through one channel or another, it was the influence of these theologians with their prophetic focus on the facts of poverty that prompted the General Conference of the Latin American Episcopate, meeting in Puebla, Mexico in 1979 to include in its final document the famous paragraphs.

> From the depths of the countries that make up Latin America a cry is rising to heaven, growing louder and more alarming all the time. It is the cry of a suffering people who demand justice, freedom, and respect for the basic rights of human beings and peoples.
>
> A little more than ten years ago, the Medellin Conference noted this fact when it pointed out: "A muted cry wells up from millions of human beings, pleading with their pastors for a liberation that is nowhere to be found in their cases." . . .
>
> The cry might well have seemed muted back then. Today it is loud, clear, increasing in volume and intensity, and at times full of menace. (Eagleson and Scharper 1979, 134)

In the context of this judgmental existentialism, the liberation theologians are truly recoverers of Moses. But what they recover in this context is not Moses as religious lawgiver and builder of a holy nation but Moses as a liberator of an oppressed people. What they recover is Moses as the founder of a tradition that besides being religious is at once political and radical and that stretches through the whole Bible to the Messiahship of Jesus himself, however much it may have changed, strengthened, and developed as it went.

There can be little argument about these assertions in the present context. Of course Moses was a religious figure, but—without differentiation—he was also a political figure. Essentially, he was the people's heroic leader, with responsibilities that ran the gamut from divining their future and defining their historic identity to organizing their government, decreeing their laws, and leading them in battle. In this, his figure reflected the comprehensive character of the biblical concern for the totality of a people's experience. Centuries later, Nathan, the court prophet, stood before the king to condemn him for his personal sin; but Nathan's story is told as a morality tale directed at the corporate guilt of the whole people. Elijah is listed as the first of the great social-political prophets, but what he condemns the people for is their sin in following the religious idolatry of their queen. Amos thunders religious imprecations against the people equally for their personal impieties and their political, economic, and social oppression of the poor. Can we suppose that Jesus, coming out of this ancient and unbroken tradition, had motives and concerns that were any less comprehensive and complex?

That this tradition was also radical is

only somewhat more problematic. That Moses was a liberator is obvious. The oppression in Egypt is vividly portrayed, as is also the escape from it. But so also is the need for purification and transformation, in short, for conversion. The episode of the golden calf, with the subsequent slaughter of the guilty by the Levites on Moses' personal command, is the outstanding example of this (Ex 32; Walzer 1985). But the whole forty-year period of wandering in the desert under Moses' rule can be seen as an experience of preparation and renewal before the entry into the Promised Land. Certainly the Gospel writers appear to have interpreted it that way when they made Jesus' period of temptation in the wilderness precisely forty days long.

The radicalism of the prophets is even more patent. For them, reform of policies, observance of the letter of the law, and appropriately executed ceremonies and rituals would never be enough (Amos 5:21-24). Only a radical reordering of priorities, a total recovery and recommitment of loyalty to the ancestral god, Yahweh, would bring the changes of spirit and behavior necessary to a restoration of the Covenant. Only then could Israel claim to have renewed its identity as a holy people. A transforming, deeply confessional, radical change of identities and gods was required.

Political Radicalism: New Testament

On the other hand, in the New Testament, the political radicalism of Jesus and Paul is obscure; that is, it has been obscured, consistently so by authorities with ulterior motives. Liberation theologians and North American scholars such as John Howard Yoder (1972) argue persuasively that the political radicalism of the New Testament has been authoritatively denied, veiled, and ignored from the beginning of Christianity down to our own day by established hierarchies who had no interest in admitting its being in the texts, much less in teaching it. The actual radicalism of Jesus was too strong and too specifically political to be countenanced. For the established hierarchies of the European Christian world, Jesus came instead to be authoritatively portrayed as a specifically religious, spiritualized figure—and biblical study by ordinary folk on their own was actively discouraged or even on occasion suppressed.

For those who make the effort to see it, however, the political radicalism of Jesus and Paul is plain enough and deeply rooted in the biblical tradition. In consists of three, interlocking principles:

1. *Radical egalitarianism.* All human beings are, existentially, equal. The distinctions between them drawn in our social orders—by age, sex, wealth, power, skills, learning, beauty, and so on—are all of little, artificial, and passing significance. ("Blessed are the meek" [Mt 5:5]; "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus" [Gal 3:28].)[3]
2. *Radical communitarianism.* All persons should "love" one another indiscriminately. This is love in the technical, Hebraic sense, which sees "souls" (vitalities) drawn (merged) by love into one life (experience—including death). ("This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you. Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" [Jn 15:12-12].)
3. *Radical pacifism.* The essential tactic by which to achieve these goals is a direct, nonviolent confrontationalism. It is engagement through a revolutionary passivity. ("Bless those that persecute you . . . do not curse them. . . . Repay no one evil for evil. . . . overcome evil with good" [Rom 12:14-21].)

Each of these propositions is given extensive elaboration and illustration in the records we have of Jesus' ministry and Paul's letters. However, some of the most important passages where this elaboration appears require reinterpretations that turn "traditional," hierarchically approved, understandings of them inside out. Thus the famous phrases (Mt 22:15–22) about rendering unto Caesar the things that are his, and to God his, far from being primarily significant for making a distinction between public and private life, in fact are to be interpreted, in a spirit of radical egalitarianism, as showing that Caesar gets only money, the symbol of a despised materialism; while God, radically, gets all honor, glory, power, and so on. In the same way, radical communitarianism requires us to love not only "good" Samaritans but also all other strangers and outcasts in our midst and also, even more importantly, our "enemies," even while they hate and persecute us. However much we may fear and, in our turn, hate what they do, we are urged to join lives with them—even as we still clearly see them as enemies.[4]

Finally, there is the radical pacifism of the Crucifixion. Without compromising religious perceptions that the Crucifixion was a redemptive act, it is important to notice, in the context of the events leading up to it, that Jesus had, and rejected, clear political alternatives. Faced with the weight of Roman imperialism and the seething presence in the Palestine of his time of a repressed Jewish nationalism, Jesus could have withdrawn "into the desert," as did the Essenes and the community at Qumran. Or he could have conspired to lead an armed uprising, such as the Zealots of his day hoped for and the Maccabees undertook before them with mixed results. Or, like Herod, he could have collaborated. Instead, he "set his face" to go to Jerusalem. He came as the king, the Messiah—on a donkey, not a horse of war. He accepted the plaudits of the masses, who waved palms, not spears and banners. And he directly engaged—passively—the Roman authorities and the Jewish collaborators. In this light, the Crucifixion was a deliberate public act that administered an unmistakable and massive rebuke to all the established "powers and principalities" of the day—and was proved victorious in the subseqent record of the Resurrection.

Of course—as before with Moses—Jesus' political radicalism is also a religiosity. Radical egalitarianism, radical communitarianism, and radical pacifism can all be seen as the social expressions of taking the two great, ancient, religious commandments with an absolute, uncompromising personal seriousness: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, all thy strength, and all thy mind" and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thy self." Moreover, it must also be said that throughout the Gospels, Jesus' political radicalism is consistently set in the context of a highly personal religiosity. His baptism, temptation, and much of the content of the Sermon on the Mount, including the Lord's Prayer, are all testimony in support of this. So too, dramatically, are the scene at Gethsemane and the last words on the cross. Personal, confessional prayer, in the record of the Gospels, is a major element in Jesus' life. But having said all that, it must be added immediately that this personal, confessional element is never portrayed as something separate and different from Jesus' public behavior. Jesus in the record is not a recluse, a mendicant, or hermit. First and last, he is a public figure, a leader. The personal religiosity is uniformly and exclusively a ground and preparation for his public roles, just as it was for Abraham in the land of Moriah, Jeremiah in the courtyards of Jerusalem, and Job in his poetry.

Three other features of Jesus' political radicalism of special interest to liberation theologians need to be emphasized. First, this radicalism must be seen as not identical with political enthusiasms of the Old Testament but as growing and developing out of them. The concern for social justice runs without break throughout the biblical literature. But the expression of this concern in narrow, nationalist, legalistic terms was rejected—in language that grew increasingly stringent—in the Old Testament as well as the New, as the biblical tradition developed. Second, parallel to the first point, is the fact that what Jesus was centrally calling for, as were the great prophets before him, can only be termed a *revolution*, a radical restructuring and reordering of social values and priorities (Mt 5:3–10). Jesus did not have the institutional sense and technical precision to make his demands with the programmatic detail a modern radical would. But once his demands are understood in political terms and set in a politicized context, there can be no mistaking either their depth or their breadth. The call is for the reduction of the structures of the world's powers and principalities to paltry significance and their transformation into the patterns of a radically egalitarian, communitarian, pacific anarchism.

The final feature of Jesus' radicalism of special interest to liberation theologians is the claim that he did indeed, speaking out of the whole of the biblical tradition, politicize his context. The liberation theologians scour the literature to support this claim with appropriate citations—and are amply rewarded. Their most usual findings (Brown 1984; Miranda 1974, chaps. 1–2; Tamez 1982) include the story of David and Nathan (2 Sm 11–12) and of Jeremiah and Jehoiakim (Jer 22) from the Old Testament and, from the New, Mary's song, the Magnificat (Lk 1: 46–55), and Jesus' vision of the day of judgment on the nations (Mt 25:31–46). All of these are extended selections and they are given a full, literal, word-by-word reading in their contexts. What comes out of them is an insistence that the Gospels in particular but also the Bible as a whole from the Exodus onward is good news for the poor and oppressed and bad news for the mighty and the rich (see also, specifically, Mk 10:17–31). The thesis is, as well, that piety is not best expressed by worship in churches and synagogues but by doing justice in the homes, markets, and work places of the poor and the oppressed. Nothing expresses this thesis better than the preference the liberation theologians have for Luke's version of the beatitude "Blessed are you poor" (Lk 6:20) —for it does not add the phrase *in spirit* as in the Matthew version (Mt 5:3)—and its follow-up, "But woe to you that are rich," which has no parallel in Matthew.

For the liberation theologians, all these points come together in the account given in Luke 4 of Jesus' return at the beginning of his public ministry to the synagogue at Nazareth:

> And he stood up to read; and there was given to him the book of the prophet Isaiah. He opened the book and found the place where it was written,
>
> "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me,
> because he has anointed me to preach
> good news to the poor.
> He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives
> and recovering of sight to the blind,
> to set at liberty those who are oppressed,
> to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord."
>
> And he closed the book, and gave it back to the attendant, and sat down; and the eyes of all in the synagogue were fixed on him. And he began to say to them, "Today this scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing." (Lk 4:16–21)

Emergent Communities

"An Option for the Poor"

The claim of the liberation theologians that Jesus dichotomized and politicized his social world has given to reading the Bible an unexpected excitement especially for North American and Western European readers (Brown 1984). Comparably, it has opened up for modern Christian churches possibilities for social vitality that had been smothered by decades of obscurantism and neglect. A major consequence of this renewal of vitality has been the doctrine of the "emergent" church (Boff 1985; Metz 1981; Torres and Fabella 1978). The emergent church, looking to Jesus as its founder, declares "an option for the poor." In contradistinction, the "established" or "traditional" or "bourgeois" church is depicted as having sustained throughout the modern era "an option for the middle class." In these terms, the denunciation by the liberation theologians of the bourgeois church is scathing.

Much of this denunciation is in Marxist terms. On the one hand, it is charged that the bourgeois church mystifies the poor, dupes them into accepting their sufferings as badges of an acceptable status among Christians. It lulls them with promises of bliss in the hereafter, and comforts them with a wide variety of charitable supports but of a sort which, even when taken in total, never amount to more than "assistantalism," that is, a policy that distributes benefits and aids but does not attack causes or structures. Mostly, however, the traditional, bourgeois church, especially the Roman Catholic Church in Latin America, simply ignores "the poor," a term the Liberation theologians define inclusively as meaning "those who have no place to live, nothing to wear, and nothing to eat, . . . the blind, the deaf, the crippled; the prisoners, the strangers, the orphans, and the widows; the afflicted, the depressed, and the hopeless . . . the feeble, weak members of society . . . who have neither a voice nor an opportunity in society" (Barreiro 1982, 15). By and large, these people simply go "unchurched."

On the other hand, the traditional church is seen as having powerfully sustained the values and institutions of established elites in the church, in the state, and in the economy. In its own magisterium, it has succumbed to an "ideology of power" (Boff 1983, chap. 5) and resists all efforts to convert it "from a 'paternalistic church looking after people' to a 'church of the people themselves' " (Metz 1981, 12). It long ago bought into the psychic foundations of the modern age, in which, by "seizing power over nature, man's identity is formed. Man *is* by subjugating. All non-dominating human virtues such as gratitude and friendliness, the capacity for suffering and sympathy, grief and tenderness, recede into the background" (p. 35). With the state, it concluded if only in effect a "concordat" (Cox 1984, chap. 7), often under the guise of doctrines of the separation of church and state, which appear to suggest a policy of live and let live. But these arrangements only thinly masked a practice of mutual support. The state protected the church, provided it with a full array of services that often included huge but hidden tax subsidies. In its turn, the church celebrated the state and its symbols through the full panoply of civil religion. Equally, the traditional church celebrated the values of the capitalist economy. It lauded those who accumulated great wealth—and were generous with it—and managed to accumulate great wealth itself. Meanwhile, characteristically, its clergy socialized with the political and economic elites and educated their children.

Over and against the traditional, bourgeois church, liberation theologians see the emergent church. Centrally, the emergent church is a call for "an anthropological revolution," an effort to achieve "a new subjectivity," "a new relationship to ourselves, to our natural and social environment, which is not one of domination and exploitation" (Metz 1981, 42). The will to power would be replaced by the will to love. Only through love and solidarity with others can true liberation be achieved; only then can "freedom from" and "freedom to" be transcended by "freedom with"—freedom in solidarity with others, especially the poor. As Gutierrez, probably the most powerful voice in the liberation theological movement, has written, "To conceive of history as a process of the liberation of man is to consider freedom as a historical conquest; it is to understand that the step from an abstract to a real freedom is not taken without a struggle against all the forces that oppress man, as a struggle full of pitfalls, detours, and temptations to run away. The goal is not only better living conditions, a radical change of structures, a social revolution; it is much more: the continuous creation, never ending, of a new way to be a man, a *permanent cultural revolution* . . . in order to achieve an ever more total and complete fulfillment of the individual in solidarity with all mankind" (1973, 32–22).

For liberation theologians the church's role in this "permanent cultural revolution" will be primary but "only insofar as it is converted and becomes more and more an incarnation of the Gospel" (Boff 1985, 64), the reemerged Gospel in all its social and political radicalism. Central to that conversion to the recovered Gospel will be the church's involvement, with all of its resources, with the poor—not the middle or the top of society but its *base.* The connecting argument here, between the emergent church, the recovered Gospel, and the poor, is that the poor, the dispossessed, the marginalized in society are uniquely placed to read, interpret, and respond to the Bible. The Bible was written *by* people much like themselves, *about* people much like themselves, and, decisively, *for* people much like themselves. Having no interest or stake or identity in present society, having indeed no interest anywhere beyond their own need for liberation from misery and oppression that is both spiritual and physical without distinction, they alone of society's classes can read the Bible directly.

The Base Community Movement

In the context of this argument, liberation theologians reflect on the so-called Christian base communities that have proliferated throughout Latin America by the tens of thousands. For liberation theologians—to repeat—theology is reflection on historical praxis, on the facts of life as lived; and the praxis that has most attracted their recent attention is the activity of these communities, particularly how they study the Bible.

The origins of the base communities (technically known as *Basic Ecclesial Communities* [CEBs]) is obscure. But the descriptions of them, often idealized, even romanticized, by the liberation theologians (Barreiro 1982; Boff 1985, chap. 9; Cardenal 1976–82; Torres and Eagleson 1981, esp. pt. 2), show extraordinary uniformities for a movement so widespread, uncoordinated, and spontaneous in fact.[5]

Typically, Christian base communities are described as small, face-to-face groups of fifteen to twenty families bonded by physical proximity and poverty. They meet irregularly but frequently, perhaps once or twice a week. The role of priests and other religious professionals in bringing them into existence and organizing their activities appears to have been often important but in styles sharply different from more traditional parish groups. The atmosphere in the communities is said to be across-the-board egalitarian, with the religious professional workers acting simply as catalysts, hardly even as guides. If only because of an extreme shortage of religious professionals in Latin America, their efforts have been focused on getting the base communities to operate on their own.

The most surprising uniformity in the description of them has to do with their functions. These reduce invariably to three:

1. *Bible study.* This activity is what brings the communities into existence and keeps them going. Sessions proceed for an hour or so and involve the reading of selected passages and the unrehearsed discussion of them based on personal experience and reflection. These discussions are often combined with equally unrehearsed prayer and some liturgical experimentation, perhaps a communal meal.
2. *Communal action.* The expression of biblical concepts and precepts in communal self-consciousness and shared action is regarded as essential—as praxis. Group projects can vary from assistance to particular members in need to programs of education, health, and entertainment services. They can extend to demonstrations of solidarity before local merchants and landlords and employers. Often these community actions extend to the overtly political but not unless other avenues are blocked. There is a bias against violence, in favor of mass demonstrations and civil disobedience.
3. *Self-consciousness.* The real poverty of the poor is understood in these communities to be a poverty of self-understanding. The poor, oppressed, and depressed must be wrenched out of those denigrating self-understandings society imposes upon them and brought to new understandings of themselves as human beings, as proper members of society, as beings able to love and be loved. They must also be brought to a clear and unobstructed understanding of their actual material condition—that they are oppressed and that this is a scandal that must not be endured. What is called for here is nothing less than a revolutionary transformation in self-understanding, a genuine social, political, economic, *and* religious self-transcendence.

A fundamental Christian conception informs, throughout, the liberation theologians' understanding of how these functions are discharged. When men and women gather in true congregation of mutually supportive, unselfish love, it is held that the spirit of God will find expression and articulation in and through them. Each will then be enabled to contribute to the group life and solidarity from whatever personal resource and talent ("charism") they may find themselves possessing. The thrust of this understanding is explicitly Pauline: "Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of service, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of working, but it is the same God who inspires them all in every one. To each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good" (1 Cor 12:4-7). This understanding is also pure Rousseau. To a remarkable degree the liberation theologians, in reflecting on what they see happening in the common life of the base communities, have captured, however unwittingly, the exact spirit of Rousseau's famed sentences: "The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. Then only, when the voice of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself, find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his reason before listening to his inclinations" (1973, 177-78).

In the end, to bring about this "very remarkable change" in the poor, to transform them from self-debasing, purely instinctual clods into self-respecting moral beings able to "build a different society, freer and more human" (Gutierrez 1973, ix), is what the liberation theologians see as the overriding goal of base community life. And it is their unshakable adherence to and understanding of this goal that most brands them as pre- or perhaps, post-Marxian.

None of this should be held to suggest that the liberation theologians, specifically in their understanding of the base community movement, are non-Marxist, much less anti-Marxist. On the contrary, their understanding of the base communities as revolutionary instruments in a conflictual world, as the first weapons in a class struggle, is shot through not only with Marxian vocabularies but also with Marxian perceptions, especially about the economic character of modern, mass societies. Moreover, there are startling resemblances between the liberation theologians' celebrations of the base communities and the reliance on communes and soviets by Marxist revolutionaries elsewhere in the modern world.

Nevertheless, there is an emphasis in the liberation theologians' understanding of base community life on interior dialectics that has only the palest parallels in Marxist literature. In Rousseau and in the liberation theologians there is a stress that virtually equates the processes of mutual support, reflection, dialogue, group action, self-growth, and social consciousness. For them these processes are the wellsprings of historical movements. Only the poor can help themselves, can transform themselves. In their lives, their dialogues, they are the initiators of social action. In contrast, the Marxist understanding of the essentials of group dynamics—of "politics" in the generic sense—is effectively nonexistent.

In support of these emphases, some liberation theologians (Boff and Boff 1984) make a distinction between liberation and salvation. The latter is taken in the classic Christian sense of a gift through grace of faith and the possibility of love, of freedom from the bonds of sin and the sting of death. Liberation is relief from the miseries and indignities of social existence. But for these liberation theologians, liberation and salvation are inseparable, the one being meaningless without the other. Liberation, filled with hope, must lead on in faith to salvation. In this these liberation theologians betray not their Marxist enthusiasms but their biblical roots. In their interpretation of that heritage there can be no fast distinctions between body and soul or the conditions of each. For the Hebrews, salvation was both liberation from Egyptian enslavement and purification in the desert, and also entry into a land flowing with milk and honey. In this perspective, there can be no salvation for the soul except as the body is liberated from dehumanizing misery. As Gutierrez writes, "When we assert that man fulfills himself by continuing the work of creation by means of his labor, we are saying that he places himself, by this very fact, within an all-embracing salvific process. To work, to transform this world, is to become a man and to build the human community; it is also to save. Likewise, to struggle against misery and exploitation and to build a just society is already to be part of the saving action" (1973, 159).

The Extremes of Biblical Radicalism

Church Discipline

Liberation theology has recovered much that is central to biblical radicalism and has revitalized the Christian, progressive message. Through the Christian base community movement, liberation theology has also developed a vehicle for mounting its challenges to traditional hierarchies in practical ways. It thus can become—and, in measure, already has become—theologically, historically, and politically significant.

But there are weaknesses here, too. Mostly they stem from liberation theology's hesitations about taking its nearly exclusive root-biblical orientation to its ultimate conclusions. It is not easy to draw attention to these hesitations. They are committed by persons engaged directly in situations involving not only extremes of human suffering but also omnipresent, immediate, and vivid threats to human life. Yet major issues of political philosophy as well as theology are at stake.

The problems and difficulties most obviously arise in connection with two all-too-practical issues: church discipline and violence. Both can be briefly stated.

The liberation theologians assert that the poor in their base communities are well positioned to read and interpret Scripture without instruction. This assertion is essential to the whole grand theme of liberation of the poor and specifically to the function of the base communities as arenas for the recovery of self-respect and human dignity by the poor. The unmistakable implication of this assertion is a radical egalitarianism, first existentially, then specifically in roles having to do with interpretations of faith and morals. This egalitarianism is profoundly at odds with the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church. By virtue of its exalted position, the Vatican is among the *least* well positioned bodies to interpret Scripture. But no liberation theologian has drawn anything like this conclusion. Boff, in his often-cited footnote 17 (1985, 171-72) describing at length—but without commentary—the easy parallels that can be drawn between the organizational patterns of the Roman church and the Communist party in Russia, may be thought to have come closest to doing that. But the chapter to which this footnote is appended appears to uninvolved readers to be mostly a series of casuistries pointing almost meekly in the opposite direction. It is clear that the liberation theologians, as a practical matter, are not prepared to take on the magisterium of their church. Yet the philosophical issue and all that it represents is essentially biblical and is as old as the church itself.

The issue of violence is even more poignant. The biblical materials lend themselves more or less easily to multiple interpretations on the legitimate uses of violence as much as on many other issues. But once a radical interpretive approach has been adopted generally, the pacifism of the New Testament is inescapable. Paul is as emphatic: "Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave it to the wrath of God; for it is written, "Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord." . . . Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good" (Rom 12:19-21). Yet Fr. Ernesto Cardenal, after witnessing the cowardice, treachery, and unbridled brutality of Somoza's National Guard as it destroyed his base community at Solentiname, joined the revolutionary forces. In human, practical terms, such conduct is understandable, even laudable. But is it congruent with the Gospel's law of love? Is there anywhere a clear line of argument that could lead biblical radicals from their interpretations of the tactics of the cross to the tactics of the gun? Is it enough to claim that not to resist violence with violence is to participate the more in it? What other than pacifism can be a radical interpretation of the commandment that we should love our enemies and pray for them that persecute us?

Again, the issue is both biblical and age-old. Nevertheless, these questions of church discipline and political violence are practical issues that take on greater significance as they lead to primary questions about the fundamental relationships individuals in base communities should have with their neighbors.

Radical Egalitarianism

Reflecting once more on the egalitarianism that is supposed to pervade the base communities, we can observe that this equality is seen bestowing among members something absolute and unqualified. Anything short of this would demean self-worth, denied to the poor by society at large but affirmed by the poverty-stricken person's newfound neighbors in the base communities. It is this sense of self-worth that enables the poor person—male or female; black, white, or Indian; old or young; ill or well; skilled or wholly ignorant—to escape societal feelings of oppression and marginalization and assert within the base community a new self that is both loving and lovable, that can with dignity both give and accept membership with others.

The egalitariansim of the base communities is thus a social concept through and through, and as such it bears in train a distinctively social concept of freedom, that most sophisticated sense of freedom that puts men and women in free solidarity with others. Only then do they become truly free and freely human and find a moral liberty in obeying laws they together prescribe to themselves.

The nobility of these conceptions cannot be denied, but, formulated by the liberation theologians as purely social conceptions, they are vulnerable to slippery dissolution into their opposites: equality into hierarchy, freedom into tyranny, and individuality into incipient totalitarianism. For, as Paul saw, any small community—perhaps more than a large impersonal one—will look to its members for different gifts. As these are given, what brake is there on their being proportionately valued—wisdom over brute strength, and brute strength over the capacity to perform mindless, merely tedious chores? Worse, what is to forestall that community in its meditations from transferring its valuations of the different gifts into parallel valuations of the different *givers?* Unless forestalled, hierarchies of differently valued persons will stabilize narrow elites; and these in turn, in the name of efficiency and in the face of ever-present external threats, will increasingly discipline the manner and modes by which lesser folk make contributions to the common welfare. Most important will be an inevitable tendency to restrict participation by the indecisive, the ill-informed, the untutored, the intellectually lame, the slow and inarticulate in the group discussions and processes of policy formulation. More and more they will become spectators. "Membership," especially for this class, will soon have a hollow ring, as hollow as was that "citizenship" afforded them in the society at large. The very thing that had been most sought and most prized will now have been perhaps irretrievably lost.

Incommensurable Value of Personhood

The only way this slide into moral and political inversion can be halted is to arrest it before it begins; and the only way to accomplish that is to place on the initial act by which a person becomes a member of the community an *incommensurable* value, that is, a value so great that the value of any subsequent service he or she may perform for the community (or any aggregate of such services) must be seen as less than it, both in the eyes of the community and those of the individual (Replogle n.d., 7).

The group and individual rationales behind this valuation process are different and require separate treatment. But both equally require recognition and both have political implications so extreme that it is no wonder that the liberation theologians, as a practical matter in twentieth century contexts, have drawn back from pursuing them to the end.

On the group side, members of base communities established in the tradition of biblical liberation must come to recognize the special character their communities possess. These communities are uniquely concerned to restore the personhood of each of their members. That function is the essense of their identity as communities. In consequence, to withhold that function from even the least of their members would radically diminish these communities' quality and identity. There can, therefore, be no compromising, directly or indirectly, practically or theoretically, of any true base community's radical egalitarianism. The political implications of this absolute egalitarianism must now be plain: with the utmost patience, with unbounded concern and respect, base communities conceived of in these terms must collectively wait upon each of their members to come forth spontaneously with whatever contribution to the common welfare they may offer. Any discipline, of whatever kind and however imposed, must be anathema. In a word, these communities must be, in concept as much as in practice, wholly deinstitutionalized. Moreover, the demand for anarchism is across the board. In these communities, bishops and kings, priests and generals, teachers and constables have no standing whatsoever, actually or incipiently.

In twentieth century contexts, even those of third-world nation-states, demands such as these are, by all practical requirements, simply foolish. Yet once explained, the biblical paradigms of the New Testament, in the descriptions of the early church communities given in Acts and the Pauline Epistles, not to mention the Peaceable Kingdom models suggested by the Old Testament in Isaiah, are plain and incontrovertable. Add to this the germane teachings of Jesus himself in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere and then ask what other political implications can be drawn from the willful and willing crucifixion of the Messiah.

The valuation of the individual's acquisition of personhood as incommensurable by the individual him- or herself is more complicated than its social recognition but no less extreme in its implications. Like the group, individuals must be brought to recognize the character of the act by which they enter the community, that by it and in it they become persons and, as it were, come of age morally. But they must also recognize that the acquisition of personhood in community is not a gateway act to be completed by a single entry. It is rather a process to be sustained day by day and day after day. Moreover, it is a process that is as much a completion as it is a commencement. Becoming a social person is not an act of magic. Animals, much less inanimate objects, cannot perform it; even among humans, not every one is able or might want to undertake it. It is a process for which a dense and sustained preparation is necessary. One needs standing, a foundation, from which to become a person and a citizen.

Biblical Contribution to the Idea of Personhood

In the West, as we now understand the full process of citizenship development, many wellsprings can be seen contributing to its definition, most obviously the Greek, in its civic dimensions, and the Roman, in its universal and legal dimensions. But the biblical contribution to it is also essential and perhaps core. For at the core of the Western understanding of personhood is a capacity for existential self-awareness and self-acceptance without which no man or woman is held to be truly whole. That capacity is special to the Hebraic tradition and is central to what the base communities, in their biblicism, explicitly or implicitly attempt to instill in all their members.

It is important to stress that this is an existential self-awareness. It is something quite different from, and perhaps also deeper than, Greek philosophical talk about an unexamined life not being worth living. It is that distinctively Hebraic talk that says in prayerful confrontation with mere other, "Here I am!" It is the language of Job, alone, abandoned, and—if not distinctively presocial—at least, in the moments of his ultimate despair, utterly *a*social. Existential self-awareness when driven to its root—as Job was by the end of his book—is a quest for standing in nothing but the time and space of mere existence, bare to the bone. Optimistically, the biblical tradition before Job, in Job, and ever more emphatically after Job, declares that standing in pure existence can be found, that through prayer and confrontation the mere self can ground itself in a stability before mystery. The task is not easy and the search for its completion is never fully done. But it is this stability of the soul, so far as it may be had, upon which the liberation theologians could explicitly ground the sense of citizenship to be embued by the base communities.

What must be finally stressed is that this existential egalitarianism, however difficult its attainment may be, is available to every person. Jeremiah's prophecy of the new covenant makes this plain:

> In those days they shall no longer say:
> "The fathers have eaten sour grapes,
> and the children's teeth are set on edge."
>
> But every one shall die for his own sin; each man who eats sour grapes, his teeth shall be set on edge.
>
> "Behold, the days are coming, says the LORD, when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah. . . . I will put my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no longer shall each man teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, 'Know the LORD,' for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, says the LORD; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more." (Jer 31:29–34)

But this is no more than a natural conclusion. The confrontation with bare life is the *province* of *any* life.

Political Implications of the New Covenant

Beyond all these theological points lie the inescapable political implications of the merely existential Jobean paradigm and the New Covenant. In the light of these, biblical political radicalism in its fullness and in all of its dimensions is simply unavoidable. Its propositions now go further than the transcendent reenforcement of the absolute egalitarianism of base communities and any other similarly constituted groups. They certainly do that much and powerfully so. This kind of positively asserted, absolutely existential egalitarianism prompted Gerrard Winstanley—to name one prominent and especially germane example—to refuse to remove his hat when ushered into the presence of General Fairfax of Cromwell's command, "because he was but a fellow creature" (Sabine 1941, 15). But even beyond these matters, as in Winstanley's own larger vision, absolutely radical existential self-respect must demand in all economic and social organizations a proportionately radical, utopian socialism, an absolute communism. Before existentialisms of this order, pretensions of property—of "This is mine; that is yours"—are as inadmissible as any pretensions of personal pride. In this context, the words of Acts 2:43–46 become a clarion call: "And fear came upon every soul; and many wonders and signs were done through the apostles. And all who believed were together and had all things in common; and they sold their possessions and goods and distributed them to all, as any had need. And day by day, attending the temple together and breaking bread in their homes, they partook of food with glad and generous hearts." Still more wonderful is the sublime belief that all this utopian communism can be practiced and will come to pass in the community at large *pacifically*. True, the saints must yearn for it and work for it and put their bodies and possessions on the line for it, as Winstanley and his followers, pathetically, did. But it *will* come pacifically: so real Christians in the biblical tradition must believe.

This kind of political thinking, to all the practical requirements of our twentieth century times, is foolishness; and it is no wonder that liberation theologians draw back from it. Unanimously they call for socialism, but consistently (coyly?) they are unclear and unspecific about the kinds and degrees of socialism they see as required for the future of Latin America. Winstanley's fate would appear to be instructive. On the other hand, the disruptive, explosive potential of his radicalism—rooted in the bible and now implicit in many of the not fully explored assertions of the liberation theologians and their emergent church—remains.

Notes

This paper was originally prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the Canadian Society for the Study of Religion, Winnipeg, 1986. I am grateful to Ellen Carnaghan for substantial assistance in its preparation for publication.

1. E. J. Dione, Jr., "Vatican Briefs Brazilians on New Decree," *New York Times*, 16 March 1986; Stephen Kinzer, "War's Sad Toll: The Divided House of Nicaragua," *New York Times*, 22 May 1986.

2. The generalizations of this and the following two paragraphs apply broadly across both the Old and New Testaments. But for specific support consult especially the story of Abraham's attempted sacrifice of Isaac (Gn 22), the Exodus narratives, especially the Covenant ceremony in Exodus 24, the Covenant renewal ceremony in Joshua 24, the Saul and David stories (1 Sm 13-31), the Elijah cycle (1 Kgs 17-22), any of Jeremiah's confessions (11:18-12:6, etc.), and the narratives of Jesus' ministry, especially in Mark. Consult Pedersen 1926, pts. 1-2, especially pp. 99-181; and Boman 1960, especially pp. 27-48, 137-53.

3. Biblical quotations are taken from *The Oxford Annotated Bible* (RSV), ed. Herbert G. May and Bruce M. Metzger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

4. Consult Yoder 1972, for comparable reinterpretations of the phrase *the acceptable year of the Lord* in Luke 4:19, and of Paul's injunction to obey the powers that be in Romans 13.

5. There is a small but growing body of literature on the base communities by scholars having fewer overt commitments than the liberation theologians (see Bruneau 1982; Cleary 1985, esp. chap. 4; Levine 1979). This literature largely corroborates the liberation theologians' description as an "ideal type," but goes on to emphasize the diversity of style, size, and purpose among the CEBs, and also the widespread existence of competing types, especially the charismatic, pentecostal type, whose outlooks are sharply conservative and otherworldly. Also emphasized are organizational weaknesses of the classic ("post-Medellin") CEBs, especially in leadership development and coordination.

References

Barreiro, Alvaro. 1982. *Basic Ecclesial Communities.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Boff, Leonardo. 1985. *Church: Charism and Power.* New York: Crossroad.

Boff, Leonardo, and Clodovis Boff. 1984. *Salvation and Liberation.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Boman, Thorleif. 1960. *Hebrew Thought Compared to Greek.* Philadelphia: Westminster.

Bonino, José Miguez. 1979. *Room To Be People.* Philadelphia: Fortress.

Brown, Robert McAfee. 1984. *Unexpected News.* Philadelphia: Westminster.

Bruneau, Thomas C. 1982. *The Church in Brazil: The Politics of Religion.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

Cardenal, Ernesto. 1976-1982. *The Gospel in Solentiname.* 4 vols. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Cleary, Edward L. 1985. *Crisis and Change: The Church in Latin America Today.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Cox, Harvey. 1984. *Religion in the Secular City.* New York: Simon & Schuster.

Eagleson, John, and Philip Scharper, eds. 1979. *Puebla and Beyond.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Glover, Willis B. 1965. God and Thomas Hobbes. In *Hobbes Studies*, ed. K. Brown. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gutierrez, Gustavo. 1973. *A Theology of Liberation.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Gutierrez, Gustavo. 1983. *The Power of the Poor in History.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Hill, John Edward Christopher. 1972. *The World Turned Upside Down; Radical Ideas during the English Revolution.* New York: Penguin Books.

Levine, Daniel H., ed. 1979. *Churches and Politics in Latin America.* Beverly Hills: Sage.

Metz, Johan Baptist. 1981. *The Emergent Church.* New York: Crossroad.

Miranda, José. 1974. *Marx and the Bible.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.

Morris, William Dale. 1949. *The Christian Origins of Social Revolt.* London: Allen and Unwin.

Pedersen, Johs. 1926. *Israel: Its Life and Culture.* London: Oxford University Press.

Replogle, Ron. N.d. Sex, God, and Liberalism. *Journal of Politics.* Forthcoming.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1973. *The Social Contract.* Trans. G. D. H. Cole. London: Everyman.

Sabine, G. H. 1941. Introduction to *The Works of Gerrard Winstanley.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Santa Ana, Julio de. 1979. *Good News to the Poor.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Tamez, Elsa. 1982. *Bible of the Oppressed.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Torres, Sergio, and John Eagleson, eds. 1981. *The Challenge of the Basic Christian Communities.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Torres, Sergio, and Virginia Fabella. 1978. *The Emergent Gospel.* London: Chapman.
Walzer, Michael. 1965. *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Walzer, Michael. 1985. *Exodus and Revolution.* New York: Basic Books.
Yoder, John Howard. 1972. *The Politics of Jesus.* Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

H. Mark Roelofs is Professor of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003.

ROUSSEAU'S GENERAL WILL: A CONDORCETIAN PERSPECTIVE

BERNARD GROFMAN
University of California
Irvine

SCOTT L. FELD
State University of New York
Stony Brook

We identify three basic elements of Rousseau's theory of the general will: (1) there is a common good; (2) citizens are not always accurate in their judgments about what is in the common good; and (3) when citizens strive to identify the common good and vote in accordance with their perceptions of it, the vote of the Assembly of the People can be taken to be the most reliable means for ascertaining the common good. We then show that Condorcet's (1785) model of collective judgment shares these assumptions with Rousseau and that understanding the implications of Condorcet's (1785) "jury theorem" enables us to clarify many of the most obscure aspects of Rousseau's treatment of the general will, including his discussion of the debilitating effects of factions and his confidence in the ability of the Assembly of the People to discern the general will by means of voting.

Rousseau's seminal contributions to democratic theory are his views on the development of the social contract and his notion of the "general will." Although the "general will" has been given various interpretations, there has been little understanding of how, in practice, political institutions might ascertain the general will for the purpose of effectuating public policy.

We illuminate the logic underlying Rousseau's notion of the general will by making use of long-neglected ideas of Rousseau's contemporary, Condorcet, especially those about the judgmental competence of individuals and groups. We also present some new results about the linkages between (individual and collective) preferences and (individual and collective) judgments about the nature of the public good. In the process, we show how some of the most obscure passages in Rousseau can be clarified by referring to results about features of majority rule first demonstrated by Condorcet some decades after *Of the Social Contract* was published. In particular, we examine the relationship between the general will and the will of all, the likelihood that the general will will err, and the subordination of individual opinions to the collective judgment. Our aim is to understand how collective decision-making processes may be appropriately used to ascertain the general will.

Almost no scholars dealing with Rousseau mention Condorcet (for important exceptions see Barry 1964, 1965, and Baker 1980), and even those who mention him customarily cite not his 1785 essay on voting but other works dealing with quite different topics (see, e.g., Ellenburg 1976,

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 82 NO. 2 JUNE 1988

46, 84, 85). A leading interpretation of Rousseau's general will, made famous by Runciman and Sen (1965), interprets it in the context of a prisoner's dilemma game, and treats it as a problem of reconciling conflicting individual preferences rather than as a problem of developing a reliable judgment of what is in the collective interest. We view our approach, with its focus on social judgments, as complementary to that of Runciman and Sen, and providing a needed corrective to a current focus, in social choice theory, on treating all value questions in democratic theory as if they could be reduced to some aspect of the problem of aggregation of preferences.

Rousseau's General Will

> The general will can only direct the forces of the State in keeping with the end for which it was instituted, which is the common good; for if the opposition of private interests has made the establishment of societies necessary, the harmony of these same interests has made it possible. That which is common to these different interests forms the social bond; and if there were not some point in which all interests agree, no society could exist. Now it is only on this common interest that the society should be governed. (Rousseau 1984, 66 [3.1])

In this quote from Book 3 of *Of the Social Contract*, Rousseau recognizes that people differ in their interests but asserts that there is a common (or public) interest on which all humankind can agree in principle—even though not all would wish to pursue it: "Indeed, each individual may, as a man, have a particular will contrary to, or divergent from, the general will which he has as a citizen. His private interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence may make him regard what he owes to the common cause as a gratuitous contribution, the loss of which will be less harmful to others than will the payment of it be onerous to him" (p. 53 [1.7]).

How is the general will to be ascertained? Rousseau's answer is, by voting: "The voice of the greater number always obliges all the others" (p. 328 [4.2]). However, the vote is not to be an aggregation of self-interested preferences. Rather, "when a law is proposed in the Assembly of the People, what is asked of them is not precisely whether they approve the proposition or reject it; but whether or not it conforms to the general will which is their own: each in giving his vote states his opinion on that question, and from the counting of the voting is taken the declaration of the general will" (p. 329 [4.2]).

This passage in Rousseau is often misunderstood. It represents an understanding of the process of voting not as a means of combining divergent interests but rather as a process that searches for "truth." Somewhere in the course of the development of capitalism, what we may think of as an essentially religious idea of voting—a search for God's mandate as revealed through man's finite cognitions (still present in some contemporary religious groups, e.g., the Bruderhof Commune [Zablocki 1971]) was replaced with a much more individual interest-based notion (Riley 1986).[1] Contemporary social welfare economics, beginning with Arrow's work (1963), has focused entirely on voting as a means of preference aggregation. The notion of voting as a process that can be thought of as a direct search for the common good—indeed, the very notion that there can be a common good that is something other than some form of summation or reconciliation of the *preferences* of individuals—has been lost.

There is another important implication of this quote about the nature of voting in the Assembly of the People, namely, that even those individuals whose vote is based on their perception of the common good may err in that perception:[2] "When the opinion contrary to mine prevails, that only proves that I was mistaken, and that what I had considered to be the general will was not" (Rousseau 1984, 329 [4.2]).

Because the voters who seek the general will are fallible in their judgments, the collective judgment can also sometimes be wrong: "The general will is always upright and always tends toward the public utility, but it does not follow that the deliberations of the people always have the same rectitude. One wishes always his own good but does not always discern it. The people is never corrupted, though often deceived, and then only does it seem to will that which is bad" (p. 75 [2.3]).[3]

Nonetheless, Rousseau expects the vote of the popular assembly (i.e., its "declaration of the general will") to coincide with the general will under reasonable conditions: "If, when an adequately informed people deliberate, the citizens having no communication among themselves, . . . the general will would always result" (p. 75 [2.3]).

We should also note that Rousseau, in the passage quoted directly above, sees the "deliberative process" as one taking place within individuals rather than in terms of a process of group debate. Thus, each voter is seen as seeking to reach an individual and independent judgment about alternatives.

There are three elements of Rousseau's theory of the general will that we wish to single out:

1. There is a common good.[4]
2. Citizens are not always accurate in their judgments about what is in the common good.[5]
3. When citizens strive to identify this common good and vote in accordance with their perceptions of it, the vote of the Assembly of the People can be taken to be the most reliable means for ascertaining the common good.[6]

Condorcet's Jury Theorem as a Formalization of Rousseau's General Will

Rousseau has long been acknowledged as one of the great political philosophers. In contrast, Rousseau's contemporary, Condorcet, languished long in obscurity until his idea of the "paradox of cyclical majorities" was rediscovered by Black (1950, 1958) and helped lay the foundation for modern social choice theory (see, e.g., Arrow 1963; Farquharson 1969; Plott 1976; Riker 1964; Sen 1966; and a host of others). However, the idea for which Condorcet is now most famous, the paradox of cyclical majorities, was actually only an incidental by-product of the problem on which he was working, which was the problem of ascertaining how groups could best make choices that were collectively optimal (Black 1958; Grofman, Owen, and Feld 1983; Pinkham and Urken 1982; Young 1986).

Two hundred years ago Condorcet (1785) recognized that majorities of individuals are likely to be more often correct than individuals. Whether understood by the participants or not, this is one fact that makes democracy "work." Condorcet's result, however, was lost for most of the next two hundred years (Black 1958) and even today is nowhere near as well known as it deserves to be (Barry 1965; Grofman 1975; Grofman and Owen 1986a, 1986b; Miller 1986). The Condorcet jury theorem (Black 1958; Condorcet 1785; Grofman 1975) says that if each individual is somewhat more likely than not to make the "better" choice between some pair of alternatives (along some specified evaluative dimension) and each individual has the same probability of being correct in this choice, then (with each voter voting independently) the probability of the group majority being correct increases as the number of individuals increases, towards a limiting value of 1. Moreover, even if individuals have varying competence—where by *competence* we mean the individual probabilities of making the "correct" (dichotomous) choice (i.e., the choice that has the higher value along the specified evaluative dimension)—then so long as the *average* competence is greater than .5, the probability of the group majority being correct still increases to 1 as the group gets large (see Grofman, Owen, and Feld 1983).[7]

We can provide a statement of Condorcet's jury theorem in a form in which its resemblance to Rousseau's theory of the "general will" will be readily apparent. We assume that

1. There is a common good and a set of alternatives that more or less share in its virtues. Thus, alternatives can in principle be evaluated with respect to the underlying normative dimension of consonance with the public interest (general will), and this evaluative dimension permits us, in principle, to rank-order alternatives.
2. With respect to choice between any pair of alternatives, each citizen i has a probability p_i $(0 \leqslant p_i \leqslant 1)$ of choosing that alternative which is more in the public interest (closer to the general will).
3. A group of size N chooses between any two alternatives by means of a majority vote in which each voter is polled about his or her independently reached choice, without any group deliberation.

Though Rousseau was not at all a formal mathematical thinker, and despite the fact that some of the basic probabilistic ideas needed to make sense of the Condorcet jury theorem were still in a very preliminary stage of development in the 1750s, we believe that the Condorcet jury theorem accurately captures the basic ideas underlying Rousseau's notion of the general will. It seems virtually certain that ideas similar to those later to be formally developed by Condorcet were "in the wind," and influenced both Rousseau and, later, Condorcet; and there certainly were various social and intellectual linkages between Rousseau and Condorcet. One connection is via the *Encyclopédie* project, in which Diderot and D'Alembert were involved. Condorcet became a close friend of the mathematician and philosopher D'Alembert, whose notion of the pursuit of the common good anticipated that of Condorcet; Rousseau, as a close friend of Diderot, may have learned of these ideas.[8]

There are five key points in understanding the relationship between the ideas of Rousseau and those of Condorcet: *First,* the Condorcet jury theorem is based on a notion of common judgment, not separate individual preferences. It thus permits us to understand better how Rousseau's distinction between the general will and the "will of all" can be implemented in a voting assembly. In Rousseau's own language, "There is often a great difference between the will of all and the general will. The latter regards only the common interest; the other regards private interests and is only the sum of particular wills."

Second, the Condorcet jury theorem permits us to understand how the majority can be a representation of the general will (when its members act in judgment of the common good and not in terms of their particularized self-interests) without the majority will being *identical to* the general will. The Condorcet jury theorem states the "limit result" that as the group size grows large, if the average citizen is more likely than not to judge correctly which of any pair of alternatives is more nearly in the public interest, the majority vote of the group will be *almost certain to be correct* in its judgment *of the public interest.*[9]

Nonetheless, the general will may err, or—in Rousseau's terminology—"the characteristics" of the general will "may not reside in the majority" (1984, 102 [4.3]). However, even for average group competence $\bar{p}$ near .5, the expected judgmental accuracy of large assemblies is considerable.[10] For example, even if $\bar{p}$ is only .51, a 399-member assembly has a competence of .66, while if $\bar{p} = .55$, a 399-member assembly has a competence of .98. For a reasonable level of $\bar{p}$ (e.g., $\bar{p} = .6$), even relatively small assemblies (of size greater than 41) have a group competence level P_N above .9 (see Grofman 1975; Miller 1986). For $p = .7$, an assembly of only size 11 will have a group competence level of above .9.

Third, knowledge of the Condorcet jury theorem (and recent extensions, e.g., Miller 1986; Owen 1986) helps us better understand the logic undergirding another somewhat puzzling passage in Rousseau:

> But when factions are formed, partial associations at the expense of the whole, the will of each of these associations becomes general with regard to its members and particular with regard to the state: one is then able to say that there are no longer as many voters as there are men, but only as many as there are associations . . . and [this] yield[s] *a less general result.* Finally, when one of these associations is so large that it overcomes the rest, . . . then there no longer is a general will, and the opinion which dominates is only a private opinion. (1984, 27 [2.3], emphasis ours)

We translate this remark of Rousseau in Condorcetian terms as an observation about factions reducing the *effective* size of the assembly. As the *effective* size of the assembly is reduced—because people vote as a herd (part of a faction) not as separately thinking and independently acting individuals—the Condorcet jury theorem tells us, group accuracy will be reduced. Indeed, at the extreme, if there is a majority faction, this faction is equivalent to a single voice deciding things; thus the benefits of large numbers are lost completely.[11] More generally, if individual choices are positively correlated with one another beyond the correlation to be expected from similarities in competence alone, group accuracy will be reduced (Owen 1986; Shapley and Grofman 1984).

Fourth, a focus on the judgmental basis of voting allows us to provide a mathematical foundation for Rousseau's observation that "the closer opinions approach unanimity, the more dominant is the general will" (1984, 322 [4.2]).

Using the Condorcetian probability framework, it can be shown that the more votes there are on the majority side, the more likely is the group majority to be correct.[12]

Fifth, a probabilistic approach to group judgment allows us better to understand Rousseau's views as to when supermajoritarian decision rules are called for: "The more important and serious the deliberations, the closer the prevailing opinion should approach unanimity; [on the other hand,] in decisions that must be resolved immediately, a majority of one vote should suffice" (p. 103 [4.2]).

If certain kinds of decisions are more subject to error than others (or are simply more important than others so that we wish to have a higher level of confidence that the group vote is an accurate expression of the general will), we might wish to require more than a bare majority vote, since this will reduce the error level since it can be shown that the more votes there are in favor, the more likely is the group judgment to be correct (Grofman 1978; Nitzan and Paroush 1985; cf. Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Rae 1969).[13]

Our emphasis has been on how individual judgments about what is in the public interest aggregate to indicate the general will. We believe that this approach captures the central notion of Rousseau's concept of the general will. However, Rousseau recognized that individuals were not always so nobly motivated and that they sometimes expressed their personal preferences, rather than seeking the general will (see n. 5). He also noted that the general will could sometimes emerge as the residue from the canceling out of individual self-interest in the process of aggregation: "The [general will] looks only to the common interest. The [will of all] looks only to private interest and is only the sum of particular wills: but take away from these same wills the pluses and minuses which cancel each other out and the general will remains as the sum of the differences" (1984, 76 [2.3]).

While this language has proved incomprehensible or nonsensical to some (e.g., Plamenatz quoted in Gildin 1983, p. 55), Gildin (1983, 55–57) provides a simple illustration of what Rousseau almost certainly meant. In Gildin's illustration of a Common's Dilemma, each fisherman would like to fish above the limit set by long-run social advantage, since, ceteris paribus, the few fish netted will not be sufficient to drive the fish population to extinction; yet if each fisherman "cheats," all will suffer (cf. Goodin 1982). Clearly, each fisherman wishes the rule to be one where *all other* fishermen must obey the limit. If we subtract out these egocentric peculiarities, the "common" preference is for a ban on fishing above the socially optimal limit for *all* fishermen (see Gildin 1983; cf. Runciman and Sen 1965).

However, as is clear from many passages from him, Rousseau believed that the most certain route to finding the general will was one in which individuals were primarily oriented toward the general will rather than to their own narrow self-interest.

Conclusions

We hope that our reconstruction of Rousseau's theory can lead to a broader understanding of democracy as a means to collective ends, rather than as just as a means for aggregating narrow interests residing in, and confined to, individuals. While it is often assumed that democracy should be based upon individuals following their own self-interests, Rousseau's and Condorcet's contributions suggest that democracy "works" better when individuals try to see beyond their narrow self-interests to the collective good. Democracy may require a certain amount of shared collective consciousness to achieve competent collective judgments; consequently, polities that lack such consciousness may not function well as democracies.[14]

Even while many politicians and researchers recognize that voters often vote to further the collective rather than their individual interests, other researchers and theorists (especially those working in a social choice framework) tend to overlook the importance of these collective orientations. Politicians obviously recognize that appeals to "right," "good," and "fair" policies have some political appeal. Similarly, empirical research consistently shows that norms of citizen duty are one of the main determinants of whether citizens vote at all. However, theorists of democracy may fail to recognize that even relatively small amounts of collective orientation (i.e., only slightly more than none), especially in the context of negatively correlated individual interests, can aggregate to collective decisions with a high probability of serving the public good. That small differences in each individual's amount of collective orientation can make large differences in the likely ability of the electorate as a whole to make collectively beneficial judgments is one of the clear implications of the Condorcet jury theorem. Thus, it may not matter that individuals are not very "sociotropic" in their voting, as long as there are *some* elements of sociotropic voting present in a significant number of voters (cf. Miller 1986).[15]

We see Rousseau as a propounder of enlightened democracy, not dehumanized collectivism.[16] For Rousseau, as for Condorcet, the process of voting is a means whereby the common good can be identified and implemented, albeit imperfectly.[17] In voting, however, social judgments, not individual preferences, are to be the basis of voter choice.[18] Democracy as a process for making good decisions based upon the aggregation of individual judgments has only recently begun to receive the attention that it deserves (Grofman and Owen 1986a, 1986b; Miller 1986; Nitzan and Paroush 1985; Pinkham and Urken 1982; Young 1986).[19] We hope our reinterpretation of Rousseau's views may encourage others to pursue the topic of collective judgments in terms of both descriptive and normative theory of democratic behavior.[20]

Notes

This research was begun while Grofman was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford. We are indebted to the staff of the Word Processing Center, School of Social Sciences, UCI for typing and table preparation and to Dorothy Gormick for bibliographic assistance.

1. Riley (1986, ix) characterizes his book as "a study of the transformation of a theological idea, the general will of God to save all men, into a political one, the general will of the citizen to place common good of the city above his particular will as a private self, and thereby to 'save the polity.' "

2. Compare this idea with that of the "impartial spectator" that, according to Adam Smith in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1971, 171) is contained within each of us and would be "forced" to agree on what is right. Such intuitionist notions of moral judgment are common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

3. We have omitted the continuation of this quote, which indicates what happens when the assembly is divided into factions. We will return to this problem later.

4. "If there were not some point in which all interests agree, no society could exist" (Rousseau 1984, 66 [2.1]).

5. Moreover, individuals may falter in their allegiance to the common good over self-interest: "If it is not impossible that a private will will agree at some point with the general, it is at least impossible that this agreement should be lasting and constant; for the private will naturally tends to preferences, and the general will to equality" (Rousseau 1984, 68 [2.1]).

6. Thus, from the vote of the Assembly "is taken the declaration of the general will" (Rousseau 1984, 329 [4.2]).

7. Let P_N be the majority judgmental accuracy of a group of size N ($m = (N + 1)/2$, if we assume, for convenience, N odd), i.e., let P_N be the probability that the group majority will, in a pairwise comparison, pick the alternative that is better with respect to the common interest. Let $\bar{p}$ be the average accuracy level of voters. Then, if voter choices are mutually independent,

$$P_N \approx \sum_{h=m}^{N} \binom{N}{h} (\bar{p})^h (1 - \bar{p})^{N-h}$$

and if $\bar{p} > .5$,

$$\lim_{N \to \infty} P_N \to 1.$$

If $\bar{p} < .5$,

$$\lim_{N \to \infty} P_N \to 0,$$

while if $\bar{p} = .5$, then, not so intuitively,

$$1 - e^{1/2} < \lim_{N \to \infty} P_N < e^{-1/2}$$

(Grofman, Owen, and Feld 1983).

8. In his *Encyclopēdie* essays on natural rights and on the ancient Greeks, Diderot himself deals with the conflict between individual wills and the general will (see Riley 1986, 203-05). We are not, however, aware of any mention of Rousseau by Condorcet in his 1785 essay.

9. Grofman (1975) characterizes this aspect of the Condorcet jury theorem as "vox populi, vox dei," i.e., the voice of the people approaches infallibility.

10. The calculations below are based on a normal approximation to the situation in which all group members have identical accuracy levels. However, for $m > 10$ or so, distributional effects of competence are minimal, and the results given above may be used even for extreme cases (e.g., ones where some members of the group have $p_i = 0$ or 1). Grofman, Owen, and Feld (1983) and Grofman, Feld, and Owen (1982) give precise bounds.

11. See n. 10.

12. To look at the differing competences of group judgments with differing margins of votes, we make use of the formula for the ratio of the probability of the correct choice by a group majority of size $m + k$ to the probability of an incorrect choice by a group majority of that same size, where m is a simple majority ($= (N + 1)/2$ if N odd), and $\bar{p}$ is mean group competence. We have

$$\frac{(\bar{p})^{m+k} (1 - \bar{p})^{N-m-k}}{(\bar{p})^{N-m-k} (1 - \bar{p})^{m+k}} = \frac{\bar{p}^{(2m+2k-N)}}{(1 - \bar{p})^{N-2m-2k}} .$$

It is apparent that the above expression increases with k.

It should be clear that no single will can ever be expected to divine the general will reliably (i.e., more formally, we would not expect any p_i to equal 1). Furthermore it is likely that any long-lasting faction, even if a majority, will turn away from a search for the common good to a concern for the private good of its own members (see n. 5; cf. *Federalist Papers,* no. 10).

13. If we insist on a supermajority, of course, then we must risk deadlock; e.g., if juries require unanimity, this opens the possibility of hung juries (see Grofman 1979, 1981; cf. Buchanan and Tullock 1962).

14. Thomas Schwartz (personal communication, March 1985) has proposed that "Rousseau and other radical democrats want to have a society without politics." In one sense, this is correct; but we prefer to stress the way in which, for Rousseau, politics in effect becomes redefined as the search for the general will.

15. Compare the view of Tocqueville: "Not only is common opinion the only guide which private judgment retains among a democratic people, but amongst such a people it possesses a power infinitely beyond what it has elsewhere. At periods of equality men have no faith in one another, by reason of their common resemblance; but this very resemblance gives them almost unbounded confidence in the judgment of the public; for it would not seem probable, as they are all endowed with equal means of judging, but that the greater truth should go with the greater number" (1945, 2:11).

16. Some of the same language we have cited to show how the majority will can become the general will if citizens strive to identify the common good and vote in accordance with their perceptions of it, other authors interpret to mean that Rousseau takes the position that individuals do not count, only society matters. For example, Peter Drucker contends that Rousseau believes that

> whatever human existence there is; whatever freedom, rights and duties the individual has; whatever meaning there is in individual life—all is determined by society according to society's objective need of survival. The individual, in other words, is not autonomous. He is determined by society. He is free only in matters that do not matter. He has rights only because society concedes them. He has a will only if he wills what society needs. His life has meaning only insofar as it relates to the social meaning and as it fulfills itself in fulfilling the objective goal of society. There is, in short, no human existence, there is only social existence. There is no individual, there is only the citizen. (1971, 51).

This seems far too extreme a reading of Rousseau. Certainly, the language in Rousseau about the "general will" is susceptible to a much more straightforward interpretation. Rousseau merely sees a public interest that is the proper concern of citizens acting in the legislative arena but does not make the extravagant claim that the legislative arena is the sole, or even the superordinate, arena (see Riley 1986, 248–50; cf. Cobban 1964).

17. The clause "albeit imperfectly" is a critical one. It is sometimes claimed that Arrow's theorem demonstrates the inherent impossibility of there being such a thing as a general will: "The theorem provides an unambiguous answer to the question 'Is there a foolproof way to derive complete and transitive social preference relations?' The answer is no. This clearly negative result casts doubts on all assertions that there is a 'general will,' a 'social contract,' a 'social good,' a 'will of the people,' a 'people's government,' a 'people's voice,' a 'social benefit,' and so forth" (Feldman 1980, 191). We believe this (common) view of what Arrow's theorem allegedly demonstrates about democratic theory is simply wrong. Our position, like Rousseau's, is that the general will may exist but that the outcome of any voting process is but an imperfect reflection of it.

18. As previously noted, we believe that the Condorcetian perspective on social judgments provides a useful corrective to the standard emphasis of economists on social welfare as the aggregation of *individual preferences* (cf. Dummett 1984, 170; Grofman, Owen, and Feld 1983; Lehrer and Wagner 1981; Margolis 1982, 66–69; Nurmi 1984). We also believe that the educative role of politicians in the political process must also be acknowledged (cf. Kelly 1987; Shklar 1969, 186–87). Similarly, accounts of political actors as vote maximizers neglect the role of politicians as innovators of organizational solutions to common problems (Glazer and McMillan 1987).

19. As we have seen, Condorcet, who was concerned with the search for the public good, is remembered only for his analysis of the effects of combining individual *preferences* in such a fashion as to give rise to intransitivities (the paradox of cyclical majorities).

20. One such application might be the analysis of judicial decision making. Clearly, Supreme Court justices are not supposed to be reconciling competing personal preferences for policy when they vote; rather they are seeking to arrive at a judgment of what the Constitution—or some statute—means (in the given context). Thus, to use terminology from early U.S. (and Continental) political thought, Supreme Court justices are to exercise "judgment," not "will" (Chamberlin n.d.). Whether such distinction is meaningful and, even if meaningful, whether human beings can be expected to restrain their will and exercise only their judgment are questions relevant to the present debate over the proper role of evaluation of judicial philosophies as a factor in shaping Senate nonconfirmation of U.S. Supreme Court justices such as Robert Bork.

References

Arrow, Kenneth J. 1963. *Social Choice and Individual Values.* New York: Wiley.

Baker, Michael. 1980. *Condorcet.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Barry, Brian. 1964. The Public Interest. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 38:9–14.

Barry, Brian. 1965. *Political Argument.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Black, Duncan. 1950. The Unity of Political and Economic Science. *Economic Journal* 60:506–14.

Black, Duncan. 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962. *The Calculus of Consent.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Chamberlin, John. N.d. Assessing the Power of the Supreme Court. In *The "Federalist Papers" and the New Institutionalism,* ed. Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman. New York: Agathon. Forthcoming.

Cobban, Alfred. 1964. *Rousseau and the Modern State.* 2d ed. London: Allen & Unwin.

Condorcet, Marquis de. 1785. *Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des decisions rendues à la pluralité des voix.* Paris.

Drucker, Peter F. 1971. *Men, Ideas, and Politics.* New York: Harper & Row.

Dummett, Michael. 1984. *Voting Procedures.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ellenburg, Stepeh. 1976. *Rousseau's Political Philosophy.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Farquharson, Robin. 1969. *Theory of Voting.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Feldman, Allan. 1980. *Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory.* Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.

Gilden, Hilail. 1983. *Rousseau's Social Contract: The Design of the Argument.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Glazer, Amihai, and Henry McMillan. 1987. Legislation and the Cost of Making Proposals. University of California, Irvine. Photo-offset.

Goodin, Robert. 1982. *Political Theory and Public Policy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Grofman, Bernard. 1975. A Comment on Democratic Theory: A Preliminary Mathematical Model. *Public Choice* 21:99–104.

Grofman, Bernard. 1978. Judgmental Competence of Individuals and Groups in a Dichotomous Choice Situation: Is a Majority of Heads Better Than One? *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 6: 47–60.

Grofman, Bernard. 1979. A Preliminary Model of Jury Decision Making as a Function of Jury Size, Effective Jury Decision Rule, and Mean Juror Judgmental Competence. In *Frontiers of Economics,* vol. 3, ed. Gordon Tullock. Blacksburg, VA: Center for Study of Public Choice.

Grofman, Bernard. 1981. Mathematical Models of Jury/Juror Decision Making. In *Perspectives in Law and Psychology.* Vol. 2, *The Jury, Judicial, and Trial Processes,* ed. Bruce D. Sales. New York: Plenum.

Grofman, Bernard, Scott L. Feld, and Guillermo Owen. 1982. Evaluating the Competence of Experts, Pooling Individual Judgments into a Collective Choice, and Delegating Decision Responsibility to Subgroups. In *Dependence and Inequality,* ed. Felix Geyer and Hans van der Zouwen. New York: Pergamon.

Grofman, Bernard, and Guillermo Owen. 1986a. Condorcet Models: Avenues for Future Research. In *Information Pooling and Group Decision Making,* ed. authors. Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Grofman, Bernard, and Guillermo Owen, eds. 1986b. *Information Pooling and Group Decision Making.* Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Grofman, Bernard, Guillermo Owen, and Scott L. Feld. 1983. Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth. *Theory and Decision* 15:261–78.

Kelly, Christopher. 1987. To Persuade without Convincing: The Language of Rousseau's Legislator. *American Journal of Political Science* 31: 321–35.

Lehrer, Keith, and Carl Wagner. 1981. *Rational Consensus in Science and Society.* Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Margolis, Howard. 1982. *Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Miller, Nicholas. 1986. Information, Electorates, and Democracy: Some Extensions and Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In *Information Pooling and Group Decision Making,* ed. Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen. Greenwich, CT: JAI.

Nitzan, Shmuel, and Jacob Paroush. 1985. *Collective Decision Making: An Economic Approach.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nurmi, Hannu. 1984. Social Choice Theory and Democracy: A Comparison of Two Recent Views. *European Journal of Political Research* 12:325–33.

Owen, Guillermo. 1986. "Fair" Indirect Majority Rules. In *Information Pooling and Group Decision Making,* ed. Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen. Westport, CT: JAI.

Pinkham, Roger S., and Arnold B. Urken. 1982. Competence and the Choice of a Voting System. Stevens Institute of Technology. Typescript.

Plott, Charles R. 1976. Axiomatic Social Choice Theory: An Overview and Interpretation. *American Journal of Political Science* 20:511–96.

Rae, Douglas. 1969. Decision Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice. *American Political Science Review* 63:40–56.

Riker, William. 1964. Voting and the Summation of Preferences. *American Political Science Review* 58:341–49.

Riley, Patrick. 1986. *The General Will before Rousseau.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1984. *Of the Social Contract.* Trans. Charles M. Sherover. New York: Harper & Row.
Runciman, W. G., and Amartya K. Sen. 1965. Games, Justice, and the General Will. *Mind* 74: 554-62.
Sen, Amartya K. 1966. A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions. *Econometrica* 34:491-99.
Shapley, Lloyd S., and Bernard Grofman. 1984. Optimizing Group Judgmental Accuracy in the Presence of Interdependencies. *Public Choice* 43: 329-43.
Shklar, Judith. 1969. *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's Social Theory.* Oxford: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Adam. 1971. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments.* New York: Garland.
Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1945. *Democracy in America.* New York: Random House Vintage.
Young, H. Peyton. 1986. Optimal Ranking and Choice from Pairwise Comparisons. In *Information Pooling and Group Decision Making,* ed. Bernard Grofman and Guillermo Owen. Westport, CT: JAI.
Zablocki, Benjamin. 1971. *The Joyful Community.* New York: Pelican.

Bernard Grofman is Professor of Political Science and Social Psychology, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717.

Scott L. Feld is Associate Professor of Sociology, State University of New York, Stony Brook, NY 11794.

CONTROVERSIES

RATIONALISM OR REVELATION?

Are there appropriate limits to the application of rational choice in political decision making? Does rationalism in politics lead to absolutism? Is there a "pressing threat" to liberal democracy "posed by the irreverent conviction of the hegemony of reason"? In the June 1987 issue of this Review, *Darrell Dobbs drew lessons from Homer's epic poem, the* Odyssey, *to argue the limits of rationalism in politics. In this Controversy, Robert Grafstein argues that Dobbs's case against rationalism is not proved. In turn, Dobbs holds to his construction of the relevance of Odysseus' nod to sacred values.*

According to Dobbs (1987), Homer's *Odyssey* offers us a valuable lesson about the limits of reason and, more specifically, about the limits of rational choice approaches in politics and political science. The lesson apparently extends to both rationally guided action and belief. These limits, moreover, are avoidable. Once, Dobbs argues, we recognize matters inaccessible to reason, the sacred, and recognize nonrationalistic means to apprehend them, revelation, we will be able to recognize with Homer the degree to which many of our intellectual and political problems are self-imposed.

These are very important conclusions and if true would have far-reaching implications for political science. Rather than argue that they are false, which I think they are, I will argue that Dobbs has not presented a persuasive case for them. Specifically, his argument is based on a misunderstanding of decision theory and rational choice. The premises of his negative argument are thus faulty. Furthermore, even if the verdict against rationalism is nonetheless true, this does not by itself justify the endorsement of revelation as a higher or supplementary means to wisdom.

Rationality and Dominance

The crew on Odysseus' boat decides to eat the sacred cows, reasoning by the rational choice principle of dominance that regardless of what the gods do, the consequence of slaughtering is always better than the consequence of refraining. Homer condemns the crew's decision as reckless, implying, according to Dobbs, that the sacred must be respected even if doing so is irrational. Rationality has reached its limits.

Decision theory, however, does not recommend the principle of dominance in this kind of case (see, e.g., Levi 1980, 107). For this principle to apply, the alternative states of nature must be independent (causally or statistically, depending on the decision theorist) of the act chosen by the crew. It is difficult to imagine that the decision of the gods to cooperate and punish is independent of the crew's decision to do something punishable. Dobbs (1987, 507) concedes that expected utility considerations may indeed conflict with the dominance principle. One of his responses is that such conflict is "rare." Yet its rarity is not obvious; and even if such cases are rare, the story of the slaughtering of the cattle may still be one;

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 82 NO. 2 JUNE 1988

and even if rare, such cases may still be important. Jeffrey (1983, 2, 8-9), for example, illustrates the relevance of the conflict to arguments over nuclear deterrence and disarmament.

Dobbs believes, in addition, that it would be reasonable to construe the crew's decision problem so as to meet the independence requirement and thus restore the relevance of the crucial dominance principle. He cites textual evidence that, in translation, is unclear to this nonexpert. More strongly, Dobbs suggests that even if there are problem cases, they can be reformulated to exhibit the requisite independence. His illustrative case is Newcomb's Problem. While this problem has political analogs (see Brams 1976, 197-212; Frydman, O'Driscoll, and Schotter 1982) I will briefly describe it in its original form. You are presented with two boxes and a choice between the contents of the first box or both. In the second box there is one thousand dollars. As for the first, which is opaque, there is someone or something that puts one million dollars in it if that being predicts you will choose only the first box; it puts in nothing if it predicts you will choose both. The being, by the way, is an excellent predictor. In more than one million trials, it has been correct 90% of the time. What is your choice, given the apparent conflict between the principle of dominance (choose both boxes) and expected utility (choose the first box)?

Following Brams (1976, 200-203)—who in turn follows a suggestion by John Ferejohn—Dobbs (1987, 506) believes the problem can be solved "by recasting its gaming elements into independent decisions." Specifically, interpret the two states of nature not in terms of whether the being put the money in or not but as *being is correct* and *being is incorrect.* Note, however, that as a result of this reformulation there is no longer any dominant choice; so the implications for Odysseus' crew are unclear. In any case there are at least two problems with this kind of proposal.

First, correctness and incorrectness are not so much states of nature as characterizations of states of nature; and work by logicians such as Alfred Tarski suggests that mixing the two can be perilous (see Grafstein 1983). Second, conflict between dominance and expected utility may be obviated in this particular case, but I do not see that independence—which allows us to apply dominance when relevant—has been secured. Suppose the being has been correct 900 thousand times when one box was chosen, correct ninety times when two boxes were chosen, incorrect ten times when one box was chosen, and incorrect 100 thousand times when two boxes were chosen (this example is inspired by Levi 1975). The being has been correct 90% of the time yet the states of nature are not statistically independent of the choices. Nor, it seems, is the being's correctness causally independent of what the decision maker does.

One can in fact always reformulate decision problems to ensure causal independence, although, as Newcomb's Problem illustrates, one cannot always additionally guarantee statistical independence (see Luce and Krantz 1971). To complicate matters further, there are incorrect ways to secure causal independence, at least in the eyes of those focusing on this form of independence (see Skyrms 1980, 128-39). What rationalism recommends for the crew, it turns out, transcends any reflexive reliance on dominance.

Representation of the Problem

Since the dominated choice of the crew—respect the cows—leads to the same consequence regardless of the state of nature, one might still argue that by coincidence the dominance principle produces the correct rational choice with or without independence: no juggling of probabilities will make the dominated choice preferable. This objection, while correct, simply highlights another problem—Dobbs's representation of the crew's decision problem.

To see this, note that the crux of Dobbs's argument is that dominance would be correct (as in the Penelope example he cites) were it not for the role of the gods, their commands, and the sacred. But it is not rational choice theory that ignores these additional elements. Rather, the fault lies with Dobbs's depiction of the choice situation: the crucial differences between the Penelope and crew examples do not receive appropriate recognition in his characterization of the consequences for the crew, which are described by Dobbs in purely secular terms. And note that the crew's preferences and choices, as Dobbs sets up the decision problem, range over these possible consequences, not over the states of nature themselves.

If, in short, there is more to killing the cows than the possibility of a quick death, namely the violation of the sacred, that fact ought to be reflected in the consequences the crew considers. Their recklessness does not lie in their choosing rationally but in their accepting Eurylochos' characterization of their decision problem, which Dobbs reinforces. Given this characterization, the crew could reveal their preference but not their reverence.

Commensurability

The preceding diagnosis is wrongheaded, Dobbs would argue, insofar as it still does not confront the fundamental failure of rationalism, its insistence that everything, sacred and profane, is commensurable: "Whatever their other differences, ancients and modern alike acknowledge commensuration as the characteristic modus operandi of reason" (1987, 506). If this is true of the ancients, so much the worse for them. It decidedly misrepresents modern decision theory. In the marketplace, commensuration does indeed describe the way people typically behave. Some would argue that as a matter of fact, this is the way nearly all people behave in general (e.g., Rothenberg 1961, 234–35). This is one reason why the assumption of commensurability has been so widely adopted for specific empirical models of rational choice. Another is a technical consideration: without commensurability, preferences cannot be represented by a real-valued utility function. Yet this does not mean that choice without the assumption of commensurability—lexicographic preferences—is seen by theorists as irrational or nonrational.

Is there any consensus among the "moderns" for treating commensurability as a cornerstone of rationality? Not for von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, 630) who describe that assumption as "probably desirable." Chipman (1960) even argues that lexicographic preferences, which induce vector-valued utility functions, are the most general and genuine basis for rational choice theory, with commensurability constituting just a special case. Taylor's (1973) analysis of politics employs the lexicographic assumption. Its use by Rawls (1971) is well known. Finally, Dobbs simply misunderstands Elster (1979) on this point. In some special cases, what appear to be lexicographic preferences are better understood, according to Elster, as constraints on decision making. But contrary to Dobbs (1987, 508) he does not mean that these constraints represent limits on rational thinking about the world. Rather, they represent limits on our ability to change the world. On the other hand, in cases when there truly are lexicographic preferences, Elster observes, the failure of commensurability to apply, "of course, does not mean that [those cases] are unamenable to rational analysis" (1979, 127).

Revelation

I do not suggest that reason has no limits. Any instance of deductive reasoning involves assumptions that are not themselves deduced. Gödel's Theorem tells us no consistent set of assumptions can generate all truths; although this does not mean there are truths no consistent set of assumptions can generate (Quine 1976, 66). Inductive reasoning faces fundamental challenges (Goodman 1965). And what is the rational choice is not always clear. So in these senses there are limits to reason apart from any problems in using or relying exclusively on reason or in treating it as the whole of science.

Yet this admission falls far short of the conclusions Dobbs recommends. For even if reason cannot confirm every "self-evident" or revealed truth, the converse is not necessarily correct: no claims about the sacred, the self-evident, or anything else become true just because reason is unable to prove or disprove them. (Tocqueville's consequentialist argument for faity, cited by Dobbs [1987, 492], is irrelevant to the question of truth.) Revelation, in sum, is no automatic antidote to the real limits of reason. By the same token, in response to Leo Strauss's observation, "Philosophy has never refuted revelation," I would ask, To whose satisfaction? Dobbs certainly gives practitioners of reason no reason to question their understanding of the way knowledge of the world comes about, an understanding that has survived confrontations with revealed biblical truths about creation and other matters. Those, on the other hand, who have faith in an epistemology of revelation even when it conflicts with or transcends reason have thereby insulated themselves from the commands of rationality. What could a refutation of revelation possibly look like in their eyes?

ROBERT GRAFSTEIN

University of Georgia

In my essay on reckless rationalism and heroic reverence in the *Odyssey* (Dobbs 1987) I called attention to a discrepancy in the poet's evaluation of two rational, strategically dominant choices. Homer condemns as utterly reckless the decision of Odysseus' crewmen to slaughter Helios' cattle, but he certifies the widsom of Odysseus' formally identical decision to conceal his identity. I argued that this discrepancy is neither an artifact of editorial patchwork nor a "Homeric nod" but is instead indicative of a distinction that remains obscured by an exclusively rationalistic orientation, the distinction between foolhardy recklessness and discerning wisdom. The recklessness of Odysseus' crewmen lies in their treatment of the divine sanction of Helios' cattle as if it were merely a price that might be weighed in a common balance with other circumstantial considerations, such as their hunger. Their confidence in the boundless range of commensuration is, I suggesed, the hallmark of a rationalistic cast of mind. The wisdom of Odysseus, by contrast, is manifest in his tempering a superlative intellect with respect for the *limits* of commensuration. Odysseus' reverence, according to my account, is established upon an insight or revelation that occurred in the course of extraordinary conversation with the shade of Achilles. In this encounter Achilles declares his preference for even the most miserable of lives over his current station as king of the dead. I pointed out that Achilles' speech is incongruous with his irreproachably courageous deeds, incongruous, that is, unless one sees that life itself is sacred. As indicated by Achilles' choice, the "value" of human life is not arrived at via rational commensuration in a nexus of exchange. As Odysseus learns, the sanctity of human life *defies* commensuration; it demands respect on its own terms, not by virtue of comparison with, or analogy to, anything else in this world (cf. Mt 16:26). Odysseus consequently rejects the boundless competitive ambition of his past, which he recognizes as nothing more than reckless commensuration in heroic guise. His remarkable change of heart disposes him to respect even the sacred cattle of Helios. For Helios, the sun-god, is sovereign over the days and seasons that measure the limits of our mortality. Odysseus' reverence for this god manifests itself in a proper respect for these limits, including the limits of human reason.

I suggested that we are in no way exempt today from the pitfalls of reckless rationalism. Our situation is precarious in that it is the commercial character of our own polity that inclines us toward such recklessness. For commercialism is merely rationalism in a three-piece suit. With its exclusive orientation toward "bottom-line" comparisons, commercialism takes for granted that everything has its price, including the very principles that make commercial freedom, to say nothing of our other freedoms, possible. As against rationalism, I suggested that *reverence* for common-law liberties and the equal rights with which we are endowed by our Creator may well prove to be our most reliable support in the struggle to keep the republic we have been given. Now Grafstein, in response, maintains (1) that the case I make against rationalism "is based on a misunderstanding of decision theory and rational choice"; and (2) that "even if the verdict against rationalism is nonetheless true, this does not by itself justify the endorsement of revelation as a higher or supplementary means to wisdom." He devotes only a concluding paragraph to the latter charge, directing his greatest effort toward establishing the former.

Rationality and Dominance

Grafstein lodges three objections to my use of decision theory in interpreting Homer's *Odyssey*, contending (1) that "decision theory . . . does not recommend the principle of dominance in this kind of case"; (2) that my representation of the crewmen's choice situation is faulty; and (3) that my emphasis on commensurability as the crux of reason is inaccurate, at least as concerns modern decision theory. Let us consider these objections in order.

Is my use of strategic dominance in describing the crewmen's irreverent decision appropriate "in this kind of case"? Notice that the issue here calls for an interpretation of the specific circumstances presented in the *Odyssey*. The critical question, as Grafstein agrees, concerns the independence of the gods' decision to cooperate in punishing the crewmen from the crewmen's decision to slaughter the cattle. Grafstein addresses the issue of independence but his volleys miss their mark and, as we shall see, merely trace tangents to the central point. The problem is that Grafstein shows little interest in the specific circumstances that constitute this case. He dismisses specific textual evidence, which I cited to support my formulations, as "unclear to this nonexpert"; and he asserts, without any reference to the relevant data—the speeches in Homer's poem—that the necessary independence between the decisions of the gods and the crewmen is "difficult to imagine." Now, the independence condition is satisfied, in plain English, as long as it is not the crewmen's decision itself that causes divine cooperation, or more strongly, if other gods are as likely not to cooperate as they are to cooperate with Helios in punishing Odysseus' crewmen. This, I submit, is not at all difficult to imagine. Cooperation is under no circumstances to be taken for granted among Homeric gods. On the contrary, factiousness is their most notorious characteristic.

But we need not leave the disposition of this issue at the level of imagination. There is, as I have already indicated, specific textual evidence to support a positive claim for independence (p. 507). In the lines I cited, Helios delivers a powerful threat to Zeus, chief of the gods. Helios declares that unless the other gods cooperate and punish Odysseus' crewmen to avenge his cattle, he will leave his appointed station and go instead into Hades and shine for the dead. Now, it seems to me self-evident that Helios would not have resorted to threats had he expected the gods to cooperate in the punishment of the crewmen's sacrilege. Helios supposes the gods' cooperation is not to be taken for granted, *regardless of what the crewmen have done.* In other words, he sees the gods' decision to cooperate with him as independent of the men's action. This conclusion is confirmed by Zeus's response in the sequel. For Zeus takes Helios' threat seriously. He urges Helios not to depart and promises him in exchange that he will punish the Ithakans immediately by hurling a thunderbolt to split their ship into little pieces. It is finally Helios' threat, not the crewmen's sacrilege, that invokes Zeus's punishment (see *Odyssey* 12.382–88).

By Grafstein's own admission, the demonstration of independence suffices to undermine his objection to the use of strategic dominance of this case. But a miracle intervenes. From the ashes of Know-Nothingism concerning the plain speech of Helios and Zeus there arises a veritable phoenix among decision theorists. Grafstein rehearses at length (and with full *apparatus criticus)* his misgivings with the scholarly literature on Newcomb's Problem. If Grafstein is more interested in Newcomb's Problem than he is in Homer's *Odyssey,* that is, of course, his privilege. But if in opposition to my argument he means to assert the *relevance* of Newcomb's Problem (with its inherent violation of the independence condition) to the case of Odysseus' crewmen, then he assumes the responsibility for a more careful study of the substantive details of Homer's story than he has thus far undertaken. Certainly, if one does not understand the "kind of case" *presented by Homer,* one is in no position to dictate appropriate theoretical devices for its analysis.

Representation of the Problem

Next, Grafstein claims that I misrepresent the crewmen's choice situation by leaving all but secular considerations out of their calculus. I expressly stated that I constructed the decision matrix describing the crewmen's choice situation "directly out of the alternatives and consequences as they are formulated in the text" (p. 496). Thus Grafstein's quarrel is really with Eurylochos and the rest of the crewmen, who all assent to Eurylochos' formulation of the problem. The real problem, however, is that Grafstein fails to grasp the significance of this assent. He considers the crewmen's assent merely a tactical blunder. As a result, he holds that "the crew could reveal their preference but not their reverence"—as if the matter of their reverence remains unsettled. I maintained, however, that it is precisely the crewmen's assent to Eurylochos' characterization of their decision problem, *as being amenable to commensuration in the first place,* that testifies conclusively to their culpable irreverence. The crewmen err in treating the divine sanction of Helios' cattle as though it were simply a signal of the price charged by the gods for Thrinakian roast beef. They carelessly transgress the limits imposed by the sacred upon rational commensuration. This rationalistic cast of mind, which recognizes no bounds to commensuration and thus holds nothing sacred, is what Homer condemns as reckless.

Commensurability

In a third attempt to establish his thesis, Grafstein opposes my observation that commensuration is central to modern as well as classical conceptions of reason. Although he has no quarrel with the accuracy of this observation as it bears upon ancient thinkers, he is vehement in his denial of its validity for modern decision theorists. His argument, however, supports neither the denial nor its vehemence. For I agree that the "assumption of commensurability" is questioned by some of the most thoughtful decision theorists. The problem is that Grafstein misconstrues the point of their questioning. He mistakenly supposes that it somehow concerns whether commensuration is, in fact, the characteristic *modus operandi* of reason. He has confused what the "assumption of commensurability" means. The authors he cites do not, in fact, deny the role of commensuration in reason but only whether all objects of human choice should be assumed to be commensurable. In other words, the authors Grafstein cites are pointing out the fallacy of imposing a scheme of commensuration upon matters that are not amenable to commensuration. In this respect these decision theorists are to be applauded for avoiding precisely the recklessness for which Homer blames Odysseus' crewmen. I accordingly credited Elster (1979, 125) and others for accepting the existence of incommensurability "as defining limits to their rational-choice theory of politics" (p. 508).

Grafstein counters by pointing out that incommensurability does not "imply limits on rational thinking about the world." His argument is that choice without commensurability is not irrational. Now if one stipulates a different, and considerably scaled down, conception of rationality from the one I argued for in my essay, it would indeed follow that choice without commensuration is not irrational. But what is new in this? I already made this point in reference to Achilles' preference for the most miserable of human lives over being king of the dead: "Achilles' preference, like all lexicographic orderings, does not violate transitivity. Lexicographic preferences are rational in this purely ordinal sense, though they preclude rational comparisons in the more meaningful sense of reason as commensuration" (p. 507). One may indeed say that "rational thinking" about the world remains possible apart from commensurability, if one is interested in maintaining a thesis at all costs. But it should give us pause to note that the cost paid for this stipulation is by no means insubstantial; "thinking" is now to be understood as restricted to checks for transitivity or consistency. As against my observation that commensuration is the hallmark of reason, this view would imply that the enforcement of consistency is reason's characteristic function. In short, it seems to me that Grafstein's defense of rationalism rests, ironically, upon a conception of reason that does not give reason its due credit. I hold reason in higher esteem, notwithstanding my criticism of rationalism.

Revelation

Grafstein in a final paragraph elaborates his contention that "even if the verdict against rationalism is nonetheless true, this does not by itself justify the endorsement of revelation as a higher or supplementary means to wisdom." He notes that claims about the sacred should not be accepted as true "just because reason is unable to prove or disprove them." I heartily agree. Moreover, if this is what Grafstein means by "automatic," then his assertion that revelation is "no automatic antidote to the real limits of reason" strikes me as singularly uncontroversial. Who, really, would disagree?

Why this failure, then, to join any serious issue? The problem is that Grafstein is operating here with a surprisingly crude notion of revelation. Consider his *coup de grace,* the contention that science provides a better account of creation than does revelation. Note that in promoting this contest, Grafstein assumes without argument (1) that the questions that science seeks to answer are the same as those toward which biblical revelation is directed, and (2) that the interpretation of Scripture that he finds antagonistic to science is the correct interpretation. There is ample reason, it seems to me, to dispute these assumptions. Grafstein's view of the opposition between science and faith presupposes a degree of convergence of purpose that simply does not exist. Broadly speaking, modern science aims at prediction and control; while faith, it may be said, is directed toward discerning God's providence and will. This difference in purpose should be kept in mind in any attempt to pit modern science against the Bible. Besides, even the most literal reading of Genesis need not conclude, against the scientifically established geological record, that all of creation took place in six solar days. After all, the sun was not itself created until the fourth "day." Thus the meaning of "creation day" in Genesis is unclear and requires interpretation, an interpretation obviously different from the one presupposed in Grafstein's account.

I will resist the temptation to delve further into the serious issues to which Grafstein's concluding remarks merely nod a distant greeting. My essay, after all, is an interpretation of the *Odyssey,* not the Bible. I suggested that a revelation, or noetic insight, brings about a decisive change of heart in Odysseus. Homer presents this change of heart and the reverence that accompanies it as the critical factor in Odysseus' heroic return to home and throne. Nevertheless, Odysseus remains for Homer, and for Homer's audience, the quintessential man of reason. Thus the very fact that it is *Odysseus* who acknowledges the limits of commensuration stands as an impressive, though admittedly not a conclusive, argument for the existence of these limits. It would be as wrong, however, to close one's mind to the impressiveness of this argument as it would be to suppose that it, taken alone, is conclusive. In this spirit, and with the tools of decision theory, I recounted the story of Odysseus as the Homeric case of (to paraphrase Hume) a thinker "turning the weapons of reason against the rationalists." I hoped as well to warn against the self-destructive rationalistic tendencies present in our own commercial republic. But, in the last analysis, it must be admitted that what Homer taught and what we find beneficial are not, for these reasons alone, to be certified as true (though once again the evidence is impressive). Nevertheless, I consider the truth of Homer's teaching—once we correctly grasp what that teaching is—to be the most important question. It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that Grafstein's comments to not more successfully join this issue.

DARRELL DOBBS

Marquette University

References

Brams, Steven J. 1976. *Paradoxes in Politics.* New York: Free Press.

Chipman, John S. 1960. The Foundations of Utility. *Econometrica* 28:193–224.

Dobbs, Darrell. 1987. Reckless Rationalism and Heroic Reverence in Homer's *Odyssey. American Political Science Review* 81:491–508.

Elster, Jon. 1979. *Ulysses and the Sirens.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Frydman, Roman, Gerald O'Driscoll, and Andrew Schotter. 1982. Rational Expectations of Government Policy: An Application of Newcomb's Problem. *Southern Journal of Economics* 42: 311–19.

Goodman, Nelson. 1965. *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.

Grafstein, Robert. 1983. The Social Scientific Interpretation of Game Theory. *Erkenntnis* 20:27–47.

Jeffrey, Richard C. 1983. *The Logic of Decision.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levi, Isaac. 1975. Newcomb's Many Problems. *Theory and Decision* 6:161–75.

Levi, Isaac. 1980. *The Enterprise of Knowledge.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Luce, Robert Duncan, and David H. Krantz. 1971. Conditional Expected Utility. *Econometrica* 39: 253–71.

Quine, Willard V. 1976. *The Ways of Paradox.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice.* Cambrige: Harvard University Press.

Rothenberg, Jerome. 1961. *The Measurement of Social Welfare.* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Skyrms, Brian. 1980. *Causal Necessity.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Taylor, Michael. 1973. The Problem of Salience in the Theory of Collective Decision-Making. In *Mathematical Approaches to Politics,* ed. Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, and Antoine H. Stoetzel. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. 1953. *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.* New York: John Wiley.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL PREFERENCES

Aaron Wildavsky has argued that it is theoretically more useful to think of political preferences as rooted in political culture than to entertain alternative bases such as schemas or ideologies. In the APSA presidential address in which he made his case, Wildavsky also advocated a program of research on political cultures, and welcomed "challenges and improvements." David Laitin accepts the invitation; he variously takes issue with Wildavsky's concept of political culture.

Wildavsky (1987) poses an important question: What accounts for people's political preferences? He also outlines a research program that can discriminate among competing explanations—for instance, culture, self-interest, tradition, and class—to account for political preferences. Finally, he contends that *culture* can explain a wide range of political preferences.

Unfortunately, Wildavsky's approach is subject to some of the same criticisms as were leveled at the "political culture" school that had its "hour upon the stage" in the 1960s. By trying to explain generalized preferences with cultural variables those scholars depleted the culture concept of any analytic power.[1] Lest we spin our disciplinary wheels on the same frictionless framework, I will propose three theses that should guide future work in political culture.

1. Culture instills not values to be upheld but rather points of concern to be debated.
2. Culture is Janus-faced: people are both guided by the symbols of their culture and instrumental in using culture to gain wealth and power.
3. Culture traffics in symbols, and symbols must be interpreted in full ethnographic context.

Values versus Points of Concern

Wildavsky defines *culture* as "shared values legitimating social practices" (p. 6) even though he understands all too well that there is rarely a value consensus within a culture. He implies that environmentalists share one culture and Reaganites another in that one group trusts central authority and the other does not. But this stretches our common understanding of what culture is. We can think of Iranian Shiites or Californian surfers as each sharing a common culture. But to say that a person who seeks to protect society from nuclear catastrophe by opposing the expanded use of nuclear energy but doesn't object to the enrollment of a student with AIDS in his or her child's schoolroom belongs to a different culture than those who feel otherwise is to misrepresent what is meant by culture. These sorts of political difference are common among members of a single culture.

Once we accept that within a culture there are diverse strands of opinion and conflicting values, what can be deduced from the notion of people "sharing" a culture? Thomas Metzger has an answer. In his essay on neo-Confucian society (1977), he sees culture not as values that are upheld but rather as "points of concern" that are debated. Rather than examine Confucian bureaucrats' preferred answers to questions of value, Metzger examines the questions generally considered worth asking and the clichés implicitly accepted. "We can understand" the Neo-Confucians, Metzger suggests, "by understanding what they worried about . . . what their shared points of uncertainty and concern were. . . . Therefore I suggest looking at Neo-Confucianism as a widely shared 'grammar' defining the problems of intellectual struggle by positing a discrepancy between the goal of life and the given world. Sharing this grammar, Neo-Confucians differed in terms of their solutions for these problems" (p. 14). To be sure, cultures do support some common values.[2] But a general focus on points of concern rather than shared values provides a richer appreciation of why political action differs across cultures (Laitin 1986).

With this idea of "points of concern" kept in mind, Wildavsky's four-box matrix of culture types (1987, 6) illustrates something important about his own culture. The central issue addressed by this matrix is the trade-off between individual freedom and government authority. Indeed this issue has been a central point of concern in the Western political tradition. Questions of whether the state has the right to impose risk on individuals will therefore be ever present on the political agenda of Western societies. But in other cultures, for instance, the neo-Confucian, these issues are not juxtaposed as opposites or as obvious trade-offs. What we learn from Wildavsky is the central importance of the debate about freedom and hierarchy in his culture, and we can predict that consensus will often fracture along this fault line. Good research in political culture should illustrate how debates get framed in other cultural arenas.

By focusing only on shared values, Wildavsky misses the point that people with strongly opposed views can share a culture and that people with similar views can come from different cultures. He also misses the true comparative possibilities of a good culture theory.

Two Faces of Culture

By arguing that the sources of political preferences are answers to two questions (Who am I? What shall I do?), Wildavsky does not answer his question about the source of preferences but merely pushes it back one step. For we can ask of him: What is the source of answers to those questions? (Could it be *interest?*) Wildavsky ignores the question of how people make decisions about their loyalty by treating it as if it were a trivial act. "By figuring out their master preferences, as it were—who they are and are not, to what groups they do and do not belong—they can readily figure out the rest" (p. 8). He is obviously begging the question here; for people may be strategic in answering these questions. Wildavsky derives from his Table 2 (p. 17) that the cultures people are in give them clues as to how to think about the poor. But the fact that businessmen (the "culture" of business?) attribute poverty to the actions of the poor smacks of self-interest rather than culture. Could they have answered the questions about who they were with a careful eye to what would serve their interests? Wildavsky doesn't address this important question.

In trying to discredit interest theories, Wildavsky sets up a rigid dichotomy between exogenous and endogenous sources of preference.[3] Wildavsky's battle is with the economists who assume that preferences are exogenous and consequently refrain from analyzing them. He argues that the source of these preferences requires explanation and that "culture" is the most compelling explanation for them.

Wildavsky, however, provides us with a one-faced view of culture. He joins (un-successfully, as I shall argue) an army of cultural anthropologists that has long argued that microeconomic theory cannot explain the different preference functions that vary systematically across cultures.[4] Any culture theory obviously must analyze how these preferences are created and sustained. This is culture's endogenous element.

But culture has a second face, one that Wildavsky's conceptualization misses entirely. To share a culture means to share a language or a religion or a historiography. Very rarely do these cultural systems coincide perfectly within a large society. People must often choose which among their religious group, language group, and so on will be their primary mode of cultural identification. This choice is often guided by instrumental reasoning, based on the potential resources available for identifying yourself, for example, as a Catholic as opposed to a French speaker.

The instrumental face of culture reveals even more. Once a cultural group organizes politically, the common symbolic system makes for efficient collective action. Tamils in Sri Lanka, French speakers in Quebec, and Jews in the Soviet Union can be easily maintained as groups not because culture is more real than class but because organizational costs are relatively low when common and powerful symbols are readily available and rules of exclusion easily formulated. Political entrepreneurs exploit this organizational advantage to make collective claims for resources. This second face of culture—in which shared symbols are used for instrumental ends, ends for which preferences are best taken as exogenous—is entirely missed in Wildavsky's culture theory.[5]

To illustrate this point from my field research in Yorubaland—I found that there were two candidates for primary cultural identification. Yorubas could see themselves primarily in terms of their association with an ancestral city or in terms of their association with a world religion. Both foci had embedded in them points of concern that implied different political emphases. That most Yorubas see their primary cultural framework to be that of their ancestral city and see their attachment to a world religion as peripheral to their real identity can be explained by exogenous factors. (An external *hegemon,* in order to foster social control at low cost, played a crucial role in making that the preferred cultural framework.) Political entrepreneurs then exploited the powerful and available symbols of ancestral city identification to organize political action seeking to enhance their group's wealth and power.

Once the cultural framework is established, however, endogenous factors having to do with the points of concern in ancestral city life can help explain other political preferences, and make sense out of intra-Yoruba political debates (Laitin 1986). Wildavsky is therefore right to point to the endogenous cultural element as a source of preferences. Indeed, out of the construction of a common culture, certain points of concern will emerge as obvious and important.

But a good theory of culture must also point to the fact that people are instrumental about which aspect of their cultural repertoire is of primary significance and that shared symbols constitute a political resource that can be effectively exploited by political entrepreneurs. Here is where a culture theory can usefully rely on exogenous sources of preferences. This is the Janus-faced element in cultural theory that Wildavsky's theory misses.

Ethnographic Analysis

By using simple attitudinal data as indicators of culture, Wildavsky breaks with those anthropologists who otherwise agree with him that culture is endogenous. For example, in a stimulating critique of the Douglas and Wildavsky volume, *Risk and Culture,* (1982) Marcus and Fischer (1986), who are in general sympathetic to an endogenous theory of culture, criticize the authors for attributing a set of culture traits to members of the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, the Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power, and the Clamshell Alliance without having provided field data to support their observations. Douglas and Wildavsky liken these organizations to irrational sects of religious zealots. Unfortunately, as Marcus and Fischer pointed out, "no ethnographic evidence [on the organizations or on religious sects] is provided to support these positions"(p. 149).

In his presidential address, Wildavsky attempts to justify his lack of ethnographic data by praising the virtues of parsimony (1987, 4). The question then becomes, Can you do culture theory without doing ethnography?

Unfortunately for Wildvasky's position, the survey research data on which he relies is woefully inadequate to explain the cultural sources of political preferences. Consider his hypothesis that on the debate over technology risks the issue is really "a referendum on the acceptability of U.S. institutions. The more trust in them, the more risk acceptance; the less trust, the more risk rejection" (p. 14). To support his culture theory, Wildavsky reports that nuclear energy experts and the military are far more likely to see nuclear power plants as safe compared to movie producers and elite journalists. But Wildavsky lets us down with his lack of data. Do the military find acceptable all U.S. institutions, for instance the Bill of Rights, more than elite journalists? Is the connection between a preference for a strong defense and a willingness to take risks in regard to nuclear energy a cultural one? Perhaps because nuclear power is an everyday reality in the military, army personnel are inured to the everyday dangers of nuclear energy.

Wildavsky is insightful in seeing packages of apparently unconnected political views as emerging from a common framework concerning general views about authority. But what draws these people together? Is it common symbols, common interests, or intense interaction? How strong are these alliances? How much slippage occurs when, for example, undergraduates in the Sierra Club become corporate lawyers? (Do they then change culture?) What about a retired officer who settles near a polluted lake and joins an environmental group seeking to put controls on the disposal of waste by local industries? Has he changed his culture? From the attitude surveys Wildavsky cites, we cannot even know whether the answers to the questions, Who am I? What shall I do? have any connection to political positions in regard to nuclear energy.

Is ethnography necessary to answer these questions? It is clear that better-designed survey data could address many of them. Surveys, however, have inherent limits. The claim that culture provides guidance for political action implies that symbols frame and rituals sustain a particular political vision. Part of the power of culture is that its members are not fully conscious of the sources of their visions and, even if honest, would not necessarily provide the relevant data to survey researchers. Participant observation and the other tools of ethnography are therefore crucial in making connections between world view and political action.

Having lived in what he calls a "political-medical museum" for a good many years, Wildavsky is well placed to provide ethnomedical data. The third thesis on culture demands that he report those data and interpret them in full social context. Any culture theory would be impoverished without the collection of data on the symbols, rituals, and interactions that constitute and reconstitute cultures.

DAVID D. LAITIN

University of Chicago

From the very beginning of political studies, efforts have been made to create categories and concepts that would facilitate the comparison of institutions bearing different labels and sporting a variety of practices. My cultural theory of why preferences come from institutions is but one of the recent entries. In view of the well-known difficulties facing this enterprise, skepticism is in order. But I would not have thought that the task itself would be rejected in favor of a return to the nominalism—country or tribal labels—from which we have striven so hard to escape. To speak of a Yoruba or a U.S. or a neo-Confucian "culture"—as if all members shared the same values and legitimated the same set of social relations—denies the possibility of conflict within such a group, as Laitin mistakenly accuses me of doing.

Adherents of cultures learn their identity by knowing not only what they are for but also what they are against. It is cultural conflict that gives meaning to cultural identification. Where Laitin states in his first thesis that "culture does not instill values to be upheld but rather points of concern to be debated," I might agree that his definition was useful if it referred to debate among rival cultures within a country or group rather than to debate within a single "culture" identified with a single group. For in my terms his formulation would have to mean that adherents of a single culture (say, hierarchy) are at least as far apart from each other as they are from adherents of individualism or egalitarianism or fatalism. Conceiving of countries or groups as compounds of cultures avoids this difficulty.

Laitin contends that "to say that a person who seeks to protect society from nuclear catastrophe by opposing the expanded use of nuclear energy but doesn't object to the enrollment of a student with AIDS in his or her child's schoolroom belongs to a different culture than those who feel otherwise is to misrepresent what is meant by culture." Adhering to a given culture on a conceptual level is determined by measures of two dimensions: strength of group boundary and degree and variety of prescription. Preferences regarding risk are a consequence, not a cause, of cultural identification (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982).

On the empirical level, I cannot misrepresent what is factually true, that is, truer than alternatives. The likelihood of a person or group who evidences an across-the-board concern with the harmful consequences of technology taking a position in favor of gay rights—including, say, opposition to compulsory testing for AIDS—is much greater than would be true of those who take a much more benign view of technology. (Consult your daily newspaper). Look and see for yourself. Because across-the-board concern with technological danger stems from commitment to an egalitarian way of life (the detailed argument is in Douglas and Wildavsky 1982), whereas support for technology as largely benign bespeaks commitment to hierarchy and individualism, these differences are well predicted by cultural theory. Those who disagree should ask themselves why, when the ideology of a group is known, its inclinations toward AIDS and technology follow as a matter of course.

According to Laitin's second thesis—"Culture is Janus-faced: people are both guided by the symbols of their culture and instrumental in using culture to gain wealth and power"—culture is subordinate ("instrumental") to more major concerns and unstable ("Janus-faced"). Were the claim of instability true, it would be difficult to explain how any grouping of people coheres. There could be no social science, both because there would be no social relations that could cohere and because there would be no regularities to observe. Obviously, Laitin has something else in mind. Enter our old friend "interests," especially the businessmen "with a careful eye as to what would serve their interests."

Readers are referred back to the original article as well as to the important paper by Michael Thompson and Michiel Schwarz (1985) for a brief discussion of the difficulties of basing political science and economics on a preexistence of interests, not inquiring as to how people came to know their interests and assuming the question to be outside the scope of these disciplines. Here I wish to observe only that when Laitin denies that preferences stem from social interaction in building up and tearing down institutions, he separates politics from social life. If, as he maintains, people are *both* guided by their cultures *and* instrumental in using shared symbols to reach their own political ends, political objectives are separate from and superior to social relationships. The instrument controls the maker.

In claiming that I do not provide ethnographic data to test my theory, Laitin attributes to me and Mary Douglas a position exactly opposite from that we take in *Risk and Culture* (1982). He says that we lump together organizations like the Sierra Club and the Friends of the Earth and "liken these organizations to irrational sects of religious zealots." The whole point of describing and analyzing these two organizations was to show that they are culturally different, the Friends of the Earth at that time being an egalitarian sect and the Sierra Club more of a hierarchy. And we drew our accounts, as the footnotes indicate, from much longer ethnographic studies that would, if included, have increased the size of our book by half again. True, we did not understand then that our use of this classical term *sect*, following such luminaries as Max Weber, would lead some readers to conclude we meant these groups were akin to *religious zealots. Zealots*, yes—as they themselves are proud to say—but religious, not necessarily. For this reason I refer to the Friends-of-the-Earth-type culture as *egalitarian*. Calling this or the other cultures "irrational" would be anathema to us. To do so would not only trivialize our theory, it would also deny our major analytical purpose, which is precisely to rationalize the conflicting positions. We wished to show that conflict over the risks of modern technology has its roots in the most characteristic human activity, the efforts of adherents of different cultures to strengthen their preferred way of life at the expense of others by claiming their institutions make people healthy whereas those they reject make people sick.

Are we correct in believing that the conflict over risk is fundamentally about the acceptability of institutions? Since Laitin challenges my view that differences over nuclear power between, say, elite journalists and others are rooted in culture, a test can be made. The extensive data Laitin wished me to put in my paper, which would have been out of place as one of a number of illustrations, has been provided in a recent issue of this *Review*. As Stanley Rothman and S. Robert Lichter (1987, 384-85, 398-99) conclude in their study of different theories accounting for elite positions on nuclear power,

> our own study of U.S. social, economic, and political leaders suggests that Douglas and Wildavsky are correct in arguing that ideological factors have also played an insufficiently recognized role in citizens' changing perception of risk. . . .
>
> The argument undergirding this essay is that the new environmental movement in the United States is partly a symbolic issue. Some liberal or radical members of key strategic elites (especially the news and entertainment media and public-interest groups), who are alienated from the social and political system but live in an environ-

> ment in which they cannot directly criticize the hegemony of liberal capitalism, are drawn to concrete issues that serve as a surrogate for such a critique.
>
> The process of substituting such issues for a broader critique of the society is not necessarily a conscious one, and the issues chosen are often genuine, that is, problems with which the society must cope.

No doubt this is not the last word. But at least the study indicates that a reasonable person with respect for evidence could believe that our theory has merit.

Laitin would like me to explain how and why individuals make their most important commitments, their choice of culture or way of life—a tall order. Michael Thompson and I are writing a book to be called *The Foundations of Cultural Theory* (n.d.), in an attempt to answer this question. But perhaps a few sentences will indicate what a cultural approach would look like.

In chapter one, "The Problem of the First Week," Thompson and I lay our social cards on the table: in the beginning, we say, were cultures. There are no isolated individuals because they would be unknown and unknowable outside a group context. Self-dealing is a curse, not a context. The cultures with which we are concerned have always existed. The problems of the first week are to explain why cultures (1) are limited in number and (2) take the form we say they do. This requires an analysis of *which* values are sharable and *which* kinds of social relations are livable. "Pushing [the source of preferences] back one step," it turns out, is a formidable task; fortunately, it is unnecessary.

The problem of the second week (and all the weeks thereafter) is to explain how and why individuals organized into the various cultures change their culture. Where the problem of the first week is stability—How and why does any set of social relationships and supporting values cohere amidst the primordial flux?—the problem of the second week is to explain change. I have speculated about the possible motives and directions of change (Wildavsky 1985). Without attempting to go further now, I would merely observe that if such explanations were successful, the task of social science would be over before it had hardly begun. While I appreciate the desire to know it all, I don't think social scientists are in imminent danger of technological obsolescence just yet.

"What about a retired officer who settles near a polluted lake and joins an environmental group seeking to put controls on the disposal of waste by local industries?" Laitin asks. "Has he changed his culture?" Leaving aside the culturally broader question of how pollution is socially defined (Silicon Valley water wells are said to be "contaminated" even though their carcinogenic content per glass is less than that of a corresponding glass of Berkeley tap water because chlorine forms chloroform, which is a weak carcinogen), the answer to the question depends on what else we know about our hypothetical officer. If he has reason to believe that he and his family will be adversely affected by conditions in the lake, considering that pesticides in the food chain amount to ten thousand times less than those naturally occurring in our daily food, the officer may be exerting his sense of local rationality (see Ames 1983, 1987). When a tornado approaches, I expect to get me and mine out of the way, not to invoke cultural theory. Should this officer join other groups and engage in other actions protesting the effects of technology, however—the "across-the-board" condition mentioned earlier—it is likely that he *has* changed his culture and not only his address.

Just as people dispute *tastes* all the time, there is likewise reason to argue about *definitions.* My strong preference is to build a cultural theory from social dimensions, following Mary Douglas's "grid" (which I call "prescription") and "group" (1970, 1982). In this way, dimensions form categories of cultures. Relative degrees of adherences to these ways of life can then be measured. And people's position in regard to their cultural context—not only the cultures to which they adhere but also the strength of rival cultures—can be used to make falsifiable predictions about many matters of interest. This progression—dimensions, categories, predictions—seems to me a fruitful mode of theorizing. A concept such as Laitin's "points of concern" does not. Of course, the predictions generated through use of cultural theory are more explicit and hence easier to try to refute. I thought that generating instructive failures (no Popperian refutations without prior conjectures) was what theorizing was all about.

AARON WILDAVSKY

University of California, Berkeley

Notes

1. See the claims for the culture concept in Pye and Verba 1965. In fact, Wildavsky's concept of culture harks back to Truman's (1951) notion of the latent interest group.

2. For example, Tocqueville's observations that U.S. citizens value linguistic uniformity but religious diversity still hold today. This is a clear example of value consensus.

3. Exogenous sources—the basis of interest theories—suggest that preferences are taken as givens, coming from outside of the system, and provide guidance for making political decisions; endogenous sources, the basis of Wildavsky's countertheory, suggest that preferences are formed and reformed as part of the process of making political decisions.

4. In this regard, Clifford Geertz's works have been most influential in political science. See his "Thick Description" in Geertz 1973.

5. Social anthropologists have emphasized this exogenous face of culture. See Barth 1969 and Cohen 1974. In political science, Robert Bates (1983) has developed this framework with great rigor.

References

Ames, Bruce. 1983. Dietary Carcinogens and Anti carcinogens. *Science* 221:1256–64.

Ames, Bruce. 1987. Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards. *Science* 236:271–280.

Barth, Frederick. 1969. *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries.* Boston: Little, Brown.

Bates, Robert. 1983. Modernization, Ethnic Competition, and the Rationality of Politics in Contemporary Africa. In *Ethnicity, State Coherence, and Public Policy*, ed. Donald Rothchild and Victor Olorunsola. Boulder: Westview.

Cohen, Abner. 1974. *Two-Dimensional Man.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Douglas, Mary. 1970. *Natural Symbols: Exploration in Cosmology.* New York: Pantheon.

Douglas, Mary. 1982. Cultural Bias. In *In the Active Voice.* Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Douglas, Mary, and Aaron Wildavsky. 1982. *Risk and Culture.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures.* New York: Basic Books.

Laitin, David. 1986. *Hegemony and Culture.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Marcus, George, and Michael Fischer. 1986. *Anthropology as Cultural Critique.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Metzger, Thomas. 1977. *Escape from Predicament.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Pye, Lucien, and Sidney Verba. 1965. *Political Culture and Political Development.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rothman, Stanley, and S. Robert Lichter. 1987. Elite Ideology and Risk Perception in Nuclear Energy Policy. *American Political Science Review* 81:383–404.

Thompson, Michael, and Michiel Schwarz. 1985. Beyond the Politics of Interest. Paper presented at the thirteenth world congress of the International Political Science Association. Paris.

Truman, David. 1951. *The Governmental Process.* New York: Knopf.

Wildavsky, Aaron. 1985. Change in Political Culture. *Politics* 20:95–102.

Wildavsky, Aaron. 1987. Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation. *American Political Science Review* 81:3–21.

Wildavsky, Aaron, and Michael Thompson. N.d. The Foundations of Cultural Theory. University of California, Berkeley. Typescript.

Forthcoming in September

The following articles, controversies, and research notes have been tentatively scheduled for publication in the September 1988 issue:

Hayward R. Alker. The Dialectical Logic of Thucydides' Melian Dialogue.

Gabriel A. Almond, Sergio Fabrini, Theodore Lowi, and Eric Nordlinger. The Return to the State. A Symposium.

Lawrence Baum. Measuring Policy Change in the Supreme Court: Civil Liberties in the 1946–85 Terms. A Research Note.

Stanley C. Brubaker. Can Liberals Punish?

Steve Chan. Defense Burden and Economic Growth: Unraveling the Taiwanese "Enigma." A Research Note.

Harry Eckstein. A Culturalist Theory of Political Change.

Scott L. Feld and Bernard Grofman. Ideological Consistency as a Collective Phenomenon.

James C. Garand. Government Growth in the States: A Longitudinal Test of Competing Explanations.

Charles J. Helm, Stanley Rothman, and S. Robert Lichter. Social Science Research as a Surrogate for Ideological Critique: Asking the Right Questions. A Controversy.

George A. Marcus. The Structure of Emotional Response: 1984 Presidential Candidates.

George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky. Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice.

Bradley Richardson. Constituency Candidate and Party in Japanese Parliamentary Election Voting.

James N. Schubert. Age and Leadership Style: The Active-Passive Dimension.

Kaare Strom and Eric Brown. Model-fitting and Explanations in Coalition Studies. A Controversy.

BOOK REVIEWS

BOOK REVIEW CONTENTS

POLITICAL THEORY

Arkes, Hadley. *First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles of Morals and Justice* ..... David A. Hoekema 605
Boesche, Roger. *The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville* ..... Bruce James Smith 606
Burnheim, John. *Is Democracy Possible? The Alternative to Electoral Politics*
  Bowles, Samuel, and Herbert Gintis. *Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought* ..... Dickinson McGaw 607
Cohen, Ronald L., ed. *Justice: Views from the Social Sciences*
  Bierhoff, Hans Werner, Ronald L. Cohen, and Jerald Greenberg, eds. *Justice in Social Relations* ..... Joe Oppenheimer 608
Connolly, William. *Politics and Ambiguity* ..... Robert Heineman 611
Green, David G. *The New Conservatism: The Counter-Revolution in Political, Economic, and Social Thought* ..... Kenneth R. Hoover 612
Hamlin, Alan P. *Ethics, Economics, and the State* ..... Ellen Frankel Paul 613
Harvey, David. *Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization.* Vol. 1, *The Urbanization of Capital;* vol. 2, *Consciousness and the Urban Experience* ..... Ira Katznelson 614
Levine, Andrew. *The End of the State* ..... Steven D. Ealy 616
Lomasky, Loren. *Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community* ..... David Osterfeld 617
Niekerk, Barend van. *The Cloistered Virtue: Freedom of Speech and the Administration of Justice in the Western World* ..... Ron Christenson 618
Paul, Ellen Frankel. *Property Rights and Eminent Domain* ..... Max Neiman 619
Schall, James V. *Reason, Revelation, and the Foundations of Political Philosophy* ..... John Francis Burke 621
Tucker, D. F. B. *Law, Liberalism, and Free Speech*
  Richards, David A. J. *Toleration and the Constitution*
  Bollinger, Lee. *The Tolerant Society* ..... Frederick P. Lewis 622
Weigel, George. *Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace*
  O'Brien, William V., and John Langan. *The Nuclear Dilemma and the Just War Tradition* ..... Quentin L. Quade 624

AMERICAN POLITICS

Abbott, Philip. *Seeking Many Inventions: The Idea of Community in America* ..... David Johnston 626
Buchanan, Bruce. *The Citizen's Presidency* ..... Steven A. Shull 627
Crotty, William. *Political Parties in Local Areas* ..... Robert J. Huckshorn 628

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
VOL. 82 NO. 2 JUNE 1988

Darcy, R., Susan Welch, and Janet Clark. *Women, Elections, and Representation* .... Diane L. Fowlkes 629
DeSario, Jack, and Stuart Langton, eds. *Citizen Participation in Public Decision Making* .... Douglas D. Rose 630
Estreicher, Samuel, and John Sexton. *Redefining the Supreme Court's Role: A Theory of Managing the Federal Judicial Process* .... H. W. Perry, Jr. 631
Fino, Susan P. *The Role of State Supreme Courts in the New Judicial Federalism* .... Burton Atkins 632
Ginzberg, Eli. *American Medicine: The Power Shift*
Fuchs, Victor. *The Health Economy* .... Theodore R. Marmor 633
Ginzberg, Eli, Edith M. Davis, and Miriam Ostow. *Local Health Policy in Action: The Municipal Health Services Program* .... Malcolm L. Goggin 638
Kleppner, Paul. *Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics, 1893–1928* .... Nancy H. Zingale 639
Knott, Jack H., and Gary J. Miller. *Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional Choice* .... Kenneth J. Meier 640
Landis, Mark. *Joseph McCarthy: The Politics of Chaos* .... Eileen L. McDonagh 640
Levy, Leonard W., and Kenneth L. Karst. *Encyclopedia of the American Constitution* .... Nelson W. Polsby 641
Logue, Calvin M., and Howard Dorgan. *A New Diversity in Contemporary Southern Rhetoric* .... Robert P. Steed 643
Nivola, Pietro S. *The Politics of Energy Conservation* .... James W. Riddlesperger, Jr. 644
Orman, John. *Comparing Presidential Behavior: Carter, Reagan, and the Macho Presidential Style* .... Kathy B. Smith 645
Schlozman, Kay Lehman. *Elections in America* .... John McAdams 646
Steamer, Robert J. *Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court* .... Robert G. Seddig 647
Tomain, Joseph P. *Nuclear Power Transformation* .... John W. Johnson 648
Waste, Robert J. *Power and Pluralism in American Cities: Researching the Urban Laboratory* .... John M. Bolland 649
Zisk, Betty H. *Money, Media, and the Grass Roots: State Ballot Issues and the Electoral Process* .... David B. Magleby 650

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Cox, Andrew, and Stephen Kirby. *Congress, Parliament, and Defense: The Impact of Legislative Reform on Defense Accountability in Britain and America* .... Frederic A. Bergerson 651
Dierkes, Meinolf, Hans Weiler, and Ariane Berthoin Antal, eds. *Comparative Policy Research: Learning from Experience* .... Hugh Heclo 652
Dix, Robert H. *The Politics of Colombia* .... J. Mark Ruhl 653
Eisenstadt, S. N., L. Roniger, and A. Seligman, eds. *Centre Formation, Protest Movements, and Class Structure in Europe and the United States* .... Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh 654
Flora, Peter, ed. *Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare States since World War II.* Vol. 1, *Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark;* vol. 2, *Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy* .... Arnold J. Heidenheimer 655

Book Reviews

Hawes, Gary. *The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export* .... Richard J. Kessler 657

Hodges, Donald C. *Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution* .... Harry E. Varden 658

Katznelson, Ira, and Aristide R. Zolberg, eds. *Working Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* .... John D. Stephens 659

Khong, Cho-Oon. *The Politics of Oil in Indonesia: Foreign Company–Host Government Relations* .... Donald E. Weatherbee 661

Levine, Daniel H., ed. *Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America*
  Mainwaring, Scott. *The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916–1985* .... Henry A. Landsberger 662

Liebenow, J. Gus. *African Politics: Crises and Challenges*
  Markovitz, Irving Leonard. *Studies in Power and Class in Africa* .... James R. Scarritt 664

Liebenow, J. Gus. *Liberia: The Quest for Democracy* .... Charles Hartwig 665

Looney, Robert E. *The Political Economy of Latin American Defense Expenditures: Case Studies of Venezuela and Argentina* .... James Lee Ray 666

Prosterman, Roy L., and Jeffrey M. Riedinger. *Land Reform and Democratic Development* .... Mitchell A. Seligson 667

Przeworski, Adam, and John Sprague. *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism* .... Harold D. Clarke 668

Ridd, Rosemary, and Helen Callaway, eds. *Women and Political Conflict: Portraits of Struggle in Times of Crisis* .... Sue Ellen M. Charlton 669

Seroka, Jim, and Rodos Smiljkovic. *Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia* .... Paul Shoup 671

Torrance, Judy M. *Public Violence in Canada, 1867–1982* .... Wayne G. Reilly 672

Zimmerman, William. *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia* .... Francine Friedman 673

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Ball, Desmond, and Jeffrey Richelson, eds. *Strategic Nuclear Targeting* .... Earl C. Ravenal 674

Boswell, Terry, and Albert Bergesen. *America's Changing Role in the World System* .... John M. Rothgeb, Jr. 677

Brown, Seyom. *The Causes and Prevention of War* .... Lynn H. Miller 677

David, Steven R. *Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security* .... Samuel Decalo 678

Epstein, Joshua M. *Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf* .... Alex Mintz 680

Gilpin, Robert, with Jean M. Gilpin. *The Political Economy of International Relations* .... Stephen D. Krasner 681

Jackson, Karl D., Sukhumbhend Baribatra, J. Soedjati, and J. Soedjati Djiwandono, eds. *ASEAN in Regional and Global Context* .... Robert L. Rau 682

Lowenthal, Abraham F. *Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America* .... Karl M. Schmitt 682

Piscatori, James. *Islam in a World of Nation-States* . . . . Farhan Rajaee 683
Sheffer, Gabriel, ed. *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* . . . . Douglas C. Nord 684
Stares, Paul. *Space and National Security* . . . . Darryl Roberts 685
Williams, Douglas. *The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: The System in Crisis* . . . . Keith S. Petersen 687
Zartman, I. William, ed. *Positive Sum: Improving North-South Relations* . . . . Craig N. Murphy 688

POLITICAL ECONOMY

Braun, Anne Romanis. *Wage Determination and Incomes Policy in Open Economies* . . . . Virginia Haufler 689
McLean, Iain. *Public Choice: An Introduction* . . . . Wing K. Yung 690

POLITICAL THEORY

First Things: An Inquiry into the First Principles of Morals and Justice. By Hadley Arkes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. xii, 432p. $50.00, cloth; $11.95, paper).

Hadley Arkes, professor of jurisprudence and political science at Amherst College, sets himself no modest task in this study. There can be no escape from the confusion and paralysis that attend contemporary political and moral discourse, Arkes urges, until we recognize that "in morals, as in mathematics," satisfactory solutions to specific problems must be grounded in "axioms or necessary truths" (p. 6). Philosophers from Plato to Locke and politicians from Madison to Lincoln sought to provide such a grounding, but contemporary thinkers have largely given up the task.

The foundation, he insists, must contain only universally valid principles, and they must be true not contingently but of necessity. This condition can be satisfied if such principles are shown to be derivable from undeniable and self-evident truths about human beings and human actions.

The opening chapters of the book provide a clearer statement of the philosophical stance that Arkes rejects—the agnostic cultural relativism that, he argues, constitutes the credo of contemporary politics and social science—than of the details of his own theory. An unusual and ambitious program emerges, however, both from the expository chapters 4 and 5 and from summary versions of the same argument throughout the book.

A specific judgment concerning morality and justice, Arkes believes, is valid only if it is grounded in the fundamental "principle of natural equality," the principle that persons should be treated alike unless there is some justification for treating them differently. This principle in turn follows from two propositions: "(1) that human beings possess the capacity to reason, and (2) that morals exist" (p. 71).

And the latter statements, Arkes argues, are not merely but necessarily true. Anyone who denies the former can be shown to have refuted his own assertion, for to discuss whether we have a capacity to reason is to exercise precisely that capacity. To deny the latter is to forego all distinction between wanton cruelty and selfless charity, between Hitler and Mother Teresa. Moreover, the skeptic who would deny the existence of morals cannot avoid using moral language to make his own case. But if the basic principles of morality are entailed by necessary truths, they are themselves necessarily true. Thus is relativism put to flight.

These matters of moral epistemology take up part 1 of *First Things*. In part 2 Arkes applies his theory to specific issues: conscientious objection, international intervention, the duty of rescue, welfare rights, privacy, and abortion.

One cannot but admire the scope of a work that begins with Kant and ends with detailed discussion of *Griswold v. Connecticut* and *Roe v. Wade*. A forceful political vision is evident throughout—a conservatism of principle that has no patience either with liberal idealism or with the moral nihilism of many libertarians. But when Arkes seeks to derive from his theory the conclusions that proportional taxation is unjust (p. 314), that abortion should be prohibited under all circumstances, including rape and incest (p. 403), and that "the level of force used by the United States [in Vietnam] was not out of proportion to the evil that was being resisted," not all who share his principal perspective will be willing to follow. (The moral defense of U.S. involvement in Vietnam is a leitmotif running through the book—*Vietnam* and *abortion* are two of the three largest items in the index.) Nor is Arkes's argument strengthened by *ad hominem* attacks on Senator George McGovern (p. 271) and Justice Harry Blackmun (p. 306) or by extended and graphic descriptions of aborted fetuses (pp. 412-14).

There are serious problems in Arkes's central argument as well. He rests his entire case for morality on the necessary truth of his basic moral principles, but he overlooks the crucial distinction between sentences that assert logically necessary propositions ("Six is an even number") and sentences that, when spoken, constitute self-confirming utterances ("I am speaking now"). The latter can be called "undeniable," for to assert their falsehood is to provide grounds for their truth. But they characteristically express contingent and not necessary truths. Arkes insists that the two propositions cited above as the foundation of morality are necessarily true, but in supporting this claim he shows only that the attempt to deny them is self-refuting. A pragmatist might argue that we should ask for no more in the foundations of ethics. But it is far less than Arkes himself insists we need.

Further difficulties arise when we proceed from foundation to superstructure. Arkes's principle of natural equality—the requirement that all be treated equally except where there is a justification for unequal treatment (pp. 68–71)—is phrased in such broad terms that it seems extremely permissive. (Imagine a marriage vow: "I promise to be faithful to you unless I have a good reason not to be.") Yet he understands it to entail as a direct consequence the illegitimacy of any but a democratic polity and the right of any democracy to invade any monarchy or obligarchy for the purpose of toppling its government (pp. 46–48). The inference seems to rest either on unstated premises or on rather special rules of logic.

First Things is a book difficult to classify: a serious essay in political philosophy that seems at times intended as revenge against old adversaries, a work that enlists supporting argument from Aristotle and Kant in its opening chapters and from Senator Jesse Helms in its last chapters. The sympathetic but critical reader will be challenged to reflect not only on whether Arkes's philosophical proposals can meet the objections they invite but also on whether they might be enlisted in support of a vision of society less ideologically constricted than that articulated here.

DAVID A. HOEKEMA

University of Delaware

The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville. By Roger Boesche (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. 288p. $29.95).

Not long after the publication of the first part of *Democracy in America,* Tocqueville complained that while many praised him, few understood him. The difficulty of his meaning and the struggle to lay claim to his authority have continued unabated into our own time. In *The Strange Liberalism of Alexis de Tocqueville,* Roger Boesche (also editor of the welcome *Alexis de Tocqueville: Selected Letters on Politics and Society* [1985]) has joined the lists. Boesche's effort deserves comment for both methodological and substantive reasons.

Boesche insists that understanding Tocqueville requires that one replicate Tocqueville's own historical method—that one must begin by seizing "the true spirit of the age" (p. 19). This is the aim of part 1 of this study. Boesche displays a broad familiarity with the intellectual currents and concerns of Tocqueville's generation, moving easily from discussions of philosophy, art, and literature to prominent themes in the popular press. Balzac, Hugo, Bonald, Maistre, Carlyle, Stendhal, Sand, Chateaubriand, and Guizot make frequent appearances in these early pages. At his best, Boesche reveals a striking similiarity of vantage point among writers of the most various temperments and political allegiances. (On occasion, however, Boesche's effort to show the breadth of a shared point of view by piling citation upon citation robs the analysis of some of its energy.)

At the center of this generational vantage point is a preoccupation with the collapse of traditional ties and the unleashing of an untrammeled egoism. Boesche focuses upon the "disgust" (p. 39) felt by Tocqueville and many of his contemporaries for bourgeois culture and social relations and their hatred of the petty passions and purposes of their own time. But while Tocqueville shared the anxieties and what might be called the social aesthetics of his generation, he rejected the romantic and historicist responses to which his contemporaries characteristically turned. In these matters, Boesche breaks important new ground in Tocqueville studies.

Tocqueville's own response is detailed in parts 2 and 3 of Boesche's study, part 2 focusing on Tocqueville's "hopes" for freedom and part 3 on his "fear" of despotism. The most valuable aspects of these later analyses are those that most directly extend the social and cultural perspectives developed in part 1. Boesche underscores Tocqueville's contempt for the middle classes and (somewhat less successfully) the distance between Tocqueville's economic views and those of liberal political economists such as Nassau William Senior (with whom Tocqueville had a long personal relationship). These arguments are preface to an elaboration of Tocqueville's "strange liberalism."

In parts 2 and 3, Tocqueville's generation fades into the background as Tocqueville emerges as the latest in a French tradition whose members include especially Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau. Whatever their differences, the members of this tradition are notable for having rejected "the great undertaking of modern liberal thinkers," namely, to conceive "republican institutions without republican virtue" (p. 194).

Boesche saves Tocqueville from those who would make him a theorist of interest (a worthy task) by portraying him in large part as a classical republican (a risky business). For example, Boesche's Tocqueville comes close to equating the seeking of freedom with the seeking of glory. While there is more than a little truth in such a portrait (Tocqueville always hoped that democratic societies might yet pursue "lofty purposes"), it also risks depriving Tocqueville's analysis of modern society of its contemporary salience. Tocqueville described himself as "a liberal of a new kind." The difficulty and the great value of Tocqueville's teaching stems from the tensions and paradoxes embedded in his thought. His limited confidence in constitutional mechanism sits uneasily with his praise of Madison. His love of independence exists alongside his fear of individualism. His conviction that liberty is an instinctive taste is not readily reconciled with the instrumental rationality of democratic peoples. Boesche is well aware of these ambivalences, but in his struggle to wrest Tocqueville from the old liberals, the parameters of the new liberalism and its relation to the old liberalism are not fully elaborated.

BRUCE JAMES SMITH

Allegheny College

Is Democracy Possible? The Alternative to Electoral Politics. By John Burnheim (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. vii, 205p. $22.50).

Democracy and Capitalism: Property, Community, and the Contradictions of Modern Social Thought. By Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (New York: Basic Books, 1986. x, 244p. $16.95).

Is Democracy Possible? Not today but possibly sometime in the future, says John Burnheim of the University of Sydney. He maintains that both capitalist and socialist states have failed to produce democracy. What they have produced in practice is bureaucracy, centralization, and oligarchy. "Neither the constitutional state nor the unlimited state can be controlled effectively by the people. Neither can do very much to improve the provision of public goods without increasing either the scope and rigidity of the state apparatus, or its arbitrariness and lack of accountability" (pp. 49–50).

Burnheim argues that electoral systems inherently breed oligarchies and are "inimical to rule by the people for the people" (p. 83). Campaigns mystify issues through advertizing and image-making techniques. Issues are aggregated so that voters cannot separate them out from each other in making a decision. Elections select leaders who are not the best and brightest but those most willing to "deal with the continual jockeying for influence and position in party life, the toadying to those already in positions of power" (p. 101).

What is to be done? Burnheim maintains that democracy is possible only if (1) the state system is abolished, and decision making becomes radically decentralized; (2) most decisions are made by specialized autonomous agencies that are coordinated by negotiations; (3) participation extends to those affected by the decision in question; and (4) decision makers are chosen by lot from those affected and volunteer to hold public office. "Democracy is possible only if the decision-makers are *a representative sample* of the people concerned" (p. 9). Burnheim calls such a system "demarchy." He admits that his project is utopian but argues that it can be brought about only by convincing people that it ought to be tried.

I would question whether the right form of procedural democracy will ever be sufficient to create substantive democracy. Inequalities in resources and power or consensus on antidemocratic values may still obstruct the development of democracy despite its form. Decentralized government by lottery might not have prevented the Nazi regime from terrorizing Jews if the majority of Germans consented to it. Negotiators are not all equal at a bargaining table if some are backed up by external sources of power. Despite these questions, I believe that Burnheim's book is penetrating, subtle, and original.

Like Burnheim, Bowles and Gintis begin their project with a critique of liberalism and Marxism. Whereas liberalism is too obsessed with liberty and private space, Marxism is too obsessed with classlessness and public space. Whereas liberalism is silent on exploitation and the community, Marxism is silent on choice, liberty, and democracy. Liberalism teaches us that power emanates from the state; Marxism teaches us that power emanates from class structure. Both, however, fail to comprehend the basic emancipatory thrust of capitalist societies: "Progressive social change in the liberal democratic capitalist societies has followed the logic of collective opposition to oppression suggested by Marxian theory, while adopting the liberal language of rights and the goal of democratic empowerment"(p. 25).

Bowles and Gintis see liberal democratic capitalism as an intrinsically conflictual social system. Taking a "clash of rights perspective," they see democratic capitalism as being driven by the contradiction between personal rights and property rights. Thus the history of U.S. capitalism is characterized by four basic accomodations: Lockean (limiting participation), Jeffersonian (distributing property), Madisonian (fostering heterogeneity), and Keynesian (redistributing income). The logic of the clash of rights divides society into public space and private space and into learners and choosers.

Given the logic and history of the clash of personal and property rights, Bowles and Gintis argue that history may work itself in three directions: global liberalism (worldwide expansion of markets and mobility of capital), neo-Hobbesian liberalism (the bureaucratic state, patriarchal family, and capitalist firm), and postliberal democracy (human development). The authors favor the development of postliberal democracy, a vision based on "learning governed by the exercise of personal rights" (p. 178). This book makes a significant contribution to further understanding the conditions limiting and extending democratic culture and institutions. And as a by-product, it sharpens historical structuralism as a method of analysis.

DICKINSON MCGAW

Arizona State University

Justice: Views from the Social Sciences. Edited by Ronald L. Cohen (New York: Plenum Press, 1986. xii, 283p. $32.50).

Justice in Social Relations. Edited by Hans Werner Bierhoff, Ronald L. Cohen, and Jerald Greenberg (New York: Plenum Press, 1986. xvi, 364p. $39.50).

These two edited volumes explore the frontiers of research regarding justice, especially distributive justice. Although they were obviously seen as part of the same project, they are very different. *Both* could be considered candidates for your library. What are their merits?

Justice: Views From the Social Sciences, is a volume designed by formula. Its essays, edited by Ronald Cohen, describe justice as perceived by each of the major social science disciplines, philosophy, and the field of public policy. These are solid essays, each one oriented around the notion that our conceptualization of justice can be seen to be determined by the nature of man and the cultural environment of those doing the defining. Each essay is about the conceptions and controversies regarding justice in each of the disciplines and, as such, reviews the history of the discipline's literature from these perspectives. In general, as reviews, they are of high quality, informative, broad, and taken from a perspective of obvious interest to the authors. Each essay pursues aspects of the defining characteristics of the subject of justice as conceptualized within that literature. As such, the entire volume can be seen to live up to its title and is a useful, broad view of the subject from virtually the entire gamut of the social sciences. But if as review essays they share some strengths, they also share some faults. They are far too timid in their exploration of the more technical, yet fundamental, findings from the social and public choice and game theory literatures. However, the volume is still pedagogically useful at the advanced undergraduate, graduate, and professional level.

Justice in Social Relations, edited—or perhaps not edited—by a team or collective that includes Ronald Cohen, is quite a different kettle of fish. In vain do we search for the formula uniting these essays. They do not revolve around a common conception of justice. For some justice is retribution, for others it is distribution, and for others it is fairness. Our editing collective is quite frank as to what happened here: as they put it, "From July 16 through July 21, 1984 a group of American and West German scholars met . . . to discuss their common work on the topic of justice in social relations. . . . To give the participants the freedom to present their ideas in the most appropriate way, we, the conference organizers and the editors of this volume gave them complete control over the form and substance of their presentations"(p. vii). As political scientists we know what giving control to an unstructured community without disciplined parties yields: a bloated and formless barrel of pork. Most publishers do not enjoy the prospect of such a publication. Indeed, one could imagine that Plenum agreed to this volume in exchange for the other. Although it would be a rare reader who would be interested in this collection as a whole, there are some redeeming essays. Some of the essays in *Justice: Views from the Social Sciences* struck me as having unusual strengths, others as illustrating the central weakness of the volume. In what I applaud as a proper opening move, the volume's first substantive essay, by Buchanan and Mathieu, deals with the philosophical view. Although it is a wide-ranging and highly informative account of the philosophical development of conceptions of justice and the controversies about them, it betrays a lack of familiarity with some of the technical literature in the area. For example, the essay juxtaposes the utilitarians to Rawls. The authors do not notice that rather than being two discrete options, these positions can be viewed as two points in a continuous space of options. This has been suggested by numerous scholars including Donald Wittman, Roger E. Howe, and John E. Roemer. Another shortcoming is the authors' failure to make interpersonal comparisons in order to form judgements regarding distributive justice. This is a central point in Amartya K. Sen's important, yet too often overlooked, works on redistributive justice.

The same two shortcomings figure in the essay by Worland, "Economics and Justice." It, too, attempts to deal with justice in distribution and fails to go beyond the marginalist analysis of classical economics because it, too, does not consider the relations between interpersonal comparisons and justice. Indeed, discussion of Sen's work and work of others such as Hal R. Varian is sorely missing from all these essays. The pattern is quite obvious: there is no serious discussion of technical literature. The technical nature of some of the literature is all the more reason to ensure that it is properly reviewed and discussed in a volume such as this.

Arthur DiQuattro's essay regarding political science's view of justice develops the basis of liberalism and then asks, "What does liberalism have to say about justice in distribution?" DiQuattro makes many good points. He discusses liberalism as based on the status and centrality of the individual and shows that this does not have to generate market inequalities. But he fails to cite the major findings of welfare economics, which go directly to that point. Further, much of the documented conflict between liberties and distributive justice is ignored, for example, the proof by Charles R. Plott that serial dictatorship underlies a popular interpretation of the Rawlsian notion of distributive justice. These gaps seem to reflect DiQuattro's general lack of acquaintance with the more technical (and perhaps fundamental) work in the area, rather than its innate dismissability.

One essay is a pleasant exception to this deficiency. "Public Policy and Justice," by Karol Soltan, covers a number of technical points very well. Indeed, he makes quite casually some technical points that are sure to interest many. For example, he notes that utilitarianism without interpersonal comparisons of utility becomes reduced to the Pareto condition. Soltan's further critique of utilitarianism as ambiguously based on the utility of individuals and hence on their values (including the value of altruism) is instructive. It certainly leads him to another technical follow-up that is correct and important: that if there is a multitude of values, we must consider the trade-offs between them. But his is the only discussion of these technical points (which are important in defining the frontiers of the research on the subject in the volume).

The discussion of experimental work is a surprising strong point in these essays. It is least surprising in Furby's "Psychology and Justice." Her critique of experimental designs is a joy to read. But Soltan and others also spend some time discussing experiments in a useful fashion.

The collectively unedited *Justice in Social Relations* is also rich in experimental discussions and devoid of serious *theoretical* (in the formal, game-theoretic sense) argument. This is even more unexpected in a volume focusing on the work of psychologists. But we can still easily identify five quite informative essays focused on experiments.

Deutsch's "Cooperation, Conflict, and Justice" summarizes the considerable experimental research that has been done on the psychological orientation toward distributive justice. In this review Deutsch identifies in stark relief the big findings: people like proportional rewards more when there is some group identification (p. 4); unless the tasks are very individualized, as well as the context, performance is not found to be a function of incentives (pp. 8–9). A real pioneer in the area, especially with regard to prisoner dilemma experiments, Deutsch's outline and interpretation of historical developments is instructive to follow. This essay is a serious addition to the perspectives we have on the development of the literature.

Cook and Hegtvedt's "Justice In Social Relations" looks at power and attitudes toward justice in relations such as exchange relations. They review a number of three and four-person experiments; but as the experiments are limited to prisoner's dilemmas, we may legitimately wonder whether their findings can be generalized to justice in exchange relations. As in *Justice,* the lack of familiarity with the relevant formal literature works to the authors' disadvantage. They could well have used Thomas Schwartz's argument that there is an instability inherent in exchange.

Another experimentally oriented essay of interest to political scientists is Messe, Hymes, and MacCoun's, "Group Categorization and Distributive Justice." They consider how group identification mediates the application of distributive justice evaluations. This is currently a subject of interest to a number of political scientists, including R. Simmons and J. Orbell.

Perhaps the most fascinating essay for political purposes was that by Crosby, Burris, Censor, and MacKethan, "Two Rotten Apples Spoil the Justice Barrel." They describe how the perception of discrimination varies as a function of the number of clear-cut cases rather than the statistical pattern of discrimination. They show that a couple of clear-cut cases lead people to perceive discrimination. This leads to an excellent discussion of experimental design issues. The obvious political relevance for political organizing should not be lost on students of collective action.

Martin's "When Expectations and Justice Do Not Coincide: Blue Collar Visions of a Just World" (pp. 317–36) reports on an experiment to discover how workers regard the appropriateness of pay scales. She observes that the disadvantaged workers are able to perceive not only the small intraclass injustices but also the large (interclass) ones (p. 324). She shows that the evaluation of these injustices is a function of specific psychological characteristics of the subjects, such as how much they feel empowered over their own fate in life and over monetary matters in their job. Thus her conclusion is the nonsurprising notion that views of distributive fairness depend upon one's experience and cultural beliefs (p. 333). I was not convinced. I was far more struck by how *little* actual variance in fair pay estimates there was between groups (p. 328).

There are other essays of more than passing interest. The essay by Tyler asks how people evaluate the performance of political leaders. Is evaluation best understood as a function of outcomes or of procedures? If outcomes, is it the value of outcomes or these values in contrast to expectations (p. 301)? In all cases, is it fairness or some other characteristic, such as general level of benefits, that matters? Are fairness judgements merely a reflection of self-interest? Tyler looks at these questions using telephone survey data. His findings are not earthshaking, but the essay is of clear relevance.

Most of the remaining essays in this volume are disappointingly thin or weak in their contributions. In this category I would certainly put the theoretical discussions of Lamm and by Cohen. These essays are not organized around any explicit theoretical idea; and although they review considerable literature in sweeping terms, they do not generate any new results. Other essays, such as those by Mikula and Greenberg, do not justify the space they use and could have well been edited or eliminated.

JOE OPPENHEIMER

University of Maryland

Politics and Ambiguity. By William E. Connolly (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987. xii, 168p. $25.00).

In this work William Connolly draws heavily on the ideas of Michel Foucault to examine the interplay between forms of social control and democratic politics. Connolly contends that the freedom, dissent, and variety required for a healthy democracy are continually threatened by "disciplinary pressures" produced by social institutions. At the same time, he recognizes that democracy requires norms and authority that may assume the characteristics of disciplinary controls. His resolution of this dilemma is a politics that candidly confronts the essential ambiguity in democratic authority and enables an aware citizenry to make informed choices. Although 7 of the 10 chapters in the book have previously appeared elsewhere, the work holds together well.

Beginning with the declaration that democracy is "the pride and hope of modernity" (p. 3), Connolly first examines the forms of disciplinary control that endanger it. The next three chapters focus on Connolly's concern that the Democratic party and proponents of the welfare state do not understand the causes of working class alienation. He traces much of this misunderstanding to a failure to recognize that the social controls accompanying and supporting the United States' infatuation with the goal of economic growth have engendered a general pessimism about the future that has led to civic disaffection. He is particularly concerned that the movement toward reindustrialization will foster an increase in disciplinary restraints in society. Connolly returns to this topic in chapter 7, where he describes how "visible" and "unconscious contrivances of social control" encourage citizen conformity and a retreat into privatism (p. 100).

In chapters 5, 6, and 8, Connolly analyzes the ideas of Jürgen Habermas, the thought of Richard Rorty, and the failings of liberalism. Habermas has understood the importance of threats to political legitimacy posed by modern society. But in offering the "ideal of discursive rationality" as the answer to these challenges, Habermas has foreclosed other approaches and may have distanced himself "from the concrete imperatives of our political economy" (p. 71). One would think that Rorty, who is examined in chapter 8, had avoided the error of positing an exclusive approach to social theory; but Connolly contends that Rorty uses "rhetorical strategies" to disparage alternative positions and to assert the primacy of his priorities (p. 123). In chapter 6, Connolly details the conceptual flaws of liberalism that Foucault did so much to expose. While trumpeting the liberal values of productivity and individual rights, U.S. institutions have used subtle but effective disciplines to harness individuals into the productive mode. Yet here Connolly draws a distinction between his position and that of Foucault. Unlike the latter, Connolly clearly expresses the view that democratic society must accept the need for norms, even though they may have subjugating and excluding effects.

In chapter 9, Connolly returns to the dilemma posed by authority in the democratic state. For him, even a democratically acceptable system of authoritative norms and standards constitutes an ambiguous achievement because it "excludes and denigrates that which does not fit" (p. 138). In the final chapter, Connolly examines the role of discourse in establishing and reinforcing norms.

In these essays Connolly has made an important contribution to an exceedingly complex issue in modern political thought. Connolly suggests that there are no final or easy answers to the democratic relationship between authority and freedom. For him the route to a democratic future lies in creating a politics that leaves "slack" for alternative ideas. Political discourse must be framed in terms that acknowledge the continuing existence of others and other possibilities. One might demur that the ambiguity that Connolly offers is an exceedingly heavy burden for the citizen—and society—to shoulder. But the essentially tentative and ambiguous character of the contemporary democratic condition is one that needed to be stated, and Connolly has done that well.

ROBERT HEINEMAN

Alfred University

The New Conservatism: The Counter-Revolution in Political, Economic, and Social Thought. By David G. Green (New York: St. Martin's, 1987. xi, 238p. $32.50).

David Green's treatment of the "new conservatism" provides a good sense of the way that conservatives who identify with classical liberalism view their theoretical origins and justify policy recommendations. As a research fellow at the Institute for Economic Affairs in London as well as an author of studies on the political economy of social services, Green is involved in the conservative movement. The book is directed to the "non-specialist reader," so its scholarly limitations are acknowledged.

In the introduction, Green defines the new conservatism as simply the old classical liberalism enhanced by a selection of insights from individualist schools of thought that prefer the marketplace to the state. He excludes from consideration the traditionalist conservatism of Burke and Scruton because it values the state too highly, and the neoconservatism of former liberals and leftists on the grounds that "most of them began as collectivists and despite modifying their views remain collectivistic" (p. 4). Thus Green leaves aside the advocates of traditional morality among modern conservatives and bypasses the liberatarian-traditionalist split.

Part 1 sketches the intellectual background: the liberal tradition (chap. 1), anarcho-capitalism (chap. 2), the Chicago school (chap. 3), the public choice school (chap. 4), and the Austrian school (chap. 5). In the necessary condensation, what is left out is revealing: Locke emerges as a "critical liberal" skeptical of allowing much latitude for common decisions (pp. 20-21). This tradition is favored by Green over continental "egoistic liberalism" with which Rousseau and, later, T. H. Green are identified. The appropriation of Locke (and indeed the term *liberalism* itself) for the new conservatism proceeds from the development, then, of a direct line from Locke through Smith, Burke, and Hume. There is nothing of Locke's concern for accumulation that is not justified by labor. Mill is barely mentioned.

The influence of the various schools is dealt with in a succinct and informative, though generally uncritical, manner. Public choice theory is effectively presented, though in the familiar reductionist terms of self-interest versus altruism. Chapter 5 offers an insightful explanation of the relation between Hayek's epistemological skepticism and his ambivalent attitude toward the role of authoritative institutions.

In part 2, Green discusses policy implications of the "new liberalism" (the phrase *new conservatism* rarely appears). United States readers may be interested in the variety and subtlety of policies proposed by libertarian conservatives in England. In his final chapter, Green argues that the new conservatism is compassionate and involves a "safety net" for the poor. He observes that "a free society is only supportable if its adherents advocate a moral code which among other things constrains the pursuit of selfish gain and requires the successful to help the less fortunate" (p. 218). Given this view, perhaps traditional conservatism is not as irrelevant as the introduction states—nor the values of the Right so sharply distinct from those of the Left, as the author elsewhere suggests they are.

Specialists will find this a book to argue with; upper-level students will benefit from the suggestions for further reading, while remaining somewhat puzzled by the typological framework. Though the writing is clear enough, the chapter introductions and summaries are rather disjointed and some generalizations overshoot the mark, as in "the market promotes universal service" (p. 220). Nevertheless, the book amounts to an interesting map of a significant quadrant of contemporary political thought.

KENNETH R. HOOVER

University of Wisconsin, Parkside

Book Reviews: Political Theory

Ethics, Economics, and the State. By Alan P. Hamlin. (New York: St. Martin's, 1986. x, 198p. $32.50).

Alan Hamlin's *Ethics, Economics, and the State* explores the relationship between rationality, ethics, and the formation and justification of government. It does so in a way that should be familiar to anyone who has followed the development of public choice from Buchanan and Tullock's pathbreaking *Calculus of Consent* to more recent work by others associated with the movement, work that attempts to reach beyond the confines of economics to moral and political philosophy by applying the traditional tools of the economist, principally the notion of rational economic man. What distinguishes Hamlin from others, however, are his detailed analysis of the standard economist's model and the deep faults that he ultimately finds with it.

Hamlin begins by making about the relationship between the individual and the state, three claims fraught with "uncertainties and ambiguities," which the remainder of the book is dedicated to clarifying: (1) that individually rational behavior may or may not produce collectively desirable results; (2) if not, it may be possible to improve upon the situation by constraining individual behavior within rules; and (3) that these rules constitute the state. Stating these propositions leads to deeper, philosophical concerns such as, What constitutes individual rationality? What is collectively desirable? How are these two concerns linked? How is the institutional structure of the state affected by views of rationality and ethics? and How might states vary if grounded on different ethical stances? Hamlin's recurring theme throughout the book is the tension between rationality and ethics, and how this tension is reflected in the philosophical debate between advocates of differing ethical-political stances over the relationship between the individual and the community.

The exploration of this theme begins with an extended discussion of rationality that takes as its starting point the neoclassical view of rational, economic man. He is, first off, a utility maximizer. But Hamlin provides a fuller description of what economists mean by rational, economic man: he exhibits consistency and efficiency of choice, ends-rationality, and belief-rationality; that is, he is an "omniscient, calculating, egotistical maximizer." This view, Hamlin concludes, has major defects that have been frequently explored. Imperfect knowledge, bounded rationality, and weakness of will, combined with the exclusion of altruistic motivations from the model due to unrealistic assumptions about human motivation as exclusively egoistic, make two alternative views of rationality more acceptable and allow for the possibility that a collective entity like the state could be more socially advantageous than individuals left to their own neoclassical devices and trapped in various plays of the prisoner's dilemma.

Under "imperfect rationality" there is room for norms or the law to serve to shore up the decisions of imperfectly rational individuals. Thus, they might precommit themselves to law as a strategy for enhancing their rationality. The "extended rationality" alternative recognizes that individuals hold other values in addition to self-interest and directs that individuals precommit themselves to law precisely to constrain themselves.

Hamlin next explores five currently prevalent ethical views: utilitarianism, paretianism, liberalism (particularly its libertarian variant), contractarianism, and Marxism. Through extended discussions of Rawls, Nozick, Buchanan, and Roemer he attempts to show that there are certain similarities that extend from the libertarians to the Marxists that would allow all of these views to be represented as the result of a contractarian bargain. The objectives of both Marxian freedom and liberal rights can be expressed in the contractarian device. There is nothing in this device, he argues, that would necessitate the generation of an exclusively liberal ethic.

This claim to have found a device to equate competing ethical views even though they are thought to be incommensurable I find unconvincing. This social contract, drawn by imperfectly rational or extendedly rational individuals bargaining from an Archimedean point to rights and to obligation to a state, glosses over the both the Marxists' fundamental anti-individualism and concern for the collective good over the individual and the libertarian liberals' contention that fundamental rights precede the state and form no part of any bargain about institutional arrangements that individuals might make. Hamlin claims for the Marxist that even if he is ultimately collectivist he could be individualistic enough to go along with the social contract because it could generate Marxian results. But then again, it might not. The contract could generate *any* results. And that is why it is also ultimately unsatisfying to a Nozickian of the natural rights variety (whom Hamlin dismisses in favor of the loosely contractarian Nozick of the latter portion of *Anarchy, State, and Utopia)* because it places human convention—agreement—above fundamental rights. Thus it seems too much of a reach to attempt to subsume all of importance in contemporary political philosophy under the contractarian model.

Somewhat unsatisfying too is Hamlin's discussion of the state as generated by the three alternative views of rationality. It seems pretty clear that Hamlin prefers the "pluralistic" state—generated by the two alternative views of rationality and the contractarian device—to either the neoclassical state or the utopian state. By the terms in which he describes pluralism—as a state that allows everyone to hold his own particular ethical values while still retaining obligation to the government—he tips his hand. Yet, ostensibly the argument remains systematically neutral, more of a typology of alternative ethics and governments than a brief for any one of them. This leaves the reader with a more refined view of alternative visions of the state, but ultimately with dissatisfaction that no one of them has been forcefully argued for as the best. Given the contractarian device, however, such dissatisfaction seems inevitable.

Despite these reservations, the book is well worth reading and quite challenging throughout. It should be of special interest to an interdisciplinary audience of those in academia concerned with the relationship between the individual and the state.

ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL

Bowling Green State University

Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization. By David Harvey. Vol. 1, *The Urbanization of Capital.* Vol. 2, *Consciousness and the Urban Experience* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985. 239p. and 293p. $25.00 and $22.50).

In 1969, when he was a young expatriate assistant professor of geography at Johns Hopkins University, David Harvey published the influential methodological treatise, *Explanation in Geography.* In the conclusion he argued that the next turn in his discipline should be a move toward theory. In the ensuing four years Harvey found such a theory—Marxism—and an object for this theory within geography—the city. He first signified this discovery and this focus in *Social Justice and the City* (1973), a collection of essays that proved a foundational text for the recrudescence of Marxist-inspired work on the city.

Harvey has continued to be one of the most influential of scholars working in this vein. In *The Limits to Capital* (1982) he reconstructed Marx's theory of capitalist accumulation with space built in. Focusing on finance capital, rent, and the need for capitalism to find "spatial fixes" for its recurring crises, that book is the most successful attempt to date to improve Marxist economics by making urban space a constitutive element of the analysis.

The two-volume set under review (half of which consists of republications of journal articles, and half of new papers) deepens and extends this work and moves in new directions. Each volume, though distinct in emphasis, shares in the ambitious project of creating a program of urban research wholly within the Marxist tradition. Taking note of the plethora of types of work within urban studies as well as of diverse objects of analysis outside the usual ken of Marxism, Harvey nonetheless asserts the privileged status of Marxism as the master theoretical analysis of modernity because of the central causal place of capitalism. Reflecting on urban and academic fragmentation, Harvey asks, "Does this mean we have to abandon Marx for some eclectic mix of theoretical perspectives? Not at all. If capitalism persists as the dominant mode of production, then it is with the analysis of that mode of production that we have to start" (2: 263–64).

In pursuit of this project, Harvey extends his reach and that of Marxist theory quite far in these exceptionally stimulating, at times brilliant, at times disappointing books. The first volume, *The Urbanization of Capital*, focuses on capitalist accumulation, rent, finance capital, residential differentiation, urban politics, and city planning. The second, *Consciousness and the Urban Experience* devotes its longest section to the redevelopment of Paris between 1850 and 1870 under Haussman's tutelage; it includes a small essay on the construction of the Basilica of Sacre-Coeur; and it contains three theoretical essays—on money, time, and space; on class conflict and the built environment; and on what Harvey calls urban consciousness—that underpin the two case studies.

In the first volume, as in his earlier work, Harvey stresses how the development of the city has helped resolve the crisis tendencies of the system and has facilitated an enhanced process of capital accumulation. In the second, more exploratory volume, he focuses on the creation within nineteenth- and twentieth-century cities of the "urbanization of consciousness," a shorthand for the formation of individual and group dispositions based not on class but on a multiplicity of identities of territory, gender, ethnicity, and race that depend on a broad conceptualization of "community" and are rooted more in the living spaces, than in the work spaces, of cities.

Capitalist cities have thus produced a new differentiated urban consciousness unanticipated by Marx. This development poses a basic challenge to an autarchic Marxism because its patterning of dispositions and collective action does not emerge in unmediated ways from the accumulation process, nor does it reflect traditional Marxist categories. The entire second volume wrestles with this dilemma within the self-imposed limitation of not moving outside the boundaries of a self-sufficient Marxism. Therein lies its considerable originality and achievement but also its shortcoming.

The book's most interesting propositions revolve around the idea that the city—and urban space—is a mediator between structure and agency within the capitalist mode of production. Capitalist development convened the spatial relationships that made the new urban consciousness possible, especially in the separation in space of work and residence. Thus, capitalism creates the city; the city creates a consciousness that reflects its variegated spatial and relational realities; yet that very consciousness deflects attention away from the primal forces of the capitalist mode of production that underly the production and functioning of cities. For Harvey, the city is thus doubly essential to capitalism: it secures a "spatial fix" for its recurring economic crises, and it misshapes class struggle by deflecting it into secondary bases of conflict.

As Harvey's case studies demonstrate, this framework for urban analysis has the merit of incorporating history, economics, space, politics, culture, and collective action. This is no mean achievement. But it is marred by two clusters of limitations. The first concerns the failure to develop a perspective on class and group formation that transcends a simple kind of reflectionism based on the operative assumption of a necessary correspondence between structure and meaning; the second is the insistence that Marxism be self-sufficient.

In Harvey's analysis, urban identities ultimately reflect the antinomy of capital and labor and thus have a hidden potential of challenging capitalism. But in a more immediate sense, they deflect class consciousness. The formulation of class consciousness is an all-or-nothing matter, and the reduction of urban identities to the hidden essence of class struggle makes it difficult for Harvey to ask contingent and comparative research questions regarding how and under what conditions community-based mobilizations might achieve their anti-system potential and how capitalism as an economic order sets limits and exerts pressures on the formation of meaning, identity, and patterns of collective action for various groups and social classes. Rather than ask under what conditions class emerges as the unifying cognitive map for a working class in a capitalist city and why it is that different groups of working people are formed as different kinds of actors in very similar capitalist and urban settings, Harvey evades these issues by taking for granted an automatic reflection in consciousness of material reality—whether it be capitalist or urban. This renders comparative and historical work, including his own case studies, merely illustrative.

If limitations of social theory vitiate Harvey's attempt to link theory and history, so too does his pursuit of a closed Marxism. The costs are most apparent in his flat and functionalist treatment of the state and its role in shaping the urban built environment. Harvey assumes what must be demonstrated: that the state has only a second-order coordinating role in capitalist development and that cities—even political capitals—are almost exclusively the spatial expressions of the logic of capital, with the state merely its instrument.

His conflation of the state and capitalism into a single, jumbo macrostructure eliminates in one stroke some of the most interesting questions about urban development and the form of the city, the role of planning, the expansion of governmental services, as well as class and group formation. Even the centerpieces of Harvey's own work—the analysis of land use, rent, and the adaptation of the urban environment to accommodate the accelerated pace of the circulation of capital—cannot possibly be developed without an elaboration of the independent interests and actions of local officials and government bureaucrats, who, together with lawyers, landlords, developers, and bankers are enmeshed in a politics of property. To be sure, at every moment there has been an intertwining of government and capital; but the story of urban development in the West in the past two centuries can be told only in caricature exclusively as a tale of capitalist requirements achieved with the aid of an always compliant state or as the story of actors exclusively bearing the "real" names of labor and capital.

IRA KATZNELSON

New School for Social Research

The End of the State. By Andrew Levine. (London: Verso, 1987). 198p. $29.95, cloth; $11.95, paper).

The keynote of this "essay in political philosophy" (p. 3) is provided by a quotation from Rousseau's *Social Contract:* "The fundamental problem of political philosophy . . . for which the social contract provides the solution" is "to find a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each associate, and by means of which one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before" (p. 28). Autonomy, freedom, and democracy provide Rousseau with a vision equivalent to Kant's "republic of ends," according to Levine. They also provide a framework that Levine uses to explain the Marxian notions of the end of the state and the development of a classless society.

This book is not simply an explication of Marx or Rousseau—Levine makes clear throughout that much of his work is "in the spirit" of these thinkers rather than adhering to the letter of what they wrote. This finely crafted essay attempts to show that Rousseau's vision of a free people living cooperatively through the exercise of its "general will" is not merely utopian nonsense but can "become a deliberate political objective" (p. 169). For this objective to be obtainable, however, Rousseau must be expanded beyond his own limited economic and historical framework through the incorporation of Marxian political themes, especially the concept of historical materialism.

Levine's discussion of exploitation in presocialist and socialist societies is interesting in its own right and is additionally important because it presents a challenge that Levine himself fails to meet. Levine interprets the movement from stage to stage within the historical materialist outline of history as "the successive elimination of forms of exploitation" (p. 118). Precapitalist societies are characterized by four types of exploitation: "control over persons, over alienable means of production, and over skills and organizational resources" (p. 119). Capitalism eliminates the ownership of persons but retains the other three forms of exploitation, while socialist societies retain "only skills and organizational exploitation." While the movement of history invokes a reduction in types of exploitation practiced, this "does not ensure that aggregate exploitation diminishes. Remaining forms of exploitation can expand to fill the void left by the elimination of the form of exploitation principally responsible for generating inequalities under its historical predecessor. Existing socialist societies appear to suffer acutely from this phenomenon" (p. 119).

Thus, unlike others writing in the Marxist tradition, Levine does not deny that exploitation is still possible in a socialist society. He does not see that this exploitation in itself is enough to prevent the vision of Rousseau and Marx from becoming reality, however. It is at this point that I believe Levine is too optimistic in his analysis. While admitting that "organizational exploitation looks insurmountable in existing socialist countries" (p. 149), he believes that under the right conditions such exploitation will itself wither away. He fails to see that the "class interest" of a socialist bureaucracy may be as great a hindrance to the development of a classless society as is the interest of the capitalist class.

Ultimately, according to Levine, society's ability to overcome the various forms of exploitation that it fosters will require "substantial modifications in human beings' dispositions and character" (p. 177). This transformation in man's nature, Levine suggests, can be brought about by the inculcation of civic virtue through political participation. "Commitment to this ideal depends," Levine admits, "on faith in democracy" (p. 178). Whether one shares Levine's faith in "the efficacy of democracy itself in transforming human nature" (p. 172), one can learn much about the nature of political philosophy and about the interconnections between Marxist and modern liberal thought, from a reading of this extremely well-written and elegant meditation.

STEVEN D. EALY

Armstrong State College

Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community. By Loren Lomasky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. ix, 283p. $24.95).

From its classic formulation by John Locke, liberalism viewed rights "negatively," that is, as the absence of interference by others and viewed the function of government as the protection of those rights. By the midnineteenth century, liberalism had, due largely to the writings of T. H. Green, come to view rights as "positive," that is, as claims to specific things such as food or safe working conditions, and the function of the state to supply these goods and services. The debate between the two liberalisms was reviewed in the 1970s with the publication of John Rawls's *Theory of Justice* and Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia.* Rawls defended the modern wing of liberalism, Nozick the classical wing.

Loren Lomasky, in his *Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community,* places himself squarely in the classical tradition. Despite his criticism of the philosophical underpinnings of Nozick's analysis, *Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community* is a fitting companion volume to *Anarchy, State, and Utopia.* Although grounding his analysis in Lockean natural rights, Nozick makes no attempt to defend them. The focus of *Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community,* however, is precisely on the derivation and defense of those rights.

Lomasky's analysis is premised on the empirical observation that individuals pursue projects. Projects, according to the author, do more than explain actions, they explain lives. They make us the unique people that we are. But project pursuit presupposes moral space within which one can choose one's projects. Thus, basic rights are primarily claims to noninterference. They are "liberty rights," not "welfare rights."

Lomasky uses his view of individuals as project pursuers to mount an effective critique of Rawlsian liberalism and to present a challenging defense of the traditional liberal order. Rawls argues that choices made by individuals behind a "veil of ignorance" would be *fair* and that one of those choices would be the "difference principle," proscribing social or economic inequalities unless they benefit everyone. But, contends Lomasky, a "fairly-agreed upon distribution" has no moral weight unless the parties have the *right* to make distributive decisions. Rawls's response is that even if our possessions accurately reflect our talents, these talents are not rightfully ours because they are genetically accidental. And if these talents are not deserved, neither are our possessions. Since this makes the "natural distribution" morally arbitrary, it can be ignored in a collective decision. This argument, Lomasky believes, proves too much, for it renders *everything* that individuates people morally arbitrary. The result, he concludes, is "thoroughly illiberal."

Lomasky's defense of traditional liberalism is thoughtful and original. From the view of persons as project pursuers he concludes that although some groups—children and the handicapped, for example—possess "positive" or "welfare" rights, basic rights are primarily liberty rights. Need is not a sufficient condition for something to be a basic right. For example, need cannot be a sufficient condition if what is needed cannot be provided by others on demand. Self-respect falls into this category. Moreover, one must distinguish between the need itself and the best way to supply the need. State interference can at times impede the provision of a good or service, reduce its quality, or generate side-effects that may more than offset the good done by the program.

The central problem for modern liberalism, argues Lomasky, is that because rights are moral claims against others, expanding welfare rights saddles people with expanding obligations, thereby jeopardizing the entire structure of liberty rights. But liberty rights must be paramount, for noninterference is a prerequisite for whatever projects one wishes to pursue.

Lomasky's extension of basic rights from project pursuers to such potential project pursuers as children and then to nonproject pursuers such as the severely mentally handicapped is worth noting, as is his distinction between children—who are rights claimants—and fetuses—which are not.

Lomasky's book does contain a serious tension. Given his rejection of an "impersonal standard of value," it is paradoxical that he should, in the last chapter, embrace the idea of a "preexistent impersonal value." Lomasky's concern is apparent. If nothing is objectively true or valuable, then it is difficult to argue that anything is morally impermissible, including interference with others. But if there *are* objective values, then some ends, some projects, are "better" than others and should be accorded priority. In coming down on the side of "objective values" Lomasky risks undermining the position he had so ably defended.

Some topics, such as the provision of public goods, should be treated in greater depth. But the prose is concise and the author's reverence for the panoply of the day-to-day concerns of flesh-and-blood people is refreshing. Lomasky's people are never placed behind counterfactual veils of ignorance but in families, clubs, and other social groups. They are presented not as abstract, autonomous agents making moral choices far removed from the woof-and-warp of our actual daily experiences but as real social beings whose choices are influenced by their unique personal histories and upbringings.

Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community is an important work. Even those disagreeing with its central thesis will find it challenging.

DAVID OSTERFELD

St. Joseph's College

The Cloistered Virtue: Freedom of Speech and the Administration of Justice in the Western World. By Barend van Niekerk. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987. xxxviii, 399p. $49.95).

Justice should not be a cloistered virtue. That is the theme of the late Barend van Niekerk's work in comparative law. "It remains one of the strange ironies of the West," he writes, "that, despite its theoretical commitment to liberty, it has raised so many sanctions against free speech concerning the administration of justice—for advantages that are mostly so illusory, and a gain that is often so trifling and at a social cost that can be so crippling" (p. 44).

The genesis of the book, the final work of an outspoken advocate of civil liberties and professor of public law at the University of Natal, was Niekerk's own trials. Three times he was prosecuted for criticizing the judiciary. First, in 1970 he was tried for contempt of court for concluding, after he had conducted a survey of lawyers, that race was a "conscious and deliberate" factor in South Africa's use of the death penalty. Second, in 1971 he was indicted for saying that the Terrorism Act was "a negation of what any true lawyer would call justice." In the third trial, 1975, the minister of justice began a libel action after Niekerk opined that a decision to reprieve a white killer and execute his black accomplice demonstrated a "lack of concern for justice and the reputation of our law" (pp. xiii–xvi).

Niekerk argues that the same premises that justify freedom of speech in all other areas of society provide justification for free speech in the legal domain. These premises range from the importance of self-fulfillment for lawyers, who normally stifle their own critical comments, to the advancement of knowledge for society, which will benefit from truth's coming out. Freedom of speech in the administration of justice is also, Niekerk claims, a device for broadening democratic participation, for minimizing conflict and maximizing stability, for preventing the inefficacy and frequent counterproductivity of suppression, as well as for ensuring that justice be done.

Although set against the background of South African restrictions, the book reaches into all quarters of the West, especially the German, English, and U.S. legal systems, with some case studies and comments drawn from France, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the South American countries. The differences are instructive. The most draconian—no surprise here—is South Africa. Although Germany has strict professional sanctions against lawyers who engage in scandalization of judges, one of the freest presses and one of the most responsible publications, *Der Spiegel*, are found in Germany. Elitism characterizes the English practice across the board, from use of contempt of court to a detachment and self-imposed silence in legal, academic, and journalistic circles. Except for the bright spot presented by the U.S. system, Niekerk concludes that "it cannot truthfully be said that the legal free speech is thriving and blooming anywhere in the Western world outside the United States" (p. 210).

Television, especially in the United States, poses a need for an enforceable professional and judicial code, Niekerk acknowledges. He suggests three general considerations: the invasion of privacy, which can make television a modern pillory; the possibility of an appreciable risk of encumbering the search for truth and justice; and the need to maintain civilized standards of speech.

Barend van Kiekerk died at age forty-two in 1981, shortly after completing the manuscript. Gilbert Marcus, in the afterword, brings developments up to 1987; John Dugard, in a foreword, tells us about the life and career of Niekerk, and Alan Paton presents a eulogy.

Although the book has an inadequate index and presents the reader with the frustration of having to keep one finger in the notes section in order to keep up with the running commentary and with details that would have been more conveniently placed in the text, Niekerk has given us an important work in comparative law. We need more like his. Others will have to write them now.

RON CHRISTENSON

Gustavus Adolphus College

Property Rights and Eminent Domain. By Ellen Frankel Paul (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987. 276p. $24.95).

By writing this book Ellen Frankel Paul has probably solidified her credentials as a person worthy of her previous appointment to the Reagan administration, having served as U.S. representative to the UN Commission for Social Development in 1983. One should perhaps not be surprised by this text, therefore, which purports to be a critique of all regulation of property rights and which rejects all but the most limited government exercise of eminent domain.

Paul begins the book by claiming that the power of eminent domain has emerged and developed without express grants of authority in the Constitution and that the police power has been applied in the context of extraordinarily vague grants of power to protect the health, safety, morals, and general welfare. Additionally, Paul argues that without well-articulated and logically unassailable theories of property rights, it is likely that government regulation of property will become and remain capricious, ad hoc, inconsistent, and subject to capture by special interests. Paul then proceeds in several sections of the book to claim that environmentalists have been the most important contemporary influence on the use of the powers of eminent domain and the police power. In several chapters, Paul discusses many (far too many) cases to illustrate the well-known fact that the courts have been confused about the regulation of property rights. With the exception of the so-called Lochner era, during which the federal courts presumably operated according to correct principles, Paul sees only caprice and illogic in court decisions respecting the scope and application of the police power and eminent domain.

Paul devotes nearly 70% of the book to making these points. The rest of the book contains Paul's argument that only a natural rights justification will provide a basis for halting the continued erosion of property rights. Although reasonable people might disagree with such an approach to remedying some of the chaos in the law of police power regulation and eminent domain, it would have been interesting to see what Paul developed. However, the little space she devotes to a natural rights argument for the protection of property rights is woefully deficient. Indeed, a better expression of such a viewpoint can be found in Bernard Siegan's equally conservative *Economic Liberties and the Constitution* (1980).

Like many other more reasonable observers of government regulation and local planning, Paul raises legitimate questions (for the wrong reasons) regarding the fair treatment of property owners. Moreover, government regulation of property does pose questions regarding the maintenance of appropriate boundaries for government exercise of the police power and its power to condemn property. However, Paul fritters away the opportunity to advance the discussion to a useful arena of discourse. Instead, her book is too often a polemic, designed to exploit the many individual cases of government abuse of property rights for the purpose of pressing her case for minimal government. While the book is largely a propaganda piece, it is nevertheless an archetype of work by contemporary conservative thinkers seeking to revive what they believe was the halcyon period of government deference to property rights, the so-called Lochner period of jurisprudence, when, it is commonly believed, substantive due process accorded constitutional protection against government regulation of property rights.

The use of eminent domain to take property from private individuals and then have publicly sanctioned transfers of title to other private individuals for their personal gain creates much potential for abuse and unfairness. The extension of police power regulation to areas with very subjective criteria for harm and public welfare (e.g., aesthetics, historic preservation, and adult entertainment) is very hard to administer consistently, and the potential for takings of property under the guise of police power regulation has become increasingly problematic.

While she is justified in her criticism of these states of affairs, most of Ellen Frankel Paul's assessment of the causes of these difficulties and her recommendations for solving them are wrongheaded. She gives far too much weight to the role of environmentalists in expanding the police power or creating conditions for abuse of eminent domain. After all, it was not the environmental movement that pressed for the adoption of the "public benefit" criterion over the "public use" criterion in the exercise of the police power. An alliance of development interests is responsible for that one. It was not environmentalists that pressed for state government delegation to local redevelopment agencies of the power to condemn property as blighted under the loosest of criteria. Again, one has the business and development community to thank, since it sought these government powers to be used to reduce their costs of acquiring and clearing property. The argument of many local governments today, who condemn private property and transfer it to other private owners on the grounds that the new owners will use the property in more profitable fashion, thereby generating local revenues for the community, was successfully pressed by business and development interests.

To think that zoning is the only way localities have to restrict development is naive. Communities could affect development by utilizing their discretion regarding the timing and extension of public services. The result would be even more devastating on some property owners than police power regulation. Or would Paul contend that property owners have a constitutional right to publicly subsidized services? Moreover, Paul seems to ignore entirely the possibility that a great deal of property value comes from the governments she worries so much about. Indeed Paul, like others of her ilk, want to have things both ways. On the one hand, government should not diminish the value of property; on the other hand, government should do nothing to try to recover, on behalf of the community, the values that the community produces for property owners. For every property owner adversely affected by the actions of the community through its governing bodies, there is at least one property owner who benefits from various government actions. Of course, the investment in local development politics by those who benefit from government actions is far more visible and influential than the episodic involvements of those interested in restricting development.

Finally, while it is easy to concede that the current administration of the police power and eminent domain is deficient, the remedy proposed by Paul—the adoption of a constitutional commitment to property rights, based on a natural rights doctrine—is foolish. The cause of the problems is rooted not in the absence of a natural rights doctrine of property rights but instead in the nature of liberal, interest group politics. The efforts by individuals, groups, and businesses to affect the nature of the development process is inevitable in an urban-metropolitan society, where there is intense competition for locationally distributed advantages and disadvantages. Finally, judgments of who is entitled to the values that inhere in the exercise of property rights is extraordinarily muddled when such values do not emerge—as Paul suggests they do—from the efforts of individual property owners but from the intermingling of many different private and government actors.

It would be incorrect to deny that public regulation of property rights is flawed. However, Ellen Frankel Paul provides a weak case for the kind of wholesale abandonment of regulation that she advocates. Perhaps the recent U.S. Supreme Court case, *First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California* (107 S.Ct. 2378 [1987] might provide more discipline for governments that are insensitive to fair treatment of property owners, as well as ameliorate some of Paul's angst regarding the diminution of property rights.

MAX NEIMAN

University of California, Riverside

Reason, Revelation, and the Foundations of Political Philosophy. By James V. Schall (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987. vii, 254p. $27.50).

Since World War II a recurrent theme among neoclassical and Thomistic political philosophers has been the importance of steadfast values for political inquiry. James Schall's most recent work is a noteworthy contribution to this end. Specifically, Schall pinpoints the vitality of the revelatory tradition to political philosophy both in terms of medieval philosophy's tempering of the classical framework of human activities and modern political philosophy's inability to replace the latter with a satisfactory political metaphysics.

The crux of Schall's position is that although the proper pursuit of *what man is* is in the practical or political realm, this activity raises questions that can be appropriately addressed only in terms of the *what is* disclosed by revelation in the theoretical realm. Consequently, there are limits to what political activity can comprehend, but it cannot comprehend these very limits independent of a philosophy open to revelation. At the same time, however, this latter life of contemplation is cultivated through leisure provided by the polity.

This distinction between the practical and theoretical realms originates in Aristotle, but Schall finds Aristotle at fault to the extent that only the soul could transcend politics to engage in contemplation; therefore, individuals understood in terms of both body and soul were relegated to the finite happiness of politics. This shortcoming is resolved in Christian philosophy by God being a personalization of Aristotle's First Mover and through the notion of the bodily resurrection of the individual.

Augustine's City of God captures this theoretic order open to revelation; yet according to Schall it is left to Aquinas to restore the indigenous importance of the City of Man—politics. Beyond just emphasizing that the very limits of politics allow for contemplation, Schall transforms Aristotle's discussion of friendship as the quintessence of human interaction in terms of the Christian Incarnation: out of respect for individuals as *what they are* (p. 126) even God comes to interact with them as a man.

Schall's exposition of how medieval thought uncovers revelation as an intelligence aimed at philosophy without overwhelming either it or the political order is of great service to the discipline. All too often, especially among contemporary political philosophers, Augustine and Aquinas are rendered as footnotes to the political philosophy of virtue articulated by the ancient Greeks. Through careful exegesis Schall shows that although in *Natural Right and History* (1953) Leo Strauss rejects Christian philosophy as being too steeped in revealed theology (p. 219), he elsewhere intimates that revelation is directed at reason and morality, as philosophies that eschew *what is* are not (p. 233).

In his assessment of modernity, Schall, like Strauss, becomes predictable. From Machiavelli to the present, the integral relationship between distinct political and theoretical realms has been abandoned in favor of the identification of human intellect and will with *what is*. Instead of nature being approached as something given, it is now treated as something formable through science. Any deference to a reality beyond humanity must be surmounted so as to emancipate man. Therefore, personal immortality as purported by revelation can only find significance in the human collectivities that transcend finite human beings (pp. 145–147).

These modern developments echo, in part, for Schall, the Stoic equation of man with *what is* in post-Aristotelian antiquity. However, the modern "anthropological metaphysics" (p. 201) moves beyond abstractions that merely reconcile the self with the world to the actual implementation of theoretical designs in the political realm. Machiavelli's Prince, Hobbes's Leviathan, Rousseau's General Will, Kant's Categorical Imperative, Hegel's Absolute Spirit, Marx's "Generic Man" (p. 199), and Nietzsche's Superman perpetrate a politics that has no bounds and hence must founder.

Curiously, Schall omits liberalism in his treatment of "the aberrations of the modern project" (p. 223). He does mention "the acceptable elements in modern liberal philosophy" (p. 223), but he never deliberates upon what they are, especially in the U.S. context. In turn, the modern thinkers he does dwell upon are essentially painted with the same broad brush and his consideration of twentieth-century thinkers is relegated to those more attuned to the revelation tradition—Strauss, Eric Vogelin, and Hannah Arendt. Arendt's case, though, is instructive in that while her political philosophy is congenial to Schall's position, her portrait of the theoretical order is much more indebted to Kant.

Could it be, then, that particular modern political philosophers are open to Schall's metaphysical concerns but do not articulate them within his framework? As Arendt points out, it is "not that the old questions which are coeval with the appearance of men on earth have become 'meaningless,' but that the way they were framed and answered has lost plausibility" (*The Life of the Mind: One/Thinking* [1978], 10). Frankly, one wishes Schall would show the same subtle sensitivity to the moderns that he does in overcoming his differences with Strauss. Otherwise, his conclusion—reminiscent of Alasdair MacIntyre's proposition, "Nietzsche or Aristotle" (*After Virgue* [1981], 103)—becomes "Nietzsche or Aquinas." If this opposition could be overcome, Schall's clarity and insight regarding the revelatory tradition would be essential in an authentic dialogue among contemporary political philosophers on how the foundational metaphysical questions should be framed. Why not Nietzsche *and* Aquinas?

JOHN FRANCIS BURKE

Delta State University

Law, Liberalism, and Free Speech. By D. F. B. Tucker (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1986. viii, 212p. $32.50, cloth; $13.50, paper).

Toleration and the Constitution. By David A. J. Richards (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. xvii, 348p. $29.95).

The Tolerant Society. By Lee Bollinger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. viii, 295p. $19.95).

These three books are united by their authors' shared commitment to a common underlying value: the idea of equal respect and mutual tolerance. In pursuit of this value, each author initially delineates and deems insufficient various established frameworks for constitutional analysis. He then devises and sets forth a new framework that he deems superior. Two of the books focus exclusively on speech issues; one treats speech and some additional concerns.

Tucker's book is drawn from the work of Rawls and Dworkin. It is an explicit effort to find a theory of free speech and judicial review that takes rights seriously. Tucker begins by pointing out the inadequacies in what he describes as functionalist-utilitarian approaches to free speech. These are approaches that attempt to test free speech against its functional efficacy in pursuit of some goal such as democratic accountability. Through analysis of several free speech issues, he attempts to demonstrate the advantages of an approach that derives rights from Rawlsian analysis. Tucker's sense is that his results accommodate intuitive judgments as least as well as functionalism while providing a better understanding of why we require governments to respect freedom of speech.

Many readers may not find his overall effort persuasive, feeling that he moves rather quickly over points that are crucial to his theory. Nevertheless, *Law, Liberalism, and Free*

Speech is a serious work offering something useful to the interested reader.

Toleration and the Constitution is a related effort, self-described as an attempt to develop a broad theory of constitutional interpretation to illuminate the connection between our constitutional traditions and the larger cultural traditions that they reflect. The author seeks to utilize a deep understanding of history and deploy an explicit democratic political theory. Richards rejects Berger's original intentionalism and Ely's proceduralism for what he describes as a contractarian approach, one that grows out of cultural and moral traditions and calls for observance, by the state, of predictable and orderly constraints to acknowledge and express the dignity of persons as free, rational, and equal. He argues that an approach that emphasizes the abstract intentions of the Constitution's clauses rather than the expressed intentions of its framers is more consistent with the imputation of reasonable and coherent purposes to the historical understanding of the Constitution.

Holding that constitutional analysis must be informed by such broad historical understanding and by "better" philosophy, Richards attempts to show how this can be done, through his discussions of religion and speech and privacy issues. It is a very tall order and I believe it fair to say that those unsympathetic to the ongoing effort to ground constitutional analysis in rights-based philosophical approaches will not be persuaded, while supporters will applaud the book and find it a helpful contribution.

Like Tucker, Lee Bollinger in *The Tolerant Society* finds established functional rationales inadequate. But instead of rejecting functional analysis for a rights-based approach, he seeks deeper functional understanding. Bollinger identifies two conventional rationales for free speech that he believes fail to offer a satisfactory grounding for it. The first of these he characterizes as the classical model, where truth is produced through the clash of ideas and each of us gains satisfaction through self-expression. Bollinger finds it naive in many ways, most notably for its failure to deal adequately with the problem of extremist speech. The second rationale he terms the *fortress model;* it sees government as a force that cannot be trusted. This model troubles him because it introduces into our public institutions an "unfortunate manipulative frame of mind, a warfare mentality."

After extensive and thoughtful analysis, Bollinger concludes that the United States tolerates extremist speech because coming to terms with it teaches each of us tolerance and self-control. He argues that this tolerance benefits democratic society by symbolically reinforcing our need to resist the ever-persent tendency to intolerance. Although Bollinger may be correct in asserting that he has identified an insufficiently appreciated social good that flows from our approach to free speech, particularly when the matter is approached on the symbolic level, many observers will probably conclude that the importance of the insight is overstated and the significance of the more traditional rationales underappreciated.

And Bollinger arguably fails to subject his own thesis to the same tests he applies to others. For example, he sees the classical model as naive and unrealistic, arguing that while personal experience supports the idea that open discussion leads to truth, it does not support either the idea that extremist speech can lead to truth or that such speech is harmless. But he does not really consider whether significant support can be found in personal experience for his claim that free speech teaches a general democratic self-control. Again, Bollinger finds the fortress model to be sophisticated but manipulative. But many might apply the same description to his model of a society that tolerates worthless and harmful speech in order to practice exercising self-control over its own intolerant tendencies.

While all three books reflect learned and commendable efforts to think deeply about constitutional theory, only the Bollinger book's creative elements manage to transcend the increasingly apparent limitations and even circularity of well-established theoretical debates. Its mode of analysis and some of the insights that accompany it—even more than the specific outcome of the effort—make it the most worthwhile reading of three worthwhile books.

FREDERICK P. LEWIS

University of Lowell

Tranquillitas Ordinis: The Present Failure and Future Promise of American Catholic Thought on War and Peace. By George Weigel. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. x, 489p. $27.50).

The Nuclear Dilemma and the Just War Tradition. Edited by William V. O'Brien and John Langan (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1986. viii, 257p. $25.00).

In quite different ways, both these volumes are concerned with whether and how traditional theory about justice and war can be applied to the monumental potentials of modern warfare. Both also come at this issue from a Catholic perspective and both are in crucial respects prompted by the U.S. Catholic bishops' 1983 pastoral letter on nuclear policy. But while the O'Brien-Langan volume is a collection of papers done by eight authors and naturally somewhat short on synthesis, Weigel's book is an unusually integrated and comprehensive overview that sustains a high level of analytic power throughout.

I do not mean to depreciate the O'Brien-Langan effort by this comparison. It is a very useful source for anyone who wants to get quickly up to date on much important contemporary thinking on just war theory. By design it features only authors who make the fundamental judgment that war under some conditions is a just act and thereby excludes pacifists. The reason for this is that pacifism, since it precludes war by definition, is not capable of asking *when* war might justly be done nor *how* it can be justly conducted. The *when* question is traditionally answered by value assessments made by those with authority to judge: What is the nature of the threat to us (or to others)? What do we have (or what are we) to be defended? What will result from a failure to defend? What will result from defending? These are essentially questions of relative and proportionate values assigned to the various issues at stake in a war-threatening situation. If the judgment is that the stakes are such as to justify war making, then the ethical focus shifts to *how* war ought to be conducted. The principal traditional answers are: proportionately (i.e., with intent to win but with limited force) and discriminately (i.e., discriminating between combatants and noncombatants and, insofar as possible, granting the latter immunity from damage).

The O'Brien-Langan contributors share a judgment that the relative human freedom achieved in democratic politics is a value meriting defense. But they divide on other issues, two of which are particular problems for some contributors. First, the principle of discrimination is sometimes referred to as if it had an almost fixed or foreknowable character. The obvious—one may even say absolute—desirability of not harming noncombatants, if thought of in such fixed, numerical terms is a hard fit for nuclear war, which, no matter how carefully fought, would kill large numbers—and, if escalated, could slay untold numbers—of noncombatants. It is thinking in that fixed framework, presumably, that prompted one of the authors (Walzer) to state that the theory of just war is refuted by the advent of nuclear weapons. But if the principle of discrimination is seen exactly as a principle—a guiding value that, like all values, must be synthesized in moral action by proportionality and prudence—then the advent of nuclears, while dramatically raising the potential ruin of any conflict, does not in and of itself refute *anything*, let alone reason and its common-sense application to the *whens* and *hows* of war.

A second area of important, though often only implicit, dispute is over the role of the Catholic church in discussions of strategic policy in a democratic society. It is perhaps understandable that church leaders would imagine some special standing in society empowering them to instruct government itself—even thunder to it. But even if understandable, it is unseemly and unrealistic. A Great Britain or United States has long since made a fundamental choice of how authority is ordered and how government is legitimized, and that choice does not give any church hierarchy a stand-alone political capacity. Rather, it has a capacity to teach principles to any who will listen, primarily its communicants. If those principles include politically pertinent values, then the communicants—believers-as-citizens, whether clerical or lay—have the duty and the right to bring those values to bear in the political life of the nation, just as any citizen may bring values derived from any source. Langan describes a format of debate on nuclear policy that seems to imagine a more direct role for a hierarchical church (pp. 7–8) and in so doing, at one and the same time errantly diminishes, in my view, the believer-as-citizen and falsely exalts hierarchical potential.

Scripture and Catholic tradition contain only a few titanic principles about war. There is nothing that prevents bishops or anyone else from trying to master more detailed and particularistic issues, of course. But as Rome made clear to the U.S. bishops in January 1983, when leaving the safe harbor of central religious principles, church leaders must acknowledge diminished authority and the danger of divisiveness within the community of believers. Hollenbach seems not to know that this was the central problem of the bishops' pastoral through its first two drafts (p. 26). Whole moral analysis of, and response to, important issues requires going from principle to particular, of course. But that does not mean a church leadership qua church leadership must so go. And if it does, it must recognize the required modesty it should exhibit, as all should in problematic areas.

Despite a few problems such as these, each chapter in the O'Brien-Langan book helps define and explain crucial issues; and several are outstanding. James Turner Johnson's discussion of those things worth defending, even with nuclear weapons, is especially thoughtful.

The title of Weigel's *Tranquillitas Ordinis* refers to that tranquillity or order that was for Augustine the state's reason for being, in pursuit of which war might justly be made. But as previously noted, customary thought about just war has been strained by the advent of nuclears. Part of Weigel's contribution in this study is to establish that if the price of war has escalated hugely because of new armaments, the price of bowing to aggression has escalated no less because of the rise of totalitarian regimes. While he ascribes more of this latter phenomenon to *new* mentalities than would some—some would say totalitarian mentality can be seen throughout history but only lately in full concert with the technical capacity to implement its appetites—there is no doubt about its novelty, its importance, its *pertinence* to judging whether war remains an acceptable tool in the modern age.

For Weigel, the central political objective of this age is to avoid both the catastrophe of nuclear war and the catastrophe of totalitarian oppression's further extension. And the central problem for his book is to explore Catholic teaching and thought as a potential source of wisdom germane to the political objective. His three theses are that Catholic and U.S. Catholic tradition contained pertinent wisdom; that from Vatican II's end (1965) to now, U.S. Catholic leadership lost hold of that wisdom; and that reclamation is possible and could help the nation in maintaining both peace and freedom.

This is a powerful study in which the author has managed to sustain rigor and perceptiveness over a very broad terrain and over a copious literature that he commands deftly. The effect of these labors is greatly to substantiate the three theses noted above. Much hard-won customary wisdom has been set aside in favor of trendier religious fashions, and reclamation needs to be tried, whether finally successful or not.

It does seems to me, however, that the author would do well to emphasize some distinctions in his use of the term *Catholic* when thinking about just war theory and generally enlightened political understanding. What he regularly refers to as the Catholic deposit of political wisdom is not especially Catholic except in the historical sense; that is, it is not contained in, nor directly derived from, doctrine. (That is why the U.S. Church leadership could so easily fly from much of that tradition without fracturing doctrinal commitments.) Much substantial thought on justice in war has been done by Catholics, but not in any uniquely Catholic way. And certainly the paramount U.S. theorists on the subject have not been Catholic. My point is simple; one who thinks it is important to encourage clear thought on war and peace, justice and freedom wants to use the widest possible categories around which rational people can gather. *Catholic* is a narrowing category in this regard and somewhat misleading, as well.

Precisely because Weigel has written a tightly integrated study, I will not try to summarize it further. It richly deserves to be read and studied by those concerned with the interaction of religion and politics and the twin terrors of modern war and modern oppression.

QUENTIN L. QUADE

Marquette University

AMERICAN POLITICS

Seeking Many Inventions: The Idea of Community in America. By Philip Abbott (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987. x, 214p. $19.95).

Abbott begins this study by citing the allegation that U.S. citizens have rejected community in favor of individualism. On the whole he agrees with this view, which has been part of the stock in trade of U.S. social critics since Tocqueville's time. But he argues that U.S. citizens have also persistently longed for community—for "more viable and stable social relationships" (p. 20). The difficulty, as he sees it, is that we repeatedly seek to satisfy this longing through "instant communities" (p. 20) that fail to meet our needs. The temptation to find instant community blocks our every effort to rediscover the real thing (p. 149).

Abbott attempts to support his thesis through discussions of five inventions to which U.S. citizens have made major contributions: the telephone, the penitentiary, the revival camp, the motel, and the pieced quilt. His focus in these discussions is not upon the scientific or technical but upon the aspect of social invention connected with each. He argues that all these inventions are pervaded by an air of "intimate anonymity" (p. 165), a simultaneous longing for and resistance to community as different from Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft* as it is from the contractual social relations to which that conception of community is usually contrasted. Because the relationships made possible by these inventions are voluntary (penitentiaries aside, presumably), the communities to which they give rise are exceedingly fragile, and therein lies the problem (p. 168).

What is the solution? First, "social space" must be won by being "wrestled and torn away from economic and political institutions" (p. 169). Abbott shares the distaste for bureaucracy that has emerged in recent years as a prevalent feature in U.S. culture. Hence he regards the welfare state and the market as equally unsuitable means for the restoration of community. To recapture social space apparently means to make more room for voluntary associations of the kind described by Tocqueville with such curiosity and praise.

Second, Abbott argues that the future agenda of liberalism should be dominated by the creation of new communities with "purpose and commitment" (p. 172). U.S. citizens have always demonstrated remarkable energy as social inventors, but in the past their energies have been misdirected. By turning this energy toward the building of "forms of human association that capture a sense of moral cohesion, mutual aid, and intimacy" (p. ix) U.S. citizens can bring the promise of their immensely inventive energies to fruition.

One difficulty with Abbott's argument is that the relationship between his diagnosis and the evidence he offers is loose. The notion that U.S. citizens have a need for community that has long gone unfulfilled appears to be a premise rather than a finding of his study. His discussions of various U.S. social inventions are interesting in themselves, but they do not offer strong support for his thesis.

A more serious difficulty, however, lies in his conception of the kind of community liberals ought to go about creating in the future. As Abbott himself appears to recognize, the fragility of U.S. communities (or partial associations) stems largely from their voluntary character. Yet in calling for the wrestling of social space away from the market and the welfare state Abbott appears to be asking for an expansion of the realm of voluntaristic social interactions. Would a "world rich in sociability" (p. 179) really emerge from such an expansion, as he suggests? I should think that any reader who accepts Abbott's thesis about the misdirectedness of past U.S. social inventiveness will look upon his remedies with a good deal of skepticism.

DAVID JOHNSTON

Columbia University

Book Reviews: American Politics

The Citizen's Presidency. By Bruce Buchanan (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1987. vii, 223p. $9.95 paper).

A book that would "help citizens choose and judge presidents" would be very useful indeed and *Citizen's Presidency* is supposed to be such a handbook. The volume tries to answer the question, "What criteria for choosing presidents and judging their performance can yield adequate levels of public support while simultaneously holding presidents to account for their effectiveness in office?" The author claims that "anyone who reads this book seriously and carefully will be better equipped to choose and judge presidents." That is a tall order, as are other questions addressed: "What is the presidency for? How does it work? How can good, fair, and poor presidential performance be meaningfully distinguished? What kind of person makes a good president?" All of the above are offered on page 3, and I have doubts about how well these questions are answered.

The seven chapters seem logically organized in attempting to address influences on choice and judgment. Chapter 1 provides a good introduction to what follows in offering propositions relating to presidents' public support. Chapter 2 concerns political culture, and Buchanan claims that the presidency has three interrelated meanings for U.S. culture: efficacy, deliverance, and greatness; but we are left wondering why these three are important. Greatness is discussed without referencing studies by historians (e.g., Schlesinger, Maranell, Murray and Blessing, Simonton); indeed, the author claims "instability from one historian's poll to another" (p. 40), when in fact several are highly correlated. So many additional concepts are discussed in the chapter (e.g. style, leadership, character, power, success, charisma, image) that they overwhelm and are underexplained.

Only in chapter 3 does Buchanan try his hand at data analysis on an admittedly unrepresentative sample of undergraduate students at the University of Texas. This chapter concerns political culture, and the author factor-analyzes 72 "performance expectations," asking students to prioritize general, domestic, economic, and foreign policy. It is probably obvious that respondents would see the general category as more important than any of its three narrower components. Ideology is also introduced; but it is unclear to me why Carter is the best example of a policy liberal, Nixon a conservative, and Kennedy a pragmatist, when others—empirically rather than intuitively—find Kennedy as most liberal and Reagan as most conservative of contemporary presidents (e.g., Bond and Fleisher). In any event, Buchanan argues for a pragmatic rather than liberal or conservative president. The chapter does reference the psychological literature but it is difficult to see how his concepts relate to psychological ones.

Throughout the book individual presidents are offered as examples, but these are illustrations rather than systematic evidence. Presumably students were asked hypothetical questions, so we do not know how Carter, for example, was perceived. Buchanan's inevitably favorable comparison of Reagan with Carter may be time-bound now that we have lived through the Iran-Contra crisis. While admitting that the distinction between them often is overdone, he proceeds to pick illustrations to "prove" his points. Skill is introduced in chapter 4, as are other concepts like "privileged cushion," which are not related to the empirical literature. The latter seems to consist largely of smooth Gallup support levels.

Chapter 5 on grounds for judgment is the most interesting with its six "competent process standards"; they are nicely developed propositions. However, it is hard to see how basing them on Reagan alone makes them applicable to his predecessors. They seem unique and occurred for him only part of the time. It is difficult to establish the author's claim that the six standards will help presidents "govern wisely and implement policy with lasting results" (p. 134).

In contrast to chapter 5, chapter 6 on grounds for choice is weakly developed. The author debunks the three "traditional" grounds without anchoring them well in the literature. Why are policy package, track record, and character traditional?

Chapter 7 compares the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed single six-year term. Presumably it is introduced as among "ways to reduce the importance of public support to presidential functioning" (p. 20), but it is hard to see how it follows from the preceding chapters.

The primary problem with this book is that the main concepts are not tied together in any comprehensive theory. The organization and conceptualization of the entire book are ambiguous. The only real attempt to relate concepts is in a hidden discussion in the second appendix (Figure B-1). Overreliance on journalistic accounts make it impressionistic. Many assertions are undocumented (e.g., pp. 30, 63, 70, 76, 107, 128). Are we really to believe from this convoluted discussion that Buchanan provides the "citizen's-eye view" promised on the back cover?

Despite severe problems, *The Citizen's Presidency* has its strengths. Considering its complexity, it is well written and edited. Buchanan presents numerous propositions that are both interesting and thought-provoking. He believes that "failure to improve quality of evaluation could ultimately result in diminution of citizen power" (p. viii). Obviously it is an important topic that needs more systematic attention.

STEVEN A. SHULL

University of New Orleans

Political Parties in Local Areas. Edited by William Crotty (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986. xi, 253p. $27.95).

Local party organizations represent one of the more fascinating aspects of the study of political parties. Even so, there has been a paucity of research based on local parties and their activities. Many reasons have been offered to explain the failure of scholars to explore this admittedly fertile soil: the variation in local party organizations by region, state, and locale; the use of nonpartisan elections; the fact that local parties often rely on volunteers; and, that local elections suffer from low participation rates. Furthermore, there are large numbers of precincts that are normally unorganized, inactive, and lacking in leadership. All of these factors contribute to the difficulties encountered by researchers in the field of local political parties. It is all the more reason why a book such as this is a welcomed addition to the existing body of literature.

In an excellent introductory essay, William Crotty notes that contrary to the prevailing view, there is recent evidence that political parties at the state and county levels may be better organized, have command of greater resources, and be in a better condition than has been previously thought. The determination of whether this represents permanent strength or more transitory and phenomenal growth represents one of the principal reasons this project was undertaken.

Although the studies included in this volume represent six authors writing about five cities, considerable effort was made to provide a collaborative and conceptual structure. The intention was to offer an assessment of the value and relevance of parties in the modern big-city United States, to evaluate the contributions and activities of local political parties empirically, to test the party decline thesis, and to outline a basis for future research.

Richard Murray and Kent Tedin studied levels of party competitiveness and the factors that motivate activists in Houston. They found that the Texas Republican party is disciplined, unified, and generally effective in spite of minority status. The Democrats, on the other hand, continue to dominate state and local elections but have not risen to the challenge of two-party political reality.

In her study of Nashville local party organizations, Anne Hopkins found little Republican structure and few GOP electoral victories. She speculates that long one-party dominance of an area may depress party activity and organizational development.

Samuel Eldersveld, using his own series of interviews with Detroit precinct leaders from 1956 to 1980 and Dwaine Marvick's party activist interviews for the same period, traces the changes that have occured in operations, personnel, and work incentives as a way to assess the ability of the parties to adapt to changing environments.

Since 1956 Dwaine Marvick has interviewed party activists in Los Angeles, constructing a valuable longitudinal data set covering over 30 years. Based on this extensive data collection, Marvick reaches several conclusions regarding the party workers' policy views, strategies, ideological commitments, and their perception of the voters, candidates, and the political system itself.

William Crotty provides a fresh view of the machine-dominated politics of Chicago. He explores the reasons the machine has survived and endured and reviews the electoral division between the "downtown" Democratic wards and the Cook County suburban Republican organizations and he has little expectation that Chicago politics will soon change.

Although collections of this type often show little comparability, this one differs in that the authors met and planned the project beforehand and attempted to use similar survey instruments in data collection. They did not emerge with many common findings but did demonstrate that local party organizations respond to different environmental cues. They were unable to shed much light on the party decline thesis, but generally concluded that levels of activity at the local level in these five cities do not suggest much organizational atrophy.

The very fact that these scholars found that the local parties are active in campaigning and in the electoral process suggests that the accepted characteristics of local parties listed earlier are not always true. This is a useful and valuable book and an important contribution to the study of local parties.

ROBERT J. HUCKSHORN

Florida Atlantic University

Women, Elections, and Representation. By R. Darcy, Susan Welch, and Janet Clark (New York: Longman, 1987. viii, 181p. $12.95).

Women, Elections, and Representation is a timely offering and one that complements Susan J. Carroll's *Women As Candidates in American Politics* (1985). Both books cover roughly the decade of the 1970s, and Darcy, Welch, and Clark also bring us data from the early 1980s. Both books treat the electoral problems of women from the perspective of theories of democratic representation. Carroll uses survey data from female candidates for state legislative, statewide, and congressional offices. Darcy, Welch, and Clark use data mainly from election statistics for women and men running in local, state, and national legislative races, in both primary and general elections. Taken together, these books conclude that though voter prejudice, antiwoman party elites, and lack of access to campaign funding may have been problems for women candidates in the past, those problems in actuality have receded even if perceptions of discrimination still linger. The more women run for office, the more they win and will win—up to a point. That point is the electoral system itself. Both books point to the political opportunity structure, with its high rates of predominantly male incumbency and slow turnover, as a strong deterrent to women's gaining representational parity.

In addition to the negative effects of such incumbency and turnover, Darcy, Welch, and Clark also provide evidence that multimember districts enhance, and single-member districts retard, women's chances to gain office. On the basis of this analysis they call for more research into what kind of electoral system might best serve women's representation without negating the gains made by minority men in single-member district systems. We should also ask if the same kind of system that enhances white women's representation would do the same for women of color. In fact, one question that goes begging in this book is what explains the grosser underrepresentation of women of color in comparison to that of white women. Comparing the barriers to representation of "women and minorities" will not answer this question, since women are differentially privileged or denied because of race while minorities include women as well as men.

Darcy, Welch, and Clark approach the "problem" of women's underrepresentation in public office by trying to solve the "puzzle" of why so few women still seek and gain office. Implicit in the question, why so few? is the assumption that in the democratic system of the United States the intention has been that women should serve, and serve equally with men, in public offices at all levels of government. And yet by the authors' own assiduous sifting of the historical literature on the colonial and U.S. Revolutionary periods, they are brought to conclude that "the American Revolution resulted in a denial of political rights to all women" (p. 3). This denial was intentional, as their examination of early state constitutions demonstrates. One could argue that this was no covert "male conspiracy" (one of the hypotheses they test) but rather overt public policy making by white men of property according to the rules they set up for themselves. Curiously the authors do not discuss the U.S. Constitution and its first ten amendments. This would have provided the federal context for reinforcing the authority of the states to exclude women from the political process. Nor do they go into how the institution of slavery in many of the states, reinforced by that Constitution, served to exclude African-American women and men not just from the political process but from human status itself.

There is, then, an inherent tension throughout this book between philosophical assumptions about the democratic nature of the U.S. political system and empirical evidence that leads to the inference that the "democratic" electoral system itself is the problem. This is not to say that the authors have not provided us a valuable synthesis of much of the literature relevant to women in electoral politics. They have done that and more with their own original analyses of women's gains in local, state, and national legislatures, whether those gains be actual, as in the local and state legislatures, or projected, as in their computer model of the U.S. House of Representatives. Perhaps unintentionally, they have shown us *why so many.* They have shown us what women have been able to accomplish in two hundred years in making an undemocratic political system move toward some form of democratic ideal.

DIANE L. FOWLKES

Georgia State University

Citizen Participation in Public Decision Making. Edited by Jack DeSario and Stuart Langton (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1987. xii, 237p. $35.00).

The premise for this book is that power over government policies has been delegated to technocrats, at the cost of democratic control. The editors believe we need to find workable means of democratic control by examining new or unusual citizen participation programs that mix elements of technical expertise about what is possible and citizen views about what is desirable. The purpose of the book is to evaluate current programs and make recommendations (p. x). The 10 essays report on specific programs, summarize prior evaluations of programs in specific policy areas, offer conceptual schemata, and make suggestions for action.

Michael D. Reagan and Victoria Lynn Fedor-Thurman provide an excellent analysis of the California attempt, through a public advisory and an energy commission, to increase public participation. Despite the openness, the authors find an "insignificant quantity of public participation" (p. 91). The key is intensity: when a specific outcome closely touches personal life, individuals are stimulated to participate in hearings, signaling to decision makers a depth of concern but not providing a reliable indicator of broad public preferences. By contrast, "public interest" groups "are increasingly likely to be involved the more the matter involves general policy" (p. 95), though the input of these "staff groups" on policy development is largely divorced from broad membership preferences. The difference between individual citizens and public interest groups lies in what they become intense about. Intensity is crucial because participation costs—time, effort, information—are high and benefits are, at best, unclear.

Marcus E. Ethridge's "Procedures for Citizen Involvement in Environmental Policy" identifies the explanations for the existence of public participation procedures as "a conservative legal movement to constrain . . . regulatory authority"; "a legislative concern with controlling" the use of "delegated legislative power"; and an "administrative interest in developing and maintaining independent political power bases" (p. 117). The procedures do not democratize administrative decision making and what little participation occurs is "systematically unrepresentative of the public interest" (p. 122). Absent "broad-based mobilization" (p. 130), the processes at most keep a subgovernment, or iron triangle, within bounds.

The remaining articles make less distinctive contributions. Rachel Bratt's review of federal attempts to spread citizen-initiated housing programs ends with a suggested marketing role for the national government (stimulate experiments, market the best to local governments with funds and guidelines, allow local adaptations). Mary G. and Robert W. Kweit note that citizens' views are facts crucial to standard policy analytic techniques such as cost-benefit analysis. The final essay by the editors makes five suggestions: that citizens have a clear role and power, that citizens get the information and resources they need, that citizens provide normative contributions and experts technical contributions, that joint review of contributions occur at a later stage (p. 219).

Overall, the book is difficult to place in the context of political science. The proffered definitions (p. 5) of *technocracy* and *democracy* make no reference to influence, power, authority, or control. Perhaps because of the editors' premise that past and current policy-making simply represents failure, the essays do not discuss long-standing means of democratic participation and control—elections, parties, interest groups, juries. Excepting the articles by Reagan and Fedor-Thurman and by Ethridge, there is little awareness of the politics of policy-making, the stages of decision making, or the role of information in opinion formation.

This book fails to integrate intense concern and value judgments about citizen participation with professional expertise about political participation and public decision making. The political science literature is partly at fault. Aside from voting in national elections, political and governmental activities of citizens are not covered in mainstream political science. However, the editors cannot be excused for ignorance of the few studies that do exist, for example, John C. Pierce and Harvey R. Doerksen, *Water Politics and Public Involvement* (1976). Another weakness is that while citizens are considered a source of value judgments, public preferences about citizen participation itself are not mentioned in the book. Michael P. Smith and I found some surprises when we studied them ("Citizen Participation and Urban Water Resource Uses," in *The Delivery of Urban Services*, ed. Elinor Ostrom [1976]).

DOUGLAS D. ROSE

Tulane University

Redefining the Supreme Court's Role: A Theory of Managing the Federal Judicial Process. By Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. x, 201p. $20.00).

Common wisdom has it that there is a workload crisis in the U.S. Supreme Court. The perception of a crisis is common; the wisdom of the perception is debatable. More contentious than the existence of the problem are the proposed solutions. One solution has been to create a new court between the U.S. courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. A phoenix, the proposal for such a court continues to be rejected, but it keeps coming back in different forms, currently as the "Intercircuit Tribunal" (ICT). Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton, former U.S. Supreme Court law clerks for justices Powell and Burger, now professors of law at New York University, have entered the debate, and as a result of their research, argument can be conducted on a much more informed basis. "We observed that the claims . . . for a new national appellate court rested on empirical premises that . . . had [not been] established. . . . We were struck by the fact that the case for the new court was being made at a level of abstraction and bald assertion—with advocates simply declaring that the Court was now not able to hear all of the cases that it should hear, but without identifying precisely which cases those were (that is without specifying the role of the Supreme Court within our judicial system)" (pp. ix, 3).

The authors redefine the Supreme Court's role in terms of a "managerial model," and establish criteria for case selection accordingly. Then they, along with the editors of the *New York University Law Review*, examine all cases petitioned during the 1982 term in light of the criteria. They find that nearly one-fourth of the cases granted had no legitimate claim on the Court's time and resources and that significantly less than 1% of the cases denied review were cases that should have been heard. They conclude that "the problem is not one of workload, however, but one of role definition" (p. 7). Accepting their conclusion depends upon accepting their criteria for case selection and accepting their coding. The criteria eliminate cases taken solely for error correction, and they prevent premature Supreme Court intervention (for example, by having the Supreme Court refuse to resolve a circuit split until at least three circuits have ruled).

The value of this research does not turn on acceptance of the authors' criteria for case selection. More important is their demonstration that control of the "problem" lies clearly within the hands of the justices. There is no need for structural change; indeed, they demonstrate persuasively that a new structure would probably exacerbate the problem. Their arguments against the ICT, and structural change generally, are not new, though they state them succinctly and persuasively. What makes their effort particularly worthwhile is the systematic examination of all potential cases for a given term so that the arguments can be grounded in data, not anecdotes. The analysis is not statistical, but it appears to be rigorous and thorough. The book only provides a summary of the more extensive work reported in 1,253 pages of volume 59 of the *New York University Law Review*. It is here that scholars will ultimately turn rather than to the book.

Though the primary focus of the book is to rebut the need for the ICT, the authors see this book as doing something more. They claim their role redefinition "has a radicalizing potential for altering our basic conceptions about the Court's relationship to the federal lawmaking process, the nature of practice before the Court, and the roles of other actors in the system" (p. 128). The book achieves this goal less well.

"The Court's principal objectives in selecting cases for plenary consideration," they write, "should be to establish clearly and definitively the contours of national legal doctrine once the issues have fully 'percolated' in the lower courts, to settle fundamental inter-branch and state-federal conflicts, and to encourage the state and federal appellate courts to engage in thoughtful decision making, mindful of their own responsibility in the national lawmaking process" (pp. 4-5). Would any justice disagree? Either the authors knock down a straw man, or they do not demonstrate adequately why their proposals are so radical. The authors posit that the concept of the Supreme Court as the court of last resort is a myth. But sophisticated observers have no such illusions. Indeed, justices themselves state that the Court is not there to correct errors. Justices admit that they do it, but they rarely justify it as a proper role. Since justices continue to do it, however, one must ask why they do not resist. Is it simply discipline, or something else? Perhaps keeping lower courts off balance might serve an enforcement function. Or perpetuating the myth may serve a crucial need at those times when the Court must act in an antimajoritarian fashion. In short, the authors do not pose hard questions to their own arguments. They treat issues intelligently but not thoroughly; and in this vein they tend to argue by case anecdote. It is unfortunate, because one suspects that they could make their "role" argument quite intelligently and thoroughly as they have done with other issues in the book.

The book makes an important contribution. It is very good at providing an overview of the Supreme Court's function in the federal appellate structure, especially for the person who is not familiar with law and knows the role of the Court only by the big cases. For those with a more detailed interest in the Court, the book provides an excellent summary of their very rich data set. The authors certainly have added wisdom.

H. W. PERRY, JR.

Harvard University

The Role of State Supreme Courts in the New Judicial Federalism. Susan P. Fino (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1987). xii, 154p. $29.95).

One concern raised frequently in the assessments of judicial politics and behavior research is that far too little attention has been devoted to examining courts in a comparative context, be it cross-institutional within the same political system or cross-national among and between political systems. Despite encouragements to engage in such designs, precious little comparative research has appeared. Occasionally scholars have seized the opportunity to use the fifty U.S. state systems as a source of theory building and hypothesis testing, recognizing that the similarities and differences across the settings lend themselves to comparative analysis, but no focused research agenda has emerged. Given this trend, Fino's study of U.S. state supreme courts represents a welcome addition to the literature.

At the outset Fino makes it clear, however, that her interest in state courts of last resort goes beyond a dispassionate study of variation across judicial systems. Instead, she views state supreme courts as participants within a broader pluralist system that contributes to the making of public policy in the United States. In this context she is avowedly activist, arguing that state supreme courts should act as a bulwark against the apparent retrenchment in the level of protection afforded to civil liberties and civil rights by the U.S. Supreme Court. Much of Fino's argument in the opening chapters is thus prescriptive in tone, seeking to define a role for state supreme courts within a larger "new judicial federalism." Although there is much promise in conceptualizing state courts of last resort as participants within a U.S. judicial pluralism, the normative component of her model, which envisions the courts pursuing particular political goals, seems to be less than adequately integrated with the empirical component designed to assess dimensions of judicial performance.

One of the author's central concerns is to identify the characteristics of a " 'good' state supreme court" (p. 14), that is "one which is committed to the development of an independent body of state law through the rendition of principal decisions" (p. 5). In this scheme, a "good" state supreme court is committed to pursuing an activist role. Activism, in turn, is denoted by three criteria that serve as indicators for state supreme court performance, the dependent variable for much of the empirical analysis that follows. These criteria include, in the author's words, "the reliance on independent and adequate state grounds; the citation of precedent borrowed from sister states; and the citation of law review or other scholarly articles" (p. 5). A detailed model is provided that views state supreme court performance as a function of a series of relationships involving socioeconomic diversity, political-legal culture, quantity of litigation, institutional characteristics of state judiciaries and the social background and role characteristics of the justices. The chapters which follow offer a wealth of information about the recruitment of judges, the judges' social background characteristics, and a variety of institutional characteristics about state supreme courts and their respective judicial systems.

Despite, and perhaps because of, the large amount of data, the study does not fulfill its potential. At times we are offered segmented analysis that all but teases us with the rich potential of the subject matter. Other analysis covers familiar, albeit interesting, issues, such as the section on formal recruitment methods and U.S. regional politics. In yet other places, Fino wrestles the concepts of political culture in trying to explain variations in supreme court performance, a less than wholly successful endeavor not so much because her analysis is wanting as because of the vagaries inherent in Elazar's original typology. Much of the book offers detailed examination of six courts—Arizona, Kentucky, California, Michigan, Nebraska, and New Jersey—each representative of a class, or type, of state court of last resort. Although these brief case studies suggest trends within the larger universe of courts, the author offers a number of disclaimers about generalizing to all supreme courts. In her words, they are intended to be "suggestive" (p. 65) only, and she is candid about the extent to which her arguments can be supported by the types of data she offers (p. 87).

In the final analysis much slips between the theory of judicial performance offered at the outset and the analysis presented through the book. Still, there is much here that should encourage others to probe the interactions between courts and their respective sociopolitical systems within the context of the fifty U.S. states.

BURTON ATKINS

Florida State University

American Medicine: The Power Shift. By Eli Ginzberg (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allaheid, 1985. ix, 224p. $32.50).

The Health Economy. By Victor Fuchs (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. 401p. $28.00).

The history of U.S. medicine over the past 15 years has been one of great change and considerable confusion. In 1971, Senator Edward Kennedy had his aides write a book about the world of U.S. medical care, entitled *In Critical Condition*. This sense of trouble was so widespread that Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives, competed over which form of national health insurance to offer. In 1974, for instance, the now-forgotten Kennedy-Mills proposal received extended consideration in the finance committees of the Congress, as did Nixon's proposed Comprehensive Health Insurance Plan and the catastrophic health insurance bill of Senators Long and Ribicoff. It all seems very long ago, looking back from the Reagan era, this flurry of proposals and stalemate over universal government health insurance.

In 1986 the picture is much different, politically and intellectually. No one of political significance is directly concerned with universal health insurance, either for the nation or for a particular state. The deficits of the first Reagan administration dominate political discourse and set severe limits on what seems sensible to discuss. Intellectually, we are living with the debris of the reform mentality of the 1970s.

In medicine, that reform mentality supported forms of governmental regulation each certain to disappoint but collectively regarded as incremental steps toward more sensible governmental intervention in the financing of health services. The regulation that in fact emerged was dispersed bureaucratically, disconnected to the major financing of care, and celebrated with visions of eventual success no reasonable analyst should have accepted. Health planning emerged in 1974—205 little agencies all over the country, equipped with the authority to say no to major capital expansion but without a financial carrot to induce anyone to do very much but rush to the state legislature or to the courts to protect planning restraint. Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs)—the program to monitor quality of care—was given to yet another set of agencies, dominated by physicians, disconnected in practice from the payment by Medicare, Medicaid, or the commercial and nonprofit health insurance plans. Medicare and Medicaid, once separate organizationally, were technically joined in what is now known as the Health Care Financing Agency (HCFA) of the Department of Health and Human Services.

All through the decade observers complained about the relatively high rates of inflation in medicine and, as with the weather in Mark Twain, little was altered. The Carter administration supported serious legislation to contain hospital costs but was defeated by a combination of hospital lobbyists, distrust of Carter's team, and disbelief about whether the federal government could accomplish what it promised. Inflation continued unabated amid drivel about a voluntary effort to control costs by the health industry, and a new set of actors came to play much more important roles in U.S. medicine.

Attracted by the goldmine of funds flowing through a system of retrospective, cost-based reimbursement, the captains of U.S. capitalism came to see opportunity where the politicians had found causes for complaint. In the hospital world itself, small chains of for-profit hospitals—the Humanas and Hospital Corporations of America, to name the most prominent examples concentrated in the South—grew into large companies throughout the disappointing regulatory decade of the seventies. The growth of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)—itself slower than promised by the enthusiasts of the 1973 legislation—came to include for-profit firms as well. Industrial giants—like Baxter-Travenol and American Hospital Supply—took their conventional dreams of competitive growth and extended them to vertical and horizontal integration. A glut of physicians started to come into practice, weakening the traditional power of doctors to determine their terms of work.

All of these changes in the structure of U.S. medicine took place within the context of increasingly antiregulatory and anti-Washington rhetoric. Both Democrats and Republicans had been influenced by a generation of academic policy analysts—mostly economists—who ridiculed the costliness and captured quality of the decisions taken by independent regulatory agencies in Washington. The Civil Aeronautics Board and the airlines industry came to represent the distortions likely when government regulates industry and, with time, the convention of describing any set of related activities with economic significance as an "industry" demythologized medicine as well. So even before the Reagan administration came into office, the time was ripe for celebrating "competition" in medicine, getting government off the industry's back, and letting the fresh air of deregulation and the vigorous exercise of competition solve the problems of access, cost, and quality.

The irony is that the more consequential health initiative of the Reagan period—Medicare's prospective payment system by diagnosis-related groups (DRGs)—is an exceedingly sophisticated, highly regulatory form of administered prices that changes the incentives facing hospitals. The further irony is that medical inflation has somewhat declined just at the time that the massive federal deficit makes unthinkable a direct attack on the problem of

30 to 40 million citizens who lack anything resembling decent health insurance. So 15 years after talk of a medical world in critical condition, the problems of access continue to be serious, the relative rate of inflation has slowed slightly, and truly extraordinary changes in the rules of the professional game are taking place as U.S. capitalism flexes its muscles on the $400-billion industry one used to call medicine.

In this context one turns to the books under review with hopes of illumination. Both are collections of essays by widely acclaimed health economists. Both take very wide views of their subjects, how and why U.S. medicine has taken the shape it has. Both, alas, suffer from excruciatingly obvious flaws. For a political scientist to take them on, a test of relevance is required. We all know that collections of essays risk repetition, looseness of argument, and the absence of sustained analysis. Stipulating that, is there anything useful to add when advising one's colleagues about what another discipline has to offer scholars of U.S. medicine and that industry's place in the politics of the U.S. welfare state?

My answer is that there are very good reasons for critically reviewing the perspective of widely read health economists. Among social scientists, economists have generally had the most influence on the formulation and evaluation of U.S. public policy. The prominence of the Council of Economic Advisors is but the most obvious symbol of this vaunted status. Health economists have been at the forefront of this disciplinary imperialism, displaying their wares to students, staff, and policy-makers. They have impressively shaped both the debate over U.S. medicine and the conventional answers given to what are, as Fuchs put it, the "exceedingly difficult questions about efficiency and equity in health." (p. 1) Moreover, health economists with the broad interests of Fuchs and Ginzberg show no hesitation in discussing the behavior of governments, evaluating their actions, explaining their decisions, and predicting their futures. Understanding the economist's viewpoint, then, is clearly useful, protecting us from unwarranted generalizations and helping us select what is valuable in the discipline's distinctive approach and claims. Let me begin with Fuchs's work.

Although the book's scope is broad and its themes inviting, *The Health Economy*'s substance is ultimately disappointing. There are at least three reasons for this. First, the work has all the problems of a collection of essays, in this instance articles written during the 1970s and 1980s. Repetition, loose links among parts, the absence of sustained argument and analysis—all of these are familiar. One solution would have been to rewrite the essays completely, using the earlier work as a first draft; this would have been another book. Another would have been to begin the collection with a substantial introduction that outlines the argument fully and illustrates how each of the chapters support it; this would have both clarified and made more palatable the resulting repetition and predicted omissions. Fuchs does provide a brief introduction, but it is the loosest guide to how the individual parts hang together. Infuriatingly, he leaves out, both in the introduction and the individual chapters, precisely where and when each essay was written or published. Given the profound changes in U.S. medicine in recent years, a collection of essays on "the health economy" that ignores most of them by patching together disparate papers between two covers is bound to be disappointing.

The second problem has to do with Fuchs's notion of how economics can help in understanding the place of medical care and health in so-called postindustrial societies. He assumes his readers will be familiar with health care institutions but not with economics. So he devotes the opening part to Health Economics 101, lecturing us about the most elementary conceptions of centrist neoclassical economic theory. One wonders where he first delivered this homiletic effort, but it fits uneasily in a collection of scholarship ranging over the many topics of the health economy. Moreover, Fuchs's real focus is on health economists, what they can teach the rest of the world and "what exciting opportunities and challenges" the changing world of medicine and health offers to his profession. One hoped the book would illuminate the broad world of health; one gets bits—often very fine bits—on this and that subject matter, grouped together under the vague rubrics of "the economic approach," empirical studies (first, of medical care and then of health), and finally a fourth part on "health" itself.

The substantive chapters do, nonetheless, have partial truths to offer. The empirical chapters take up a number of quite interesting topics. Fuchs provides good reasons to think that physicians can create part of the demand for their services; he calls attention to data that support the conclusion—much associated with Fuchs's scholarship but widely shared—that rich, modern societies with substantial health care resources cannot expect to produce large gains in health status from more of the same medical care. And there are other chapters of equal interest and cogency: a pioneering paper on surgery, detailed investigations of the benefits of motor vehicle inspection, the effects of low-level radiation exposure, and the complicated causal relations between education and smoking.

As a guide to public policy, however, the work is quite disappointing. Looking over his shoulder at fellow economists, Fuchs is at pains to try to explain why modern citizens should want first-dollar health insurance, why national health insurance should appeal to such a wide variety of nations, and why the role of government should have expanded so greatly in this field during the twentieth century. Here Fuchs alternates between the banal and the dubious, interrupted intermittently by common sense. For instance, he claims that "the conditions of modern life seem to compel a more equal sharing of material goods and political power" (p. 290). Maybe, maybe not. But no serious analysis is presented to substantiate this high-level claim. In Fuchs's view, "national health insurance and other interventions in health are best viewed as political acts undertaken for political and social objectives that are minimally related to the health of the population, . . . a conclusion," we are told, "inescapable from the evidence now available" (p. 292). Yet, though Fuchs does review the evidence on health status and public policy, he hardly touches the rich literature—in political science and elsewhere—on how and why national health insurance and other public policies politically emerged. His chapter on the "irrationality" of national health insurance is not about collective madness but about the presumptions of his U.S. colleagues in health economics. He is at pains to show them why what they regard as "irrational" is commonly taken to be both a civilized way to finance medical care and a necessary public feature of every other industrial democracy but the United States. Who, we should ask, merits the "irrational" adjective?

There is, then, something quite odd about this collection of the essential Fuchs. High-minded and vacuous on the largest political questions in health, Fuchs is rigorous in reviewing the statistical work in epidemiology. The result is a book that irritates in its mix of levels of analysis while contributing a reprinting of some of Fuchs's most interesting empirical studies of selected topics in the world of medical care and health. This is not a substantial work on its announced subject, *The Health Economy*. And from the standpoint of political sciences scholarship, the book is galling in its ignorance. Fuchs wonders about the origins of governmental action in health but ignores Robert Alford's seminal *Health Care Politics*. He writes broadly about national health insurance as a political topic, but one looks in vain for references to Paul Starr's magisterial synthesis, *The Social Transformation of American Medicine*, or to Rudolf Klein's account of the politics of the British National Health Services' origins and postwar development. Nowhere is there mention of U.S. political studies: my own work on Medicare or National Health Insurance, the scholarship of Frank Thompson, Deborah Stone, Judith Feder, or Harvey Sapolsky, let alone the philosophical reflections of a Norman Daniels or a James Childress on what Fuchs lumps together as "equity" issues. It is churlish, in one sense, to recite a book's omissions. But Fuchs advertises his scholarship as an inquiry into health and medical care in a "broad social, political, and economic context." It is no such thing as regards the political context of health policy-making in the United States. And where there is a large gap between promise and performance, scholarly norms call for blunt words. Political studies all too often concede the world of economic concerns to economists; this humility (or fright) may be quite harmful. But equally harmful is the slothful scholarship of the imperialistic economist, mixing the detailed analysis of costs and production functions with the most casually constructed accounts of why governments should, or should not, act and why they act as they do.

Ginzberg's *American Medicine: The Power Shift* is somewhat less ambitious in scope but hardly less parochial. Yet the parochialism is quite different in character. Whereas Fuchs professes the virtues of proper economic analysis, Ginzberg ponders about the present value of the "most important efforts [he] made in the early 1980s to understand the unsolved problems facing the U.S. health care system and to identify the preferred solutions" (p. ix). This is no modest aim; but Ginzberg manages to group 18 essays into four parts, each fetchingly titled to entice the reader into a sense of delving in high political economy: "A Tale of Four Decades" (part 1); "The Mirage of Competition" (part 2); "Physicians, Nurses, and Allied Health Personnel" (part 3); and the quintessential grab bag, "Health Agenda" (part 4).

Ginzberg's book, as with Fuchs's, raises questions of aesthetic taste and scholarly norms. He has the grace to report at the start of each chapter whence it came. The foreword explains that the various essays "explore the complex forces that played themselves out" in U.S. medical politics and "point up the anticipated, as well as the unanticipated interactions among them" (p. xv). One would have thought the scholarship on federal and state health politics would have informed this inquiry. Instead, it appears that Ginzberg's chief scholarly authorities are other works by the selfsame Ginzberg. I counted, in reviewing the first chapter on the past four decades, 10 references to Eli Ginzberg out of a footnote total of 19.

Leaving scholarly style aside, what is one to say about the addition to our understanding of the "power shift" in U.S. medicine this book of essays offers? Ginzberg's first chapter makes the unexceptional claim that our system is a thoroughly mixed one, with for-profit, nonprofit, and governmental actors all sharing power in medical care. "We have no option," he tells us, "but to continue along the path that we have been going, seeking to introduce feasible changes while preserving the many virtues of the mixed system that has evolved" (p. 12). This is a good example of giving advice without much guidance. He is rightly concerned that "significant improvement in health care delivery can never be achieved by the passage of laws such as procompetition or by sole recourse to an administrative device such as prospective budgeting." But it is quite unclear what he is suggesting when he concludes that "significant improvement requires continuing adjustments in the use of resources informed by the lessons of experience," adjustments that will be forthcoming when the "leadership in each community [recognizes] its obligation to become involved in improving health care delivery for all persons in their area" (p. 52). Well, yes, but how will that come about? Ginzberg is relentless in questioning the simplistic search for panaceas to U.S. medicine's troubles. He punctures the "grand illusion" of competition (chap. 7), cautions that competitive forces are now firmly at work, and illustrates, in a fifth chapter on competition and cost containment, how easily one can confuse cost containment with sensible restraint of wasteful expenditure. He predicts the "coming struggle for the health care dollar," though many would say we are already there, and urges, in chapter 17, "a plea for caution" in "the reform of Medicare." In all of these ways, Ginzberg's essays raise real difficulties and make plausible recommendations. But as with so many of his economistical colleagues, Ginzberg is much better at telling us what to do than how to do it. He brings decades of experience to this counsel and if he annoys the colleague who wishes for more detail of design and more generous acknowledgement of the work of others, these short essays offer at least modest value for the money.

Both books, however, reveal how much the study of an important policy field is an interdisciplinary exercise. The economist brings a crucial set of questions that no political scientist can afford to ignore. But the work of economists—typically, so self-contained both about their expertise and, alas, their ignorance—reminds us that political and other social scientists will have to do most of the scholarly integration. Something in the training of dismal scientists—the Jim Tobins and the Robert Heilbroners and the James Buchanans notwithstanding—directs their attention inward. It's a shame, as both these works reveal. Yet there is an alternative available within the economics' profession; Bob Evans's brilliant treatise, *Strained Mercy: The Economics of Canadian Health Care.* Less easy to buy from its Canadian publisher, Evans's book is subtantially more illuminating, the best work I know of in English on the economic issues of medicine.

THEODORE R. MARMOR

Yale University

Local Health Policy in Action: The Municipal Health Services Program. By Eli Ginzberg, Edith M. Davis, and Miriam Ostow (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1985. xiv, 136p. $28.50).

Local Health Policy in Action reports the results of a five-year five-city evaluation study of the Municipal Health Services Program (MHSP), a demonstration project designed to improve the delivery of primary health care to the inner city poor. Between 1978 and 1983, evaluators from the Conservation of Human Resources at Columbia University monitored the implementation of MHSP in Baltimore, Cincinnati, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and San Jose. This report describes changes that took place during the course of program implementation and seeks to explain them in terms of a number of political, community, and professional organizational variables. Based on findings from their evaluation research, the authors make recommendations relative to the future use of urban community health care centers. The assessment of program utilization and cost outcomes is reserved for another report.

Lacking an operational definition of the dependent variable in this study (implementation), the reader is forced to infer from the detailed analysis in chapters 2 and 3 that implementation is conceptualized as a series of on-site decisions and actions about facilities, services, and public health versus hospital resources devoted to delivering comprehensive health services to the poor. Arguing from an ecological perspective, in chapters 4 and 5 Eli Ginzberg and his coauthors attempt to show that the ability of implementors to carry out the MHSP mandate was constrained by national and, especially, local "political-institutional" environmental factors; for example, the structure of local government, the influence of area medical schools, the personality of the mayor, turn-over rates among political leaders and program managers, and circumstances unique to each site.

While the report can be recommended for what it has to say about the local politics of ambulatory health services to the inner city poor, the findings make familiar reading for implementation scholars; namely, that implementation is complex and variable and that variability in implementation behavior can often be explained in terms of individual-level differences as well as differences in the implementation milieu. A major shortcoming is that the authors have chosen to write a report rather than a book: the sponsor-dictated research problem is atheoretical and policy-specific; the study is noncumulative in that it is not set in the context of an existing literature on implementation, urban services delivery, or evaluation research; and the findings are not generalizable: for instance, rather than purposefully or randomly selecting sites, cities were chosen for "their potential for realizing the primary goal of the demonstration" (p. 2). Thus, the report misses an opportunity to speak to a larger audience of policy generalists as well as specialists in implementation and evaluation research.

One aspect of *Local Health Policy in Action* that makes it potentially valuable to a larger audience is the creative approach that project consultant Richard Nathan developed for field research. Because it is both comparative and longitudinal and because it has the advantage of minimizing measurement error associated with conventional ex post facto evaluation studies, I personally like the approach—a standardized set of participant observations of events as they occur periodically at the five sites during the course of five years of program implementation. Unfortunately, beyond a cursory overview in the introduction and a vague reference to the MHSP demonstration fitting an "experimental construct" or presenting "the opportunity for natural experiments" (p. 79), nowhere in the volume is there a detailed explanation of how the experiment was actually conducted—how and at what intervals the qualitative data were collected and how the data were pooled and analyzed.

What is sorely needed is a discussion of problems related to conducting a study of this sort, that is, how key concepts are defined, what measurement strategies are used, how alternative explanations are treated, and how the researchers confront data reliability problems as well as internal and external threats to validity, for example, the "degrees-of-freedom" problem. Absent such a discussion, one does not know how to interpret the findings and the "lessons and implications" that are outlined in chapter 6.

Local Health Policy in Action should make satisfying reading for specialists in health policy and urban policy and politics. For implementation and evaluation researchers and for policy generalists, however, this monograph is likely to be a disappointment.

MALCOLM L. GOGGIN

University of Houston

Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics, 1893–1928. By Paul Kleppner (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987. xv, 263p. $35.00).

In this historical and quantitative analysis of the so-called fourth party system, Paul Kleppner provides a sequel to his *The Third Electoral System, 1853–1892.* Born in a realigning period that extended from the depression of 1893 through roughly 1900, the fourth party system, according to Kleppner, involved a regional schism between "Metropole" and periphery; the collapse of competition in the East; demobilization of partisans of both parties; disaggregation in the linkages between vote and partisanship; and considerable minor party strength as well as volatility in aggregate voting patterns. None of these observations is revolutionary, of course, but Kleppner brings a wealth of statistical analysis and historical narrative to their elaboration. And there are some innovations as well. Though a leading exponent of the ethnocultural model of voting in the nineteenth century, Kleppner argues that the best way to view the realignment of the 1890s is as the breakdown of ethnocultural cues and their replacement by economic ones in the aftermath of the depression of 1893. Though other analysts have talked about the importance of mobilization and demobilization in the creation of realignments, Kleppner is one of the few actually to take account of these processes fully in his analysis.

The detachment of voting from its nineteenth-century ethnocultural ties, together with the selective demobilization of significant portions of the electorate, paved the way for the "rationalization of politics" by the Progressives, whose essentially undemocratic reforms restricted the franchise, and took power from elected officials giving it to bureaucrats. This, Kleppner concludes, is the basic legacy of the fourth-party system.

Although adopting a realignment perspective (inherent in the assumption that U.S. political history can be usefully divided into party systems), Kleppner insists that the identification of realignments must be limited to abrupt shifts in aggregate system state and not be confused with the underlying individual political changes. Having established to his own satisfaction in the first two chapters that such an abrupt aggregate shift occurred in the 1890s, he spends the bulk of the remaining chapters assessing the underlying individual patterns of change using ecological regression. Readers who are dubious of this technique will find plenty of examples to fuel their doubt, for instance, that in the West 72% of those who voted Democratic in 1894 voted Republican in 1896 while 46% of the Republican voters in 1894 switched to the Democrats in 1896 (p. 79) or that no Norwegians or Swedes in Minnesota voted Democratic in 1894 but 47% of the Norwegians and 24% of the Swedes did so in 1896 (p. 87). Table after table of such statistics are uncritically presented without qualification or caveat.

The "system of 1896" has often proved troublesome for analysts intent on finding commonalities among all of the realignment sequences in U.S. history. The vote shifts that inaugurate it are barely big enough; Republican strength in the Senate in 1896 has to be fudged a bit to find unified control of government; the dominant party looks stronger at the end of the cycle than at the beginning; and so on. Though he does not intend it to, Kleppner's analysis raises the possibility that the 1890s might be more usefully treated not as a realignment but as the beginning of an extended period of dealignment. Detachment from party loyalties, vote switching in response to short-term assessment of the parties' performance, increased personalism in politics, disarray in the parties' positions on cross-cutting issues such as immigration, prohibition, and the Klan, were symptomatic of the fourth party system from its start. That such characteristics are also typically regarded as symptomatic of periods of dealignment suggests an intriguing alternative formulation.

NANCY H. ZINGALE

College of St. Thomas

Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional Choice. By Jack H. Knott and Gary J. Miller (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987. x, 290p. $18.67).

Reforming Bureaucracy has as its central theme that "there is something important to be gained by noticing the similarities in administrative reform across levels of government and functional program areas. That something is the pooled experience of the failures and successes of administrative reform movements in these different settings" (p. 5). Knott and Miller examine administrative reforms from a perspective that combines neoinstitutionalism and rational choice. They conclude that institutional structures can render the combined impact of rational individual decisions inefficient or irrational from a social perspective.

Although the argument that administrative and political structures are not neutral is not novel, Knott and Miller's range of applications sheds new light on the question. Such diverse reforms as merit civil service systems, city manager government, independent regulatory commissions, professionalized police agencies, professionalized education administration, the New Deal, rationalized budget systems, and President Reagan's efforts to control the federal bureaucracy are discussed.

At the risk of creating a new politics-administration dichotomy, one can say that students of public administration have normally divided themselves into students of the management of public organizations and students of the politics of bureaucracy. Such topics as public management and public personnel have developed separately from the literature discussing bureaucracy as a political institution. Knott and Miller have merged these two disparate streams of research. Using a historical focus rich with detail, they subject the management reform literature to a political analysis. Their conclusion that administrative structures reflect the political values of those who created the structures is totally convincing.

The rich content of *Reforming Bureaucracy* simply cannot be revealed in a short review. Perhaps a better view of the book can be gleaned from what it is not. Despite the authors' identification of rational choice as a dominant methodology, no use of rational choice analysis appears until page 126. Readers expecting a bureaucratic treatment a la William Niskanen or James Buchanan will be disappointed. Instead the authors give us a readable critique of bureaucracy that occasionally uses some rational choice logic. Neither should the neoinstitutionalist focus put off any readers since public administration is one of those rare fields that went directly from institutionalist to neoinstitutionalist without ever being behavioral.

Reforming Bureaucracy is also best viewed as an ongoing effort rather than a finished product. After their exhaustive critique of previous efforts at administrative reform, the authors offer their own reforms in a concluding chapter. Because Knott and Miller have been so convincing in the first 12 chapters, the reader cannot resist using their analytical techniques on their own reform proposals. Only a book-length treatment of their own reform agenda could do it justice, but the chapter will stimulate thought.

Reforming Bureaucracy is not only an interesting intellectual argument but is also suitable for use as a graduate or undergraduate text. The book contains sufficient public administration material to make a marvelous supplement in a traditional public administration course. It could easily provide the core of a class on bureaucracy and public policy or bureaucracy and politics. Classes in organization theory, personnel, and budgeting could also benefit from the use of selected chapters.

KENNETH J. MEIER

University of Wisconsin, Madison

Joseph McCarthy: The Politics of Chaos. By Mark Landis (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 1987. x, 171p. $29.50).

This interesting book seeks to explain Joseph McCarthy "both as man and as phenomenon" (p. 17) by developing a new category of political-psychological analysis: the impulsive style (pp. 131–42). In a useful review of the literature, the author notes previous reliance by scholars of the McCarthy era upon two competing explanations of this debacle in U.S. political history: first, the pluralist explanation attributing McCarthyism to the political mobilization of an inherently unstable, uninformed, irrational mass public and second, the elite explanation interpreting McCarthyism as a continuation of what is basically normal partisan competition.

The author's contribution is the view that McCarthy and McCarthyism are best understood as a combination of these two contradictory explanations. Republican partisan elites did indeed consider McCarthy an instrumental asset for deposing Democrats from their 20-year rule. Yet as the author contends, it is also true that McCarthy's appeal—perhaps his very strength—stemmed from an individual political style identified by pluralists as "the style of mass politics" (p. 19). Thus the author argues that "it was the injection of Joseph McCarthy's [impulsive] political style into elite partisan struggles" of the 1950-54 time period that produced the anti-Communist hysteria known as McCarthyism (p. 19).

In developing the notion of the "impulsive style" or "impulsive type" in U.S. politics, the author draws upon a number of major theorists, including Maslow (need hierarchies), Piaget (cognitive development), Kohlberg (moral development), Connell (child's construction of the political world), Barber (leadership typologies), Merelman (political ideology), Lasswell (political man) and Converse (belief systems). However, in reference to these theories, the author is unusually selective, dealing with only a very limited range of the material available. In fact one could say he is superficial and at times even outdated. For example, Kohlberg's six-stage theory of moral development is discussed on the basis of works written as long ago as 1968 and 1969. Yet not only have Kohlberg's theories been extensively critiqued in the last 15 years, but Kohlberg modified his own presentation of the "six"-stage theory since publication of the works cited by the author. What this points to is a research orientation in this book that is disappointing. It is only tantalizing, not illuminating, to refer to a number of important theoretical perspectives without employing the concomitant rigor necessary for using them in a thorough manner.

In addition, the author's application of his new political construct—the impulsive style—to an analysis of McCarthy's behavior would have been strengthened by a more systematic use of evidence. There is anecdotal invocation of snippets of information—usually quotes from McCarthy, journalists, and scholars—as illustrations of how McCarthy typifies the impulsive type. However, such "evidence" is extremely fragmentary, as well as highly selective. What might have been more convincing would have been the analysis of larger blocs of McCarthy's communications—perhaps campaign speeches, the *Congressional Record*, congressional committee reports, his correspondence—to ascertain whether in fact the particular psychological outlook identifiable as the "impulsive style" *predominates* McCarthy's discourse and conduct.

There is merit in the book's argument that two competing explanations of McCarthy and McCarthyism—pluralist and elitist—can be reconciled by viewing McCarthy as an elite operating with the style usually associated with that of the mass public. The author presents the case for how this combination clicked in U.S. politics for a short term, leaving us with the legacy of "McCarthyism" for the long term. Whatever might be said about the methods used to develop this thesis, Landis's book does offer an interesting point of view.

EILEEN L. MCDONAGH

Northeastern University

Encyclopedia of the American Constitution. 4 vol. Edited by Leonard W. Levy and Kenneth L. Karst with Dennis J. Mahoney (New York: Macmillan, 1986. 2,196p. $320.00).

There are at least two wrong ways to read an encyclopedia. The first is to consult it only when you want to know something specific, go directly to the entry most likely to help you, and then withdraw. This technique is excessively instrumental and rarely leads to the germination of an interesting idea. The second wrong way is the way I have just attempted in order conscientiously to review this encyclopedia, namely, to begin at the beginning and try to slog straight through, actually reading all the entries as they come. The reader of the *Encyclopedia of the American Constitution* will be suitably rewarded by what so far as I know is as close as anyone has come to the right approach to encyclopedia reading, that is, leisurely browsing. This approach maximizes pleasure as well as intellectual nutrition.

The work at hand consists of four generously sized volumes of large type, much in the style of this same publisher's *International En-*

cyclopedia of the Social Sciences of not so long ago. The accompanying press release boasts of 2,200 articles. I have not verified this but am prepared to believe it. There are indexes of names, subjects and cases, a longish glossary of terms, a chronology of constitution-related events starting with the adoption of Magna Carta (1215) and concluding with the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (1985) and, appended, the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, among other worthy texts. The subjects of the articles themselves include brief descriptions of leading cases, biographical sketches of various shapers and chroniclers of the living constitution and of U.S. public law (presidents, legislators, judges, lawyers, scholars), brief and not-so-brief discussions of important ideas, concepts, structures, schools of thought, and periods of institutional history.

Among the most edifying entries were two by Thomas Emerson, one on freedom of speech and the other on freedom of the press. Yet another entry, also extremely worthwhile, by Archibald Cox, is on the First Amendment. An alert reader will note some redundancy. The editors were quite properly not finicky about this. And Emerson-Cox is not the only example. Robert Bork has contributed a brilliantly lucid exposition of his views in an essay titled "Judicial Review and Democratic Theory," which comes directly after a superb essay by Gerald Gunther on judicial review. What a pity if either of these distinguished contributions had preempted the publication of the other because of misplaced scruples about repetitiousness.

Other especially good articles: Paul J. Mishkin on habeas corpus; Frank Easterbrook on William Rehnquist; Stewart Abercrombie Baker on John Paul Stevens; Clement E. Vose on the test case; Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. on the White Court; Alpheus T. Mason on William Howard Taft; and Gerald Gunther, once again, on Learned Hand. I can't know that all these articles are accurate and authorative. But they read persuasively and in some cases entertainingly and I am inclined to give them the benefit of the doubt. This is especially true of Frank Easterbrook's friendly discourse on Rehnquist, a judge who ordinarily gets such a bad press that a cursorily informed reader has difficulty understanding what virtues his friends and allies see in him. There are similar merits in the Baker account of Stevens, which discerns a thread of consistency in the record of a justice who is often described as eccentric and extremely unpredictable. I am grateful to these two authors for clarifying hitherto mysterious aspects of the jurisprudence of both justices. Easterbrook takes the further disarming step of citing in his bibliographical notes David Shapiro's unremittingly hostile article on Rehnquist.

This leads me to a general complaint about the execution of the encyclopedia as a whole: bibliographical references are sometimes adequate, but frequently they are incomplete or so brief as to be nearly useless or missing altogether. Here are some examples: The bibliography on Dwight Eisenhower consists only of Fred Greenstein's important book. In a world that now includes a sizable Eisenhower literature, that is not enough. Nor is the omission of Bernard Wolfman's book from the William O. Douglas bibliography. Is a book by Ralph de Toledano the best reference on J. Edgar Hoover? And should it be the only one? I think not. Likewise a book by Victor Lasky seems to me a dubious—make that a shockingly dubious—sole reference for the entry on Robert F. Kennedy. Could the author have meant the far more defensible *Kennedy Justice* by Victor *Navasky?*

Several of these lapses occur in articles contributed by the hard-working Dennis J. Mahoney, the political scientist among the editorial triumvirate (of the other two, Levy is a well-known historian, Karst a law professor). I conjecture that Mahoney assigned himself the task of filling in last minute gaps and ran up against deadlines. Deadline pressure doesn't fully explain references that are completely missing, however. I don't see why Samuel Krislov couldn't have included a bibliography to his essay on amicus curiae and mentioned his famous article on the amicus brief. Some entries, especially biographical sketches of less well known people, are too short to be used as a source by themselves. Without bibliographical supplements, curious readers are not given enough information about these people nor any help in finding more. See, for an example, the entry on William Few.

There does not seem to have been much effort made to bring symmetry to articles on like subjects. The article by Walt Rostow on Lyndon Johnson, for example, is much longer than the article by Michael Parrish on John F. Kennedy. Rostow fails to achieve the distance from his subject that Parrish manages with evident ease and that Henry F. Graff achieves in his account of the constitutional dimensions of the Nixon presidency. A measure of Rostow's overdefensiveness is his repetition of the discredited Johnsonian canard that U.S. public opinion was predominantly hawkish on Vietnam during the mid sixties. It seems to me that the sensible editorial judgment at the outset would have been to assign the Johnson article to someone other than a member of Johnson's entourage.

I suppose it was inevitable that we would have to hear from Raoul Berger on the subject of impeachment, since his well-timed book on the subject is widely known. His analysis of the Nixon impeachment in the encyclopedia, however, seems to me lacking in political sense.

Is it only my imagination that suggests that the needs of political scientists were slightly shortchanged in this generally admirable compendium? The articles I liked best were, on the whole, written by lawyers. Perhaps not quite as many first-string political scientists (Hanna Pitkin on representation? Gordon Baker on gerrymandering? Emmette Redford on Lyndon Johnson?) as one might have expected found their way into these pages; and some first-raters, like Martin Shapiro and Ward Elliott, were overused on small items.

I think, overall, that this will prove to be a useful reference work. Despite occasional lapses, omissions, and mistakes, especially in the bibliographies, there is a great wealth of useful information in this encyclopedia and no little amusement for the creative browser.

NELSON W. POLSBY

Harvard University

A New Diversity in Contemporary Southern Rhetoric. Edited by Calvin M. Logue and Howard Dorgan (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987. viii, 268p. $32.50.)

This volume consists of eight essays addressing various aspects of the public discourse accompanying the dramatic social, economic, and political changes in the South following the Supreme Court's landmark 1954 decision in *Brown v. Board of Education.* The essays identify and describe a variety of southern responses to the sweeping changes of the period from approximately 1954 to 1984, a period during which the South became, for the first time in this century, a largely open forum.

A major strength of the book is that it develops an analytical perspective that is not commonly found in studies of southern politics. All of the contributors are communications specialists; and each of the chapters blends discussions of such matters as rhetorical methods, strategies, and styles with analyses of the content of the public discourse being examined. Each essay reminds us that there are significant connections between the style and strategy of public address, whether written or oral, and the impact of that address on concrete events. One example should demonstrate the point. G. Jack Gravlee's detailed rhetorical analysis of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s public argumentation show that his communication style and strategy were deeply imbedded in a long history of southern black religious practices and values; this, in turn, helps to explain why King's influence among southern blacks exceeded that of more militant spokesmen representing a different rhetorical tradition.

At the same time, this communications perspective limits the scope of the political analyses presented. In some instances, more effort is spent in dissecting oratorical method than in exploring related political background and consequences. Moreover, the diversity examined in these essays refers more to the variety of participants and the rhetorical methods they employed than to the subject matter of southern public communications. With the exception of Martha Solomon's analysis of the southern debate over the equal rights amendment, all of the chapters deal to some extent with the civil rights struggle. In four of the essays, this is the central substantive focus; in the other three essays, civil rights is less central but is addressed. While such attention to civil rights is useful and the subject is undeniably important, this limited focus is unfortunate since there is more to understanding the changing South, especially since the 1960s. The relative lack of attention to economic, cultural, religious, and partisan issues as separate from the struggle over civil rights narrows the scope of the volume and reduces its utility for students of southern politics.

An additional problem is that the chapters are somewhat uneven. Thus while the essay analyzing the public addresses of southern governors and gubernatorial candidates during the 1970s is firmly grounded in a carefully collected data base, some of the other essays (e.g., "Response of the Main-Line Southern White Protestant Pulpit to *Brown v. Board of Education,* 1954–1965") are based on fragmentary data. Similarly, the chapters presenting case studies of the rhetoric of selected individuals are not uniformly successful in relating these figures to their southern roots or to the events of the period.

On balance, the book is less than the sum of its parts. There is little obvious connection among the chapters beyond their common temporal and regional settings and their concern for rhetorical analysis, and there is little sense that the volume develops any clear theme except that "a variety of voices were heard as the region responded to radical social change" (p. 13). Still, most of the essays are interesting and informative, and that in itself qualifies this book as a useful addition to the literature on contemporary southern politics.

ROBERT P. STEED

The Citadel

The Politics of Energy Conservation. By Pietro S. Nivola (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1986. viii, 285p. $31.95, cloth; $11.95, paper).

Nivola's book is valuable as an addition to the energy policy literature for five distinct reasons: it provides case studies concerning policy development in four energy arenas—natural gas, oil, electricity, and gasoline; it illustrates the frustrations of policy-making at the national level; it examines difficulties inherent in making cohesive policies in a federal system; it examines the problems associated with the ebb and flow of executive leadership in Washington; and it provides a well-formulated argument in favor of deregulation as a policy goal to attain the conservation of energy. Because it has all of these themes, the title of the book is somewhat limiting; Nivola provides an analysis of national policy-making in the energy arena over a period of years, only one of the purposes of which is the conservation of energy.

Particularly useful are the case studies concerning national policy-making, which are studies that could be used to illustrate the frustrations of making policies in a pluralistic nation on items of complexity. Very often the purposes of the legislation passed are confusing and the outcomes of the policies stand in stark contrast to their original intentions. Certainly the cases of oil and natural gas policy fall into that category. In his examination of the various struggles in Congress and in the states, Nivola also illustrates another point well—that the various arenas of energy policy defy aggregation. Indeed, the politics of oil, natural gas, electricity, and gasoline are separate issues, with connotations that render analysis that fails to distinguish among them of limited value.

His analysis of the various struggles within Congress include a sensitive understanding of the interactions among members of Congress, between Congress and the president, and among competing interest groups. He also illustrates the difficulty of using public opinion as a cue for national policy-making. Particularly noteworthy are his logit analyses of voting behavior in Congress, which reveal the overwhelming impact of party affiliation as a predictor of energy votes, especially in the arena of deregulation of oil and natural gas.

The analysis also is a good case study of the difficulties of comprehensive policy-making in a federal system. The regulation of electricity, particularly, remains a state function, and states take various approaches to such regulation. The result is that often national goals cannot be accomplished through state programs.

Presidential leadership is another theme of this book. The fact that presidents come and go but policies endure makes for interesting difficulties in accomplishing policy goals. When the nation has a changeover in presidents, the entire focus of policy in a given arena may change. Thus it was that the changeover from President Carter to President Reagan changed the whole debate with regard to energy policy. Under such circumstances, the directions of policy often get changed in midstream.

Finally, this book provides a well-developed rationale for using deregulation and market forces to accomplish the nation's energy conservation goals. For this reason, the book, while valuable, must be read in concert with the work of other scholars who argue for the conversion of the nation's energy system through solar and other renewable energy resources and those who argue for an increased governmental role in the development of the nation's energy needs in the long run.

JAMES W. RIDDLESPERGER, JR.

Texas Christian University

Comparing Presidential Behavior: Carter, Reagan, and the Macho Presidential Style. By John Orman (New York: Greenwood, 1987. viii, 190p. $35.00).

John Orman has compiled a group of individual comparative studies of Carter and Reagan and attempted to unify them into a thematically consistent whole. The result of this effort is an uneven book containing some very interesting discussions of presidential behavior.

He begins his discussion with an explanation of the macho presidential style. In brief, the style entails a president being competitive, sports-minded and athletic, decisive, unemotional, strong and aggressive, powerful, and a "real man." Carter was unfairly, according to Orman, criticized for not living up to this macho stereotype that all presidents to some degree have exhibited. Conversely, Reagan personified this macho style except for his tendency to show controlled emotions in his speeches. Reagan gained popular support by fitting the stereotype that the U.S. public expected of their president while Carter violated this myth and lost support. The ensuing chapters evaluate the Carter and Reagan presidency mainly using data from four original studies.

Using the *Public Papers* of presidents Carter and Reagan the author attempts empirically to verify access to the president. Since participants at formal meetings are listed in the *Public Papers,* Orman counts each name listed as one interaction and concludes with the total number of interactions per individual. He correctly acknowledges the fact that access is not influence and that all members in a meeting do not contribute equally. One fruitful approach, using this data base, would have been to code individual meetings with the president as a sign of a higher advisory profile. Identifying formal access in reported meetings would not provide a complete description of presidential access but it is available information. When available, use of the daily diaries of the presidents would provide additional information on informal meetings and telephone conversations. Many presidential studies have suffered from using the best available data, even if not ideal. The conclusion of this study is that Carter had over half of his interactions with only three people: Brzezinski, Mondale, and Moore, with Rosalyn Carter attending one hundred official meetings. Carter met most often with national security advisers while staff meetings were most common in the Reagan presidency. Additional comparisons are limited by the author's method of presenting the data. While Carter's interactions are presented in nine clear tables, Reagan's interactions are summarized in only three tables. The Reagan discussion is regrettably less well documented than the Carter chapter.

A second study deals with an examination of presidential activities cataloged in the *Public Papers.* Orman cites the real problem that all activities (letter versus speech) are not equally involving but does not clearly define his categories of analysis. Therefore, the conclusion that while Carter was active in official transactions Reagan was more active in political activities becomes less significant. Why, for example, is a meeting with a "foreign head of state" viewed as political while a "communication with Congress" is seen as official?

The third study looks at interest group interactions with the president as listed in the *Public Papers.* As expected, Carter and Reagan defined their "public" in very different ways. Carter met most often with representatives of unions, the military, veterans groups, public interest groups, and religious groups. Reagan emphasized corporate leaders, conservatives, right-wing groups, and religious groups. This study gives empirical support for the argument of individual discretion for the presidents within their institutional constraints.

A 10-point list of criteria for great presidential performance focusing on justice, peace, civil rights, economic and public interest concerns is described but unfortunately not directly applied in the concluding section on the press.

A longitudinal study of valenced (positive or negative) reporting on the president from 1900 to 1983 categorized all articles on presidents or presidential candidates cited in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. The result is a fascinating body of information for students of media and politics and of presidential behavior. Orman presents the data in a useful fashion that could be used for numerous analytical discussions. However, positive valenced stories that say good things about the president are not necessarily macho stories, nor are negative stories solely "feminine"-type portrayals. So while Orman describes interesting temporal and partisan patterns in media coverage of the president he does not strongly support his macho thesis.

Empirically based studies of the president placed in a comparative perspective provide an important and expanding focus for presidential scholars. This book contributes to this tradition and presents original data that are well worth studying.

KATHY B. SMITH

Wake Forest University

Elections in America. Edited by Kay Lehman Schlozman (Boston: Allyn & Unwin, 1987. xvi, 336p. $14.95).

In its conception, this book is something between a general treatment of elections and public opinion and one of the "quickie" volumes rushed to press after each quadrennial presidential elecction. The conception has worked out pretty well: the essays have a contemporary feel, dealing with the two Reagan elections and the Reagan presidency. On the other hand, the authors seem to have benefitted from extra time in which to reflect on events and (in a couple of cases) get hold of some timely data.

The various authors, participants in an October 1985 symposium at Boston College, are well-known and respected scholars. Many of the essays find the authors reiterating positions with which they have long been identified. Even these contributions are useful as updates of established themes (Crotty, Ranney, Jacobson, Warren Miller, Frankovic) or as a succinct summary of an important view of U.S. politics (Walter Dean Burnham).

Sometimes one is disappointed at what is not reiterated. On the subject of presidential nominating rules, Austin Ranney and William Crotty are old sparring partners. Here they contribute essays that are judicious, scrupulous, and balanced. All this is admirable, I suppose, but I would have liked to see some sparks fly. Ranney does a little bit better, getting in a few digs at the reformers and proposing one very radical, utterly impossible reform himself.

Sometimes, on the other hand, the reiteration seems somewhat tired and not a little anachronistic. Burnham, for example, accurately observes that parties mobilize the citizenry and especially mobilize people of low status. From this he correctly deduces and demonstrates that the decline of parties implies an increasing class bias in participation. He then concludes that this class bias is a conservative bias since "there seems little reason to doubt" that the sizable "party of nonvoters" would be Democratic voters or, if the option were available, socialist voters. There is, in fact, plenty of reason to doubt. With the rise of the elite new class, the link between social status and attitudes has become exceedingly weak. On "social issues," the well-off are more liberal than the poor. Thus it is far from clear that Burnham would get the sort of policy outcomes he wants from a more *genuinely* egalitarian political system. But of course that is not the same thing as a political system dominated by elites using the rhetoric of equality.

Burnham's suppositions run afoul of John Petrocik's careful analysis of the "party of nonvoters" from 1956 through 1984. Consistent with traditional "surge and decline" theories, nonvoters (like peripheral voters) have been heavily influenced by the short-term forces that dominated the election and have preferred the winner (be he a Democrat or Republican). Nineteen eighty, however, was an anomaly, with nonvoters preferring Carter by a substantial margin. Petrocik suggests that the 1980s may have seen the rise of a new kind of nonvoter, but in spite of a careful canvass of the data, he is puzzled about the nature of the beast.

Warren Miller's paper, a continuation of work he has done in collaboration with Merrill

Shanks, bypasses some of the questionable features of their earlier efforts (for example, a complex, entirely hierarchical causal structure) to provide a very instructive comparison between the 1980 and 1984 elections. While most political scientists were insisting that the 1980 election had not the slightest element of a policy mandate for Ronald Reagan, Miller and Shanks showed that the voters saw government policy as being, on net, to the left of their preferred position and that this perception accounted for a substantial part of the Reagan margin. In 1984, the public perceived policy as having shifted to the right, generating a large increase in expressed satisfaction. Limiting further rightward movement, however, is the fact that among the dissatisfied, those who see policy as too conservative now outnumber those who see the status quo as being too liberal.

A pair of papers by Doris Graber and Michael Robinson debate the role of the media in the 1984 presidential election. The intellectual challenge addressed by both essays is the need to explain the fact that while network news coverage of Reagan was strongly negative, the president won by a landslide. Graber suggests that while the *words* used were highly unfavorable toward the incumbent, the pictures conveyed a much more favorable image. Robinson, in contrast, suggests that "good news" during the election year offset any (minimal) effects of "bad press." Both essays quickly go beyond their data into the realm of punditry and speculation; but this is not surprising, given the vast difficulty in actually measuring media effects.

Aaron Wildavsky's essay, "President Reagan As a Political Strategist" is brilliant and provocative. He labels the president "a superb political strategist" who is "providing about as much direction as the existing American antileadership system can support." This piece will probably be widely reprinted as a counterweight to liberal analyses that portray the president as either an ignorant dolt or (contradictorily) a nefariously effective manipulator of the masses; but one suspects that it is almost as far off the mark as they are. The deficit is one example. Wildavsky sees a cunning strategy to deprive the Democratic party of political support by depriving it of the opportunity to spend money on its favored constituencies. I see merely a president staunchly committed to cutting taxes and increasing defense spending.

Among the other authors represented here: Gary Jacobson attacks common-cause-style campaign finance reform; Frank Sorauf provides a provocative comparison of campaign financing in the House and the Senate; Kathleen Frankovic gives a blow-by-blow account of the 1984 primary season, as seen through the *New York Times*-CBS polls; and Schlozman (with Sidney Verba) provides a fine analytic outline of ways of viewing the behavior of voters.

JOHN MCADAMS

Marquette University

Chief Justice: Leadership and the Supreme Court. By Robert J. Steamer (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1986. xiv, 334p. $24.95).

In the midst of a seemingly endless literature on the U.S. Supreme Court—legalistic, institutional, historical, behavioral—there is a relative dearth of material on the office of chief justice. Well-known, often-cited articles by Alpheus Mason, David Danelski, Walter Murphy, and Sidney Ulmer have provided an important beginning. And biographies of John Marshall, William Howard Taft, Harlan Fiske Stone, and, recently, Earl Warren have added greatly to our understanding of the office and its potential for leadership.

In 1982 the White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia hosted a conference on the chief-justiceship; from its proceedings came Peter Fish's monograph, *The Office of Chief Justice of the United States: Into the Federal Judiciary's Bicentennial Decade.* This may be regarded as the first book-length study of the chief-justiceship (discounting *Our Eleven Chief Justices* by Kenneth B. Umbreit [1938], which is largely biographical).

Robert J. Steamer's *Chief Justice* is more extensive than the Fish monograph, for it examines the 15 chief justices through Warren Burger in much greater detail, categorizing all largely on the basis of style and contribution. Three—Marshall, Hughes, and Warren—are classified as "great."

Aware of the difficulties of conceptualization, Steamer nonetheless uses leadership in his analysis. What is a leader? Why are some chief justices leaders both on and off the Court? Justice Abe Fortas, Steamer tells us, called Earl Warren " 'a great and powerful leader,' declaring: 'We know this; we feel it,' but he could not say why. He finally took refuge in the phrase: 'By some process short of the occult,' no more descriptive perhaps than Frankfurter's 'intrinsic authority' or as others would say, an x-factor, an unknown quantity" (p. 62). In order to reach empirically based conclusions regarding successful leadership on the Supreme Court—focused in the position of chief justice—political scientists have relied on small group analyses, employing the behavioral distinctions of Robert Bales. Bales's task and social dimensions have been further refined to include intellectual and managerial components.

Even with such "group-based" definitions of leadership, categorizing chief justices of the United States as "great" leaders, near-greats and unsuccessfuls remains a formidable task. Steamer concludes his treatise in a manner not significantly more precise than Justice Fortas: "In asserting the performance of the men who have occupied the head chair of the nation's highest tribunal, it is evident that the leadership they provided—social, intellectual and managerial—has been qualitatively uneven, that the results for exceptional leadership are complex, enigmatic, and in large measure dependent upon imprecise, intrinsic qualities" (p. 293).

In reaching conclusions, Steamer blends—I would not say confuses—the trait and situational approaches to leadership. "Personality . . . is a major determinant of effective leadership," he argues, "but the fact that a chief justice must work his will with eight independent souls not chosen by him is a formidable barrier to his success" (p. 294).

Throughout the book, Steamer either refers to or uses situational measures—opinion assignment, conference management, court cohesion, dissent rates, procedural innovation—to operationalize "successful leadership." In this regard, *Chief Justice* builds effectively on earlier research, especially what with a more quantitative or social-psychological bent. Yet an uncertainty about how to treat, how to integrate qualitative concerns pervades the analysis: "In sum, judicial craftsmanship, while not essential to leadership, cannot be disregarded" (p. 88).

Chief Justice is an ambitious effort, all the more admirable for its attempt to integrate traditional (often impressionistic) and empirical scholarship. While we still await the definitive, single-volume work on the office of chief justice of the United States, this work adds measurably to our understanding of this position.

ROBERT G. SEDDIG

Allegheny College

Nuclear Power Transformation. By Joseph P. Tomain (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987. x, 212p. $25.00).

"In the event of the cancellation of a nuclear power plant under construction, who pays?" Should the costs be borne by a utility's customers, its stockholders, or taxpayers generally? This is the timely policy question posed by Joseph P. Tomain in *Nuclear Power Transformation*.

In the early 1970s, the future for nuclear power in the United States looked promising indeed. New plants were coming "on line" every few months, and power companies were rushing to place orders for new reactors. It was predicted as late as 1975 that a thousand nuclear reactors would dot the North American landscape by the end of the century. Since the late seventies, however, there has been little good news for the U.S. nuclear industry. In spite of industrial investment in nuclear power in excess of federal spending on the space program or the Vietnam War, no domestic power company has placed an order for a reactor since 1977; safety concerns and outright fears about nuclear accidents are widespread; the price of nuclearly produced electricity is no longer competitive with coal; and, most critical to Tomain's analysis, nuclear power plants under construction are being scuttled, leaving staggering price tags that must be paid.

What happened? Clearly the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI) in 1979 had something to do with the loss of public confidence in nuclear power. However, the financial problems facing the nuclear industry had emerged several years before TMI grabbed the headlines. The skyrocketing cost of labor and nuclear plant materials, increases in interest rates for borrowing funds, and most importantly, managerial incompetence led to the actual price tag of some nuclear construction ending up being as much as 10 times more than projected.

This book, Tomain writes, could have been subtitled *From Three Mile Island to Chernobyl.* The actual title aptly summarizes one of the themes of the post-TMI history of nuclear power—transition. Since the late 1970s, nuclear power has been moving away from what Tomain calls a "traditional" pattern, typified by capital-expansive plant construction, through a transitional one, characterized by stalled and canceled construction, to a "post-industrial" pattern, predicted by Tomain to include some new scaled-down nuclear construction.

The heart of *Nuclear Power Transformation* is an excellent chapter detailing case studies of nuclear mismanagement in the transitional period. The case of the Zimmer nuclear plant in Ohio is illustrative of the current problems in the nuclear industry. The Zimmer plant was years behind schedule and more than a billion dollars over the original projected cost of $240 million when it was canceled. The investors will probably lose a good portion of the $1.7 billion spent on the project because the state supreme court has ruled that an Ohio utility may not raise the rates to customers to recover the losses resulting from the abandonment of nuclear construction. Only if the Zimmer plant can be converted to a coal-fired facility will the investors recoup any of their original outlays. By contrast, courts in other states have ruled that abandonment costs can be absorbed by utility ratepayers.

Tomain's *Nuclear Power Transformation* is built upon careful research in a range of government and industry materials. In addressing the question of who pays for abandonment costs, Tomain offers many thoughtful observations. However, the reader has to wade through some tedious and fuzzy exposition of "models" and "dualities" before finally arriving at Tomain's recommendations.

This lack of clarity is, unfortunately, not confined to the concluding sections. Although logically organized, *Nuclear Power Transformation* is frequently repetitious. Moreover, the author misses a number of opportunities to humanize his technical subject and provide glimpses of the personalities of the individual regulators, citizen critics, or utility executives whose names appear in his pages. For example, it would have been intriguing to find out more about the mysterious agent hired by Cincinnati Gas and Electric to investigate problems in the Zimmer project. Part of the story of the post-TMI era is that of the people who, wittingly or unwittingly, have figured into the transition. Notwithstanding these criticisms, *Nuclear Power Transformation* is an important book and a welcome contribution to the growing list of scholarly titles on nuclear power.

JOHN W. JOHNSON

Clemson University

Power and Pluralism in American Cities: Researching the Urban Laboratory. Robert J. Waste (New York: Greenwood, 1987. xvi, 176p. $32.55).

The resurgence of the study of political power, reflected in recent publications by Clarence Stone, David Ricci, William Domhoff, Thomas Dye, and most recently, Robert Waste, is long overdue. Professor Waste's book provides a detailed trip backward to the time when we were still debating whether democracy was alive and well in U.S. cities; and therein lies both its major strength and weakness.

For Waste, the pluralist-elitist debate is still unresolved and still urgent. His book restates Robert Dahl's polyarchy model, emphasizing what Dahl said (and really meant) and how his critics misinterpreted him. This attention to democratic theory should be a component of the new literature on power, for the study of power without attention to its normative implications is shortsighted. Waste makes an important contribution by reexamining the concept of polyarchy, showing that Dahl's apparently inconsistent discussions of the concept can be reconciled when we realize that in fact Dahl had two polyarchy models: one, describing an ideal (or egalitarian) polyarchy, represents Dahl's normative views on democracy; the other, describing polyarchy-in-action, represents Dahl's empirical conclusions about U.S. democracy.

Waste defends Dahl against criticism of his polyarchy model, suggesting that critics misunderstood the dual nature of his model. But this single-minded defense of Dahl is a major weakness of Waste's book. In refighting the battles of the 1960s, Waste ignores recent advances in the study of power and their potential impact on the concept of polyarchy. Only 20% of the material referenced postdates 1975 (with fewer than 20 post-1980 references). Almost completely ignored is recent work by a number of sociologists who use network analysis procedures to assess social structure and structural impediments to action; these include Edward Laumann (*The Bonds of Pluralism* [1973]) and Ronald Burt (*Toward a Structural Theory of Action* [1982]). Also missing are references to recent studies of citizen participation, particularly at the community and neighborhood levels (e.g., Harry Boyte, *The Backyard Revolution* [1980]). Waste missed a worthwhile opportunity by not considering how these and other recent studies (1) are consistent (or inconsistent) with Dahl's earlier conclusions about polyarchy-in-action; (2) are consistent (or inconsistent) with Dahl's formulations of an ideal polyarchy; and (3) allow an expansion of either polyarchy model.

To his credit, Waste develops his own empirical procedure to assess polyarchy in urban settings. Unfortunately, he remains committed to Dahl's well-known structural critiera for polyarchy (e.g., freedom of speech, right to vote) in his choice of measures, with predictable results: he found that two Rhode Island cities, chosen to maximize differences in adherence to the principles of polyarchy, were almost identical on his polyarchy scale. This no doubt shows that U.S. cities practice a generally comparable and generally acceptable brand of democracy (although Waste's conclusions may be confounded by insensitivity in his measures). But I expect that cities nonetheless *do* differ in meaningful ways in their adherence to democratic principles. Further, we can assess those differences through a careful examination of Dahl's eighth criterion for polyarchy: governmental policies reflect citizen preferences. The community power studies conducted during the 1950s and the 1960s attempted to assess the strength of this linkage, and the more recent studies of political networks and participation were largely motivated by the same consideration. With more work in this area, a bridge between polyarchy-in-action and ideal polyarchy could be constructed. It is a pity that Waste did not take us further in this direction.

JOHN M. BOLLAND

University of Alabama

Money, Media, and the Grass Roots: State Ballot Issues and the Electoral Process. By Betty H. Zisk (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987. 279p, $29.95, cloth; $14.95, paper).

This is a book about selected ballot proposition campaigns and elections in California, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Oregon between 1976 and 1982. It is based primarily on secondary sources, elite interviews, and participant observation. The book seeks to explain electoral success and assess the educational impact of direct legislation (p. 158). The book differs from recent books and articles on this subject by focusing on elite behavior, issue activists, and the conduct of specific campaigns.

Zisk's summaries of the issue campaigns in these states shed light on a form of electioneering that has been largely overlooked by political scientists. The book addresses several salient questions: Who gets involved in these campaigns? Why? To what extent are issue networks established? Do supporters and opponents seem to learn from the experiences of proponents and opponents in other states? How? What strategies exist to get issues on the ballot, to persuade voters, to dominate the media? Zisk's examination of voter decision making is based not only on her own research but on the work of others as well.

While the book is insightful in several respects, several methodological and research design mistakes limit its contribution. By the author's own admission the selection of states and issues for the study was highly subjective (p. 23). This resulted understandably from both time and budget limitations and the desire to focus more on the elite level. But the book poses several questions for which a larger sample of data exists and is more appropriate. Ranges of participation on ballot measures, for instance, are readily available from most states and the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The book not only fails to pull from this broader and more appropriate sample but does not even look at all of the measures in the four states for the period studied. Using these incomplete data, the author dismisses the fatigue and negativism hypotheses found in some of the literature she examines (John Mueller, "Voting on the Propositions" *American Political Science Review* 63[1969]: 1197–1213). In addition, the book excludes from analysis the 10 states that permit voters to decide constitutional amendments and revisions but not popular initiatives or legislative statutes. This peculiar division of states potentially affects the book's analysis of issue agendas, numbers of issues presented to voters, and so on.

Zisk also mistakenly defines *turnout* as the percentage of registered voters who vote, rather than as the percentage of the voting age population who vote. Although she knows that rates of registration vary across these states, she repeatedly uses this less accurate measure of participation (p. 112).

In terms of the book's stated objectives—to help readers understand electoral success (or, more commonly, failure) in ballot propositions and to clarify the level of public education resulting from the process—Zisk is critical of both dimensions of the process. She finds discouraging the power of money in proposition voting; the confusing, distorted, and overly simplified nature of the campaigns; the scanty coverage by newspapers on the substance of the ballot questions; and the low degree of voter sophistication (p. 246). In short, Zisk claims that ballot propositions are often not referendums on the petitioner's question but instead are measures of how ably sponsors can distort and confuse questions to the voter through 30-second advertisements and through the media's focus on charges and countercharges rather than on substance. Contradicting these conclusions, the author ends the book by saying, "While these mechanisms for direct democracy are hardly the universal panacea that some past reformers have claimed, they have helped to open up new pathways for participation, for political communication and even for policy innovation" (p. 268). In this treatment of direct democracy, as in so many others, the author ends up pulling her punch.

DAVID B. MAGLEBY

Brigham Young University

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Congress, Parliament, and Defense: The Impact of Legislative Reform on Defense Accountability in Britain and America. By Andrew Cox and Stephen Kirby (New York: St. Martin's, 1986. ix, 315p. $29.95).

Cox and Kirby, both of Hull University, have selected a promising topic for study. They seek to use the notion of defense accountability as a device for probing into the dark side of the national security state, or in this case national security states of the United Kingdom and the United States.

Vital issues are addressed. Questions of titillating weapons procurement scandals are as current as this morning's newspaper, lending immediacy to their study. Further, they have linked case studies to important concerns—executive-legislative relationships, the costs of secrecy in democracies, and the possibility and utility of institutional reform—by means of the concept of accountability, which they define in essence as "the obligation on those who have been delegated to carry out public functions to reveal, to explain and to account financially for their actions and decisions" (p. 9).

Crucial defense decisions involve the allocation of resources for defense as opposed to other programs and the allocation and management of resources within the area of defense. The notions of *public accountability,* where governments are required to justify defense in relation to domestic programs, *program accountability,* by which officials demonstrate that programs are achieving their objectives; and *financial accountability,* relating both to legality and efficiency, are introduced to guide the reader.

Cox and Kirby had the right idea. They

undertook comparative research in Great Britain and the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s to see if it was possible for legislatures to reform themselves in order to be better able to scrutinize and control defense policymaking. While there are many differences between Parliament and Congress, they find that the defense field is particularly resistant to direct accountability for several important reasons, including the unwillingness of legislators to discharge their functions properly, the lack of expertise outside the defense establishment and the dearth of independent agencies to provide information that is not first filtered through defense channels. Even if these problems could be overcome, the executive can usually rely on secrecy or the tendency of defense-related committees to be made up of prodefense legislators. In fact it turns out that to be effective, the legislature needs the executive branch to carry out its own functions competently, itself a problematic precondition for meaningful oversight.

The authors wisely point out that accountability in setting defense priorities relates to the commitments expressed in a state's foreign policy. In addition, assessments must be made of the intentions, strategies, and capabilities of potential adversaries. These political questions also must be followed by a political evaluation of the priority of defense in relation to other national goals. In practice, as the authors point out, deficiencies in the legislative budget process, despite reforms, have kept Congress and the Parliament from systematically setting priorities.

In the realm of defense procurement, the authors detail the story of the success of Congress in overturning the "unsound" decision to exclude funding for the Marine Corps AV-8B V/STOL aircraft. Yet even this case "is explained more by a rare combination of political factors than it is by the effect of a reformed budget process" (p. 205). The British reforms contributed to the illumination of the defense procurement process but did not have significant policy impact. Studies of British and U.S. manpower policy reinforce the general conclusion of the study.

The authors seem displeased with their conclusions. The creation of special budget and oversight committees in the two legislatures has had relatively little impact on the traditional committees and on the traditional means of getting things done. They praise the British efforts to release more information while pointing out that the Congress is actually suffering from information overload. Ultimately, they call for the development of proportional representation in Britain and the adoption of a new freedom of information act there.

Though they are not optimistic about the prospects for defense accountability being achieved in the future, due to the partisan and parochial attitudes of legislators and those who control the executive branch, they hold out the hope that somehow circumstances might conspire for a forward-looking legislature to create a role for itself in the coming budget-crunch era. The failure to face up to the findings of the research, which, unfortunately, are excessively repeated, weakens an otherwise worthwhile addition to the literature of legislative-executive relations, public administration, and national security policy studies.

FREDERIC A. BERGERSON

Whittier College

Comparative Policy Research: Learning from Experience. Edited by Meinolf Dierkes, Hans Weiler, and Ariane Berthoin Antal (New York: St. Martin's, 1987. 531p. $40.00).

During 1982 and 1983, the Berlin Wissenschaftszentrum, in conjuction with Stanford University, attempted to assess the last two decades of comparative policy research. This bulky volume is the result. It is less than a fully integrated stocktaking but it is also more than the usual pseudobook produced by collecting conference papers.

After the introductory preliminaries (where, among other things, Karl Deutsch reviews two thousand years of comparative research), the first section of the book deals with problems of methodology and the uses of comparative research. Adam Przeworski offers a very practical overview assessing methods of cross-national research since 1970. Alex Inkeles examines the difficulty of relating such research to the needs of policymakers. In a third chapter Aaron Wildavsky applies his four-fold classification of political cultures to the problem of chemical regulation and uses of research in six developed nations.

The heart of the book consists of eight chapters reviewing the relevant literature in four substantive fields: environmental policy, education policy, economic policy, and social policy. In each of these areas, the project organizers have tried to have the authors assess the "state of the art" by addressing a common set of questions. Some of these issues are theoretical (What theories have implicitly or explicitly been developing in the field and how have they fared in research findings?) some are methodological (What are the particular problems associated with cross-national policy research?) and some are organizational (What have we learned about how to manage such research realistically?). A brief final section seeks to draw conclusions and chart future directions.

As is normal in such projects (and this one has 34 authors or coauthors), certain people appear to have taken their assignment seriously, read each other's papers, brought citations up to date, and tried to think through their position. Others seem to have been along for the ride. To me, Przeworski's chapter is in the former category, offering a clear-headed and frank discussion of methodological issues. David Vogel's review of the literature on comparative environmental policy sets a comparably high standard of thoroughness and thoughtfulness, as does the chapter on economic policy by Burkhard Strümpel and Joachim Scholz. There are other good chapters, as well as some real clunkers. Enough said.

Most readers interested in this field will probably find this book's greatest value to lie in the literature reviews of the four substantive fields. Unfortunately, only Vogel's chapter appears to cover works appearing after 1984. Much of the rest of the volume has a canonical quality that, however valid the injunctions, is unlikely to alter the way other researchers carry out their work.

What have we learned about doing comparative policy research? The results surveyed in Ariane Berthoin Antal's thoughtful last chapter are not likely to surprise many readers. We have learned that comparative studies need to be more attentive to theory building so that cumulative results are achieved. Studies need to be more historically grounded and use more longitudinal data. We should worry more about the parochialism in our choice of countries and the true equivalency of issues in different national settings. We should do a better job of parsing the implicit models that lie hidden in our varying research designs. For more scholarly and socially useful comparative policy studies we do not need some new methodological breakthrough. We need to use more carefully and rigorously the methodologies we already possess. To cope with the sheer complexity and volume of information needed in large-scale comparative studies, we need to become more adept at organizing scholarship through multinational and multidisciplinary teams of researchers. Most of us are ill-prepared to do that and pass the incapacity on to the next generation by the way we teach students to work.

To all of which one can only say *amen.* However it is curious that the editors come down very hard on the last point without ever mentioning recent strides being made in truly cross-national team research. For years now people have been making assertions about the distributional consequences of different nations' social and economic policies. What we haven't had are good data to test such assertions. The so-called Luxembourg Income Study—a robust international team project—is now giving us the first really comparable data on individual financial resources in a series of developed nations and it is but the forerunner of an even more far-reaching program of comparative research at the European Center for Population Studies in Luxembourg. It is an elementary point, but I think it is true. Students of comparative public policy have enough theories, hypotheses, methodological tools, and conferencing opportunities to keep them going into the next century. What they do not have are decent data.

HUGH HECLO

George Mason University

The Politics of Colombia. By Robert H. Dix (New York: Praeger, 1987. xv, 247p. $37.95).

Colombia is one of the most significant countries in Latin America, yet it is also one of the most seriously neglected by both scholars and journalists. Although it is the third or fourth most populous nation in the region and one of the very few countries in the Americas that has maintained a stable civilian-ruled political system since the late 1950s, Colombia is largely ignored in the United States. Except for occasional articles about the lucrative and violent cocaine traffic in the popular press, there is a great silence. General volumes on Latin America normally omit discussion of this important South American nation almost entirely.

Our collective ignorance about Colombia makes Robert Dix's outstanding new book an especially welcome event. His carefully researched and gracefully written analysis provides an excellent introduction to this complex nation, which will benefit any interested student or scholar. As he did in his classic 1967 volume, *Colombia: Political Dimensions of Change*, Dix carefully integrates the relevant scholarly literature on Colombian politics (which now includes many of his own specialized studies on populist movements and other topics) into a coherent and illuminating synthesis. Although there are other very useful single-volume treatments of Colombian politics, such as Harvey Kline's insightful *Colombia: Portrait of Unity and Diversity* (1983), Dix's book, which covers events as late as the 1986 elections, is the most important comprehensive and up-to-date work available.

Dix's book begins by placing Colombia in comparative perspective emphasizing major similarities to other Latin American nations (e.g., economic dependency and Iberian colonial origins) and highlighting key differences (e.g., noninterventionist military tradition and strong traditional political parties). The author also provides a brief but thorough historical overview that does not slight the critical nineteenth century, during which many of the enduring patterns of Colombian politics developed. Later chapters analyze in detail, with extensive references to the literature, the socioeconomic and geographical context of politics, parties and electoral behavior, interest group activity, governmental structure, and characteristics of contemporary public policy formation.

After 30 years of study, Dix still finds Colombia to be a puzzling and somewhat paradoxical country. In spite of its liberal democratic formal institutions and procedures, the Colombian polity is revealed by Dix to be a highly elitist system, in which power is narrowly concentrated. He also observes that despite some of the most glaring socioeconomic inequalities in Latin America, the radical Left remains quite weak, notwithstanding several active but ineffectual Marxist guerrilla groups. In addition, the author continues to be intrigued by the fact that although rapid social mobilization has completely transformed Colombian society in recent decades, it has left traditional political institutions remarkably intact.

In his conclusion Dix examines some possible explanations for these and other Colombian puzzles. Ultimately, in contrast to more radical observers, he reaches the conclusion that Colombia's paradoxical political system has its own logic and can be expected to "muddle through" for a good deal longer. His argument, like his entire volume, is persuasive.

J. MARK RUHL

Dickinson College

Centre Formation, Protest Movements, and Class Structure in Europe and the United States. Edited by S. N. Eisenstadt, L. Roniger, and A. Seligman (New York: New York University Press, 1987. 187p. $30.00).

The stated purpose of this book is to present a new approach to the comparative study of societies and politics. The new approach, which the authors occasionally call the *civilizational approach*, focuses on the normative beliefs of "elites"—a term that, unfortunately, is never systematically defined in the book but that seems to refer to all individuals and groups enjoying unusually high amounts of prestige within a given society or territory.

Allegedly, the political behavior of elites is shaped to a great extent by the "chasm between the transcendental and mundane order," or, stated differently, an inevitable gap between what is and what ought to be (p. 9). The authors concede that many other social circumstances influence elites' political behavior. But they single out elites' moral and religious beliefs for special attention.

According to the authors, elites consciously design and redesign political institutions and processes according to their religious beliefs and moral principles. Depending on how they define their moral and religious standards and conceptualize the gap between what is and what ought to be, elites will shape their existing political systems so as to include or exclude other groups in society, and so as to tolerate, suppress or encourage certain forms of protest activity.

Eisenstadt develops the analytic framework in two theoretical chapters. The remaining chapters use this thematic focus on elites and their moral and religious beliefs to answer certain perennial issues in Western social science, such as U.S. exceptionalism (Why is there no socialism in the United States?) and southern European political turbulence (Why are democratic regimes in southern Europe so fragile?). Other historical topics include French state building and student protest in England and Italy. The chapters are primarily syntheses of currently available historical literature. The authors do not present fresh data; rather, they present alternative interpretations of history, in which the ideals of elites are given considerable causal weight.

There is an interesting tension throughout this book between (1) a reductionist interpretation of history, in which the theological and moral beliefs of elites are an omnipresent first cause behind all sorts of trends, events and actions, and (2) a more richly contextual view of history, in which the beliefs of elites are only part of an immense set of significant factors that jointly shape human history. The ambiguity is due in part to the authors' incomplete development of their theoretical framework, a situation that the authors openly acknowledge. They are confident that the theological-moral beliefs of elites matter. But the authors are not yet certain how *much* the theological-moral beliefs of the elites matter or how elites' beliefs concretely interact with other possibly important variables, such as sudden breakthroughs in science and technology, gradual changes in divisions of labor, and differences in material interests among people of different classes.

In addition, the civilizational approach tends to minimize the ideologies of lower classes or to treat their ideological evolution in a surprisingly superficial manner. Lower-class moral and political ideologies, to the extent that they are discussed at all, are treated primarily either as mere repetitions of elites' beliefs or as simple repudiations of elites' values and beliefs. However, as many historians—such as E. P. Thompson, Christopher Hill, and Lawrence Goodwyn—have pointed out, the beliefs of nonelites often have a substance and a developmental logic of their own, largely independent of the moral beliefs of elites. Moreover, Thompson, Hill, and Goodwyn insist that the beliefs of nonelites often have important consequences for the organization and transformation of society at large. They therefore encourage intellectual historians to look at ideas "from the bottom up." The advocates of the civilizational approach, however, choose to look "from the top down" and presume that elites have an unparalleled say in how social and political institutions develop.

Centre Formation, Protest Movements, and Class Structure in Europe and the United States, in short, is a politically and intellectually provocative book, given its thesis about the decisive political and social importance of elites' religious assumptions and moral aspirations. The book's central argument is often vaguely stated, and not infrequently it is overstated. Certainly much more can be (and has been) said about how ideas—in particular the ideas of poorer classes—impinge on social and political history. The book is nonetheless important, because it compels us to reconsider how and why moral and religious ideals matter and because it provokes us to reconsider the origins, nature, and extent of elites' powers.

CYRUS ERNESTO ZIRAKZADEH

University of Connecticut

Growth to Limits: The Western European Welfare States since World War II. Edited by Peter Flora. Vol. 1, *Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark.* Vol. 2, *Germany, United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1986. 383p. and 499p. $95.75 and $122.40, cloth; $29.95 each, paper).

These volumes analyze welfare state development primarily for the period since 1950 for 8 of the 12 countries included in a project directed by the inveterate research maestro in this field. With the exception of France, these are the same nations covered in Peter Flora's earlier endeavors. Once again he has lead and directed a group of younger political sociologists and political scientists, this time to produce in-depth monographs mainly written by natives of each country. The comparative analysis based on their country studies will be presented by Flora in one of three additional volumes soon to be published.

Each national study opens with a historical synopsis of developments in the first half of the century. Then follow a descriptive section concentrating on the development of welfare state resources and clientele; an evaluation of the distribution of services and transfers in terms of their impact on the distribution of life chances; and analyses of the demographic, economic, and political correlates of welfare program development over the 30-year period. In the final sections public opinion data are drawn on to help assess future options particularly in the light of experiences during the decade of resource constraints since the mid-1970s.

In view of the extensive research particularly on this part of Europe, one test for the volume on Scandinavia is that for redundancy. It meets this test very well, for the wealth of data tapped by the authors presents much more fine, detailed analysis than is found in most of the earlier English language literature. While it is not clear why the countries are presented in reverse alphabetical order, Sven Olson makes an excellent start with the Swedish chapter. In his evaluation he distinguishes between the more successful—income maintenance and health—and the less successful policy experiences, as in education and housing. But he also presents data from successive levels of living surveys that permit other conclusions to be drawn, since these show that individuals "with problems" were reduced much more in housing than in health between 1968 and 1981 (p. 63).

Sampling the other authors' analyses of how their countries handled the problems of the past decade, one finds variations that suggest that reference to a single underlying Scandinavian model may be losing utility. For Denmark Lars Norby Johansen ascertains that the reason why the Glistrup backlash evaporated later in the seventies was partly due to increased mobilization of welfare state clients and public employees but that this led to increased mobilization and declining concensus. He identifies a trend toward a dual welfare state, with entitlements and universalism remaining dominant in some areas, but with a market-based counter-process becoming stronger, particularly in housing and pension policies. Denmark was slower to react to the mid-seventies stagnation than Finland, where Matti Alestalo and Hannu Usitalo credit earlier pruning with helping to engender increasing consensus during the latter 1970s. They are confident that the major welfare state achievement will not be threatened during the 1990s. Oil helped Norway to postpone hard choices, and Stein Kuhnle is a little more guarded in assessing prospects there. A stronger conservative party has pushed for privatization with more effect there, and he predicts that some changes in tax and benefit structures may have to be made. But partly because the welfare state is of particular importance to the Norwegian political culture, he prognosticates that "a radical turn toward a privatized residual welfare state is unlikely."

As these examples show, the authors are not coy or cautious about interpreting the trends that are extracted from their very diverse data. Thus their prognoses can be matched against others employing more formal models. The aim of not losing a potential audience among policy-makers is evident also in the title. Flora sees growth over the three decades explained politically mainly by the structural elimination of the self-employed "natural enemies" of the welfare state. Future limits are seen as the result of recent rapid growth and (following Allardt) in the shift in focus from *having* to *being* and *loving*.

In the second volume both the countries and the authors are more heterogeneous. The fine hand of the most experienced of the contributors is evident in the German section, while those on Italy and Ireland were developed from doctoral dissertations at the European University Institute, under whose sponsorship these volumes appear. Peculiarities of the less well known Irish and Italian situations are skillfully analyzed, as in Maria Maguire's presentation of how the Irish attempt to close the welfare gap that separated it from the rest of Europe was made possible in the 1960s through the Catholic church's policy reversal on key aspects of social services reform. Her description of the mixed success of the endeavors to link higher education to employment markets is borne out by the recent exodus of Irish young people.

Everywhere there is superb documentation, which will be still further extended in a subsequent volume. While the contributions are similarly structured, they vary significantly so as to allow the authors to explore particularly unique problems. Where called for, general rules are deviated from in order to analyze a particular problem dimension. Thus, whereas intranational regional differences are generally not treated, this rule is broken for Italy. Mauricio Ferraro illustrates vividly the striking North-South differences in the contributions and expenditures mix of welfare programs and how these are explained by linkages to party networks and especially to the quasi-partisan *patronati,* which regulate individual access to welfare.

The German and British chapters help clarify why the coming to power of conservative governments in 1979 and 1982 have had such different consequences. The analysis of the party control-welfare relationship is much more abbreviated for Britain, and the claim that "legislative changes are not a fully adequate indicator of the political input to social policy" (p. 223) cannot by itself justify this. One wonders whether the publishers expressed their annoyance by misspelling the names of both the country and author, Richard Parry, in the table of contents, as well as that of his home town elsewhere. But generally the degree of gremlin control is quite high; and the volumes are well produced.

For Germany, Jens Alber's analysis of postwar core laws shows that of those passed through 1974, 81% initiated extensions, only 8% cutbacks; in the subsequent decade 56% instituted cutbacks, only 27% extensions. Public opinion support of spending levels weakened, but in 1984 those favoring curtailment in the crucial social transfer system were less than a fifth in all social groups. By contrast, support for the universalistic basis of many British programs was eroding, and Parry ascertains that even in the Labour movement "an essentially individualistic model of consumption is displacing faith in social solidarity and collective allocation" (p. 235).

Overall, these volumes present unmatched analyses of developments in Europe, and they will be essential to U.S. social scientists whose access to the underlying European publications and sources is more restricted.

ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER

Washington University

The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export. By Gary Hawes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987. 196p. $25.00).

Hawes's study of the interaction of the agricultural export economy with the international economy and its effect on economics and politics in the Philippines, based on 1980 research but updated, focuses on three case studies of agricultural production in coconut, sugar, and fruit products. Each study is presented in separate chapters. There is also an introductory chapter, "Creation of the Philippine Political Economy" and a concluding one, "State and Regime in the Philippine Context." A bibliography is not included, although there are five appendixes detailing agricultural production and identifying principal producers.

Hawes's work makes many of the same points as Frank H. Golay's earlier study, *The Philippines: Public Policy and National Economic Development* (1961). Whereas Golay wrote that "the Philippine economy has many attributes of a fluid 'frontier' economy in which the entrepreneurial class as a competing elite is displacing the heretofore dominant agricultural aristocracy. . . . Filipino entrepreneurship is distinctly Filipino in its strong predilection to seek economic advantage through political institutions and processes" (pp. 408–9), Hawes observes how "elite cohesion" broke down with the development of competing economic strategies, one emphasizing import substitution industrialization and the other, agricultural exports (pp. 125–26, 352).

Hawes claims that one reason for Ferdinand Marcos's declaration of martial law in 1972 was the diversification of economic investment into industrial production that threatened the elite's "privileged positions" (p. 38). Then he argues that the development of "state autonomy" during martial law helped to rationalize development policy around an export-oriented agriculture, a rationalization now threatened by the return to a democratic political system (p. 53). His case studies are chosen to illustrate how an "export-oriented model of development" was a means to sustain Marcos in power and to reconsolidate "class domination" by a traditional elite (p. 54).

His primary intent of demonstrating how domestic economic interests and international economic pressures interact with domestic politics to affect the political structure is a laudable one and central to understanding Philippine politics. Yet his case studies do not fully explain this interactive process.

His analysis of the evolution of state policy toward these agricultural sectors has an artificial flavor. Various government orders are recited in copious detail and corporate directorships outlined without fundamentally explaining why and how decisions occurred. For example, we are told that a Filipino company, House of Investments, was a minority shareholder with Dole in an agribusiness concern that created an inequitable system of "grower's contracts" with small farmers to produce and market bananas, but we are never told who owned House of Investments (it is not even cited in the index) nor why Dole would have collaborated with it. As Hawes has argued that Marcos-crony capitalism was an important determinant of economic strategy, one wonders if that was true in this case.

His study would have been better served with a more thorough updating. While published after the fall of Marcos, references are made as if he were still president (p. 78). In addition, several important developments that occurred during the latter part of the Marcos period but that give insight into economic policy and elite attitudes go unnoticed. For example, in coconuts, no mention is made of the attempted assassination of Emmanuel Pelaez, now ambassador to the United States, reputedly because of his efforts to protect coconut farmers from Marcos cronies. In sugar, efforts by another crony, Antonio Floirendo, to gain control of the world sugar trade, the failure of which contributed to Marcos's overthrow by eroding economic growth levels even further, is also not noted.

In his conclusions Hawes disaggregates elements of the bourgeoisie to demonstrate how the impact of the Marcos regime on their economic interests contributed to his fall (pp. 135–42). Workers do not figure prominently in his analysis. The National Federation of Sugar Workers is mentioned once (p. 100). However, as his case studies have not clearly demonstrated competing elite interests—how they interacted and how they were affected by Marcos's policies—one is left with a hypothesis but not a proof. Yet the hypothesis is an extremely important one, especially if, as Hawes concludes, the Philippine State under President Aquino "has changed, but very little" (p. 164).

RICHARD J. KESSLER

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution. By Donald C. Hodges (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986. xiii, 378p. $27.50, cloth; $11.50, paper).

The exact nature of the ideological orientation of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua is an issue much argued and little understood. Popular misconceptions notwithstanding, most students of the Nicaraguan revolution realize that Sandinista ideology is a far cry from orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Yet the precise composition of the new amalgam is more difficult to determine. This task has been greatly facilitated by Donald Hodges's new work. *Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution* carefully examines the diverse influences in the revolutionary process. It is clearly the seminal work on Sandinista ideology and arguably the best treatment of Augusto César Sandino's (1895–1934) thought. It goes far beyond David Nolan's more modest *The Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution* and adds much new information on Sandino not found in Neil Macaulay's excellent *The Sandino Affair* or Gregorio Selser's pionéering study, *Sandino* (1957).

Hodges begins by carefully tracing Augusto César Sandino's life and intellectual development. Particular attention is paid to the Sandinist namesake's exposure to radical Mexican nationalism, *anarquismo*, communism, and theosophy (which Hodges sees as a major influence in Sandino's thought). Part 2 examines the intellectual development of the current Sandinistas and is distinguished by its careful scholarship, ample commentary on the genesis of each possible influence, and comparative analysis of its appearance in religious or revolutionary movements elsewhere. Like most of us who would understand this complex phenomenon, Hodges examines the role of nationalism and Nicaraguan history but pays particular attention to the import of the new Marxism and the new Christianity (an outgrowth of liberation theology in Nicaragua). A chapter on military strategy is broad in scope and among the best ever written on the subject in the Latin American context.

The work argues that although Sandino began his political career as a Nicaraguan liberal, "his ideology evolved from a rudimentary anarcho-communism acquired during his first stay in Mexico into the comparatively sophisticated political theosophy developed during his second visit there from 1929 to 1930" (p. 19). Although a few elements of Sandino's strategic thinking were circuitously incorporated into Guevara's thinking and the revolutionary struggle in Cuba, most lay dormant until after the Sandinistas were forced to rethink their positions in light of several costly military defeats in the first part of the sixties. Carlos Fonseca Amador then encouraged the careful study of Sandino's ideas and began to circulate his writings and syntheses of his political and military thought. Only after reflecting on the politicoorganizational thrust of Sandino's original message (and their previous overemphasis on armed struggle without political organization) did the Sandinistas begin to grasp the importance of mass organization and broad-based people's warfare. Alternately working with peasants, workers, the masses generally, sectors of the church, and even bourgeois politicians, the young revolutionaries gradually built the politicoorganizational base that enabled them to topple the hated Somoza regime. Their openness to all the most dynamic (and nondogmatic) currents in the new Marxism that grew up in Latin America and Europe in the sixties and seventies, to the new Christianity that was developing in Latin America, and—most importantly—to the increasingly strong insurrectionalist tendencies in the Nicaraguan people themselves, enabled them to guide (but not always lead) the overthrow of the hated dictatorship. The resultant ideology was strongly influenced not only by dynamic new currents in Marxism and Christianity but by the revolutionary fervor of the Nicaraguan people.

The most controversial aspect of the work is Hodges's thesis that the well-documented heavy incorporation of liberation theology and Ernesto Cardinal's radical Christianity into revolutionary ideology is but a modern-day substitution of liberation theology for the radical rationalist theosophy that—he argues—so heavily influenced the original Sandino. Careful reading of the footnotes reveals that one of the most frequently cited sources to document the strength of Sandino's belief in theosophy and the heavy influence of the Mexican Communist party that Hodges alleges is none other than the highly propagandistic *El verdadero Sandino, o el calvario de las Segovias* by Anastacio Somoza himself. Thus one is placed in the strange position of needing to accept much of what the author of Sandino's death said about him in order to accept the full validity of Hodges's argument. Problems in these areas or with Hodges's reticence about acknowledging just how different the use of popular people's war was in Nicaragua as compared to Cuba do not, however, diminish the overall importance of the work. Rather they suggest that—as is the case with most ground-breaking scholarship—there are other possible interpretations of some of the rich data presented.

The great value of *Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution* lies in Hodges's discussion of how Sandinista ideology evolved from Sandino, the confluence of historical factors that facilitated this process, the brilliant analyses of what the author correctly labels the new Marxism and the new Christianity in Nicaragua and in the aforementioned analysis of revolutionary strategy. This work is by far the most comprehensive effort in these areas and will become the standard work for understanding the ideology of revolutionary Nicaragua.

HARRY E. VARDEN

University of South Florida

Working Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States. Edited by Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. viii, 470p. $55.00, cloth; $14.50, paper).

In the past two decades, inspired in large part by E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*, historians, sociologists, and political scientists have produced a large number of studies of the development of the working class in the nineteenth century in various of the now industrialized countries. These studies have generally focused on a given community or occupation or a relatively short time period in one country or both. The aims of this edited volume are (1) to build on these studies to produce overviews of the process of working class formation in eight essays focusing on different time periods in three countries (the United States, France, and Germany) and (2) to use this material along with studies of Britain to develop in two essays some conclusions about the common features of working class formation and the causes of variation among the countries. The value of this volume is enhanced by its cohesion. It is not the ordinary compilation of essays. The authors met twice: once to react to a discussion paper on class formation by Katznelson (which formed the basis for chapter 1) and to work out a shared agenda for the individual essays and a second time to discuss drafts of the essays. Thus there is considerable theoretical continuity in how each of the essays deals with the material.

This volume's importance lies not only in its presentation of the historical evidence and comparative synthesis, it also makes an important contribution to a great lacuna in class theory. In the past decade and a half, there has been a proliferation of sociological works discussing the criteria for the placement of positions, occupations, or groups into objectively defined categories of class. By contrast, there has been little theoretical and empirical work on the process of class formation; that is, the process by which objectively defined categories of class do (or do not) lead to the development of cohesive social groups, which, in turn, become the basis for common consciousness and collective action.

Katznelson's initial essay outlines a framework for the study of class formation, suggesting "that class in capitalist society be thought of as a concept with four connected layers [or levels] of theory and history: those of structure, ways of life, dispositions, and collective action" (p. 14). To elaborate briefly, *structure* is class at the objective level; and variations in structure are those due to level of economic development, capital intensity, average enterprise size, product specialization, and so on. The level *ways of life* includes such factors as work relations, labor market relations, and patterns of residence. *Dispositions* are shared attitudes, including class subcultural definitions of society and social relationships. *Collective action* includes not only riots, strikes, and demonstrations but also movements and organizations. Diversity, through time and across countries, at levels 3 and 4 are the main objects of analysis of the essays.

It is impossible to do justice to the individual essays in such a short review. Suffice it to say that aside from the main themes that emerge again in Zolberg's concluding comparative essay, almost all of them contain observations that help one to understand facets of the development of labor in the respective countries. To take just a few examples, Bridges argues, convincingly I think, that artisans in the earlier nineteenth century United States were not culturally different from their European counterparts (contra Hartz). Rather, their different reactions can be accounted for by the U.S. setting: widespread suffrage and the urban locale of industrialization in a growing agricultural country. Cottereau throws new light on the reasons for the low degree of formal organization of the French unions, showing its interconnection with industrial structure and foreign competition, low population growth and tight labor markets, and high degree of informal workers' control in the workplace.

Zolberg begins his comparative historical synthesis with a devastating attack on previous attempts to account for variation in working class ideology and organization by Lorwin, Rokkan, and Lipset. He rightly argues that World War I and the Russian revolution so massively changed the political scenery as far as labor was concerned that it is impossible to connect prewar social and historical factors directly to postwar characteristics of labor movements, as these authors do. His analysis, which focuses on the situation at the outbreak of the war, emphasizes two broad sets of factors accounting for variations in the four cases: variations in capitalist industrial structure (the pace and timing of industrialization and the structure of the economy) and the character of the political regime (legacies of absolutism and extent of political rights for the working class). The latter is particularly important for distinguishing the polar cases—both in terms of regime type and working class movement—of the United States and Germany. Variations in capitalist industrial structure elucidate variations in all four cases but are particularly important in explaining the peculiar nature of French unions and union-party relationships.

Though explaining differences is Zolberg's main task, he takes pains to point out that there was in fact a considerable degree of convergence between the four cases as of the immediate prewar period.

As in all books that break new ground, there is also much that one will quarrel with in this volume. Two points struck me with particular force. First, despite the title and Katznelson's theoretical outline, the essays focus much more on labor movement formation than on working class formation. The consciousness and (in)action of unorganized workers are hardly discussed, especially in the sections of the book that cover the turn of the century, despite the fact that only a minority of workers in any of the countries were even union members at this time. Moreover, nonorganizational measures of class cohesion other than residential segregation (i.e., those that would tell us something about unorganized workers, such as intergenerational reproduction, intermarriage, etc.) are analyzed only in Kocka's essay. This lacuna is all the more serious in the light of the importance this group has in the analysis of the ultimate time period under discussion in the one place they are mentioned, Zolberg's analysis of prewar France. There he argues that the usual view of the French workers as radical syndicalists is false since only a small minority of workers were members of the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), many if not most CGT members voted, and a large number of French workers voted for parties of the Center and Right.

Not only are a limited number of cases considered in the volume, the cases chosen are systematically (and probably purposely) biased to the large countries. This affects not only comparative conclusions but also the analysis of many other essays since their insights are often based on comparative observations. To cite just one example, the Norwegian case completely contradicts Zolberg's political regime hypothesis, since a parliamentary regime with broad suffrage was in place before the development of the labor movement and male suffrage was adopted only a decade after the founding of the Social Democratic party; yet the pattern of labor movement development was most similar to Germany: close union-party cooperation and a radical (initially reformist Social Democratic Marxist and later syndicalist) leadership. In my view, the inclusion of the experience of the smaller democracies of Europe as well as that of Italy would change a large number of the hypotheses advanced in the book.

There is a sense, of course, in which attacking a work for what it does not do is a bit unfair, and there is no doubt that the publication of the book is a milestone in the study of working class politics. It will be essential reading for Europeanists, students of comparative labor movements and working class politics, and, more generally, of macrocomparative history for some time to come.

JOHN D. STEPHENS

Northwestern University

The Politics of Oil in Indonesia: Foreign Company–Host Government Relations. By Khong Cho-Oon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. x, 253p. $39.50).

This is a study of the problems of the relationship between multinational companies and host governments arising from mutual perceptions of the imbalance in their respective bargaining strengths. It is the book's argument that this problem of "perceptions" of a sense of imbalance is essentially political in nature, with economic concerns and market forces peripheral. In order for a satisfactory relationship to be established between the foreign company and the host government there must be an objective recognition by both sides of each other's interests and negotiations in order to strike a balance.

Mineral industries are a special case. The negotiating concerns of both sides are sharpened by the finite nature of the resources. The issue of the distribution of gains from exploitation must balance the factors of foreign capital, technology, and expertise against sovereign control. Furthermore, there are different time perspectives with respect to the rate of exploitation. In this general context, the author examines the Indonesian petroleum industry as an appropriate subject, illustrating the wide range of issues raised by Indonesian aims and attitudes toward host government-foreign investor relations. The book, therefore, is a contribution to the study of global resource policy as well as the Indonesian political economy.

Looking at the pattern of relationships in the

Indonesian oil industry, governed by production-sharing agreements between Pertamina, the state oil company, and its foreign contractors, the author identifies three central areas of concern in the negotiating process. First there is question of the division of revenue. The author details the issues of royalties, taxation, depreciation, and the other financial conditions. Related to this is the determination of the absolute level of total revenues and matters affecting it, such as level of output and export prices. Disappointingly, the author does not really discuss the impact of Indonesian OPEC membership on this. Finally, there is the domestic impact of the foreign company's operations in economic and political terms. The author does not find that the oil industry has made substantial backward and forward linkages that would integrate resource activities to Indonesian national development. The author concludes that although there appears to be a basic shift in favor of Indonesia in terms of the content of the agreements for oil extraction, the examination of the operational conditions of the agreements leads to doubts whether such a shift has in fact occurred. The author attributes Indonesia's failure to make real what it has obtained on paper to deficiencies in the technical and managerial resources available to Pertamina to implement the production-sharing contract clause vesting Pertamina with sole responsibility for managing the extractive operation. In the long term, however, as the Indonesian side builds up its own capabilities, it already holds the legal means to effect the transfer of petroleum extraction from the foreign companies to indigenous management.

Readers interested in the domestic political linkages of Pertamina will be disappointed. The author does not examine Pertamina as an important political institution in Indonesia. Although he does note the problems of accountability and corruption, he warns that "attempts to investigate such matters lead to a nebulous realm because of their controversial and politically sensitive nature" (p. 165). Certainly, however, Pertamina's position as a state within a state and its off-budget financial inputs to other institutions and individuals had impact on Indonesian perceptions of its interests in its relations with the foreign companies. It is, in fact, the special nature of Pertamina in the politics of Indonesia that somewhat qualifies its identification by the author as an appropriate case study of his general propositions about relationships between foreign companies and host governments.

DONALD E. WEATHERBEE

University of South Carolina

Religion and Political Conflict in Latin America. Edited by Daniel H. Levine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986. 266p. $24.95).

The Catholic Church and Politics in Brazil, 1916–85. By Scott Mainwaring (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1986. 328p. $37.50).

These two books contribute to a well-delineated, and well-worthwhile subfield of Latin American studies, that which deals with Catholicism. (Although *religion* is used in the titles, on the whole Catholicism is what is meant.) This body of literature is conveniently and necessarily manageable in size—*necessarily* because the kind of immersion in the topic necessary to produce quality work requires a degree of intellectual, almost emotional, commitment to the topic that not many can muster, certainly not over the long run. Levine has in fact stayed with the topic for over 10 years; I very much hope that Mainwaring—whose volume is a revision of his dissertation—will do so, because it is an excellent piece of work.

The issue with an essentially historical account such as Mainwaring's is generally not—and certainly not in this case—whether the main facts are accurate. The academic (and literary) issue is whether the author shows sensitivity to the forces that produced the facts and whether enough empathy is shown to make them come alive. The history of the evolution of Catholicism—in this case, Brazil's—is essentially the history of a series of internal movements and of reactions to these movements, with both action and reaction propelled by persons of one or another kind of conviction. The structure of the church, its hierarchical nature, its international links, and its doctrine are not just "there." They are interpreted, vigorously accepted, severely questioned, or taken up to be modified by the groups that form these movements. The author's job is to portray the perceptions of the structure and ideology of the church and of the surrounding society that the leaders and followers of these movements and countermovements maintain. Only then can the reader understand why actors behave the way they do.

Of all this, Mainwaring does an excellent job, all the more praiseworthy because the period he covers and the movements and geographical regions he covers are extensive. Beginning (in essence, and the title notwithstanding) in the late fifties with the various progressive movements, many involving Catholic students and lower-level priests but always with the essential protection of at least a segment of the senior hierarchy, Mainwaring then portrays the church's reaction to the military coup of 1964 and its aftermath. While both in 1964 and again more recently a notable conservative strain asserts itself as a reaction to what are perceived as left-radical excesses in society at large (1964) or in the internal movements of structural and doctrinal reform (liberation theology), the long-term historical change is clearly "progressive." The essential concern of the church with secular matters is now accepted, and the structure of the church has changed: the laity, including "popular sectors," have assumed a role that would have been totally inconceivable a mere 30 years ago. The frictions to which this gives rise—as well as the frequent *lack* of friction compared with what might have been expected—are not only well described, but their causes are sensitively analyzed. The book is somewhat overwritten (actual conflicts and their bases repeat themselves in the last few chapters), and in the first chapter the four analytical alternatives don't come through as clearly as they might. But these blemishes are minor and certainly not unique.

The overall quality of Levine's book is good for an edited volume and there is a good deal of unity here, provided naturally by the material itself. The underlying issues are very roughly similar in many of the Latin American countries: what about the role of the lay poor and the strong preference of some of the lower clergy for them? What about repressive military regimes that attack the poor and the priests who defend them and thereby require a response from the hierarchy whether it initially wishes to take a critical stand toward repression or not. When dramatic political events (large-scale violence) take place and dramatic socioeconomic situations (mass poverty, deepened over time) present themselves, both reaction and no reaction are political, as Levine again points out. The contributors to this volume are among those who have stayed longest with the field: Phillip Berryman, Michael Dodson, Thomas Bruneau, and Brian H. Smith; but there are also some welcome newcomers: Susan Nelson, Charles Reilly, Mainwaring, and Thomas Kelman. Their case studies of Brazil, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Chile, Colombia, and Bolivia—as well as Levine's more general essays—all focus on the multiple implications for church structure of the increased activism of the poorer laity, led by sympathetic priests. They are of high quality.

In order not to be accused of trying to join a mutual admiration society, let me make the following point, which is meant seriously, and applies to much of Latin America writing: We were certainly weary of the mechanical application to the facts of life of excessively abstract schemes such as those of Parsonian functionalism. We—at least I—subsequently became weary very quickly of the equally mechanical application to the facts of life of excessively abstract schemes of a neo-Marxist and dependency kind. But there is a place for middle-level generalizations—if not about "institutions such as the church and others similar," then at least about "the church." Ivan Valliers's attempted stage-type conceptualization aroused a great deal of (understandable) ambivalence after its appearance in the late 1960s; though many used it, if only as a foil. But we do need new, courageous—probably flawed—attempts of this kind. These essays (and Mainwaring's monograph) reach the level of thoroughly sound but nevertheless essentially ad hoc reflections on current events. There is absolutely nothing "better" than such first-class journalism. But there *is* something different. And *some* of our thought, as academics, should be devoted to that difference.

Henry A. Landsberger

University of North Carolina

African Politics: Crises and Challenges. By J. Gus Liebenow (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986. xii, 305p. $32.50, cloth; $12.50, paper).

Studies in Power and Class in Africa. Edited by Irvine Leonard Markovitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987. xv, 400p. $32.00, cloth; $14.95, paper.)

If anyone doubts that the study of African politics remains sharply divided between work influenced by modernization theory and work influenced by neo-Marxist theory, he or she needs only to examine these two important books briefly and such doubts will vanish. Both books are quite general in their coverage, and both are intended for use in the classroom, but they differ remarkably in substance. Liebenow deals with the impact of colonial rule, the challenges of nation building, the crisis of enduring poverty, political parties, military coups and military regimes, and U.S. policy toward Africa, but in all of this he makes only passing reference to class. In contrast, the latter concept and its relation to power in and over the state are central to the analysis presented in all chapters of the Markovitz collection, chapters that also cover many of the topics discussed by Liebenow.

Modernization theory is reflected at many points in Liebenow's analysis but does not explicitly dictate all aspects of that analysis. He defines modernization rather loosely as an attitude favorable to change in the direction of a broader scale of social interactions and a belief that such change can be brought about by human beings of all kinds working together. Nation building is an important component of modernization because it involves overcoming barriers of ethnicity, race, language, religion, and urban-rural differences to establish a larger national community. Class barriers are not mentioned, however, in this otherwise excellent discussion.

The crisis of enduring poverty, although acknowledged to stem from a variety of factors including the residual effects of colonialism and a sometimes hostile international environment, is blamed primarily on the policy failures of African governments. In the absence of a class explanation for these failures, they are blamed on unrealistic ideological commitments to industrialization, socialism, and self-reliance. What should replace these commitments, in Liebenow's opinion, is not an equally unrealistic commitment to capitalism but rather a pragmatic mixture of institutions involving popular participation and an emphasis on agriculture in the immediate future, combined with a gradual move toward modest industrialization later on. These are extremely sound recommendations, but the reasons they have not been implemented in many African countries and are in constant danger of being abandoned in those countries in which they have been implemented have to do with social structures and international constraints as well as ideological commitments. The latter cannot be understand apart from their interaction with the former. In Africa, class interests have often transformed the ideology of socialism into the reality of state capitalism, which fails to follow Liebenow's recommendations for alleviating poverty for reasons very different from those identified by examining socialist ideology alone.

The Markovitz book contains chapters of varying quality, although the average quality is high. The editor's introduction contains an extension of the theoretical approach that he presented in *Power and Class in Africa* (1977), particularly with regard to the combination of the public and private sectors by the ruling class as the new base of their power, the limits of dependency theory, and the consequences of policies such as indigenization for class formation. The ways in which each chapter ties into one or more of these themes or those covered in Markovitz's earlier book are briefly explicated.

The most interesting chapters to me—those by Beverly Grier, Martin Kilson, Thomas Callaghy, Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Ronald Libby, Stanley Greenberg, and Hermann Giliomee—illustrate the wide variety of methods by which, and contexts in which, relations of class and power are analyzed. The first two authors write about the colonial Gold Coast, utilize an historical approach, and are very informative. In addition, Kilson has a fascinating theoretical discussion of the limits of African populism as an instrument of change. Callaghy's chapter essentially summarizes parts of his book, *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective* (1984), which uses the approach of comparative historical sociology. Kofele-Kale's chapter presents quantitative data on the regional distribution of public offices and other resources in the Cameroon, which are effectively integrated into his argument about the use of regional cleavages by the Anglophone bourgeoisie in that country to further their own class formation.

A commendable point in both of these books is their effort to integrate the analysis of South Africa into their respective frameworks for analyzing African politics. For Liebenow, the clash of nationalisms in South Africa presents unusually severe problems of nation building; although he also emphasizes the degrading and exploitative character of apartheid as it is currently practiced. Libby's chapter in the Markovitz book demonstrates that there is a strong class cleavage among white Afrikaner business people that may lead to party realignment, as those owning small businesses join workers in the Conservative party. Greenberg and Giliomee show that the Bantustans do not contain effective labor markets, reinforcing the case that they are places permanently to keep people who are totally devoid of privileges in order to reinforce class differences between them and those who are given limited privileges through obtaining jobs in the "white" areas.

JAMES R. SCARRITT

University of Colorado, Boulder

Liberia: The Quest for Democracy. By J. Gus Liebenow (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987. xiii, 336. $35.00, cloth; $12.95, paper).

This book is likely to be *the* one-volume current information and background source on Liberia, Africa's oldest republic and a country with special historic ties to the black America, for some time to come. Liebenow is one of the pioneers of United States-based African studies in general and of Liberian studies in particular, with several landmark works to his credit (such as his 1969 book, *Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege*). As was the case with his earlier book, this one will not endear him to the current ruling elite in Liberia, as Liebenow throughout proclaims his desire to encourage democratic changes in Liberia and has taken a leading role in this country in attempting to change U.S. government policies toward the Doe regime—by testifying before congressional committees, for example.

The book is divided into three parts: an excellent initial part—nearly half of the book—covering the "First Republic" and Liberian political culture; a second part giving a "prelude and perspective" on the 1980 coup, which ended the First Republic and the dominance of the traditional settler elite in a hail of bullets; and a five-chapter final part entitled "Second Chance for Democracy: Promise versus Performance," which details the initial high hopes engendered by the coming of the "new order" in 1980 and the gradual disillusionment of those who hoped for representative government, as Samuel K. Doe's government reverted to many of the practices of the discredited True Whig administrations of the past.

Liberia is well written, with an intimate knowledge of the dramatic events of the past decade in Liberia tempered by an appreciation of the complexities of Liberia's past. Liebenow makes appropriate comparisons with other African situations on occasion, which help place the work in the broader African context. The national elections of October 1985 and the subsequent attempted coup the following month are closely analyzed, with Liebenow taking the Reagan administration to task for failing to take more vigorous actions against the (then military) Doe government at the time. (Doe was installed as the first president of the Second Republic in January of 1986.) Events may soon substantiate Liebenow's suggestion that President Doe's regime may not survive much longer, but the reasons for Liberia's ongoing crisis are clearly spelled out here.

This is an excellent book, and belongs in general (including public) and specialized libraries alike.

CHARLES HARTWIG

Arkansas State University

The Political Economy of Latin American Defense Expenditures: Case Studies of Venezuela and Argentina. By Robert E. Looney (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986. xxiii, 325p. $39.00).

The subtitle of this volume is misleading. General titles with specific subtitles often constitute transparent attempts to attract a wider audience than case studies of a particular country or two can muster. But this book does not concentrate exclusively on Venezuela and Argentina. It begins with a statistical analysis of determinants of defense expenditures in the entire third world, then presents comparisons between Latin American and non-Latin American countries, and then focuses on Latin American countries exclusively. Only then does the author turn to a discussion of Venezuela and Argentina.

Looney reports that for third-world countries in general, as well as Latin American countries in particular, resource availability is the most important factor in an explanation of defense expenditures and in determining whether a country will become an important arms producer. For arms producers in Latin America (but not for nonproducers), the overall impact of military expenditures on economic growth is positive. An examination of budget trade-offs for Latin American countries reveals that arms producers experience negative trade-offs between defense expenditures and social welfare expenditures, while nonarms producers enjoy "positive trade-offs" between those two budget categories.

Regarding Venezuela, Looney reports that increases in defense expenditures are associated with decreases in other major areas of government expenditures and that in the future Venezuela's defense expenditures are likely to maintain the stability they have shown in recent years. With respect to Argentina, Looney's major finding is that its military allocations are most importantly a function of long-term economic trends, affected only secondarily by changes in political regimes. Even so, he finds that military regimes in Argentina have consistently outspent civilian governments on defense. For the future, Looney anticipates that Argentina's military expenditures should increase steadily, growing at 2.3% annually from 1984 to 1990.

Ultimately, however, I wonder whether anything is really established by this book except the author's ability to computer-analyze mountains of data and his dogged persistence in attempts to interpret reams of computer printout. My doubts stem not from a general skepticism about quantitative analyses; on the contrary, I am quite sympathetic to such efforts in principle. What I find lacking here to a disturbing degree is theoretical discipline.

The reader will find in this book almost a hundred tables in a little over three hundred pages. However, the variables in the tables and related formulas seem to be selected entirely according to the size of their contribution to a high r-squared. For example, at one point Looney tests a hypothesis about the impact of military expenditures on economic growth in 10 arms-producing Latin American countries. The regression equation produces an r-squared of 96.7. But the data in the equation pertain to military expenditures in 1981, while the economic growth figures cover the years from 1970 to 1982 (p. 54). In other words, the "theory" on which this analysis rests fails to take into account the rudimentary logical requirement that the alleged cause precede the reputed effect.

The author reports that one of the factors that best discriminates between arms producers and nonproducers among Latin American countries in 1979 to 1980 is growth in exports from 1960 to 1970. He makes an attempt to "explain" this finding (p. 43), an effort that is especially valiant in light of the fact that (predictably) the form of the relationship changes entirely (from negative to positive) if export figures from 1970 to 1982 are substituted for those observed in earlier years. But his valor is best described as quixotic in its confrontation with the inherent implausibility of such ad hoc, post hoc "explanations" of relationships that emerge from analyses based on so many tentative candidates for independent variables (roughly 34, in this case).

Finally, it is ironic, in reading a book ostensibly devoted to the *political* economy of defense expenditures, to discover in chapter 2 (p. 38) that "a number of political variables were added to the data set. . . . The results were not, however, an improvement over those obtained from the eight socioeconomic variables initially selected." So much for the political variables. We are not even told what they were. All we can infer with confidence is that they failed to contribute to a high r-squared, and therefore, as far as Looney is concerned, they are of no interest.

Area specialists are not typically sympathetic to quantitative approaches. A book like this one is not likely to overcome their resistance, notwithstanding its laudatory preface by Martin Needler.

JAMES LEE RAY

Florida State University

Land Reform and Democratic Development. By Roy L. Prosterman and Jeffrey M. Riedinger (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. xii, 314p. $29.50).

This is a book of advocacy. Its authors wish to alert us to the necessity of carrying out land reform in the third world before the year 2000. If such reform is carried out, they argue, then it will be possible to avoid "at least half a dozen great civil conflicts . . . which might well carry a combined death toll in the millions" (p. 1). In addition, some 100 million hunger-related deaths and 200 million births will be avoided. Finally, land reform will save some 1 billion people from Marxist despotism. The authors assert that these four benefits of land reform are not merely "fanciful predictions" but are "to be expected with considerable confidence" (p. 2).

Prosterman and Riedinger arrive at their predictions after many years of study of land tenure problems around the world. Their book is broadly comparative, with illustrations drawn from throughout the world. Their most detailed analyses, however, come from an examination of South Vietnam and El Salvador. The book begins by arguing that relative deprivation is the cause of revolution and civil violence. It is not poverty in general, however, that causes these upheavals; rather, it is that kind of poverty whose cause can be directly attributed to human agents. Since most people in the third world earn their livelihood from tilling the soil, their grievances are largely related to land tenure issues. Hence, instability is linked to land tenure, specifically landlessness. The authors then show that when the percentage of landless families to total families in the population is high, there is a direct link to instances of political instability and to poor performance of the agricultural sector. Four different models of development are reviewed (termed the *family farm model,* the *collective model,* the *populist model* and the *nonagricultural incomes model*), with the family farm receiving the highest marks. The book then shows how the family farm model, often dismissed as incompatible with the conditions found in the third world, can be tailored to fit these conditions.

The work can be evaluated on three levels. First, as a study of land reform it provides a great deal of useful information, some of it statistical and some descriptive. The descriptive information is by far the more useful since it is based largely upon the hands-on experience that the authors had in Vietnam and El Salvador. Second, as a prescriptive work it fails because of the overzealousness of the tone. The wild claims made in the introduction merely serve to warn serious scholars and policymakers that the authors are so deeply committed to land reform that they likely lack objectivity.

It is the third level of analysis, the one dealing with the importance of land reform in third world stability and development, that is likely to be of greatest interest to the broadest range of scholars in the social sciences, particularly those concerned with the field of political economy. The volume places singular emphasis on landlessness as the most important variable in predicting mass political violence. This emphasis is at odds with two other approaches in the literature. First, empirical studies, beginning with the pioneering work of Bruce Russett, have not concentrated on landlessness but have centered instead on land distribution, often measured by the Gini index. Prosterman and Riedinger convincingly argue that measures of land distribution usually ignore the size of the agricultural sector and therefore are unable to weigh the importance of unequal land distribution to the society as a whole. But the importance of this contribution is mitigated by the widespread awareness of it, beginning with Huntington's landmark work of 1968. Second, the focus on a single variable is at odds with the multivariate tradition that defines modern empirical social science. We tend to shy away from single-variable explanatory models, since few stand up under rigorous statistical testing. A test of the landlessness thesis across 60 countries carried out by

Edward N. Muller and myself (*American Political Science Review*, 81 [1987]: 425–52) found a significant correlation of trivial magnitude with the 1973–77 death rate from political violence. When income inequality is added to the equation, landlessness is reduced to nonsignificance. The multivariate causal model developed in that study found that the landlessness variable was totally irrelevant, while agrarian inequality was relevant only when mediated through income inequality.

The volume is highly recommended for upper division and graduate courses on development, as it can serve to provoke likely classroom discussion. It will also be of considerable use to those who seek an insider's view of land reform in Vietnam and El Salvador.

MITCHELL A. SELIGSON

University of Pittsburgh

Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism. By Adam Przeworski and John Sprague (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986. vi, 224p. $24.95).

Throughout much of the twentieth century democratic socialist parties have been major actors on the political stage in most Western countries. In the past decade, however, many of these parties have suffered serious electoral reversals; and debates about their future prospects have engaged party activists and scholarly observers alike. Przeworski and Sprague's *Paper Stones* makes a valuable contribution to these debates and by so doing facilitates understanding of the dynamics of party support in liberal democratic political systems.

The authors' point of departure is a variation on the familiar "dilemma of democratic socialism." Historically, as debated by socialists themselves, this dilemma concerned the consequences of participation in "bourgeois elections" and, more particularly, the consequences of electoral success. The latter was an expected consequence of the former because it was assumed that the working class would inevitably become an "overwhelming majority" and would support socialist parties. Once in power these parties would face the decision of whether to institute "reforms" to alleviate the misery of the working class. The presumed dilemma was that such reforms would lessen the radicalism of the working class, thereby undermining electoral support for Socialist parties and thwarting their long-term goal of instituting the socialist commonwealth.

For Przeworski and Sprague the dilemma is somewhat different. They emphasize that socialist parties entered the electoral arena when the working class was not an "overwhelming," or indeed even a "bare," majority. Thus the immediate problem for these parties was not what to do with power but how to get it. Moreover, since the working class (defined by the authors as "manual workers in mining, manufacturing, construction, transport, and agriculture" [p. 172]) has not become a majority in capitalist societies, this problem has persisted. "Leaders of socialist parties must repeatedly decide whether or not to seek electoral success at the cost, or at least the risk, of diluting class lines and consequently diminishing the salience of class as a motive for the political behavior of workers themselves" (p. 3). Przeworski and Sprague hypothesize that historically this risk has been both real and substantial.

To determine whether Socialist parties have encountered a persistent vote trade-off attendant upon pursuing "pure class-only" versus "supraclass" electoral strategies, Przeworski and Sprague analyze party support patterns in seven countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden). Using longitudinal data on vote shares and class composition they estimate the magnitude of the opportunity costs socialist parties have incurred by adopting one of these strategies. The modeling techniques employed are elegant; and the results thereof, thought-provoking.

A principal finding is that the short- and long-term opportunity costs borne by Socialist parties for pursuing supraclass strategies are almost always positive (the very long-term results for France being the sole exception); that is, votes among the working class are lost when these parties gain support among other classes. In cross-national perspective, however, the equilibrium value of the trade-off varies sharply. In some cases, supraclass strategies produce increments in vote shares, but in others pure class-only strategies are advantageous. Comparing political contexts leads the authors to conclude that opportunity costs covary with the strength of corporatist institutions (principally the strength, organization, and party affiliation of trade unions) and the existence of communist party competition for the working class vote.

Using their opportunity-cost model Przeworski and Sprague also consider why the vote for socialist parties eventually stabilized at a plurality level and why, now, these parties face the prospect of secular decline. They conclude that the class structure, that is, the minority position of the working class and the nature of the trade-off between working and nonworking class support have powerfully influenced the historical development of electoral support for these parties, and will continue to do so in the future. Other relevant factors include relationships between socialist parties and trade unions and the strategic choices (sometimes mistakes) made by socialist party leaders. Within the authors' frame of theoretical reference, the argument about the past is powerful; that about the future, less so.

When forecasting the likely decline of socialist parties Przeworski and Sprague place great weight on the observation that the working class (as they define it) constitutes a diminishing proportion of the electorate in all Western countries. It is also true, however, that workers remain a sizable segment of these electorates; and it is by no means certain that Socialist party leaders, particularly in countries where the trade-off between working and nonworking class support is not especially sharp, will be unable to construct supraclass coalitions that are sufficiently large to win elections. The possibility for doing so would seem inherent in the authors' emphasis on the importance of party strategies: "the assumption that public opinion is exogeneous [*sic*] to party strategies is absurd. . . . Parties mould 'public opinion': they present the public with images of society, evoke collective identifications, instill political commitments" (pp. 125–26). Given this and the additional consideration (which the authors admit) that there is a set of significant "valence" issues that cut across class lines, the future of major Socialist parties would not seem to be necessarily bleak, particularly in the near and medium term. The authors may be correct to conclude that "the era of electoral socialism may be over" (p. 185), but their analyses do not provide "clinching evidence" on the point.

Another weak point concerns the use of survey data. The authors rightly recognize the utility of such data for bolstering their argument; but some readers will be disappointed with what they have done or, better, have not done in assessing the dynamics of individual-level behavior. This is perhaps particularly the case with regard to the hypothesis that "once workers vote socialist they are not very likely to change, even if party strategies do change" (pp. 60–61). Evidence on this point is very relevant to the central argument about vote trade-offs. Except in the long run, where considerations of voter replacement come into play, the existence of such trade-offs requires that the hypothesis be *false*. Testing it with appropriate panel data would have been an interesting and valuable exercise.

The conclusion that Przeworski and Sprague's analyses are neither complete nor convincing in every respect should not blind one to the many strengths of their book. *Paper Stones* is a theoretically rich and methodologically sophisticated contribution. Perhaps most importantly, it brings a much-needed long-term dynamic perspective to a field too long dominated by static analyses and a focus on essentially stochastic influences on short-term trends. That the authors may not be able to persuade all of their readers about the likely future of democratic socialism is not a major failing. That they have helped us to understand its past and present is quite sufficient.

HAROLD D. CLARKE

Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Women and Political Conflict: Portraits of Struggle in Times of Crisis. Edited by Rosemary Ridd and Helen Callaway (New York: New York University Press, 1987. xi, 246p. $38.00).

The editors of this collection, both social anthropologists, use the theme of public conflict to explore the conditions that render women powerless and those that provide opportunity for women to enhance their power. The case studies contribute to the growing body of theory on gender and politics by distinguishing between *women's powers* and *men's power*: "women's powers as being more diffuse and individualized outside the bureaucratic structures of society; men's power as being more co-ordinated and structured within an institutionalized framework" (p. 3). The focus is on a relatively narrow spectrum of political conflict, and this is a source of both strength and weakness in the book: *strength* because some of the conflicts in question have been understudied but *weakness* because of the thin body of theoretical material available for integration into the studies.

The conflicts that are studied, with the exception of Homa Nategh's chapter on Iran, lie between the evolutionary and the revolutionary that are the substance of most studies of women and political change. Several of the conflicts are interesting precisely because they illuminate gender roles in circumstances seldom understood outside the immediately affected communities—Cyprus in the 1970s, the 1984–85 coalminers strike in Britain, and Brittany in western France, for example. In one way or another all of the authors were personally involved in the conflicts about which they write; and although this personal involvement provides the richness that often comes with participant observation, it also carries with it the drawbacks of political bias. Homa Nategh's anger at the course the 1979 Iranian revolution took, for example, raises the question of both the sources and the perspective available to an Iranian academic forced into exile in the wake of the revolution.

The book contains eight case studies: in addition to those on Cyprus, Britain, Brittany, and Iran noted above, the chapters cover Northern Ireland in the 1970s, Palestinian women in Lebanon, gender relations in the Israeli kibbutzim, and the Turkish community in West Berlin. The distinction between *women's powers* and *men's power* is not explored in any systematic fashion, but the narratives do suggest clearly that while women's powers emerge in unexpected and often creative ways in time of strife, these powers remain peripheral to male power, which is institutionalized. Moreover, women's powers are only recognized and appreciated when they are exercised in the name of, and on behalf of, domestic roles and responsibilities. As Callaway herself concludes, these brief ethnographies "give little evidence . . . that through their efforts women have gained any greater share in the making of public policy or even of decisions in areas which affect their own lives as women" (p. 228).

In their introductory and concluding chapters, the editors suggest some reasons for the inability to translate private and even public struggles into public power: the vulnerability of women to sexual violence, conformity to cultural, religious, and class expectations; and competition from household obligations. The most provocative hypothesis to emerge is that women are most effective when their political activity serves to reaffirm the cultural identity of their communities and that probably as a consequence little in the way of traditional gender relations is altered in either the private or the public sphere. In Northern Ireland, Lynda Edgerton observes, "the collective power and social identity that women acquired through their public activity have not been reflected in an altered position within the home" (p. 80). "The status and respect awarded by the community to mothers of Palestinian martyrs," note Rosemary Sayigh and Julie Peteet, "epitomises the politisation of women's reproductive role" (p. 122). Women active in the British coalminers strike were fighting to save coal communities, which are "close-knit, heavily male-dominated and traditional" (p. 97). Under certain conditions, assertion of traditional culture becomes a radical political statement. This is somewhat true in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon and, as Clare Krojzl stresses, especially true for Turkish women in West Berlin: "If Germans see the veiling of Turkish women as a sign of outmoded tradition and women's subordinance [*sic*], Turkish women use it as a deliberate political act oriented toward the future and demonstrating control over their lives. . . . As a political act, the practice of veiling can be seen as conservative in reinforcing traditional gender roles and radical in its conscious rejection of the ascribed status of Turks in Berlin" (p. 206).

Women and Political Conflict offers no new methodological approaches to studying gender and politics. The case studies are descriptive and often anecdotal, and limited—geographically and culturally—to Western Europe and the Middle East. The studies do, however, provide new insights into the opportunities, and particularly the limits, of noninstitutionalized power. Women may be mobilized in times of political conflict, but just as often they are restrained by violence, culture, state, or religion. "Women's powers" are furthest from being realized when all four of these factors reinforce each other, as in Cyprus after the Turkish invasion of 1974, which left many Greek Cypriot women without either status or protection, or in Iran after the 1979 revolution and the war with Iraq that quickly followed.

SUE ELLEN M. CHARLTON

Colorado State University

Political Organizations in Socialist Yugoslavia. By Jim Seroka and Rados Smiljkovic (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986. xxvi, 332p. $49.50).

The literature on Yugoslav political institutions falls roughly into three categories: hostile; sympathetic but critical; and laudatory and uncritical. This volume, one of the few books in recent years to address the question of the structure and functioning of political institutions in the Yugoslav self-management system, attempts to find a niche in the second category but all too often falls into the third. The volume is at its best when describing the political institutions which are at the heart of the self-management system; even the expert will find much that is useful here. But the work falls down when it comes to describing how these institutions function. All too often the authors confuse the ideals of the system with its reality. Shortcomings are identified but treated as unfortunate deviations that can be overcome with patience and goodwill. The electoral system in place prior to the 1974 constitutional revisions is subjected to repeated criticism, even though it permitted more than one candidate to run for election and was far more democratic than the method of indirect elections adopted in 1974. The conclusions on the Party, which are the heart of the book, read like an annual report issued by a corporation or university:

> Our fundamental conclusion is that the Yugoslav political organizations have usually been effective in fulfilling their roles within the legislative system and process. The political organizations have neither abused nor neglected the use of their powers and capabilities within the legislative domain. They have maintained a careful balance of activity that has permitted the Yugoslav legislatures on the federal and republic levels to survive, to develop, and to prosper. (p. 236)

This conclusion, and others like it, seem out of place in light of the deterioration of the Yugoslav system (in all its particulars) after 1980.

Three factors help contribute to this lack of accurate and incisive analysis. One is the collaborative nature of the work. At times the two authors—one a U.S. and the other a Yugoslav political scientist—seem to be taking diametrically opposed views. On other occasions they seem to have settled for blandness and empty phraseology, as in the example just cited.

A second reason for the lack of incisive analysis lies in the reliance of the authors on quantitative empirical data. These data, drawn largely from sample surveys and other aggregative statistics, are not without interest. Unfortunately they tell us very little about how the political institutions in the self-management system actually function. At times the data are presented selectively; for example, figures on the number of strikes are given for the period 1964–69 but not for later years. The limits of the method are revealed in the authors' refusal to comment on the degree to which the Party has become federalized on the grounds that "the federalization of the Party is a very difficult issue to measure with the use of empirical evidence" (p. 75). (In this connection it should be noted that the lengthy discussion of democratic centralism in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] nowhere indicates whether lower bodies are required to carry out the decisions of higher bodies, a central tenet of the concept of democratic centralism as it has been applied in Communist systems.)

A third reason for the low level of critical analysis lies in the assumption of the authors that political institutions are necessary to guide the self-management system and adjudicate among interests. Thus the period up to 1974 is pictured as one of growing confusion and weakness; while the post-1974 system, with strengthened party controls, is seen as a step forward in the development of self-management. This puts the book at opposite polls from the only other in-depth analysis of the party in recent years, April Carter's *Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia* (Princeton, 1982). While the Party does play a crucially important role in making the system function (and, vainly for the most part, in trying to adjudicate among interests), it does not follow that by strengthening the Party one has strengthened self-management. Judging from the corruption and abuses of power uncovered in the LCY in recent years, the system needs less, not more, party control.

The volume is not lacking in recommendations for change or in comments critical of this or that aspect of the self-management system in Yugoslavia. But what is desperately needed, at present, is a better understanding of how the Yugoslav political system could have fallen so far so fast since Tito's death. The reader will seek in vain for the answer in the Seroka and Smiljkovic volume, which appears to bend over backwards not to offend Yugoslav sensibilities when dealing with the shortcomings of the self-management system.

PAUL SHOUP

University of Virginia

Public Violence in Canada, 1867–1982. By Judy M. Torrance (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1986. 270p. $32.50).

This book is an ambitious attempt to examine the sources, character, and responses to, public violence in Canada. Torrance has assembled a great deal of historical, sociological and psychological information and produced several suggestive interpretations of both Canadian politics and Canadian culture in general.

Torrance begins her work by defining *violence* as "the infliction of physical harm on people or their property" (p. 9). Having eliminated nonphysical harm, she further narrows the scope of her study by noting she will be mostly concerned with "public" violence, which she describes as "those incidents that are widely regarded as having a significant impact on society or an important part of it" (p. 14). It is possible, of course, to take issue with these definitions, but they are presented along with discussion of other possibilities and certainly her choices constitute a reasonable basis for scholarly exploration.

Discussion of the literature regarding violence permeates the book, but little if any of this information will be new to those interested in the field. In any event, Torrance is concerned with applying these theoretical approaches to analyzing violence to various Canadian cases; and it seems appropriate, therefore, to focus this review on that effort.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty with an attempt to examine public violence in Canada is that there has been so little of it. For example, only one incident of public violence in Canadian history, that is, the Northwest Rebellion of 1885, resulted in more than nine deaths. For this reason much of Torrance's work is aimed at an explanation of why Canada has been a comparatively nonviolent society. Not surprisingly, she finds that Canada's history, its political culture, and the actions of its governments offer partial explanations.

Torrance's treatment of what she calls the myth of the "Peaceable Kingdom" is particularly interesting. She argues that the perception of Canada as being, and needing to be, a peaceful society, especially when compared to the United States, has had a powerful effect in shaping the attitudes of both political leaders and the Canadian people as a whole. This perception has tended to stigmatize both public violence and the nongovernmental organizations promoting it as being "un-Canadian" and therefore illegitimate. In consequence, these beliefs have also provided the authorities with strong justifications for applying stern measures to suppress public violence. Torrance further notes that in many instances the occurrence of violence in Canada has been precipitated by governmental actions rather than those of discontented groups. These governmental actions, however, have been popularly approved as being necessary for the preservation of "peace, order and good government." Indeed, her discussion of the role of government in the management of violence in Canada is among the most valuable portions of the book.

I believe that the portrait of Canada that Torrance paints is generally accurate and that her book will be an important contribution to understanding public violence and Canada. Having said this, I also think the author has used far too much space in attempting to relate all potentially relevant theories of violence to the Canadian experience. Very often this diligence results in what might be characterized as an "on-the-one-hand-but-on-the-other-hand" type of evaluation. These assessments are no doubt judicious, but they result in tedious reading and the impression that almost everything is explanatory, but not very. In the conclusion of her book Torrance acknowledges the often limited value of much of the theorizing about public violence and proceeds to offer a sensible listing of "eight factors that ought to be taken into account when seeking to explain an incident or pattern of violence."

Public Violence in Canada is, I believe, a thoughtful book and can be read profitably not only by those interested in Canada but by anyone who is interested in the fields of political stability, collective violence, and internal war.

WAYNE G. REILLY

Hollins College

Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia. By William Zimmerman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. ix, 158p. $22.00).

William Zimmerman's book is intended to be a "stocktaking of important trends in Yugoslav political development" (p. 5). Yugoslavia's change from a closed, Soviet-type system to an open one after the 1948 Cominform expulsion is studied from three perspectives: (1) national-international linkages; (2) connections between the external environment and the evolution of Yugoslav institutions and policy processes; and (3) linkage between Yugoslav and international economies and Yugoslav mass-elite relations.

In 1948 the Yugoslav leadership was forced to reformulate the direction of their domestic and foreign policies. The Yugoslavs aspired to play an important international role despite their exile from the Soviet bloc by promoting an ideology which differentiated them from both superpowers. Zimmerman contests the supposition, widely held by Yugoslav scholars, that nonalignment resulted from Yugoslav adherence to workers' control through self-management, the linchpin of its domestic policy. His argument is that self-management was "the domestic expression" of Yugoslav aspirations for increased international influence. Chronologically, of course, self-management forms were instituted long before nonalignment became a policy option. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia's turn to the United Nations in the aftermath of the Cominform expulsion was a forerunner of its use of international mechanisms to preserve the domestic legitimacy of the Communist party and, one suspects, the integrity of ethnically divided postwar Yugoslavia. The fact that the Yugoslavs persist in tinkering with self-management speaks volumes for its importance to the elite, particularly since economists warn that persistence of some of its forms threatens deepening economic chaos for Yugoslavia. The major concern of post-Tito Yugoslavia is Soviet "hegemonism." Perhaps the major hope is that Yugoslav self-management may be deemed worth saving as a unique construct and that the West will continue to allow that Yugoslavia's nonaligned status must be maintained. In that case, Zimmerman's national-international linkage is brought up to date.

Zimmerman details Yugoslavia's problem of governing its workers abroad, whose large number qualifies them to be considered as Yugoslavia's "seventh republic." However, the "seventh republic" is able to influence the Yugoslav government in ways that the six traditional Yugoslav republics cannot; that is, the regime must avoid policy-making that interrupts the flow of remittances from the migrant workers. Furthermore, Yugoslav workers have greater exposure to Western ideas and culture (including conspicuous consumption) limiting even more Yugoslavia's ability for heavy-handed socialization. Zimmerman thus concludes about Yugoslav economic migration that "just as exit precludes Yugoslav totalitarianism," it also opens an escape valve that decreases the likelihood of antiregime and of pluralist mobilization (p. 143). Because the subject of migrant workers is such a difficult one both from the point of view of the sending and the receiving countries and because Zimmerman presents such a wealth of material on Yugoslavia's approach to the problem, this publication might have profited from some discussion and comparison of the problems that other sources of migrant labor, such as Turkey, share with Yugoslavia and how (or if) they are able to solve them. The reader with interests outside of Yugoslavia might also have benefited from learning more about how the EEC countries have reacted to the influx of Yugoslav labor and to what extent this has altered relations between Yugoslavia and those countries.

While there are books aplenty about various aspects of Yugoslavia, Zimmerman's work has its greatest value in its focus on the effect of the international environment on internal political development. This study persuasively argues via the Yugoslav example that "plural penetration [by elements of the international environment] can increase a state's freedom to maneuver internationally and also allow its elites to maximize the resources available with which to pursue its internal development strategy" (pp. 145-46). It would be interesting to see if this theory corresponds as well to a country that is securely within a bloc as it does to a country that professes nonalignment.

The author's respect and concern for the reader are evidenced by his attention to organization and word economy. However, detracting from the quality of the author's presentation is the format of the footnotes. Inclusion of a shortened version of each footnote within the text was disconcerting as it broke the flow of reading and forced the incorporation of explanatory notes into the text. Happily, this is only a minor imperfection in a work of real value for both policymakers and analysts of Communist systems, toward whom this book is aimed.

FRANCINE FRIEDMAN

Vanderbilt University

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Strategic Nuclear Targeting. Edited by Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. 367p. $29.95).

To nuclear strategy and in turn to all our defensive dispositions, nothing is more important than targeting—a point amply made by the editors and authors of this instructive and expertly written and compiled work. It is a collection of 13 chapters (including an introductory essay), by 13 authors, including the editors, Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson. The other authors are David T. Cattell, Lawrence Freedman, Colin S. Gray, Michael Kennedy, William T. Lee, Kevin N. Lewis, F. S. Nyland, George H. Quester, Bennett Ramberg, David Alan Rosenberg, and David Yost. All are well known in the general field or subfields of nuclear strategy.

The format of this volume, with almost half of the chapters previously published in virtually the same versions, breeds some overlapping. The book is not a text or the structured and unfolding argument of a single author or study group or even a panel or conference, yet the volume has coherence and great current utility despite the somewhat ancient origin of some of the chapters. In fact, the editors have done a considerable service to the strategic-intellectual community and, beyond that, to the defense policymaking community and the attentive public, in presenting in one place a comprehensive set of essays that focus sustained attention on the significant dimensions of the nuclear targeting question: historical, analytic, critical, and prescriptive.

Though targeting is "central" to nuclear strategy and national strategy, it is poorly understood—indeed in some ways perversely misunderstood—by the public. This is true even—perhaps especially—of those in the peace movement, who describe themselves as particularly "concerned" about the possible effects and the putative imminence of nuclear war, who base a large part of their discontent with present U.S. (and Soviet) nuclear strategy on the misperception that it (still) embodies an immediate, total, and mutual countercity salvo. (Actually, U.S. nuclear targeting doctrine did call for something approximating this, but only in the first primitive years of the United States possession of nuclear weapons, and even then, the lists included a much wider spectrum of military targets.) Thus, peace activists seize the "best" of both sides of the critical argument, assailing the instability that is more properly associated with counter*force* targeting, and condemning the terminal destruction that is properly associated with counterpopulation targeting. But also, in a curious mirror image, the hawkish Right carelessly assumes that present nuclear targeting doctrine consists of the notorious "MAD" (mutual assured destruction). A careful reading of the essays in this book should disabuse anyone of such simplistic misapprehensions of targeting doctrine—though it may create other reasons for apprehension.

It would be invidious—as well as impossible in this space—to conduct a comparative evaluation or a detailed review of the contributions of each of the 13 authors. All the contributors bring to their essays the benefit of years of cool, exacting attention to weapons, strategies, characteristics of target systems, and the history of nuclear decision making in the United States and elsewhere. The general plan of the book is a history of targeting doctrine; a comparative discussion of the doctrines of the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union; a critique of various types of targeting doctrines (countervalue, including deliberate killing of population; counterforce; attacks on political elites; countereconomic targeting, including destruction of nuclear power plants; concentration on the sinews of Soviet control of ethnic minorities); and a discussion of the problem of nuclear war termination.

A reviewer, casting his eye over this material, might ask, at the outset, why study targeting at such close range (that is, if one is not a "weaponeer" by vocation)? To give a sense of where targeting fits within its larger field, I divide nuclear strategy into two aspects: first, *posture* (the numbers and kinds of weapons; their characteristics of accuracy, range, and destructive yields of radiation and heat and blast; the delivery vehicles and platforms; their locations; their time urgency, vulnerability and speed to target; and the mechanisms of command and control) and second, *doctrine*, consisting of (1) precedence or occasion of use, that is, when they are to be used (in a first or second strike, in response to what provocation, in what sequence and numbers) and (2) *targeting*, that is, at what we aim our nuclear forces: whether countervalue, counterforce, or some variant of either.

It is essential to realize that targeting is "logically" connected with precedence of use (most poignantly, the implication of counterforce with first strike) and also with the evolution of the tangible elements of nuclear posture. An example of the latter connection is the observation, made by Ball in the introduction, that not until five or six Single Integrated Operational Plans (SIOPs) from the first one in 1960 did the United States even have the technology, particularly that of accuracy, that would make it relevant to entertain a menu of sharply distinguishable targeting options.

Nuclear strategy is not merely an underdeveloped area; it is also a peculiarly perverse subject. What shines through the entire collection of essays is a paradox—or at least an irony: that rationality—of target selection, among other aspects—is not just hard to attain but self-contradictory. Precisely because rationality contributes to the limitation of destruction and the chance of reimposing intrawar deterrence, that is, stopping the destruction, it conflicts with the very *ir*rationality whose prospect constitutes the most effective deterrent of nuclear war in the first place. This book invites us to ponder the blend of rationality and irrationality inherent in nuclear deterrence and nuclear war. In particular, the exacting critique of targeting *choices* should dispel the widely accepted and almost comfortable notion that nuclear threats and nuclear war proceed from "madness." That judgment leads not only to misplaced ascriptions of causality but to wrong, as well as contentious and distracting, remedies—such as those in George Kennan's article entitled "Cease This Madness" (*Atlantic*, January 1981).

This book incorporates the judgment that over long stretches of time, actual targeting doctrines had little to do with rhetorical policy; that targeting doctrines have been existential, in the sense that they were determined and limited by capabilities. This is not quite the more far-reaching claim of liberal critics that targeting doctrine has evolved through sheer mindlessness. There is also considerable ground for skepticism of tailoring effects to accomplish exotic strategic purposes and Machiavellian political purposes. First, there is the sheer degradation of command and communication, including the "hot line," that would occur in the first few minutes of a nuclear war. Second, even though U.S. doctrine since 1973 has explicitly excluded attacks against cities "per se," there are some residual-ly limitless nuclear effects. And especially there is the high degree of collocation of military or leadership or political targets, or just about any other category of supposedly discrete targets with large bodies of population, particularly in the Soviet Union. Not to put too fine a point on this, the enemy might not understand—or might not choose to understand—that we didn't "mean" to destroy its cities; and, of course, then it would be all over for us, too. In fact, all 200 of the 200 largest Soviet cities, and 80% of the 886 Soviet cities with populations over 25 thousand would be attacked anyway, and thus various "noncity" attacks would kill an estimated 50 to 100 million Soviet people. Among other "unintended"—or, more grisly, intended—effects of attacks against Soviet nuclear power plants would be the release of radioactive substances from some 40 reactors, which would render 50,000 square miles of territory in the European USSR uninhabitable for at least 50 years. All of this calls into serious question the feasibility of "escalation control," on which limited nuclear options partially rest. And it illustrates that nuclear weapons are not the clear and precise signaling devices sometimes suggested in the more abstract literature on deterrence and compellence. The encompassing context is that in an initially deliberate, or even an expanding and ultimately all-consuming, nuclear attack on populations, about half a billion people would be killed "promptly" in the United States, the Soviet Union, and Europe, and other hundreds of millions would be extinguished by more slowly developing global effects.

One thing I miss, in the discussion of the derivation of U.S. targeting doctrine (though it does appear in the discussions of British, French, and Soviet doctrines), is an ultimate inquiry into *why* (in the sense of a reason, not just a blank history or a mindless technological drift) our current strategy has moved to an emphasis on counterforce, with such disabilities as the open-endedness of weapons and cost and the heightened crisis instability. There is a connection that runs very deep in our overall national strategy. Counterforce targeting is virtually dictated by our extension of nuclear deterrence over important allies, such as those of NATO. The thread runs through "damage limitation" (of our society, not merely of our offensive nuclear forces) as a function of our offensive nuclear weapons; damage limitation is important to the credibility of our extended deterrence. Damage limitation, in turn, is facilitated by counterforce (and by strategic defense). Thus, in this one respect, this book fails to indicate what—and how much—would have to change, beyond the weapons systems and the deployments, if we should want to change our current targeting doctrine.

Does any common prescriptive advice emerge from this book? Perhaps this would be too much to expect, given that the book is an assemblage of views from some at least obliquely antagonistic parts of the defense intellectual community (for example, Colin Gray and Jeffrey Richelson). One summary conclusion, endorsed by almost all, is that any nuclear war might be so catastrophic that no combatant would "prevail," in the gross sense of this word. Even Colin Gray, an avowed proponent of not the desirability (!) but at least the relative feasibility of fighting a nuclear war, states that if prior attention is not devoted to damage limitation and intrawar deterrence, the initiation of even limited nuclear strikes would lead to "suicide on the installment plan."

Coeditor Ball, in the introduction, counsels that "it would be prudent to give further consideration to targeting strategies that avoid attacks on military, leadership, and economic-industrial targets in urban areas, since these attacks create a greater risk of climatic effects." Also, for other reasons, the various authors advise avoiding the targeting of such sophisticated subsets as the networks that control ethnic minorities and the bunkers of military and civilian leadership, as well as discouraging counterforce in its specific sense of targeting (presumably in a first, or early, strike) the enemy's nuclear missiles. But such severe limitation of target categories (and I, for one agree with the sense and thrust of such limitation) carries the implication that it might degrade deterrence. And since deterrence is the irreducible function of nuclear weapons, a function acknowledged even by those who assert that they have no "military" function, then we are back where we started. In the business of nuclear strategy, as in most other businesses, there is no free lunch—or, in this case, no free launch.

EARL C. RAVENAL

Georgetown University

America's Changing Role in the World System. Edited by Terry Boswell and Albert Bergesen (New York: Praeger, 1987. xi, 300p. $37.95).

This book is concerned with whether the United States can continue as the dominant power in the contemporary international system, and the possible consequences that may emerge from a change in the pattern of U.S. hegemony. The book is divided into three parts. The first examines the U.S. decline in the context of continuity and change in world system structure. The essays in this section are devoted to the discussion of such topics as the U.S. response to the world economic crisis that has supposedly resulted from a downward phase in the long wave of international economic expansion and contraction, the political ironies that have emerged as U.S. power has waned, the degree to which the world system has undergone structural transformations since the Second World War, and the prospects for the sort of basic changes in the international system that would lead to the demise of the nation-state.

Put simply, the central thesis in the first section is that the ability of the United States to retain its hegemonic position is in decline. It is explained that this is a function of twin processes: (1) long waves of economic prosperity and recession, and (2) the inability of dominant countries to use their policy selections to guarantee their ascendency over time. Both processes are attributed to the inherent functioning of the capitalist world system, in which constant competition for market domination and profits create tendencies toward such things as overproduction, a constant search for cheaper labor, and a continual jostling by lesser countries to upset the domination of hegemonic actors. It is argued that these historical shifts are inevitable and that the policy choices of actors will do little to arrest these processes. It also is noted ominously that in the past, war has been a key mechanism for facilitating changes from one hegemonic state to another. Therefore, the apparently imminent demise of the United States is discussed as being a reason for apprehension.

The second part of the book investigates some of the specific problems that have emerged as U.S. difficulties have multiplied. The problems examined include (1) the erosion of innovative approaches to production and management in the United States and the attempt to borrow potential Japanese solutions; (2) the degree to which the international arena remains hierarchical even as U.S. hegemony recedes; (3) the nature of the international competition that confronts the United States and how it has changed over time; (4) the changing conflicts between the United States and the third world; and (5) how U.S. aid to third world countries has shifted over time and whether it is related to violent changes in governments.

On the whole, the book's greatest strengths are found in this part. As is stated at one point, "while the process of hegemonic rise and decline in world production is much discussed in world system and international relations circles, the specifics of the process are little understood" (p. 157). Enhancing understanding requires careful research. The work reported by the authors in this part of the book reflects this sort of research, with efforts being made to test systematically some of the contentions that often are associated with world systems theory. The discussion in the first part of the book would have benefited from similar attempts to substantiate the views that are expressed.

The book's final section considers how declining hegemony affects U.S. culture and society. The decline of U.S. art, shifts in the perceptions that U.S. citizens have of themselves and of the world, and the changing roles played by women in the world and in U.S. society are the topics that these essays address. With the exception of the essay on U.S. perceptions, these essays are only tenuously tied to the themes presented earlier. A concluding chapter designed to summarize and tie together the points made by the contributors would have been useful for overcoming this problem.

JOHN M. ROTHGEB, JR.

Miami University

The Causes and Prevention of War. By Seyom Brown (New York: St. Martin's, 1987. xiv, 274p. $32.50).

Seyom Brown admits to casting his net "widely across ideological orientations and fields of knowledge" (p. vii) in his search for the causes of war and strategies for peace. He reaps a rich harvest in the end, one whose final bounty is worth the attention and the patience needed to fish with him in what are sometimes familiar waters, at least for academic specialists in peace studies. The net *is* a large one, corralling relevant work out of all the social sciences and the views of strategists and statesmen, biologists, philosophers, moralists, and theologians.

At its best this work provides clear, well-reasoned summaries of the views of a Ghandi, Galtung, Kissinger, or Harold Brown, of the rationale for the Kellogg-Briand Pact, for UN peacekeeping, or for the NPT and SALT. Abstract issues in alliance building, deployments, diplomatic maneuvering, and much else that may cause or prevent warfare are often neatly illustrated with apt historical references, so that even the familiar may look invitingly fresh.

Yet the effort to gather everything in may not always discriminate clearly among what is more or less important to an understanding of this most critical of human issues. For example, chapter 7 presents a considerable sample of "peace plans"—from the seventeenth century to the present—for transforming the global political structure to minimize the amount and scope of large-scale violence. While one might argue that some of these are demeaned by the tiny space allotted them, more disconcerting is the effect of a section toward the end of the chapter "The Superpower Disarmament Charade." Its placement and the space given it suggest that the earlier proposals will always be subject to the cynical manipulation of those who speak for nation-states. The leave-no-fish-uncaught approach is the main culprit here, for it tends to induce an agnosticism with regard to value choices that may perplex, more than lead, those who need direction.

The book's real importance is in its long concluding chapter, "Toward an Integrated Strategy of War Prevention and Control." Here the great net is hauled in to show how an integrated peace strategy must operate in five interlocked spheres—morality, social structure, diplomacy, military capability, and military strategy—with Brown's conclusions as to what will enhance peace then laid out for each sphere. It is an impressive work of synthesis, departing from the accumulated findings of the previous nine chapters to winnow and combine them into a convincing sketch of a strategy that is original in conception and highly provocative. For one hint of the symbiotic strength that results, Brown proposes that in the moral sphere, the number of people killed or tortured as a result of individual or group action generally determines the degree of moral evil of the action (p. 221). That premise informs his strong emphasis in the sphere of military strategy on the concept of firebreaks, of which he adduces four types—all intended to prevent escalation of combat to genocidal levels (pp. 252–57). For these reasons, when discussing the social structure, he advocates dismantling the major East-West alliances on grounds that "the principal risk borne by all coalition members—the prospect of local wars turning into global holocaust—has become a terrible . . . liability to the protectors and the protected alike" (p. 230).

The author does have a tendency to assume an inevitable disjunction between efforts to transform the system so that conflicts may be resolved peaceably, and "muddling through" in time-honored ways to avoid a holocaust. Yet as shown above, he also concludes that actors responsible to the current state system need to adopt radical changes in policy. It is more than a semantic quibble to note that, as these are implemented, they will begin to produce structural changes of the sort that will enhance the safety of the species over the longer term. The wisdom in this book is that the author never makes the best in any way the enemy of what is better. Nor should he—or we—forget that if the unacceptable risk of catastrophic violence can be transformed into one that we can live with, that risk, in turn, can be progressively diminished and the world made safer for us all.

LYNN H. MILLER

Temple University

Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security. By Steven R. David (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. xi, 191p. $22.50).

During the past two decades the literature on military coups in the third world has mushroomed—at least in some fields of regional studies—at virtually an exponential rate. Yet few scholars have explored systematically and from a global perspective the outer parameters of such domestic upheavals. Too often ignored are the international dimensions and implications of military coups; the linkages between domestic coup plotters and external powers; and the praxiological policy dictates stemming from a foreign power's desire to either overthrow a third-world regime or to shield it from an internal upheaval.

Such is the main focus of Steven David's *Third World Coups d'Etat.* His six compact chapters commence with a summary outline of generic causes of military coups (utilizing an adaptation of Huntington's not very satisfactory typology) and their repercussions especially on the United States. Claiming that significant external involvement is visible in 38 instances out of some 357 successful coups in the post-1945 era, he then analyzes the experience of the United States, the Soviet Union and (in a very cursory manner) several other powers in supporting, deterring or crushing third-world coups. He concludes with a survey of several possible U.S. responses to the various international challenges posed by attempts at violent regime changes.

David's assessment is that the United States has promoted its global interests far more effectively and with greater success, through protecting Third World regimes from coups than through backing the overthrow of unfriendly regimes. Even when U.S.-supported or sponsored upheavals have met with success "the long-term cost . . . has often worked to the detriment of U.S. interests" (p. 68). The Soviet Union has more clearly evolved a contemporary strategy "designed to preserve Soviet gains rather than to expand Soviet influence" (p. 102) with the authoritarian, elitist single party, closed-society (often military-led) system prevailing in allied third-world states making its task much easier.

The author's recommendations to U.S. policymakers seeking to provide a bulwark for friendly foreign regimes against internal military upheavals are the inevitably shopworn ones of yesteryear, so uniformly ignored by most third-world leaders: encourage a drift towards democracy, popular structures, economic and political reforms, bridging the gap between rich and poor; limit societal corruption, inculcate civic values in the military; encourage regional pacts; provide military matériel that will assure that direct U.S. involvement in the actual suppression of an upheaval is unnecessary; and encourage other powers more inclined to intervene (e.g., France, UK) to do the dirty work instead.

In general the specialist assessing David's work will here and there grumble over an occasional slight factual error, misinterpretation, cold warrior bias, or sloppy attention to detail in the notes section. (No bibliography is provided.) But all this would be in the nature of petty nitpicking for the author has masterfully, if at times somewhat superficially, synthesized a huge amount of data from a wide array of sources and weaved it with sufficiently convincing detail into his six chapters. There is thus in essence little that is wrong with what is *in* the book; however, far too many questions are raised by what is *excluded* from analysis under a variety of pretexts.

Specifically, foreign involvement in coup contexts is very narrowly defined as the author himself reminds us at the very outset, a fact that somewhat undermines the value of David's study. The work moreover relies exclusively on secondary sources (on the grounds that the global breadth of the study realistically precludes field research), not one of which is in the foreign languages. Insisting on "public, credible evidence that foreign involvement played a major role" in coup contexts (p. 2), David automatically precludes from analysis upheavals poorly understood or reported abroad, those in countries permanently shrouded by a veil of secrecy (e.g., in the Soviet orbit) or where foreign involvement is for a variety of reasons suppressed or glossed over by the host country. Similarly, excluding from consideration instances of heavy ongoing foreign support (e.g., France) for third-world regimes faced with internal threats *short* of an actual military coup may appear methodologically rigorous; but it fails to give adequate cognizance to the fact that in some countries the existing civil-military stability may be *solely* a function of the certainty in military circles that any coup would be immediately reversed by foreign force of arms.

As a result of these coup exclusions, Africa, for example—with some hundred coups and attempted coups to her credit—merits only casual attention and then only with reference to a few key upheavals. Despite the insights David strives to develop from his global perspective and notwithstanding numerous *references* to a variety of military coups in a host of countries, in reality the study rests excessively on data drawn from a limited number of upheavals in key countries. Hence the very uneasy feeling the reader is likely to have as he or she puts down the book, aware of its solid merits but also that it really presents only part of the picture. Clearly a wider net needs to be thrown out by the next scholar to approach this theme (with the "French connection" in client states specifically bearing investigation) if the very pertinent issue of the external parameters of third-world coups is to be more definitely analyzed.

SAMUEL DECALO

University of Natal

Strategy and Force Planning: The Case of the Persian Gulf. By Joshua M. Epstein (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987. xiii, 169p. $28.95, cloth; $10.95, paper).

Joshua Epstein's book deals with a very important defense policy problem of immediate concern to the United States: What strategy and what force structure would provide the most credible deterrent to large-scale Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf? To assess these questions, Epstein analyzes a case study of U.S. defensive options to Soviet attack options in the oil fields of Khuzestan in southwestern Iran. Three basic strategies are addressed: one is symmetrical (i.e., involves a reaction to threats "at the same location, time and level of the original provocation"), while the other two are asymmetrical (i.e., involve "shifting the location or nature of one's reaction onto terrain better suited to the application of one's strengths against adversary weaknesses") (p. 1). The *conventional tripwire-vertical escalation* (asymmetrical) strategy is discussed in chapter 2. Here "a small nonnuclear force would be quickly emplaced as a signal of U.S. commitment and as a tripwire that if violated, would ostensibly trigger nuclear employment against targets in the Soviet Union or Iran. The prospect of nuclear reprisal, rather than that of outright conventional denial, would carry the disuasive burden" (p. 6).

The *horizontal escalation* (asymmetrical) strategy (discussed in chapter 3) involves "launching counter offensives with conventional forces against Soviet targets *outside* the Persian Gulf theater" (p. 6). According to Epstein, the major weakness of the asymmetrical strategies as a defensive response to Soviet aggression in the gulf, is their lack of credibility. He therefore suggests another alternative: the *conventional deterrence* (symmetrical) strategy (which is addressed in chapter 4). This strategy advocates the use of a U.S. rapid deployment force considerably smaller than that planned by the Reagan administration to deter Soviet aggression. According to Epstein, this is the most credible and the preferred defense strategy available to the United States in the Persian Gulf.

Strategy and Force Planning is a well-written and well-organized book and is easily read. It compares and evaluates different Soviet scenarios (e.g., the airlifted and overland attack options) and U.S. defensive options while employing threat assessment and force planning methods (detailed in a series of appendixes). Its use of dynamic simulation methods coupled with sensitivity analysis while offering an alternative formulation to Lanchester's equations is particularly innovative. The author's knowledge of Iran's geography and of Soviet and U.S. military options and vulnerabilities in the gulf is also impressive. Based on his analysis, Epstein recommends that in case of Soviet aggression in the gulf, the United States threaten to exploit Soviet military vulnerabilities while relying on a five-division, speedy, rapid deployment force (see chapter 5).

As is the case with some studies based on scenarios, however, Epstein's discussion of a number of issues seems speculative and leaves the impression that other attack options and counteractions should also have been considered. Moreover, Epstein's quantitative analysis is directed not at the comparison of the three basic strategies (a comparison that, although well presented, is entirely subjective) but rather at the issue of force structure and requirements. Furthermore, as the author himself has noted (p. 5), the generalizability of his analysis to other contingencies in the Persian Gulf is questionable. Despite these few limitations, however, the strengths of *Strategy and Force Planning* clearly outweigh its weaknesses. It is a very interesting and timely book, which deserves the attention of all serious students of national security policy.

ALEX MINTZ

Hebrew University
Texas A&M University

The Political Economy of International Relations. By Robert Gilpin with the assistance of Jean M. Gilpin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. xvi, 449p. $45.00, cloth; $9.95, paper).

The study of international relations in the United States has been dominated by two alternative paradigms, liberalism and realism. Robert Gilpin has been one of the most sensitive and illuminating exponents of the latter perspective. In *The Political Economy of International Relations* he distills and extends much of his earlier work. This study is both a shrewd analysis of the contemporary international environment and a summary of developments in the field of international political economy over the last two decades.

Gilpin does not believe that the prosperity and stability that characterized the early postwar period, when U.S. hegemonic leadership was at its height, can be restored. There have been fundamental structural changes in the international system, most importantly a decline in the power of the United States resulting from postwar recovery in the rest of the world, the astonishing performance of several East Asian countries, and domestic mismanagement of the U.S. economy, especially by the Reagan administration. Consumer spending, economic growth, and the defense buildup were made possible only because the Japanese were prepared to underwrite the massive federal budget deficit. The competitiveness of U.S. firms was eroded by overvaluation of the dollar, which altered consumer tastes and strengthened foreign producers. The United States went from being the world's major creditor to being its largest debtor. Never before had such a dramatic shift in international financial markets taken place in so short a time.

Gilpin sees little prospect for the emergence of pluralistic leadership that could replace U.S. hegemony and sustain a liberal order. The United States has increasingly turned toward the pursuit of more specific and narrowly defined interests, which Gilpin terms *minilateralism.* U.S. policymakers destroyed the Bretton Woods system in August 1971. Protectionism has increased. The macroeconomic policies of the Reagan administration undermined stability by leading to exchange rate misalignment, massive bilateral trade deficits, and exchange rate instability.

The Europeans are not prepared to assume a global role. Their economies cannot easily adjust because of wage rigidities and welfare state commitments; and they have, in any event, never been as wedded to liberalism as the United States. Planned trade is more attractive for the European community.

The Japanese have made rhetorical commitments to openness, but the dense social networks that characterize all Japanese relationships make it very hard for foreign manufacturers to penetrate the Japanese market. The Japanese concentration on interindustry rather than intraindustry trade increases the likelihood of interest group-generated political conflicts. The Japanese cannot act as a market of last resort, one of the critical functions for any hegemonic leader in the world economy.

Because pluralistic leadership is unlikely, Gilpin argues that the best that can be hoped for is what he terms *benign mercantilism*—a policy of state intervention designed to promote domestic values and order rather than to prey on the vulnerabilities of other states. He already sees manifestations of such a strategy. There has been an increasing amount of sectoral protectionism, a policy that can accommodate variations in the ability and willingness of different countries to adjust to external pressures. Regional blocs are emerging with North America, West Europe, and the Pacific basin becoming more internally integrated.

Gilpin notes that his view is less sanguine than that of many economists who see the developments of the 1980s as the result of a temporary conjuncture of events whose consequences could be reversed through proper economic policies. It is also more pessimistic than the implications growing out of theories of cooperation concluding that liberal order is possible even without hegemony.

Gilpin is legitimately and explicitly skeptical about the possibility of securing empirical evidence that would decisively substantiate realist, Marxist, or liberal perspectives. But he has written a study that makes an important contribution to the vitality and lucidity of that debate.

STEPHEN D. KRASNER

Stanford University

ASEAN in Regional and Global Context. Edited by Karl D. Jackson, Sukhumbhend Baribatra, J. Soedjati, and J. Soedjati Djiwandono (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986. viii, 357p. $20.00, paper).

In its twentieth year, ASEAN faces considerable challenges. The organization has lost momentum in its political leadership of the opposition to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Economic integration within ASEAN still remains to be accomplished. In order to meet these challenges more effectively, the organization must move toward greater structure and institutionalization in its organization and decision making. ASEAN continues to play a central role in Southeast Asian politics.

This volume evolved from papers presented at the third U.S.-ASEAN conference, "ASEAN in Regional and International Context" held in Cheng-mai, Thailand in January 1985. The papers have been revised and reflect events up to February 1986, including the change in government in the Philippines.

This volume meets a variety of needs in the discipline. It provides excellent individual summaries of contemporary politics and foreign policies of the member states. ASEAN is well placed in its regional context with regional decision makers and specialists contributing. Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and economic integration in ASEAN are each addressed with separate analyses by a regional and a U.S. specialist. Considerable attention has been paid to the selection of contributors to this book. Regional scholars are equal in number to U.S. contributors. All contributors are well known in the Southeast Asia and U.S. academic communities.

Part titles and authors are as follows:

"Overview," Thanat Khoman, Robert A. Scalapino, and K. S. Sandhu

"Politics and Foreign Policy of the ASEAN States," Ansil Ramsay, Suchit Bunbongkarnand Sukhumbhand Paribatra, Jusuf Wanandi, Donald K. Emmerson, Carolina G. Hernandez, Larry A. Niksch, Shafruddin Hashim, Chan Heng Chee, and Michael Leifer

"Regional Relations," Evelyn Colbert, Douglas Pike, and David A. Steinberg

"ASEAN and the Major Powers," Karl D. Jackson, Hadi Soesastro, Bruce Glassburner, Leo E. Rose, Sheldon W. Simon, and Zakaria Haji Ahmad

This book will be of use to those searching for a paperback text or supplementary work on ASEAN. It is also appropriate for supplementary use in an international relations or politics course on Southeast Asia. It is the most comprehensive work on ASEAN, its member nations, and the region published in the U.S. in the 1980s.

ROBERT L. RAU

U.S. Naval Academy

Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America. By Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987. xi, 240p. $19.95).

Lowenthal argues that all administrations since World War II have paid too little attention to the needs and problems of Latin America or, conversely, have overreacted to perceived security threats, especially in the Caribbean–Central American region. In his view, the Reagan administration is one of the worst offenders. Lowenthal proposes that the U.S. government substitute for its hegemonic striving in the hemisphere a policy of special attention to the region embracing long-term cooperation and economic assistance. He argues that such a new approach not only meets the reality of a Latin America greatly transformed over the past three decades but also enhances U.S. security and economic interests.

To support this thesis he traces the enormous economic changes that have taken place in Latin America since 1960. He also expresses the hope that the recent replacement of a series of authoritarian regimes by electoral-constitutional systems represents a substantial move toward democratic reformism, mixed economies, and evolutionary social reform. He regards bureaucratic authoritarianism, military populism, and socialism as unsuccessful approaches to the drive for economic growth. Following this, he briefly reviews U.S. policies toward Latin America from the 1960s to the present, particularly toward Mexico, Brazil, and the Caribbean Basin. In the three areas he examines specific issues and applies his own perspectives as to how U.S. policy should be conducted and to what ends. He ends with a strong appeal for his new approach.

How well does Lowenthal present his case? The answer of course depends on one's own values and perspectives. It is doubtful that he will move the Reagan administration to modify its policy in Central America or to propose a major new response to the debt crisis and other economic problems. Those of us who have been critical of U.S. policies in Latin America find much to applaud in his prescriptions. I particularly support his view that no security threat emanates from any Latin American country but that it might come from Soviet submarine or strategic air bases in friendly countries. Many of us also believe that the debts should be scaled down, fees and interest rates reduced, and U.S. markets opened more freely to Latin American products, even those in stiff competition with U.S.-manufactured products. Lowenthal argues forcefully that if the Latin American economies cannot produce and sell their products abroad, they cannot possibly develop their economies, improve quality of life, or pay off their debts.

But I have reservations about the work, some of which are serious. First, Lowenthal frequently equates democracy with electoral constitutionalism. Second, he fails to clarify the relative responsibilities of the United States and the several Latin American countries for the economic development of the area. He is clearly no *dependentista*, but he does speak of dependent economies on occasion. More importantly, he fails to address social inequities in Latin America adequately. He notes the maldistribution of wealth, income, health care, education, and so on, but offers no analysis of local political restraints inhibiting reform. Finally, he fails to assess the political feasibility of his new policies or to offer credible strategies and scenarios for implementing them. Lowenthal wants it all: U.S. cooperation for moderate social reform, economic growth and development, and democratic government, the program of the Alliance for Progress. With the demise of the alliance, many of us came to believe that "not all good things come together," that the three "goodies" could only be packaged separately, and that the U.S. role could only be minimally beneficial, when not harmful.

KARL M. SCHMITT

University of Texas, Austin

Islam in a World of Nation-States. By James Piscatori (New York: Cambridge University Press in association with the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1984. viii, 193p. $34.50, cloth; $12.95, paper).

In the midst of politicization of "the children of God," particularly the Muslims, who seem to have risen against all established international norms, Piscatori's book is refreshing, delightful, and surprising. It is surprising because it is a grave, but sober and well thought-out, stand against the current strong wave both within and outside the Islamic world. It is generally held that Islam as a universal and comprehensive scheme for ordering human existence strives for a universal government, thus contradicting the present international system of territorial states. Piscatori tells us that he will write two volumes, one dealing with Islam and nationalism and the other treating "the transnational character of Islam" (p. vii). The present volume addresses the first issue.

Piscatori's basic argument is that Islam has been much more tolerant of political realities as compared with other ideologies and religions. In terms of the present international system, Islam and the Muslims are in agreement both with "its rules of the game" and more importantly with its philosophical foundation, "territorial statism." After a well-reasoned argument, Piscatori concludes that "in Islam, the nation-state is no less possible, or no more fraught with problems, than it is in non-Muslim world. Indeed, over centuries of historical experience and the evolution of theory, Muslims have largely freed themselves of a model which denigrates territorial pluralism and demands monolithic unity. In the process, another, rather different, consensus has emerged which implies that the nation-state is, or can be, an Islamic institution" (pp. 149–150).

All Muslim countries are active members of the international system and its central club, the United Nations, including the Islamic Republic of Iran. Piscatori proves that such a participation is not simply a tactical move. Rather it represents a new consensus that has emerged among Muslims. This consensus is proven by an examination of "the classical and medieval theory," "the practice of Muslims" (or what the author calls "consensus of action" [*ijma' al-fi'l*]), and the works of Muslim writers (or "the consensus of speech" [*ijma' al-qaml*]). They all point to the harmony of Islam and the international system. One more factor in his thesis concerns the notion of development in modern Muslim thinking. According to Piscatori, "the view that Islam retards to the process of development . . . owes much to Marx and something to Durkheim" (p. 117), who connected nation-building with secularization. Recent Muslim experience displays, in Piscatori's view, a great deal of development even on the part of "radical" Muslims.

If Piscatori is right, then what about the so-called "radical Islam" or "fundamental Islam"? Piscatori discusses them under the rubric of "non-conformism." According to him, "while not the majority's sentiment, [it] has a distinguished place in Muslim thought on nationalism and the nation-state" (p. 101). It is true that nonconformist leaders consider features of the present international system as contrary to Islam, but Piscatori rightly observes that this kind of thinking "coexists with nationalist thinking. . . . Particularly when charged with running a society, these idealists become realists—of a sort—who recognize that the nation-state is a functional institution" (p. 116).

Piscatori's argument may raise a general objection. This way of interpreting Islam, its history, and the Muslim's life, it may be said, constitutes interpreting Islam according to the world rather than the world according to Islam. But this objection arises from a rigid way of defining Islam. Islam recognizes the right of Muslims to exercise independent judgements (*ijtihad*) wherever their religious tradition is silent. "The classical and medieval theory does not refer to nation-state" (p. 144); and Muslims' words and deeds reveal a consensus that answers the objection. Piscatori's book is a major contribution to Islamic studies as well as an important treatment of the issue of the boundary between religion and politics in Islam. And if the author's promise is materialized and the companion volume on the transnational aspect of Islam is published, many of the ambiguities that overshadow politics in Islam will be answered.

FARHAN RAJAEE

Tehran, Iran

Modern Diasporas in International Politics. Edited by Gabriel Sheffer (New York: St. Martin's, 1986. viii, 349p. $32.00).

In recent years the activities of ethnic minorities within nation-states have become of interest to scholars of both international relations and domestic politics. Not only have these populations presented serious challenges to the internal social, economic, and political practices of individual countries around the globe; but they also have become a source of irritation in several interstate relationships. One has only to consider the recent roles of the Chinese in Vietnam, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, or the East Indians in Uganda to realize that such ethnic minorities have become actors in the international arena as well as players on the domestic stage.

Gabriel Sheffer's edited work attempts to draw our attention to this fact. Each of the essays contained within the book focuses the reader's attention on the role and influence of ethnic diasporas on international and trans-state politics. Whether it be the case of Turkish "guest workers" in Western Europe, Indian immigrants in East Africa or the overseas Chinese population in Southeast Asia, an effort is made to detail the manner in which such groups become important—and often controversial—linkages between two societies. Similarly each author explores the character of the triadic networks of interaction and influence that develop among "homeland," "host country," and the diaspora group that develop from such linkages.

This inquiry into the significant international dimension of ethnic minorities represents an important advance in the study of immigrant populations. Until quite recently most of the literature in the field focused its attention almost exclusively on the internal political activities of immigrant groups and ignored their linkage role to the international system. The several contributors to Sheffer's volume have done an excellent job in attempting to conceptualize and empirically explore this linkage function. They have endeavored to discover how and under what circumstances immigrant groups become active participants in the international arena as well as the effects of such participation on the foreign relations of homelands and host countries. Milton Esman's concluding essay is particularly helpful in this regard.

The comparative focus of the inquiry is one of the major strengths of the volume. In most instances the cases that have been selected for study aptly illustrate the various ways in which immigrant groups become involved in interstate tension and conflict. Unfortunately, not all of the more recent examples of this type of behavior are noted. This is particularly the case with instances in North America. One of the few shortcomings of the book is that it tends to neglect Vietnamese, Haitian, and Hispanic migrations to the United States and Canada, while devoting disproportionate attention to Jewish and Palestinian diasporas.

Another concern relates to the contributors' desire to establish a distinction between the behavior of diaspora groups and other immigrant populations that are more assimilated into the host community. While it is true that the former groups are likely to be more visible and prominent participants in the linkage function between homeland and host country than the latter, this difference in behavior may be a difference more of degree than in kind. Certainly much of the existing literature on nondiaspora immigrant groups has useful insights into the international behavior of ethnic minorities and should not be ignored.

Overall, *Modern Diasporas in International Politics* should be welcomed as a useful contribution to the growing number of studies examining the external behavior of ethnic groups. It provides a fresh look at the behavior of one type of immigrant group and reminds us that political activity by such communities is a contemporary reality and not simply a historical condition. Interstate relations in the latter part of twentieth century will continue to bear the imprint of immigrant influence.

DOUGLAS C. NORD

University of Minnesota, Duluth

Space and National Security. By Paul Stares (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1987. xvii, 219p. $28.95).

Space and national security remains a major issue of discussion in academic and policy circles. A number of volumes on the subject have been published in recent years as well. In contrast to Stares's first work, *The Militarization of Space*, this one focuses squarely on the role of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons and their role with respect to strategic diplomacy and existing weapons systems. While there has been some work conducted in this area, this is one of the first comprehensive treatments of the subject matter.

Stares argues that the United States need not pursue the development of an antisatellite capability to meet the Soviet threat to U.S. assets in space. If in fact the United States proceeds with the development of its program, we can surely expect the Soviets to reactivate their ASAT program and throw the United States and the Soviet Union into a new and dangerous arms race in space. It will make the costs of increasing security for existing U.S. assets in space more costly and difficult to ensure. In addition, the increased complexity of ASAT systems might add greater uncertainty to decision making in crisis situations. As an alternative to this situation, he proposes several alternative strategies for resolving the current stasis in U.S.-Soviet relations regarding antisatellite weapons. In the absence of a full scale effort of the kind envisioned by the Reagan administration, Stares proposes that U.S. officials continue to improve U.S. capabilities for surveillance of activities in space; continue to take measures to reduce the threat from Soviet satellites; develop a U.S.-Soviet ASAT test moratorium; develop a U.S.-Soviet space weapons ban; develop an accident provision in a space agreement; and develop new guidelines and clarifications for permissible types of antimissile research and development.

The evidence for these ideas are based on a thorough examination of the utility and value of, and threats to space systems posed by, existing technologies and formal arrangements between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, he presents a comparative analysis of the balance between the U.S. and Soviet space programs, and argues that any basic understanding of the strategic balance in space requires an assessment of the contextual framework within which satellites and antisatellite weapons fall. Stares begins his work with a comparative assessment of the two programs, and concludes that the United States is still the dominant power in space. Furthermore, this is not likely to change in the near future. In fact, Stares points to the panic of the Soviets regarding the Strategic Defense Initiative as a clear sign of their fear of U.S. power. In effect, the Soviets want to avoid an arms race in space because they are fearful of the long-term consequences. He argues persuasively that although the Soviets have a larger number of satellites in space, the quality and longevity of U.S. satellites more than makes up for their smaller number. The Soviets build simpler satellites dedicated to single missions. However, one disadvantage for the United States remains outstanding. Because the United States has fewer satellites, the level of dependence is greater; and this could have horrible consequences in a crisis situation. Under current circumstances, according to Stares, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is likely to attack the other's assets in space. Should the current situation change and the relative values of satellites change in response to a new set of conditions, we might face an entirely different set of problems.

The value of satellites are assessed in terms of their contribution to national security and enhancing the effectiveness of operations on earth. In contrast to this rather broad-based statement, Stares argues that the value of satellites depends on a number of critical variables that change from one context to another. It is therefore senseless to make general statements about the value of satellites without allowing for this kind of change. Such variables as geography, the nature of a crisis, redundancy, and so on play an important role in the relative value of space assets. Moreover, many satellites are used for essentially the same purposes, and can be used for more than a single mission. Stares' major conclusion, based on his review of the evidence, is that given U.S. dependence on satellites and the diverse uses different satellites can be put to, the United States has much more to lose than to gain by proceeding with an antisatellite weapons program.

In that the principal reason for the development of a U.S. ASAT program is the threat posed to the United States by Soviet assets, Stares proposes that basic enhancements of existing space-based systems would serve to limit the effectiveness of a Soviet attack. Such devices as attack and warning sensors, emergency maneuvering aids, and adding decoys to U.S. satellites would be sufficient to limit and deter a Soviet attack. The author draws on a considerable body of literature to support this position. The overwhelming consensus is that the Soviet threat to U.S. systems is exaggerated and need not be taken seriously. Once again, Stares notes that an arms race in space of an offensive nature can only make matters worse.

The most interesting feature of the study addresses the circumstances under which ASAT weapons might be made operational and employed, but this is also the weakest part of the whole work. The more important point is that contextual factors are embodied by each scenario where ASAT weapons might be used, and might play an important role in the outbreak of war. Several scenarios are possible. The first is what the author refers to as "client-state conflicts." The Arab-Israeli war of 1973, the 1978 war between Ethiopia and Somalia, and the Falklands-Malvinas war of 1982 were all circumstances of this kind and moments where satellites came into play. While the United States and the Soviet Union have provided intelligence to their clients via satellite, we should not expect much more. The United States and the Soviet Union are not likely to attack each other's satellites simply because one state provided intelligence to a client. Escalation between the superpowers is very unlikely under the circumstances. The second major form is the "client-state-versus-superpower conflict." The Libyan crisis is cited as an example of this type. It is a situation where a superpower provides information to a client state engaged in a conflict with another superpower. Intelligence provided to a client state could have an important impact on the ability of a lesser state to defend itself and inflict damage on its adversary. While the Soviets and U.S. leaders would certainly act to complicate such transmissions, once again it is very unlikely that either the United States or the Soviet Union would use ASAT weapons against the other as a result. Once again, escalation would be very unlikely. The third major type is "superpower-versus-superpower regional conflicts." In contrast to other types of conflict, this form is more open to danger and could very well throw the whole international system into chaos, and Stares therefore gives greater attention to this form.

In a kind of cost-benefit analysis Stares concludes that even in the latter context the costs of using ASAT weapons would probably outweigh the benefits. Reciprocal action by Soviets and U.S. leaders would no doubt serve to deter each state from attacking the other. If either power struck the satellite assets of its adversary, this would provide an important set of signals to the other power that could play a decisive role in subsequent action. This action could prove to be catastrophic. In the case of a possible Soviet invasion of Western Europe, ASAT weapons would not be very useful. The extensive quality of Soviet satellites in the European theatre are bolstered by measures of redundancy that would make any loss of Soviet satellites a minor matter. The Soviets could move quickly to levels of reconstitution commensurate with their security requirements.

DARRYL ROBERTS

Duke University

The Specialized Agencies and the United Nations: The System in Crisis. By Douglas Williams (New York: St. Martin's, 1987. xvi, 279p. $29.95).

This is a book produced by a committee. The committee is entirely British in membership and is overwhelmingly composed of former practitioners of intergovernmental organizations. That it is British means that the book is calmly and gracefuly written; that it is practitioner-shaped means that it is more experientially "wise" and less "scientific" than many U.S. readers might prefer. It is also pro-United Nations, in its fashion. These practitioner-consultants all see the UN "system" as being severely threatened in our time, they want to protect and rescue it, and they try to tell how. In the process and in any event, they wish to inform.

This last they do successfully. Anyone who wants a quick, comprehensive update on, and evaluation of, the UN "system" of specialized agencies will find it here. It does not often treat the agencies individually and it usually and diplomatically declines to name names, but it organizes its survey of their operations sensibly and covers them well. The analysis is almost laboriously even-handed: yes, most specialized agencies have been exploited by their third-world members, who force the consideration of allegedly extraneous political issues into their sessions (and shouldn't); but (1) hardly any political issue is truly irrelevant to some of these agencies (especially UNESCO) and (2) perpetual and unpersuasive frustration of their successful resolution in the designedly "political" organs of the UN has encouraged third-world delegates to bring them repeatedly to whatever other forums they can find. As this commentary observes more than once, UN member states have got "the UN System which they deserve" (pp. 205, 207).

The prescription on how to save it is thus readily come by: Disputing members must see the advantages of the system that accrue to all and adjust the conflicts that have arisen between them into some new international consensus, vaguely delineated but devoutly to be wished. Can it be done? "Despite Kassebaum, the reaction to African famine and the Chernobyl accident may indicate that this could be happening" now (p. 239).

"Despite Kassebaum." The United States is the major villain of the piece. This book's account of "Kassebaum and Gramm-Rudman" (chapter 8) is a small gem of analysis and indictment. The real bête noire is the Reagan administration, in this and in several other respects. Only rarely does this study lose its characteristically weary cool and point an angrily accusing finger. U.S. refusal to approve a $12 billion "replenishment" for the International Development Association in 1985 occasions one such outburst: "It is the degree of arrogance of the Reagan administration and its unwillingness to demonstrate any spirit of cooperation on such matters, even with its close allies, that has alarmed its friends and many governments in the richer as well as the poorer countries of the world" (p. 162).

But even here the study remains cautious.

Friends of the UN should not simply wait for the Reagan administration to pass and for another less anti-UN administration to take its place. The affliction is deeper than that, everywhere. This book may not prescribe for it very convincingly. But it analyzes it sympathetically and carefully. In doing so, it recognizes national variations of outlook toward the UN clearly enough. One commentator's views are said to be "characteristically French, and it is doubtful if they would be shared by, say, the Scandinavians" (p. 188). The work of the committee that did this study might have been enriched by a few, say, Scandinavians—or third-worlders, or rigorous U.S. social scientists. But within the limits of its genesis and format this is good work. Both friends and enemies of the UN everywhere would do well to pay attention to it.

KEITH S. PETERSEN

North Carolina State University

Positive Sum: Improving North-South Relations. Edited by I. William Zartman (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987. 262p. $29.95, cloth; $14.95, paper).

Throughout the 1970s most negotiators treated most North-South encounters as zero-sum conflicts. The rulers of the wealthy states believed that any moves toward the South's New International Economic Order would come at the cost of the North's wealth and power. Representatives of the Group of Seventy-seven acted as if accepting mere reforms of international economic institutions would undermine their more radical goals. This collection of essays is motivated by the belief that more positive, mutually advantageous outcomes could be achieved.

The book consists of eight case studies of North-South negotiations, mostly in the late seventies and early 1980s, framed by Zartman's introduction and conclusion, which link the studies to broader themes from different theories of negotiation. The subjects of the case studies have been well chosen. They cover all of the major North-South issues and institutions usually discussed in the literature: commodities, debt, the law of the sea, the United Nations, the European Economic Community–African Caribbean Pacific forums, and the various ad hoc forums created in the 1970s. The cases also include a few that are perhaps even more important than what is usually covered: negotiations over wheat and third-world food security, the multifibre arrangements, and the debates about telecommunications in the International Telecommunications Union.

Some cases are better researched and more thoughtfully written than others. Raymond F. Hopkins's study of the wheat negotiations and Barbara A. Fliess's study of the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 are particularly outstanding. Even with some weaker essays, the overall quality of the case studies is much better than one might expect in such a broad collection. All the authors are significant authorities with expertise in their particular subject.

This does lead to one of the book's drawbacks. A great deal of what appears here has appeared before, in only slightly different forms, in other articles or books by the same experts. The book would have been a good deal more timely if it had appeared immediately after much of its original research had been completed. As it is, the importance of these essays must be historical; the North-South conflict has changed quite a bit since the early eighties.

Nevertheless, the book is a unique resource, a broad analytical history of the most important North-South negotiations in one period, a major resource for students of negotiation, North-South relations, and international organization. I know that over the next few years I will recommend it many times to many students with very different interests.

In the end, of course, the book cannot answer its central question. It does not tell us how North-South negotiations can move from zero-sum impasses. Theories of negotiation can only tell us that people often can construct common visions of their mutual interest. Those theories cannot tell us what those visions might be. To understand the current North-South impasse fully we also need to understand why the visions of mutual North-South interest that have been offered (the most important example being the international Keynesianism of the Brandt Commission) have failed to convince. But that is the job of another book.

CRAIG N. MURPHY

Wellesley College

POLITICAL ECONOMY

Wage Determination and Incomes Policy in Open Economies. By Anne Romanis Braun (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1986. xix, 380p. $18.50, paper).

The field of international political economy covers a range of analytical levels, from the systemic interactions of global economics and politics to the comparative study of domestic industrial relations. We hear continuing arguments over the relative importance of international over domestic factors and over the value of economic versus political analysis. Anne Romanis Braun, formerly of the International Monetary Fund, falls clearly and not surprisingly into the category of those relying on economic analysis for her arguments. This book sums up her long experience studying incomes policy and wage-bargaining systems in advanced industrial economies and concludes that incomes policies have been used, historically, in response to weaknesses in the international payments system. The most interesting aspect of her book is that in the debate over incomes policies as a method to moderate the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, Braun concludes that "in the last resort, the problem is an essentially political one of encouraging the formation of consistent and feasible real income aspirations of organized groups . . . and of promoting a system of checks and balances to prevent excessive and disruptive gains by particular groups" (p. 57).

Braun has undertaken a complex task, and her many arguments can become confusing. First, she defines incomes policies as those that restrain increases in money incomes by restraining powerful organized groups; she explicitly does not include in her study those incomes policies implemented with purely redistributional objectives. Next, she divides her analysis into four time periods based on the type of incomes policies implemented by the industrial countries: the 1940s and 1950s, the early 1960s, the late 1960s and early 1970s, and from 1973 to the present. However, the book as a whole consistently focuses on a comparison between the policies implemented in industrialized countries during the period of fixed exchange rates before 1973 and their reactions after the switch to flexible rates. Prior to 1973, she argues, the industrial economies approximated a single closed economy where incomes policies could be effective in maintaining price stability. Under the pressure of differing rates of inflation, during the late 1970s the macroeconomic goals of the industrial countries increasingly diverged. Braun goes on to analyze four large industrial economies (the UK, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Canada) and three small economies (Austria, the Netherlands, and Norway) and their adjustment problems under flexible exchange rates.

Braun departs from mainstream macroeconomic analysis by detailing the flaws in applying neoclassical economic theory to her subject. Her familiarity with the history of incomes policies and wage bargaining leads her to the somewhat surprising conclusion (for an economist) that the assumption of perfect clearing of all markets, a key tenet of general equilibrium theory, is too far from reality to explain wage and price behavior in the short and medium term (though she makes no comment on its utility in predicting long-term trends). Braun describes both labor and product markets as characterized by administered prices in some sectors, which act as barriers to competition. The idea of monopoly behavior is not new, but Braun brings together many of the arguments about such behavior on the part of both management and labor, devoting an entire chapter to a critique of neoclassical economic theory, particularly monetarism and its policy prescriptions.

The main problem with Braun's work springs partly from the complexity of her subject, and partly from the conclusions she draws. One of the more surprising aspects of a book by an economist is that it is theoretical and historical-descriptive, with a weak empirical foundation. There seems to have been no intention actually to test the numerous interesting hypotheses she proposes, despite the great amount of information she supplies. For instance, while the last half of the book consists of detailed case studies, her rationale for the particular countries she chooses is not clear; she simply divides them into large and small industrial economies, without giving a theoretical justification for this categorization, a justification that would have been possible by incorporating current arguments on state size and openness to the international economic system as factors influencing policy options. Another example is her choice of actual incomes policies to study—in the first chapter she lists eight different kinds of incomes policies that fit her limited definition. Only wage indexation gets a thorough examination, as part of Braun's excellent critique of monetarist policy recommendations.

For a political scientist, this book can be very frustrating to read. Braun offers some interesting hypotheses and some contentious conclusions but without enough supporting data. In her discussion of wage indexation policies, she states that history shows they are most effective as a means of mitigating the political consequences of rapid inflation and lessening conflicts arising from changes in the distribution of income. Further, "indexation may also have been an important element in ensuring the survival of a democratic, free enterprise system" (p. 206). This is strong stuff and not fully supported. The crucial political variables are subsumed in the discussion under wage-bargaining structure and macroeconomic policy. Braun does not explicitly address the type of regime as a variable in her analysis. Nevertheless, in her conclusions to the case studies Braun states that the 1970s demonstrated that rapid inflation could be controlled by either moderate demand restraint implemented by a labor or coalition government with a union-supported incomes policy, gradually slowing inflation while avoiding sudden unemployment; or by very restrictive demand policies implemented by right-wing governments intent on restoring price stability rapidly by increasing unemployment to moderate wage demands (p. 313).

Braun's final chapter was for me the most interesting, though sadly incomplete. In it she outlines a program of research into the effects —theoretical and empirical—of dividing the national economy into two sectors: the large enterprise sector manufacturing for the international market and the national manufacturing sector producing for the domestic economy. The author hypothesizes a relationship between the scale of an enterprise, the difficulty of entry into that sector, and the ease of organizing the labor force. The relative distribution of these two sectors within an economy would influence the range of policies available to it and their relative effectiveness. All of this is presented simply as hypotheses to explore, a prelude to what I hope will be the next work by Anne Romanis Braun.

This book brings together detailed information and ideas on the subject of wage bargaining structures and incomes policies, and will be interesting to those who study problems of adjustment and industrial unrest in the advanced industrial economies. However, reading this book can be likened to taking a long drive on a country road: there are a lot of bumps, and it would be helpful to have a map or some familiarity with the way; but despite the problems, there are occasionally some fabulous views.

VIRGINIA HAUFLER

Cornell University

Public Choice. An Introduction. By Iain McLean (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. viii, 222p. $45.00, cloth; $14.95, paper).

As its back cover suggests, this is indeed a timely publication. Although the *Papers on Non-Market Decision-Making,* the predecessor of the journal *Public Choice,* was first published in 1966, the public choice approach was not made well known to others outside the field of political economy until James M. Buchanan was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1986.

Apart from Dennis Mueller's *Public Choice* (1979), this is the only available volume to date that surveys major works of public choice theorists. Like Mueller, McLean has chosen to organize his book into two main parts. Part 1, "Practice" deals with positive public choice, and part 2, "Theory" deals with normative public choice. This classification may cause critics of public choice to raise objection, since part 1 itself includes various public choice theories in explaining the behavior of politicians, voters, interest group members and civil servants. Perhaps this problem arises from the difficulty that no description can be manifested without an interpretation of "what is."

Part 1 begins with a chapter on the "scope" of public choice before it proceeds to review the works of public choice theorists who view politicians as political entrepreneurs (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young), voters as consumers and political parties as firms (Anthony Downs), interest group members as free riders (Mancur Olson), bureaucrats as budget maximizers (William Niskanen). The first part of the book ends with a discussion on political coalitions that centers around the works of William Riker.

One of the strengths of this book is that after each model has been presented, both U.S. and British cases are used to test it. However, while McLean is conscientious to attract an English-speaking audience from across the Atlantic, he makes no mention of the development of public choice in continental Europe or in Japan. Moreover, it is unfortunate that McLean has not included a section on the intellectual development of the public choice approach in this introductory text. It is equally unfortunate that unlike other review articles (e.g., Louis Weschler in *Public Administration Review* 42 [1982]: 289 and Mark Sproule-Jones in *The Politics of Canadian Public Policy* [1983], pp. 127–47), this book has not laid out the fundamental assumptions used in public choice theories.

Part 2 includes a chapter on three prominent problems in collective action: assurance game, chicken game and prisoner's dilemma game, as well as a chapter on Arrow's impossibility theorem. Although concrete examples are given throughout the discussion on these "games" (pp. 127, 129, 131, 133, 139), McLean has made little effort to relate the meaning of the logic derived from them to more concrete social and political problems. While the concluding chapter deals interestingly with the "unfinished business" in collective action, the book suffers from an omission of a closing section outlining the common criticisms of the public choice approach. Nevertheless, McLean seems to be implicitly addressing one criticism from some economists who charge that public choice is too simplistic, by repeatedly echoing that the problem is "more complicated . . . than it looks" (pp. 132, 147, 154, 170–72).

Two founders, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, made their entry into public choice with their publication of *The Calculus of Consent* (1962); however, McLean has neglected to review this important work. Equally important is Vincent Ostrom's book, *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration* (1973) because it introduces a significant variant of public choice to the field of public administration. McLean has chosen not to include Ostrom's book in his discussion. Ostrom's approach to public choice might appeal to an audience that does not subscribe to quantitative analyses and hence would not employ mathematical proof in resolving intellectual problems (see *PS* 20 (1987): 242). This might be important, since McLean's first intended audience "is a student of politics or sociology" (p. 2), who will have little training in mathematics or economics.

Unlike many other public choice reviewers, though, McLean has by and large fulfilled his promise not to use mathematical presentations in his review. He succumbed to the mathematical temptation on a few pages only (138 and 144–45). In other parts, he has included the mathematical logic, when necessary, in appendixes at the end of a chapter.

Another strength of this book is that an informative list for further reading and a glossary of technical terms are provided at the end. But this plus is counterbalanced by the frequent use of abbreviations with no reference list. This might cause great inconvenience to those who wish to read only part of the volume. Examples of abbreviations are numerous: MW (minimal winning coalition), SW (minimum size coalition), MCW (minimum connected winning coalition) (p. 113); AGs (assurance games), CGs (chicken games), PDGs (prisoner's dilemma games) (p. 126); TFT (tit for tat, p. 135); CSS (collectively stable strategy, p. 137); STV (single transferable vote, p. 156); AV (alternative vote, p. 159); SWF (social welfare function, p. 165).

There are other minor debatable issues. McLean seems to equate the meaning of *self-interest*, an important concept in methodological individualism, with the term *selfish* (p. 13). While selfish individuals are those who act with little regard for others' welfare, self-interested individuals can be understood as those who act consistently in order to promote their own interests without necessarily causing harm to others' welfare. The confusion between these two terms has caused some to accuse public choice theorists of being too cynical about human activities in the public sector. Also, McLean asserts that "anarchy" could be a viable method for producing public goods (pp. 14–16). This might be another debatable issue (see Buchanan, *What Should Economists Do?* [1979], p. 273).

Apart from these minor flaws and debatable issues, the value of this book must be judged by its success in introducing the public choice approach to the unfamiliar reader. As such, this book will undoubtedly remain for some time an excellent introductory text for both undergraduate and graduate students.

WING K. YUNG

University of Toronto

CHARLES C THOMAS • PUBLISHER

New! **GERMAN POLICE: Ideals and Reality in the Post-War Years** *by* **Erika S. Fairchild.** This book is a study of police power and public accountability in the Federal Republic of Germany. It details how German police have attempted to create a new image and new forms of organization since 1945, and how they have dealt with the serious problems of civil unrest over the past 20 years. Information is provided on police organization, training, and operations. *June '88, about $39.75*

New! **DEADLY FORCE: The Lure of Violence** *by* **Robert S. Clark.** This book examines the current state of the nation as it relates to violence. Some of the topics discussed include: irresistable urges to deadly force, background to death, social and legal environments, killers in the streets, rights of a free people, and toward a less deadly society. *June '88, about $29.75*

New! **AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH** *by* **Max Futrell** *and* **Cliff Roberson.** Designed as both a textbook and a basic research manual, this book examines such topics as researching government publications, understanding legal research, using statistics, writing the research report, and many others. Discussions on grant proposals and sources of funding for research projects round out this valuable text. *'88, $39.75*

THE DEATH PENALTY: Issues and Answers *by* **David Lester.** The death penalty and the controversial issue of its deterrent effects herein receive up-to-date, authoritative coverage. The author also reviews research into other issues—life on death row, discrimination and the death penalty, juries and the death penalty, types of people favoring the death penalty, and the world's policies on capital punishment. *'87, $21.75*

Order direct for fastest results • Write or call (217) 789-8980 • Books sent on approval
Postage paid on MasterCard, Visa & prepaid orders • Catalog sent on request

2600 South First Street • Springfield • Illinois • 62794-9265

Political Science Research: A Methods Handbook. *M. L. Goel.* Covers primary aspects of contemporary political science research from conceptualization and research design to data assessment and report writing. *336 pp., hardcover, $22.50 (tent.).* Accompanied by workbook with chapter summaries and exercises. *202 pp., paperback, $10.50 (tent.).*

Judicial Review and American Democracy. *Albert P. Melone, George Mace.* Examines legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court's power to shape constitutional principles, doctrine, and law through judicial review of the lower court decisions. *312 pp., hardcover, $28.95 (tent.).*

Individuals include payment with $1.50 postage/handling fee for first copy, $.75 for each additional copy. Iowans include 4% sales tax. MasterCard™ and VISA® accepted. Free brochures and catalogs available.

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS • Dept. 0900, 2121 S. State Avenue • Ames, IA 50010 (515) 292-0140

Princeton University Press

Deadly Paradigms
The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy
D. Michael Shafer

Michael Shafer argues that American policymakers have consistently and fundamentally misperceived the political context of revolutionary wars directed against American clients, and that because American attempts at counterinsurgency have been based on flawed premises, these efforts have failed in virtually every instance.

Cloth: $34.50 ISBN 0-691-07774-6

International Incidents
The Law That Counts in World Politics
Edited by *W. Michael Reisman* and *Andrew R. Willard*

This provocative book shows that many international standards of acceptable conduct derive far less from adjudications, statutes, or treaties and far more from what is found to be acceptable in the conflicts that we today call international incidents.

The contributors demonstrate how law that counts has been developed, modified, and terminated in a variety of dramatic international incidents: the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, the Harrods bombing, the Argentine invasion of the Falklands, the incursions of foreign submarines into Swedish waters, and others.

Paper: $12.95 ISBN 0-691-02280-1 Cloth: $35.00 ISBN 0-691-07772-X

Coercion
Alan Wertheimer

Alan Wertheimer develops a theory of what it is to be coerced or forced to do something, or to do something under duress. He argues that at the most general level, there are two views about coercion. In one view, whether one is coerced is, in essence, an empirical question of an ordinary sort, while in another, coercion claims involve moral judgments at their core. In arguing for a moralized theory of coercion, Professor Wertheimer uses a comparative analysis of coercion in the law to support a philosophical analysis of coercion.

Cloth: $34.50 ISBN 0-691-07759-2

Soviet Grassroots
Citizen Participation in Local Soviet Government
Jeffrey W. Hahn

Jeffrey Hahn examines the degree to which citizens who are elected to local government in the USSR can successfully represent the interests of those who elected them. Basing his conclusions on interviews with local deputies, observations of local soviets at work, and the analysis of a wide range of primary source material, the author finds that Soviet citizens do have some chances to participate meaningfully in local government.

Cloth: $35.00 ISBN 0-691-07767-3

National Conflict in Czechoslovakia
The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918–1987
Carol Skalnik Leff

The Slovaks' dissatisfaction with their status in the constitutional order has dogged Czechoslovakia from the country's inception after World War I, and the substantial Slovak minority (now about one-third of the population) has recurrently complicated the state's struggle for self-definition, stability, and even survival. Professor Leff establishes a systematic analytic framework for the discussion of the Czech-Slovak relationship and how it has affected and been affected by the state power and the political system.

Cloth: $35.00 ISBN 0-691-07768-1

India's Democracy
An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations
Edited by *Atul Kohli*

How have India's democratic institutions altered while accommodating new demands for political participation and while solving serious socio-economic problems? Here nine distinguished contributors analyze state-society relations in that country: Henry C. Hart, James Manor, Stephen P. Cohen, Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Paul R. Brass, Pranab Bardhan, Francine R. Frankel, and Ghanshyam Shah. The concluding essay by Atul Kohli provides an overview of the changing state-society relations in India's democracy.

Cloth: $37.50 ISBN 0-691-07760-6



Workers on the Nile
Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882–1954
Joel Beinin and *Zachary Lockman*

The authors of this study of the Egyptian workers' movement challenge traditional scholarship by demonstrating the importance of the working class and of class struggle in the history of modern Egypt.

Dissenting from the conventional view that Egyptian workers were simply passive followers of bourgeois nationalist notables, they argue persuasively that the growth of large-scale capitalist enterprises in industry and transport created the context within which workers played an increasingly independent political role.

Princeton Studies on the Near East

Cloth: $75.00 ISBN 0-691-05506-8

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR
Princeton University Press
41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • (609) 452-4900
ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)


THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE OF PERESTROIKA

ABEL AGANBEGYAN

Chief Economic Adviser to MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

Indiana University Press

is proud to announce a major publishing event

> *"... perestroika is revolutionary in character and its full realization will alter and renew our whole society.... although it is proceeding slowly, with difficulty, and many mistakes have already been made along the way, with more probably yet to come, nonetheless, as Gorbachev has said, there is nowhere for us to retreat. We must move forward."*
>
> —from THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE OF PERESTROIKA

Abel Aganbegyan, the most significant economist in contemporary Soviet society and Mikhail Gorbachev's chief architect of *perestroika*, has written a uniquely authoritative, comprehensive, and candid analysis of the current economic reconstruction in the USSR. *The Guardian* has called Aganbegyan the "big wheel of *perestroika*" and said that "he remains disarmingly frank about the problems which beset the Soviet economy." This book was specially commissioned for the Western reader to clarify the ideas, processes, and implications of *perestroika* for the future.

In the new series, *Second World*, edited by Teodor Shanin of the University of Manchester.

AT BOOKSTORES EVERYWHERE

$18.95

INDIANA
UNIVERSITY PRESS
Tenth and Morton Streets, Bloomington, Indiana 47405



Automatic Government
The Politics of Indexation
R. Kent Weaver

Political scientists often argue that legislators' decisions are motivated largely by their desire to "claim credit" for measures benefiting their constituents. Weaver introduces the equally strong motivation—policymakers' desire to avoid blame for unpopular decisions and outcomes—within the context of the politics of indexation.
Cloth $31.95/Paper $11.95

Forthcoming Summer 1988
Judges and Legislators
Toward Institutional Comity
Robert A. Katzmann, Editor

"The Judiciary and Congress not only do not communicate on their most basic concerns; they do not know how they may properly do so," writes federal appeals court judge Frank M. Coffin in *Judges and Legislators.* "The condition is that of a chronic, debilitating fever." This volume—which includes papers by judges, key legislators and legislative staffers, scholars, and members of the private bar—seeks to determine if, how, and under what conditions the judicial-congressional relationship may be improved.
Cloth $28.95/Paper $10.95

Do you subscribe to *The Brookings Review?*

The Brookings Review is the public policy magazine of the Brookings Institution, keeping you up to date on the research and writing of Brookings scholars and the important issues of the day. For $15 you can receive a full year of articles on economics, foreign policy, and politics.

The *Review* helps put the news in context and often challenges conventional assumptions; it explains what is really at stake, who stands to gain, and who is likely to lose. In so doing, it often makes news itself.

Write for a free sample copy.

BROOKINGS

The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-6258

United States Policy in Latin America

A Quarter Century of Crisis and Challenge, 1961-1986

Edited by John D. Martz

This important new volume examines U.S. policy toward Latin America from the heart-stopping Cuban missile crisis to the heating up of the civil war in Nicaragua, offering a historical perspective as well as an account of current problems that will continue to challenge U.S. policymakers well into the next century. The first part of the book discusses the policies of administrations stretching from Kennedy to Reagan. Issues raised there are addressed in the second part, which illustrates the management of various crises and turning points. The third part looks at problems that still test U.S. policymakers. Contributors include Abraham F. Lowenthal, Wayne S. Smith, Riordan Roett, Jack Child, Steve C. Ropp, Paul E. Sigmund, Michael J. Kryzanek, Margaret Daly Hayes, Robert Pastor, Michael J. Francis, and Federico G. Gil.

A new volume in our series, Latin American Studies. *384 pages, introduction, notes, index. $28.95*

Alabama Government and Politics

By James D. Thomas and William H. Stewart

For most of the nation, Alabama government is emblemized by Governor George Wallace blocking the entry to the University of Alabama, defying court-ordered integration and championing states'-rights slogans. But Wallace's return to power in the 1980s witnessed sweeping social and political changes in Alabama. Today the state for the most part enjoys the aura of "the new South." Thomas and Stewart bring a detailed sense of its colorful past to their forward-looking book about its government and political institutions. In the course of writing about Alabama's legislative, administrative, and judiciary branches; its local politics; and its historic relations with the federal government, they reveal much about life today in this southern state.

The inaugural volume in our new series, State Politics and Government. *256 pages, preface, notes, index, 11 tables, 4 figures, 4 maps. $13.95 paper, $28.95 cloth*

NEBRASKA

University of Nebraska Press · 901 N 17 · Lincoln 68588-0520

HEDRICK SMITH on how Washington works...and PAUL KENNEDY on where it may lead us


THE POWER GAME
HEDRICK SMITH
THE POWER GAME
HOW WASHINGTON WORKS
HEDRICK SMITH
Author of THE RUSSIANS


THE RISE AND FALL
KENNEDY
ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS
PAUL KENNEDY

"A shrewd analysis by a superb reporter."
—Austin Ranney,
Professor of Political Science,
University of California at Berkeley

"A detailed, colorful, wide-angle political map of Washington during the Reagan era." —Nelson Polsby,
Professor of Political Science,
University of California at Berkeley

"Not only the inside stuff but the insightful stuff." —William Safire

"Washington reporting at its finest."
—Norman Ornstein,
The American Enterprise Institute

"A great achievement."
—James Joll,
New York Review of Books

"If Allan Bloom's *The Closing of The American Mind* was the book of the year in 1987, this year's well could be *The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers* by Yale historian Paul Kennedy."
—*The New Republic*

"A work of almost Toynbeean sweep ...directly relevant to our times...Its publication may have a great and beneficent impact."—Michael Howard, *N.Y. Times Book Review* (front page)

Illustrated with maps and tables.

Now at your bookstore.
RANDOM HOUSE
201 E. 50th Street, NY, NY 10022

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL WRITINGS

Volume 1, 1946–1955. *From the Critique of Bureaucracy to the Positive Content of Socialism*

Volume 2, 1955–1960. *From the Workers' Struggle Against Bureaucracy to Revolution in the Age of Modern Capitalism*

Cornelius Castoriadis

Translated, edited, and with a foreword by David Ames Curtis

This is the first collection, in English, of essays by one of Europe's foremost political and social thinkers. It contains key texts that define the critique of bureaucratic capitalism in *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, the journal founded by Castoriadis in 1949 along with the revolutionary group of the same name. It was this journal which influenced the student and workers' rebellion of 1968 and the development of the non-communist French Left. Each volume: $35.00 cloth, $14.95 paper

GRAMSCI'S POLITICS *Second Edition*

Anne Showstack Sassoon

"To find a book which is at once sensitive to the openness of Gramsci's writings, tracing concepts and themes as they are developed, and sometimes abandoned...and [which] relates these to his practice as a political militant is rare. Sassoon has managed this in a book which is both comprehensive and accessible."—Colin Mercer, *Marxism Today*, reviewing the first edition. With a new preface, first chapter, and updated bibliography. $35.00 cloth, $14.95 paper

REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

Gender, Motherhood, and Medicine

Michelle Stanworth, editor

The contributors to this volume present a coherent and nuanced feminist approach to an often inflammatory topic. They consider political, legal, and socioeconomic issues, along with the perceptions of women on the experience of motherhood.
Feminist Perspectives series $39.50 cloth, $14.95 paper

Concepts in Social Thought Series

DEMOCRACY • Anthony Arblaster

Arblaster contends that the struggle for democracy has only just begun and we would do better to talk about creating democracy rather than about defending it. He draws on the writings of Rousseau, Paine, and John Stuart Mill to support his argument.
$25.00 cloth, $10.95 paper

PROPERTY • Alan Ryan

Ryan cites a wide range of theorists—from Plato to Robert Nozick—to discuss the political, moral, and historical aspects of the institution of ownership.
$25.00 cloth, $10.95 paper

SOCIALISM • Bernard Crick

From ancient Greece to modern Britain, Crick distills the essence of socialism, uncovering its presuppositions, and linking theories of socialism to its real-life history.
$25.00 cloth, $10.95 paper

University of Minnesota Press

Minneapolis MN 55414

The Eagle and the Lion

The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations

James A. Bill

Political analyst James Bill, who has not only lived in Iran but also closely observed U.S. policy-making toward that country, draws on interviews with many of the key American and Iranian figures, embassy files, Persian sources, archival records, and other sources from both countries to write this definitive analysis of American-Iranian relations.

"Written with superb narrative fluency and marshalling a wealth of scholarship and firsthand experience, this is **a masterful recounting of American involvement in Iran** from the 1940s to the 'secret reentry' of 1985–86. . . . **A profoundly important, moving, and timely** book." —*Kirkus Reviews*

"**A carefully documented hard-hitting case study** of the reasons behind America's trials and tribulations in the Third World."
—Melvin R. Laird

"By far **the most searching study of contemporary United States–Iranian relations** I have encountered." —George W. Ball



"*The Eagle and the Lion* is **an extraordinary book,** a remarkable study in depth and in full particulars, of America's failed Iranian policy. It is written with verve and passion, and yet never oversteps the bounds of careful scholarship."
—Gabriel A. Almond $25.00

Now available in paperback

American Security

Dilemmas for a Modern Democracy

Bruce D. Berkowitz

The author of *Calculated Risks* presents a provocative discussion of some of the major issues affecting American national security today, including such controversial topics as weapons procurement, arms control, and alliance politics.

"**Sane, sensible.** . . .Makes a valuable contribution to the current debate on American defense policy." —*Library Journal*

"**Thoughtful, judicious, and informed,** this book presents an intelligent and often persuasive analysis of a number of difficult policy problems." —Bruce Russett $12.95

New in cloth and paper

Voltaire's Politics

The Poet as Realist
Second Edition

Peter Gay

This classic study of Voltaire's political thought examines his writings in the political and social framework of their time and relates his ideas for social reform directly to his experiences in eighteenth-century Europe.

"**A brilliant and incisive** exposition of Voltaire's political ideas." —John Rule, *William and Mary Quarterly* (on the first edition) $40.00 cloth, $15.95 paper

Yale University Press
Dept. 748
92A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520

New & Noteworthy

Evolutionary Politics

By GLENDON SCHUBERT. From a political science perspective, these essays focus on both individual and small-group political behavior. Schubert's work draws extensively on contemporary evolutionary theory, biosocial and psychobiological theory, ethology and primatology, behavioral ecology, experimental work in animal behavior, neurobiology, human development, and the philosophy of both life and social sciences. $19.95 paper; $39.95 cloth

Union Brotherhood, Union Town

The History of the Carpenter's Union of Chicago, 1863–1987

By RICHARD SCHNEIROV and THOMAS J. SUHRBUR. With an effective balance of analysis and interpretation, the authors examine labor unions within the larger social order in which they existed. They define the interplay between union development, technological innovation, and the changing balance of power between workers and employers—and provide much insight into the Pullman strike, World War I labor policies, New Deal work-relief programs, and collective bargaining in the building trades. $14.95 paper; $24.95 cloth

The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant

Volume 15: May 1–December 31, 1865

Volume 16: 1866

Edited by JOHN Y. SIMON, Associate Editor: DAVID L. WILSON. "A superb series of papers....A model of scholarship as well as a delightful work to read."—*The Filson Club History Quarterly*. "These volumes help in gaining at least a partial understanding of the enigmatic, somewhat mysterious general who overcame many personal and physical obstacles in a career that would finally yield him the White House." —*Journal of Southern History*. $47.50 each

Add $1.50 when ordering by mail.

SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY PRESS

Dept. PS68, P.O. Box 3697, Carbondale, IL 62902-3697

See our display with Publishers Book Exhibit at this year's APSA Meeting

POLITICAL SCIENCE FROM AGATHON PRESS

Recent Titles—

Constitution Making: Conflict and Consensus in the Federal Convention of 1787

By Calvin Jillson, Dept. of Political Science, *University of Colorado*

256 pp. ISBN 0-87586-081-8 (cloth) $30.00
January 1988 082-6 (paper) $15.00

Political Science: The Science of Politics

Edited by Herbert F. Weisberg, *The Ohio State University*

Published in cooperation with the American Political Science Association.

320 pp. ISBN 0-87586-066-4 (cloth) $32.00
1986 075-3 (paper) $15.00

Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences

Edited by Bernard Grofman, *University of California, Irvine*
and Arend Lijphart, *University of California, San Diego*

352 pp. ISBN 0-87586-064-8 (cloth) $38.00
1986 074-5 (paper) $16.50

Politics in Context:
Assimilation and Conflict in Urban Neighborhoods

By Robert Huckfeldt, *Indiana University*

200 pp. ISBN 0-87586-067-2 (cloth) $24.50
1986 068-0 (paper) $15.00

Congress and Policy Change

Edited by Gerald C. Wright, Jr., Leroy N. Rieselbach, *Indiana University*
and Lawrence C. Dodd, *University of Colorado*

304 pp. ISBN 0-87586-076-1 (cloth) $32.00
1986 077-X (paper) $15.00

Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes:
The United States and Western Europe

Edited by Heinz Eulau, *Stanford University*, and
Michael S. Lewis-Beck, *University of Iowa*

256 pp. ISBN 0-87586-071-0 (cloth) $24.00
1985 072-9 (paper) $15.00

Forthcoming—

The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism

Edited by Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman

Crossroads of Social Science: The ICPSR 25th Anniversary Volume

Edited by Heinz Eulau

Culture, Structure, or Choice? Essays in the Interpretation of the British Experience

Paul Warwick, with an Introduction by Harry Eckstein

Send your orders to:

Agathon Press, Dept. J, 111 Eighth Avenue, New York, NY 10011

Institutional purchase orders accepted. All other payments must be in advance.
Visa and MasterCard accepted. Telephone: (212) 741-3087

Princeton University Press

Galbraith, Harrington, Heilbroner

Economics and Dissent in an Age of Optimism

Loren J. Okroi

In a remarkably lucid style, Loren Okroi analyzes the ideas of three leading reformer-critics in the United States and places their main arguments in the context of the economic, social, and political history of postwar America. In so doing, he provides not only a skillful introduction to American social thought since the 1950s but also a wide-ranging examination of the contemporary failures of American liberal ideology.

As he explicates the works of these three men, it becomes clear that present policy debates have not even begun to resolve the dilemmas their writings have exposed.

Cloth: $29.50 ISBN 0-691-07771-1

Reasons for Welfare

The Political Theory of the Welfare State

Robert E. Goodin

Robert Goodin passionately and cogently defends the welfare state from current attacks by the New Right. But he contends that the welfare state finds false friends in those on the Old Left who would justify it as a hesitant first step toward some larger, ideally just form of society.

Reasons for Welfare offers a defense of the minimal welfare state substantially independent of any such broader commitments, and at the same time better able to withstand challenges from the New Right's moralistic political economy.

Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy
Marshall Cohen, Editor

Paper: $14.95 ISBN 0-691-02279-8
Cloth: $45.00 ISBN 0-691-07766-5

Announcing a new series:
Studies from the Project on the Federal Social Role
Forrest Chisman and Alan Pifer, Editors

The Politics of Social Policy in the United States

Edited by *Margaret Weir, Ann Shola Orloff,* and *Theda Skocpol*

This volume places the welfare debates of the 1980s in the context of past patterns of U.S. policy, such as the Social Security Act of 1935, the failure of efforts in the 1940s to extend national social benefits and economic planning, and the backlashes against "big government" that followed reforms of the 1960s and early 1970s.

Historical analysis reveals that certain social policies have flourished in the United States: those that have appealed simultaneously to middle-class and lower-income people, while not involving direct bureaucratic interventions into local communities.

Paper: $14.50 ISBN 0-691-02841-9
Cloth: $52.00 ISBN 0-691-09436-5

Democracy and the Welfare State

Edited by *Amy Gutmann*

The essays collected here explore the moral foundations and the political prospects of the welfare state in the United States. Among the questions addressed: Has public support for the welfare state faded? Can a democratic state provide welfare without producing dependency on welfare? Is a capitalist (or socialist) economy consistent with the preservation of equal liberty and equal opportunity for all citizens?

Paper: $12.95 ISBN 0-691-02275-5
Cloth: $42.50 ISBN 0-691-07756-8

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR
Princeton University Press
41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • (609) 452-4900
ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria

LARRY DIAMOND

The first work to analyze fully the evolution, decay, and failure of the First Republic, weighing this crucial experience against theories of the conditions for stable democracy. Richly documented and graced with sophisticated revelations, Diamond's book concludes with an eloquent new methodology for analyzing the persistence and failure of democracies, and it points to the relationship between state and society as a crucial determinant of the possibility for liberal democracy. A comprehensive translation of that era's history into political sociology.

416 pages, index $39.95

Extremist Shiites

The Ghulat Sects

MATTI MOOSA

"Likely to set a new plateau from which a new set of scholarly studies will be launched . . . a rich, original, timely work."—Robert L. Canfield

600 pages, index $37.50

The Other Europe

Eastern Europe to 1945

E. GARRISON WALTERS

448 pages, Cloth $29.95
20 maps, index Paper $16.95

The Decline of the Union

British Government in Ireland, 1892–1920

EUNAN O'HALPIN

260 pages, index $33.00

Religious Resurgence

Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism

Edited by
RICHARD T. ANTOUN
and MARY E. HEGLAND

288 pages, Cloth $27.50
glossary, index

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1600 Jamesville Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13244-5160

Insights & Issues
Political Science from Chicago



URBAN DESIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE
Regime and Architecture, 900–1900

WOLFGANG BRAUNFELS

Translated by Kenneth J. Northcott

In his masterful survey of a thousand years of urban architecture, renowned European architectural historian Braunfels identifies certain themes common to cities as different as Siena and London, Munich and Venice.

Cloth $49.95   416 pages   190 halftones

THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN
JOSEPH VINING

"A fascinating tour-de-force on the nature and meaning of law."—Phil Rose, *New Law Journal*

Paper $12.95   281 pages

TALES OF THE FIELD
On Writing Ethnography

JOHN VAN MAANEN

"This book will prove invaluable to novices who are learning the fieldwork trade, and it will also be a rich stimulant for veterans, provoking them to think in new ways about the presentation of their work."—Walter W. Powell, University of Arizona

Paper $7.95   190 pages
Library cloth edition $25.00
Chicago Guides to Writing, Editing, and Publishing series

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
A Primer for the People

DAVID P. CURRIE

Currie has written a masterful introduction to the Constitution for anyone interested in learning how it works and what it has come to mean. He shows us the Constitution as it actually operates, in the light of the decisions of the courts that have interpreted and applied it in the years since its adoption.

Paper $6.95   152 pages
Library cloth edition $21.00

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
ARNOLD XIANGZE JIANG

Foreword by Akira Iriye, Series Editor
Introduction by David Roberts

Jiang critically examines U.S. foreign policy toward China from the eighteenth century to the Reagan-Deng years.

Cloth $22.00   208 pages
The United States in the World: Foreign Perspectives series

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND POST-MAO REFORMS
A Historical Perspective

TANG TSOU

"There is a refreshing 'presentness' each time Professor Tsou gets a new fix on the Chinese situation."—John K. Fairbank, *New York Review of Books*

Paper $14.95   351 pages

THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY

Class and Politics in the American Welfare State

JILL QUADAGNO

"A major interpretation of the development of old age provision in the United States from the nineteenth century to the present."—Theda Skocpol, Harvard University

Cloth $27.50 272 pages 6 halftones, 1 map

THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE OF ISLAM

BERNARD LEWIS

"Professor Lewis powerfully depicts the conflict between traditional Islamic political language, both as received and as now revived, and the Western political language that was absorbed in the last centuries and in the midst of which Islam lives."—Allan Bloom, University of Chicago

Cloth $14.95 176 pages



PROFESSIONAL POWERS

A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge

ELIOT FREIDSON

"This is a stimulating and well-written book which opens up a new perspective on the professions as well as contributing to existing debates."—David Podmore, *Times Higher Education Supplement*

Paper $12.95 241 pages

Andrew Carnegie. (From *Life Magazine*, April 13, 1905.)

AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY

Second Edition

ROBERT H. BREMNER

In this revised and enlarged edition of his classic work, Robert H. Bremner provides a social history of American philanthropy from colonial times to the present.

Paper $10.95 308 pages 9 halftones
Library cloth edition $28.50
Chicago History of American Civilization series

THE ROAD TO REBELLION

Class Formation and Kansas Populism, 1865–1900

SCOTT G. MCNALL

In analyzing why America's largest mass-democratic movement failed, McNall integrates new historical accounts with original analyses of census data, Alliance membership records, and speech transcripts.

Paper $19.95 376 pages 10 halftones
Library cloth edition $49.95

PAPER STONES

A History of Electoral Socialism

ADAM PRZEWORSKI *and* JOHN SPRAGUE

By analyzing the history of electoral socialism from 1890 to the present in seven European countries, the authors explain why no political party offering a socialist transformation of society has ever won an electoral majority.

Paper $11.95 224 pages

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS *5801 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637*

LSU Press

★ The Trusteeship Presidency

Jimmy Carter and the United States Congress
CHARLES O. JONES

Based on extensive interviews with President Carter and senior members of his staff shortly after he left office, this book examines Carter's seemingly antipolitical approach to politics and the ways in which this approach affected his often strained relations with Congress. *Illustrated*
$24.95

★ Contemporary Southern Politics

Edited by JAMES F. LEA

The essays in *Contemporary Southern Politics* are concerned with the South's reentry into mainstream American politics, culture, and economics, with the ways in which the South has changed and is still unique, and with the valuing of these changes and continuities. *Illustrated*
$35.00

★ Curbing the Courts

The Constitution and the Limits of Judicial Power
GARY L. McDOWELL

In this provocative study, Gary L. McDowell argues that the current spate of "judicial activism" that is prompting various efforts to curb the federal judiciary is the result not of judicial usurpation but rather of congressional abdication.
$27.50

★ Poland Challenges a Divided World

JOHN RENSENBRINK

In *Poland Challenges a Divided World,* John Rensenbrink holds that a new way forward for Poland has been taking shape ever since the Gdansk Accord of August, 1980. "Rensenbrink clearly understands the confusing, paradoxical, but fundamental significance of Solidarity to Poland, to Europe, and to a world in search of new categories."—Michael T. Kaufman, former Warsaw correspondent of the *New York Times*
$19.95

Louisiana State University Press
Baton Rouge 70893

POWER AND TACTICS IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION

How Weak Nations Bargain with Strong Nations

William Mark Habeeb

What happens when two countries of differing political power and influence come to the negotiating table? One would assume that a greater power would prevail over a lesser power. Yet, for example, in the negotiations over the future status of the Panama Canal, Panama achieved many of its objectives. William Mark Habeeb proposes a model for understanding such "asymmetrical negotiations" and their outcomes, based on the nature of the actors' "issue-specific" power balance. In addition to the Panama Canal negotiations, Habeeb examines the U.S.-Spanish base negotiations of 1951-76 and the Anglo-Icelandic "cod wars" of 1958-76.

"An important, original contribution to our understanding of international negotiation."—William Paul Smith, Vanderbilt University

$25.00

In paperback for course use

THIRD WORLD POLITICS

A Comparative Introduction

Paul Cammack, David Pool, and William Tordoff

This comparative and thematic introduction places the politics of the Third World in its historical, social, and international framework. Emphasizing the importance of the past for understanding the present and the necessity of placing politics within its social and economic contexts, the authors explore the international political and economic forces that have shaped—and are shaping—the Third World.

At the heart of the book are individual chapters examining the key institutions and processes in contemporary Third World politics: the state, political parties, the military, revolution, and the status of women.

$14.95 *paperback* **$38.50** *hardcover*

BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY

John P. Burke

How much do bureaucrats know? And how much should they tell? John Burke moves from case study to theory to explore what is perhaps the most basic problem confronting modern democracy: How are we to make bureaucracies both accountable and responsive? Now in paperback, *Bureaucratic Responsibility* is a provocative combination of descriptive analysis, political theory, and prescriptive speculation—and makes a timely case for a more responsible bureaucracy.

$12.95 *paperback* **$32.50** *hardcover*

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS
701 West 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, Maryland 21211

NEW FROM INDIANA

Now in paperback

Why ERA Failed

Politics, Women's Rights, and the Amending Process of the Constitution

By Mary Frances Berry

"... important and compelling ... 'must' reading ..."
—*American Political Science Review*

paper **$8.95**
(Also available in cloth **$22.50**)



New Edition

On the Take

From Petty Crooks to Presidents
Second Edition

By William J. Chambliss

"... reads with the ease of an action-filled, best-selling novel... worthy and refreshing ..."
—*Journal of Criminal Justice*

cloth **$27.50** paper **$9.95**



The Politics of Islamic Revivalism

Diversity and Unity

Edited by Shireen T. Hunter

Can the current vitality of Islamic revivalism be attributed primarily to the religious characteristics of Islam? Or do political, social, and economic factors play a more fundamental role? Leading authorities on Islam and the Muslim world analyze the success of revivalist movements in a wide range of Islamic countries.

cloth **$35.00** paper **$12.95**

The Making of the Georgian Nation

By Ronald Grigor Suny

Suny's study of the making of the Georgian nation is the first historical investigation of the roots and evolution of modern Georgia in more than a quarter century and the first to deal extensively with Georgia's experience under Soviet rule.

Published in association with the Hoover Institution Press
cloth **$45.00** paper **$17.50**

Diplomacy and the American Democracy



By David D. Newsom

"David Newsom is a diplomat's diplomat, cool under fire, experienced, wise."
—Marvin Kalb

"This is a first-rate account of the role of diplomacy in the promotion of our national interest."
—Edmund S. Muskie

cloth **$25.00**
paper **$ 9.95**

Also by David D. Newsom:

The Soviet Brigade in Cuba

A Study in Political Diplomacy

Foreword by Stansfield Turner

"... a detailed, serious and very interesting analysis ..." —*Foreign Affairs*

cloth **$25.00** paper **$7.95**

Alternatives to Anarchy

American Supranationalism since World War II

By Wesley T. Wooley

"... a very substantial, original, and exciting work of scholarship. It is gracefully written, judiciously argued, informed by a cogent analysis, and grounded in a wide range of primary sources." —Lawrence S. Wittner

$25.00

An Appetite for Power
Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa

An Appetite for Power

Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa

By Gerhard Maré and Georgina Hamilton

Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement lays claim to an important role in the determination of South Africa's future. *An Appetite for Power* provides a critical examination of Inkatha's activities at a crucial period in South Africa's history.

$35.00

At bookstores, or order from

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
TENTH AND MORTON STREETS, BLOOMINGTON, IN 47405 • 812-335-6804
Major credit cards accepted

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

FEEL THE EXCITEMENT WITH A NEW EDUCATIONAL SOFTWARE GAME

DESCRIPTION: CAMPAIGN PROMISES™ Presidential Election Game combines the major elements of the presidential election process into an exciting educational experience. Students must allocate resources efficiently to win the most electoral votes in the 51 state and district elections. Possible resource commitments include CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATIONS, PRE-ELECTION ADVERTISING, PROMISES PROMOTION, or SABOTAGE (DIRTY TRICKS).

USES:

Motivate Students!	Set up teams and play a few turns every session.
Teach Concepts!	Augment lectures on voting behavior as it relates to game elements.
Hold Tournaments!	Increase enthusiasm and participation levels of students in the field of Political Science at class or department tournaments.

ADDITIONAL FEATURES:	Two to six students or teams can play. Save a game in progress for continuation later. Over 10 colorful screens. Tutorial program and 29 page manual included. Sound effects with on/off toggle.
SYSTEM HARDWARE:	IBM® or compatible with 256K RAM. MS-DOS 2.1 or higher. Color monitor recommended, however, monochrome does work. Apple® IIGS version available in July 1988. 5 1/4" or 3 1/2" disk size available.
PRICES:	Educational discount price is $29.95 each. Order 10 or more copies for $25.00 each. SHIPPING AND HANDLING INCLUDED! Demonstration diskette available. Please request demo on University stationery and enclose $5.00 to cover handling costs.

ORDER FORM
CAMPAIGN PROMISES™ GAME

$29.95 each or $25.00 if ten or more ordered. Connecticut residents please add 7.5% tax. Shipping included!

Name ________________________
Address ______________________
____
____
Phone __________ Quantity ____________
Computer__________ Disk Size__________
Payment Method: Check Enclosed __________
Master Card______________ Visa ________
Card #____________ Exp Date__________
Total Amount Enclosed ______________

SEND TO: Front Runner Software Company
P.O. Box 435
Collinsville, CT 06022-0435
(203) 233-3144

PCM



NOW
NOW
NOW
WE MARCH FOR

From the SUNY series in
AFRO-AMERICAN STUDIES
John Howard and Robert C. Smith,
editors

WHEN THE MARCHING STOPPED

The Politics of Civil Rights Regulatory Agencies

HANES WALTON, JR.

This book takes the "next step" in the study of the civil rights movement in the United States. It is the first comprehensive and systematic study of the various civil rights regulatory agencies created under Titles VI and VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Introduction by Mary Frances Berry.

320 pp. / $19.95 pb. / 0-88706-688-7

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS
P.O. Box 6525 • Ithaca, NY 14850 • 1-800-666-2211

•New Paperbacks•
in Political Science from Praeger Publishers

• POLITICS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
Revised edition.
by **Thomas P. Anderson**

This new edition updates Anderson's analysis of current conflicts in Central America. He contends that the roots of Cental America's current crises are not to be found in the East-West struggle, but in the competition within each country for the control of scarce natural resources.
ISBN 0-275-92883-7. $14.95

• A NEW IRAQ
The Gulf War and the Implications for U.S. Policy
by **Frederick W. Axelgard**
(The Washington Papers, No. 133. Published with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.)

"[Axelgard's book] not only provides a wealth of information on recent political developments in Iraq, it also contains provocative policy recommendations for U.S.-Iraqi relations. In the wake of the Iran-Contra affair... Axelgard's call for closer U.S.-Iraqi ties certainly deserves the most serious consideration."
—Stephen Solarz, U.S. House of Representatives
ISBN 0-275-93014-9. $9.95

• SOUTH AFRICA
In Transition to What?
edited by **Helen Kitchen**
(The Washington Papers, No. 132. Published with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.)

Kitchen brings together eleven eminent specialists to assess specific critical aspects of the tangled internal affairs from which South Africa's future will emerge.
ISBN 0-275-92974-4. $12.95

• HAS FREEDOM A FUTURE?
by **Adolph Lowe**
(The Convergence Series. Founded, planned, and edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen.)

"Adolph Lowe's book on freedom is a tract for our times, the wise testimony of one of the economists worthy of being called a worldly philosopher. It is a tough-minded analysis of the conditions needed for freedom in the modern age. I recommend it for everyone who is not afraid to wrestle with the future."
—Robert Heilbroner, Professor of Economics, The New School for Social Research
ISBN 0-275-92938-8. $12.95

• Praeger Publishers A division of Greenwood Press, Inc.•
88 Post Road West, P.O. Box 5007 Westport, CT 06881 (203) 226-3571

UNEQUAL ALLIANCE

The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Philippines

ROBIN BROAD

"*Unequal Alliance* is a highly original treatment of an important subject. Based on first-hand interviews and detailed, primary source research, this book is a significant piece of work which should find a wide audience."—Gary Hawes, University of Michigan

"This is an excellent book. In particular, Broad's access to a range of Philippine and World Bank participants in the late 1970s and early 1980s loan negotiations provides a unique picture of the processes of globalist institution-transformation in a crucial, less developed country. And it does this while avoiding a mechanistic, black-box conspiracy theory without ignoring the sometimes overwhelming impact that international capitalist institutions can have on 'Third World' policy formation."—John Willoughby, American University

$35.00

Studies in International Political Economy, Volume 19

MANAGING THE FROZEN SOUTH

The Creation and Evolution of the Antarctic Treaty System

M. J. PETERSON

The continent of Antarctica, barren and uninhabited, has posed political as well as environmental challenges for the nations of the world. In particular, the question of how to govern this massive body has confronted the international powers with daunting issues. In this fascinating work, M. J. Peterson examines these issues and the kind of treaty system which has emerged over the last several decades. $35.00

Studies in International Political Economy, Volume 20.

OF RULE AND REVENUE

MARGARET LEVI

Of Rule and Revenue provides an exciting new examination of how rulers rule. Specifically, it attempts to formulate a theory about how rulers can extract revenue from their subjects in the form of taxes.

"I think this book will have a major impact. It positions itself in the macro-level literature and looks at states and the evolution of political forms. But it does so while championing the use of micro-level tools of reasoning and models derived from rational choice." —Robert H. Bates, Duke University

$35.00

California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy, 13

WARS OF THE THIRD KIND

Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries

EDWARD E. RICE

"A useful, well written, and interesting review of the most important guerrilla wars in recent history . . . it makes its point about them, that they are inherently hard to handle and that they are potentially quite dangerous for major powers, in a most convincing way."—Daniel Chirot, University of Washington

$18.95

At bookstores or order toll-free 800-822-6657. Visa & MasterCard only.

University of California Press

Berkeley 94720

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN RURAL CHINA

JOHN P. BURNS

An important dimension of local politics is the interaction between leaders and the masses. In this study, Dr. Burns describes and analyzes the nature of both mobilized and citizen-initiated political action in rural China from 1962 to 1984. Based on the Chinese provincial press and two series of Hong Kong-based interviews with people who lived through the Cultural Revolution in China's countryside, he examines the hypothesis that in one-party states undergoing economic development the quality and quantity of political participation is transformed. A central focus is the role of political leadership in this process. $35.00

THE STATE AND THE MASS MEDIA IN JAPAN, 1918-1945

GREGORY J. KASZA

The author examines state-society relations in interwar Japan through a case study of public policy toward radio, film, newspapers, and magazines. The treatment of official controls over the mass media addresses key issues related to modern state development, such as why constitutions have failed to play their traditional role in limiting state authority, how modern political ideologies have legitimized new state powers, what conditions have determined the effectiveness of civil resistance to the state, and how technology and bureaucratic organization have contributed to the expansion of the public sector. $35.00

CONGRESS AND INDIAN NATIONALISM

The Pre-Independence Phase

Edited by RICHARD SISSON and STANLEY WOLPERT

Seventeen distinguished historians and political scientists discuss the phenomenon of Indian nationalism, one hundred years after the founding of the Congress party. They offer important new interpretations of Nationalism's evolution during more than six decades of crucial change and rapid growth. As India's foremost political institution, the National Congress with its changing fortunes mirrored Indian aspirations, ideals, dreams, and failures during the country's struggle for nationhood. $48.00



SPAIN AFTER FRANCO

The Making of a Competitive Party System

RICHARD GUNTHER, GIACOMO SANI, and GOLDIE SHABAD

New in paper—*Spain after Franco* focuses on competitive politics in Spain. Giving particular attention to class, religious, regional, and ideological cleavages, the authors examine the interplay between the party-building and electoral strategies adopted by the new elites and the political orientations and behavior of the mass public.

"This volume...will be of immense value in the teaching of Iberian politics."

—Richard Gillespie,
The Times Higher Education Supplement

$14.95 paper

BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM

Argentina 1966-1973 in Comparative Perspective

GUILLERMO O'DONNELL

Translated by JAMES McGUIRE in collaboration with RAE FLORY

Here is a book that will be of importance not only to specialists on Argentina, but to all who are interested in recent Latin American politics in general. Based on research that extended over nearly a decade, involving extensive interviewing of key political actors, a massive effort at "event scoring" of a broad spectrum of political activities, the compilation of a large body of new economic data, and careful use of periodicals and other sources, this long-awaited book contains a great deal of new information about Argentine politics, and presents it within the framework of an elaborately developed theoretical perspective. $45.00

CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY

Consciousness, Action, and Contemporary American Workers

RICK FANTASIA

A commonplace assumption about American workers is that they lack class consciousness. This perception has baffled social scientists, demoralized activists, and generated a significant literature on American exceptionalism. In this provocative book, a young sociologist takes the prevailing assumptions to task and sheds new light upon this very important issue. In three vivid case studies Fantasia explores the complicated, multifaceted dynamics of American working-class consciousness.

"I would rate this book near the top of whatever scales measure importance. Good, strong, first-rate, unusually worthy, original—these are the adjectives that come to my mind." —Kai Erikson, Yale University

$27.50

INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE

A Second Look

Edited by PAUL RABINOW and WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN

This is a new edition of the very well received *Interpretive Social Science* (California 1979) in which Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan argued for the use of an interpretive approach in the social sciences, instead of relying on a model based on the natural sciences.

$35.00 cloth $10.95 paper

RUSTED DREAMS

Hard Times in a Steel Community

DAVID BENSMAN and ROBERTA LYNCH

New in paper—When two steel mills in Chicago's Southeast Side were shut down, thousands of people were thrown out of work, and an entire community was plunged into a crisis that seems to have no end.

"*Rusted Dreams* does more than trace out the chain of decision and policy that led to the demise of Wisconsin Steel and South Works. It is also a parable of human interdependency in a more intimate sense. . . . As the fate of the Southeast Side proclaims, the connective tissues of a neighborhood, its very capacity for community, even individual sanity, are fleeting things which depend for sustenance on a vigorous economy." —Jonathan Rieder, *Washington Post Book World*

$8.95 paper

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE AND THE POLITICS OF TRANSFIGURATION

With a New Chapter and Epilogue

TRACY B. STRONG

This book represents the effort to look at the whole of Nietzsche's thought. In considering the political aspects, Tracy Strong focuses on Nietzsche's claim that Western culture, in all its aspects, is coming to an end.

"Strong's systematic analyses (e.g., geneology as a methodological tool, the concept of the Dionysian, Nietzsche's use of Greek philosophy and tragedy) make this perhaps the best book on Nietzsche in English."

—William Baskin, *Religious Studies Review*

$11.95 paper

CHIEF OF STAFF

Twenty-Five Years of the American Presidency

Edited by SAMUEL KERNELL and SAMUEL L. POPKIN

New in paper—"This is the well-edited transcript of a symposium moderated by John Chancellor featuring eight former White House chiefs of staff who served Presidents Eisenhower through Carter. The interplay is quick, witty, informal and perceptive about the art and improvisation demanded by the role."—Gaddis Smith, *Foreign Affairs*

"The problems that have befallen the Reagan White House...might well have been avoided if the lessons in this volume had been followed in the last few years."

—Fred Rotundaro, *Commonweal*

$9.95 paper

At bookstores or order toll-free 800-822-6657. Visa & MasterCard only.

University of California Press

Berkeley 94720

O X F O R D

Chadha
The Story of an Epic Constitutional Struggle
BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, *Wesleyan University.* "The case called Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha was a great case because of its large abstractions—grand legal issues, ideological currents, interest group pressures, historical timing.... [Craig] contributes substantially to public understanding of a great case that has a happy ending and a power struggle that has no ending at all."—*New York Times Book Review.* 262 pp., $24.95.

The Turban for the Crown
The Islamic Revolution in Iran
SAID AMIR ARJOMAND, *State University of New York, Stony Brook.* "An authoritative and insightful analysis of the Iranian scene, which will be helpful in the years ahead to Iran-watchers who will be asking whether a workable relationship is possible between technical modernization and traditional Shi'ite values."—Cyril E. Black, *Princeton University,* 288 pp., $21.95.

The Gulf War
The Origins and Implications of the Iraq-Iran Conflict
MAJID KHADDURI, *The Johns Hopkins University.* A thoughtful account of the Gulf war, covering the complete history of relations between Iran and Iraq, the present conflict, and the possibility of peace. 224 pp., $24.95.

Is Socialism Doomed?
The Meaning of Mitterrand
DANIEL SINGER. "Anybody wanting to make predictions about France's political future or about Europe will profit from reading this book....A stimulating and well-informed analysis of the disappointments of the 1980s."—Theodore Zeldin. 256 pp., $24.95.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10016

Europe Without America?
The Crisis in Atlantic Relations
JOHN PALMER. The postwar world of the Atlantic Alliance is breaking up, and in this provocative book, John Palmer examines the background of the crisis, arguing that it is no passing phase but a central feature of the West's crumbling economic and political order. He focuses on the options available and challenges Europe to think again. 217 pp., $22.50.

The Uneasy Alliance
Religion, Refugee Work, and U.S. Foreign Policy
J. BRUCE NICHOLS, *Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs.* "A fascinating and enlightening study of cooperation and conflict between government policy and religious missions in the field of refugee work....A better vehicle for forcing us to confront fundamental questions of national meaning could hardly be devised."—John H. Mansfield, Harvard Law School. 320 pp., $24.95.

Reaganomics
An Insider's Account of the Policies and the People
WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, *The Cato Institute.* A former member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers describes in fascinating detail the formulation of the Reagan economic program, the internal debates, the program's effects, and the probable future of Reaganomics. "A lucid analysis of Reagan economics by that rare creature, an objective insider."—Herbert Stein. 384 pp., $21.95.

Eloquence in an Electronic Age
The Transformation of Political Speechmaking
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, *University of Texas.* A perceptive and often disturbing account of how political speechmaking in America has evolved from fiery oratory to the homey one-liners of Ronald Reagan. 301 pp., illus., $24.95.

OXFORD ♦ UNIVERSITY ♦ PRESS

Princeton University Press

Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice

Larry M. Bartels

This innovative study blends sophisticated statistical analyses, campaign anecdotes, and penetrating political insight to produce a fascinating exploration of one of America's most controversial political institutions—the process by which our major parties nominate candidates for the presidency. Larry Bartels focuses on the nature and impact of "momentum" in the contemporary nominating system. In the course of his analysis, he addresses questions central to any understanding—or evaluation—of the modern nominating process.

Paper: $14.95 ISBN 0-691-02283-6 Cloth: $45.00 ISBN 0-691-07765-7

Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic

Samuel Merrill, III

Samuel Merrill addresses a significant area of applied social-choice theory—the evaluation of voting procedures designed to select a single winner from a field of three or more candidates. The author uses computer simulations based on models of voting behavior and reconstructions of elections to assess the likelihood that each multicandidate voting system meets political objectives.

Cloth: $29.50 ISBN 0-691-07770-3

When Parties Fail

Emerging Alternative Organizations

Edited by *Kay Lawson* and *Peter H. Merkl*

Throughout history parties have faltered and new groups have emerged, but rarely has this process been so accelerated, so widespread, and so conducive to dramatic political change as in our present era. Among the organizations discussed in this substantial new book are environmentalist groups, such as the West German and Swedish Greens, the Italian Radicals, and local protest groups in Japan, Switzerland, and the United States. Also examined are parties and movements in Denmark, Israel, Britain, Poland, Taiwan, Ghana, and France.

Paper: $19.95 ISBN 0-691-10242-2 Cloth: $75.00 ISBN 0-691-07758-4

CONGRATULATIONS TO RICHARD P. NATHAN, who has been presented with the 1987 Charles E. Merriam Award of the American Political Science Association. The Award is presented annually to the person whose published work and career represents a significant contribution to the art of government through the application of social science research.

Richard Nathan co-edited and contributed to *Reagan and the States,* which was recently published by Princeton University Press.

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR
Princeton University Press
41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • (609) 452-4900
ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

Ritual, Politics, and Power

David I. Kertzer

In the most comprehensive study of political ritual yet written, David I. Kertzer explains why ritual has always been and will continue to be an essential part of political life.

"An important work that makes a valuable contribution to the study of politics and of culture. Fascinating, amusing, and topical."
—Myron J. Aronoff.



"From Machiavelli, Venetian doges, and Jacobins to JFK's funeral and Gorbachev and Reagan's recent joustings for media attention, Kertzer brilliantly illuminates the symbolic aspects of low and high politics." —Joseph LaPalombara $22.50

Logic and Politics

Hegel's Philosophy of Right

Peter J. Steinberger

Steinberger examines Hegel's political philosophy in terms of the general methodological principle Hegel sets forth in the *Logic*, offering the first discussion that bridges the gap between these two areas of Hegelian thought.

"More clearly than has been done hitherto, [Steinberger] brings out the systematic linkages between Hegel's political philosophy and his logic." —Steven B. Smith $24.00

State Supreme Courts in State and Nation

G. Alan Tarr and Mary Cornelia Aldis Porter

"A significant contribution to the literature on state supreme courts, this book will be of considerable interest to students of the judicial process and of state politics."
—Lawrence Baum $28.50

War and the Changing Global System

William K. Domke

As the world has modernized and become more complicated, governments contemplating war have become subject to new political constraints. In this book William K. Domke investigates the potential constraints posed by domestic political structure, foreign-trading interests, and the commitment to international organization since 1815. Building on a foundation of information covering a long historical period, Domke greatly advances our understanding of why wars begin. $22.50

Understanding the Political Spirit

Philosophical Investigations from Socrates to Nietzsche

edited by Catherine H. Zuckert

In this book, ten prominent political scientists discuss the development of "spiritedness"—the force of the human spirit as the psychological source of political action—from Socrates, Homer, Plato, and Aristotle to Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Hegel, and Nietzsche.

"These essays, a happy mixture of breadth and integration, will appeal to scholars and students . . . in political science or political theory."
—Thomas L. Pangle $21.50

Now available in paperback

Forecasting Political Events

The Future of Hong Kong

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, David Newman, and Alvin Rabushka

The authors forecast Hong Kong's future by applying an innovative formal interest group theory of politics that both explains the process by which policy decisions will be made and predicts the specific resolution of concrete issues.

"Thorough and perceptive." —John Walden, *Asian Wall Street Journal* $12.95

Yale University Press
Dept. 749
92A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520

Harvard University Press

Leadership in the Modern Presidency

Fred I. Greenstein, Editor

"*Leadership in the Modern Presidency* offers a vivid account of the evolution of the presidency into the modern, highly complex, highly influential office we know today. It is highly recommended to anyone interested in understanding how our country is led, and by whom."

—*The Christian Science Monitor*

$29.95

The AIDS Bureaucracy

Sandra Panem

This sobering analysis of the first five years of the AIDS epidemic reveals how severely challenged are the traditional approaches of research and health-care-delivery institutions by the health emergency that now confronts us.

$22.50 cloth; $9.95 paper

Bifurcated Politics

Evolution and Reform in the National Party Convention

Byron E. Shafer

A Russell Sage Foundation Study

"A brilliant case-study of how purposive political action brings about unintended political and social consequences."

—Robert K. Merton,
Columbia University

$27.50

The Nonprofit Economy

Burton A. Weisbrod

Written in a clear, direct style, this book deals comprehensively with what nonprofits do, how well they do it, how they are financed, and how they interact with private enterprises and government.

$22.95

God Land

Reflections on Religion and Nationalism

Conor Cruise O'Brien

In his famously witty style, Conor Cruise O'Brien illuminates the confusion and conflation of religion and nationalism throughout history, and the enormous tension produced by interactions between the two.

The William E. Massey Sr. Lectures in the History of American Civilization

$15.95

The Conquest of the Microchip

Hans Queisser

This fascinating insider's view of the birth of the microelectronics industry provides a unique perspective on an era of new knowledge that has resulted not only in the restructuring of science, technology, and industry, but also in major rearrangements of economic and political power.

$24.95

The Film Factory

Russian and Soviet Cinema in Documents, 1896–1939

Edited and translated by Richard Taylor

Coedited and with an introduction by Ian Christie

This book looks at the early achievements of Soviet silent film as the product of an extraordinary ferment of polemic and experiment following the 1917 October Revolution.

Harvard Film Studies

$49.95

79 Garden St.
Cambridge, MA 02138

SENSIBLE READING FOR A COMPLEX WORLD

Making Sense of Europe
Christopher Tugendhat

“A brilliantly informative book that includes both an analysis of what exists and a set of practical guidelines for further progress.”—Fritz Stern, *Foreign Affairs*

“A major treatise about the whole European condition....”—*The Observer*

240 pp., $25.00

The Japanese Way of Politics
Gerald L. Curtis

“It is rare to find a book that analyzes the changes that have occurred over the past thirty years in the Liberal Democratic Party's behavior and organization as skillfully as Professor Curtis' does....A major contribution internationally to the academic world and to the worlds of business and politics.”—Yasuhiro Nakasone

Studies of the East Asian Institute

301 pp., $30.00

Making History
The American Left and the American Mind

Richard Flacks

“I was privileged to make history with Dick Flacks in the '60s: his book is sure to become the standard academic work on the American Left in the twentieth century.”—Tom Hayden

376 pp., $35.00

New in the series

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL CHANGE
John Gerard Ruggie, General Editor

Sanctity Versus Sovereignty
The United States and the Nationalization of Natural Resource Investments

Kenneth A. Rodman

Traces how American government and corporate officials have resisted—and adapted to—third world economic nationalism.

448 pp., tables, $45.00

Winner of the Edwin W. Rickert Award

Managing International Markets
Developing Countries and the Commodity Trade Regime

Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher

An analysis of one of the most important issues in North-South negotiations in recent decades: the intergovernmental regulation of commodity markets.

432 pp., tables, $40.00

Mechanization and Maize
Agriculture and the Politics of Technology Transfer in East Africa

Constance G. Anthony

In this lucid analysis of the problem of third world hunger, Constance Anthony argues that interaction between political development and the mobilization of technical resources is necessary for any solution.

178 pp., $25.00

Inside Terrorist Organizations
Edited by David C. Rapoport

This powerful study infiltrates the workings of the groups themselves, to uncover rarely discussed aspects of terrorism. The articles consider the relevance of religious culture in shaping group motivations, conflicts over purposes, strategies and division of labor and the strife between terrorists, sponsors, and supporters.

260 pp., $14.50 pa, $35.00 cl

Pax Atomica
The Nuclear Defense Debate in West Germany During the Adenauer Era

Marc Cioc

“A compelling account....This book is essential reading for both historians of the Cold War and for contemporary policymakers.”
—Thomas Schwartz, Harvard University

256 pp., illus., $27.50

PINTER PUBLISHERS
distributed in the U.S. and Canada

Vietnam
Melanie Beresford

Unique among books on Vietnam for its examination of the impact of the Reunification on the structures of party and government, as well as on policy debates.

Marxist Regimes Series

220 pp., $12.50 pa, $35.00 cl

Italian Politics
A Review
Volume II

Edited by Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti

Collecting the latest facts and figures, the authors present this volume to keep scholars and students abreast of political developments. A large community of scholars from Europe and North America brings its expertise to the changing field of Italian politics.

220 pp., $30.00

- NOW IN PAPERBACK -

The Morality of Terrorism
Religious and Secular Justifications

Edited by David C. Rapoport and Jonah Alexander

“A very interesting series of contributions. The book will be a welcome addition to any course on terrorism.”
—*The American Political Science Review*

A Morningside Book

377 pp., $14.50s, paper

To order, send check or money order, including $3.00 for postage and handling, to:

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Dept. JN, 136 South Broadway
Irvington, NY 10533

THE MISUNDERSTOOD MIRACLE

Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan

By DAVID FRIEDMAN. Japan's industry has succeeded, Friedman claims, because of the expansion of small manufacturers, constant product innovation, and the ability of specialty firms to meet the needs of a changing market. *Cornell Studies in Political Economy.* $12.95 paper; $39.95 cloth

STATE AND FAMILY IN SINGAPORE

Restructuring an Industrial Society

By JANET W. SALAFF. In the last two decades, the government of Singapore transformed the new republic from a low-tech to a high-tech society. Salaff interviewed one hundred young families from all social classes to learn how this restructuring has changed family life. *The Anthropology of Contemporary Issues.* 17 b&w photographs. $37.50

COLLAPSE OF AN INDUSTRY

Nuclear Power and the Contradictions of U.S. Policy

By JOHN L. CAMPBELL. The commercial nuclear power industry was flourishing in the United States in the early 1970s; fifteen years later, it had collapsed. Campbell addresses controversies whose implications go beyond the questions surrounding nuclear power itself. *Cornell Studies in Political Economy.* $11.95 paper; $32.50 cloth

SOVIET INDUSTRY FROM STALIN TO GORBACHEV

Studies in Management and Innovation

By JOSEPH S. BERLINER. This book provides the best available account of the structural problems that have hampered Soviet economic development since the Stalin revolution—problems that are today the focus of intense debate among Soviet leaders and planners. *Studies in Soviet History and Society.* $34.50

ISRAEL AND CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970

By JONATHAN SHIMSHONI. Providing a much-needed history of Israel's border warfare during specific periods of the 1950s and 1960s, this work examines Israeli military strategy in light of current theories of conventional deterrence. *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.* $32.50

FIGHTING TO A FINISH

The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945

By LEON V. SIGAL. Sigal offers new answers to the troubling questions surrounding the protracted and costly termination of the war in the Pacific, showing how domestic politics in both countries affected the outcome. *Cornell Studies in Security Affairs.* $39.95

THE NEAREST COAST OF DARKNESS

A Vindication of the Politics of Virtues

By J. BUDZISZEWSKI. In sharp disagreement with the neutralist, relativist, and even nihilist philosophical and ethical perspectives that prevail in our society, J. Budziszewski here argues for the "politics of virtues"—the classical view that the characters of the citizens should be the first concern of the statesperson. $24.95

SEARCHING FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Labor Migration and Employment in Mexico

By MERILEE S. GRINDLE. Focusing on Mexico, Grindle examines how rural development strategies can help provide more secure livelihoods for the many people who can no longer support themselves and their families by working in their local communities. *Food Systems and Agrarian Change.* $24.95

ETHNICITY, PLURALISM, AND THE STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Edited by MILTON J. ESMAN and ITAMAR RABINOVICH. A timely discussion of the role ethnicity plays in contemporary Middle Eastern affairs, this book is the first systematic exploration of this important dimension in the social life, statecraft, politics, and international relations of the region. $12.95 paper; $35.00 cloth

THE DECLINE OF AUTHORITY

Public Economic Policy and Political Development in New York State, 1800-1860

By L. RAY GUNN. Gunn examines the transformation of New York State government between 1800 and 1860, a period during which governmental authority declined as state governments relinquished their role in the allocation of resources to the private sector. $29.95

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS
124 Roberts Place, Ithaca NY 14850

The Best in Political Science
from
THE FREE PRESS


MIDDLE AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM
The Future of Liberal Democracy
HERBERT J. GANS

MIDDLE AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM
The Future of Liberal Democracy
Herbert J. Gans

An inquiry into the deeply-rooted individualistic values of American working and lower middle class people which tend to widen the gulf between them and the increasingly complicated centralized institutions of Big Government and Big Business. Perceiving a serious threat to participatory democratic processes, Gans calls for a new understanding between Liberal and Middle America and offers innovative measures to ensure the representation of all Americans in our national community.

“Indispensable for anyone who wants to understand why most Americans grumble about the status quo yet shrug off radical changes. But make no mistake: in the form of modest proposals, Herbert Gans has given us a sensible way of thinking about a political agenda that would be both visionary and practical. This book should be read by anyone interested in reconstructing a politics more representative, more participatory—more fully liberal in the best sense.”
—Todd Gitlin, author of *The Sixties*
1988 224 Pages ISBN: 0-02-911251-6 $19.95

THE MORAL DIMENSION
Toward A New Economics
Amitai Etzioni

Blending elements of psychology, philosophy, and sociology with economics, renowned scholar Etzioni presents a bold new vision of economics—which proposes that broader moral, social and political concerns modify economic behavior and shape individual decision-making. In establishing the necessity of moral and social considerations in economic behavior, he provides a provocative new framework for a more comprehensive, ethical, and realistic economics.
September 1988 352 Pages
ISBN: 0-02-909900-5 $24.95



A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE
Bernhard Goetz and the Law on Trial
George P. Fletcher

“Professor Fletcher’s fascinating study of one of the century’s most captivating cases demonstrates how the Goetz litigation captured the law’s never ending quest to civilize itself, to strike a proper balance between self-help and vigilantism, between justice and emotion, and the law as rules and the jury as part of a process for ameliorating these rules.”
—Alan M. Dershowitz, *Harvard Law School*
1988 288 Pages ISBN: 0-02-910311-8 $19.95

FALLING FROM GRACE
The Experience of Downward Mobility in the American Middle Class
Katherine S. Newman

A penetrating analysis of the American Dream in reverse. With one in five American workers forced down the mobility ladder, earning less, and suffering a severe loss of status and self-respect, Newman explores the personal and social realities beneath America’s current economic vulnerability at home and abroad.

“Katherine Newman’s splendid book shows us our culture when its promises fail. She reminds us of millions of people we would rather forget and, even more importantly, she calls us to reexamine our deepest beliefs. Hers is an indispensable voice in the current American cultural conversation.”—Robert M. Bellah, University of California—Berkeley, co-author of *Habits of the Heart*
July 1988 304 Pages
ISBN: 0-02-923121-3 $22.95


OVER 350,000 COPIES SOLD
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIES OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL POLITICS
NELSON W. POLSBY
AARON WILDAVSKY

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Contemporary Strategies of American Electoral Politics
Seventh Edition

Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky

Now in its seventh quadrennial edition, this is the essential guide to understanding how America chooses its president–from pre-primary maneuvering to election day itself. A non partisan, unsentimental history of how the presidential campaign has evolved in our time, this volume is also a contemporary analysis of how any candidate's strategy must take into account the underlying realities of the American social and political environment that have governed the election process during the past two decades.

“Essential reading for anyone who wants to grasp what goes on in a presidential campaign.” –R. W. Apple, Jr., *The New York Times*

1988 416 Pages
ISBN: 0-02-925262-8
$12.95 paper


POLITICAL PASSAGES
Journeys of Change Through Two Decades, 1968-1988
John H. Bunzel, Editor
Martha Bayles · John H. Bunzel
Peter Collier · Joseph Epstein
James Finn · Jeffrey Herf
David Horowitz · Carol Iannone
Julius Lester · Michael Novak
Ronald Radosh · Richard Rodriguez
Introductory essay by Edward Shils

POLITICAL PASSAGES
Journeys of Change Through Two Decades, 1968-1988

John H. Bunzel, Editor

1968. The season of national discontent: student uprisings, assassinations, black power, Richard Nixon, Vietnam. The twelve writers included in this unusual volume were among those either responsible for or sympathetic to the social and political upheavals which seemed about to transform American society: they were campus activists, war resisters, militant feminists, and civil rights marchers. Twenty years later they are all dramatically changed, and in the highly provocative and fiercely critical autobiographical accounts they have written here, authors such as Julius Lester, Joseph Epstein, Ronald Radosh, Peter Collier and David Horowitz tell of their fascinating personal journeys and the views they hold today.

1988 320 Pages ISBN: 0-02-904921-0 $21.95


Thomas H. Kean
GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY
The Politics of Inclusion

THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION

Thomas H. Kean

One of the GOP's brightest young politicians, New Jersey's popular governor Tom Kean, here talks about himself; his deep commitment to the values at the core of his “politics of inclusion” that won him an astonishing 70 percent of his state's racially and ethnically diverse voters; and his vision of the future for both the Republican party and the nation.

“Describes how conviction and sensitivity brought Tom Kean from defeated candidate to triumphant governor. It offers fascinating insights into ‘the man’ as well as ‘the governor,’ with lessons for both Democrats and Republicans.” –Bill Bradley, U.S. Senator from New Jersey

1988 256 Pages
ISBN: 0-02-918341-3
$17.95


WHILE OTHERS BUILD
A COMMONSENSE APPROACH TO THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE
ANGELO CODEVILLA

WHILE OTHERS BUILD
The Common Sense Approach to the Strategic Defense Initiative

Angelo Codevilla

This dramatic attack on the Reagan Administration's approach to the Strategic Defense Initiative by an important–and politically conservative–expert in strategic weaponry exposes the crisis in America's military capabilities. Codevilla argues that the SDI program now in place dangerously postpones the hard choices about how to best defend ourselves today against Soviet missile superiority–and offers the chilling theory that the Soviets actually find the present SDI effort to their benefit. Codevilla pulls no punches as he points to existing American systems that can be modified and developed to provide an effective anti-missile defense *right now.*

1988 274 Pages
ISBN: 0-02-905671-3 $22.50

For VISA or MasterCard orders, call toll-free 1-800-323-7445
between the hours of 9am and 5:30pm Eastern Time.

Fp THE FREE PRESS
A Division of Macmillan, Inc.
866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022

Chatham House

Publishers, Inc.

Box One, Chatham, New Jersey 07928 Telephone: (201) 635-2059

THE REAGAN LEGACY: Promise and Performance

Edited by Charles O. Jones, ***University of Wisconsin-Madison***

The problem of managing the Reagan Presidency, therefore, can be stated as follows: How can organizational structures, systems, and strategies be developed for a committed Presidency and a detached President? **Bert A. Rockman**

From the outset, the Reagan administration pursued a campaign to maximize presidential control over the federal bureaucracy that was more *self-conscious* in design and execution, and more *comprehensive* in scope, than that of any other administration in the modern era. **Peter Benda and Charles Levine**

For Reagan it is also a matter of changing how people *think* about the role of government and about the mission of the United States in the world. Public opinion at this deeper level is known as a 'public philosophy,' and shaping a new philosophy has been one of Reagan's fundamental goals. **James Ceaser**

The prospects for fulfillment of the realignment that seems so near depend primarily on presidential leadership. Ronald Reagan has carried his party up to the brink of realignment. The 22nd Amendment to the Constitution, if not his age, prevents him from taking the GOP further. **Paul Allen Beck**

Reagan indubitably had a major, lasting impact on the federal judiciary, both in terms of his unrivaled number of appointments and in reinvigorating judical conservatism on the bench. Although encountering a few setbacks, on balance Reagan's judges reflect the consensus of the dominant national political coalition on the role of the federal courts in American politics. **David M. O'Brien**

Certainly the recent foreign policy record has not been one of 'Reagan *uber alles*.' Like previous Presidents, this one has learned that chief executives simply *do not* and *cannot* dictate foreign policy the way that *some* constitutional interpreters suggest they should. **I.M. Destler**

For all the President's political popularity, he was unable to regain the legislative initiative he had in 1981. The domestic policy debate became a stalemate beween a President determined to retain the victories he had achieved and a Congress determined to keep him from advancing further. **Paul E. Peterson and Mark Rom**

European leaders' puzzlement arose out of the fact that, even if they did not take Reagan seriously, the American people certainly did; and, more important, it was clear that Reagan's two terms in the White House could not, in any reasonable way, be accounted a failure. **Anthony King and David Sanders**

President Reagan is providing about as much direction as the existing American antileadership system can support. For what he does not attempt, as well as for what he does, President Reagan is the appropriate leader for his time. **Aaron Wildavsky**

The next President and Congress cannot easily escape the Reagan legacy. They may be able to manage it better without him, however. **Charles O. Jones**

0-934540-70-5 $14.95 *paper* 0-934540-71-3 $25.00 *cloth*

For further information about these and forthcoming titles, please contact Edward Artinian, publisher, CHATHAM HOUSE PUBLISHERS, Box One, Chatham, N.J. 07928. Telephone: (201) 635-2059.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

The *American Political Science Review* aims to publish scholarly research and writing of exceptional merit. Contributions must demonstrate the highest standards of excellence in conceptualization, exposition, methodology, and craftsmanship. Because the *Review* reaches a diverse audience of scholars and practitioners, contributors must demonstrate how their analysis or exposition illuminates a significant research problem, or answers an important research question, of general interest in political science.

Article Manuscripts

Article manuscripts should be submitted to the Managing Editor, Professor Samuel C. Patterson, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 112 Derby Hall, Columbus, Ohio 43210-1373. Four copies must be submitted, and none can be returned. Manuscripts must be typed double-spaced, on only one side of the paper. The author's name and affiliation should not appear on the copies submitted, but only on a separate covering sheet. An abstract of no more than 150 words must be sent with the manuscript. In general, the *Review* considers manuscripts of up to 30 pages in length. Moreover, the *Review* does not consider manuscripts submitted to other publications.

Manuscripts should be prepared following the guidelines of the *APSA Style Manual*, a publication of the American Political Science Association's Committee on Publications. It is available from the Managing Editor's office. Otherwise, authors should follow the *Chicago Style Manual* and the example of recent issues of the *Review*. Graphs and tables should be presented on separate pages, with their location in the manuscript indicated, e.g., the notification "Table 1 about here," at the proper places.

Book Reviews

Books intended for review and all book review correspondence should be sent to the Book Review Editor, Professor Helen M. Ingram, *American Political Science Review*, Department of Political Science, University of Arizona, Social Sciences 315, Tucson, Arizona 85721.

Other Correspondence

Information, including news and notes, for the Association's news journal *PS*, should be sent to Dr. Robert J-P. Hauck, Editor, American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Advertising, reprint, and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Domestic claims for nonreceipt of issues must be made within four months of the month of publication; overseas claims, eight months. Advertising information and rates are available from Ann V. Peyser, Advertising Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Indexing

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Current issues are indexed by *International Political Science Abstracts*, *United States Political Science Documents*, and *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Microfilm of the *Review*, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review*, Volumes 1–62, 1906–1968, also may be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences*. Book Reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index*.

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Ideological Change in the British Conservative Party
Ivor Crewe & Donald D. Searing 361

Explaining Senate Election Outcomes
Alan I. Abramowitz 385

Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey Banks 405

Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War
Paul K. Huth 423

Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis
James E. Alt, Randall L. Calvert & Brian D. Humes 445

Income Distribution in the United States
Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr. & Christopher Dennis 467

Rulers and the Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the
Onset of Mass Political Violence
Manus I. Midlarsky 491

Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the
McCarthy Red Scare
James L. Gibson 511

Churches as Political Communities
Kenneth D. Wald, Dennis E. Owen & Samuel S. Hill, Jr. 531

Liberation Theology: The Recovery of Biblical Radicalism
H. Mark Roelofs 549

Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective
Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld 567

CONTROVERSIES

Rationalism or Revelation?
Robert Grafstein & Darrell Dobbs 579

Political Culture and Political Preferences
David D. Laitin & Aaron Wildavsky 589

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Theory 605
American Politics 626
Comparative Politics 651
International Relations 674
Political Economy 689